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Abstract
The central focus here is on variance in outcomes in Korea’s Free Trade 
Agreement negotiations that occurred in response to domestic pressures. The literature 
on trade policy has focused in large part on the United States; there has been relatively 
little work done on developing countries, such as Korea, and what studies are available 
regarding Korea tend to focus on systemic interpretations, with few exceptions. I 
attempt to address this imbalance by examining both statist and societal approaches 
with a view to understanding the variances in trade policy outcomes. This variance 
cannot be explained using systemic approaches alone; it suggests an important role 
played by domestic social actors. Although systemic and statist interpretations can help 
us in understanding large parts of how and why Korean FTAs evolve as they do, on 
their own these approaches fall short in providing a comprehensive explanation for the 
variance in outcomes, which are the result of a combination of domestic stakeholder’s 
motivations and modes of expressing policy preferences. I test this argument using 
qualitative methods, consisting of interviews with important individuals, across three 
case studies; the Korea-Chile, Korea-Japan and Korea-US FTAs.
The key findings of this thesis are that the variance that occurs reflects the role 
that domestic social actors play in Korea FTA policy outcomes. Furthermore, these 
domestic social actors utilise Organisational Power (OP) to act through specific 
channels of influence: Public Influence (PI), ability to Influence Public Institutions (IPI) 
and Proximity to Policy makers and Politicians (PPPM)), and that the ability to 
influence policy outcome is linked to these actors’ ability to access these channels 
effectively. During the Korea-Chile FTA, the agricultural sector successfully persuaded 
the government to exclude three specific items from the final agreement, despite 
immense pressure from Chile not to do so. The Korea-Japan FTA ground to a halt 
during negotiations due to opposition from the FKI and the fact that the only supporting 
institution was the MOFAT. Finally, the Korea-US FTA, although it has not reached 
ratification as of writing, has already been successfully altered by the KoA and 
affiliated groups. Each of these groups had access to either multiple channels of 
influence (PI, PPPM and IPI) or had dominance in one (e.g. Korea-Japan where the FKI 
had dominance in IPI). Lack of access to these channels of access would seem to 
preclude an ability to influence FTA policy outcomes.
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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to decipher to what extent and how South Korea’s 
domestic interest groups influence international trade agreements. This will be done 
through a study of Korea’s policies on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
The initial stages of Korea's domestic interest groups' (or domestic stakeholders) 
relationship with international trade policy can be tied to the demonstrations against the 
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Uruguay Round (UR) of negotiations. 
The opening of the rice market in the UR1 negotiations of 1993 precipitated one of the 
most critical issues for South Korea (hereafter, Korea) in terms of its economy, politics, 
society and culture (Kim 1994: 69). During the course of the negotiations, many 
Koreans expressed vehement opposition to the opening of the rice market through 
nationwide demonstrations (Kim 2006b; Kim 1996; Sim 1993). Farmers and civic 
groups held rallies, issued statements and sent representatives to Geneva2. Even the 
Korean ambassador to Geneva, Hu Se-ung, once claimed that ‘Rice is life to Koreans,’ 
when the issue was raised at a meeting of the GATT. Countering this however, the 
Chairman of the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), Choi Chong-hyun, suggested 
that the government should proceed to open the Korean rice market on the basis of the 
low economic value of rice in Korea3. Despite this formidable economic argument, the 
coalitions opposed to concessions on rice in the negotiations presented difficulties for 
the government to implement any decision on the issue. As a result, Korea received 
more concessions on rice than any other country participating in the UR negotiations, 
including Japan4.
Similarly, during the 2003 World Trade Organisation (WTO) conference held in 
the Mexican resort of Cancun, when ministers from 146 countries hoped to break a two- 
year deadlock in trade liberalisation talks, a Korean citizen, Lee Kyang-hae -  who 
headed Korea’s Federation of Farmers and Fishermen -  killed himself in protest against
The UR was the most complicated set o f  the GATT negotiations because it widened the agenda to include 
not only trade in goods but also trade in services, intellectual property, and trade-related investment measures and it 
began the process o f applying global trade rules to sensitive areas such as agriculture and textiles (Cohn 2002: 235).
During this negotiation period, some visits by National Assembly (NA) members and the farmers’ 
representatives’ visits to Geneva -  plus their demonstration activities there — were also helpful in explaining the 
Korean agricultural sector’s difficulties.
Korean agriculture experienced considerable structural changes as a consequence o f economic 
development and policy reform in the process o f  trade liberalisation. In the early 1960’s, agricultural shares o f  Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and total employment accounted for almost 50 and 60 percent respectively. It took only 
around four decades for these shares to fall to the current levels o f  4.5 and 8 percent.
Japan was given a six year grace period before tariffication and allowed foreign rice imports amounting 
to 4 to 8 percent o f  its domestic consumption to be imported for six years; on the other hand, Korea was given a ten- 
year grace period and allowed 1 percent to 4 percent o f its domestic consumption to be imported for ten years.
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the WTO. His action -  besides being one of the most tragic and poignant individual 
statements in the global trade debate — was iconic for domestic actors protesting against 
global economic liberalisation. Furthermore, it was symbolic of the sort of political 
backlash that could occur when forces threaten — or appear to threaten — vested 
economic interests or traditional social practices and values. When people find the 
social or distributional consequences of market forces not to their liking, they will often 
attempt to use the political process to regulate or negate those forces. FTA policy, itself 
a form of international trade policy, is similarly susceptible to these societal 
undercurrents. In other words, competition between domestic interest groups over FTA 
policy can precipitate outcomes that will affect international trade and, therefore, 
international relations. The effects of domestic interests on FTA policies can ultimately 
determine outcomes even in an internationally-driven process.
The WTO was the most significant advance in multilateral trade since the 
establishment of the GATT in 1947 and transformed the nature of global ‘trade’ 
agreements (Wallach and Woodall 2004: 1). Since its formal establishment in 1995, as a 
result of the conclusion of the UR multilateral trade negotiations, the WTO evolved 
beyond being the only international body to administer the rules of trading among its 
members. The GATT/WTO facilitated a substantial increase in trade among their 
members. Other embedded agreements had similarly positive effects (Goldstein et al, 
2007: 37). However, most WTO members in developing countries believe the agenda 
favours the interests of more powerful and developed countries, as it is inherently based 
upon a global trade regime that discriminates against their interests (Khor 2004: 158- 
188). Increasingly, the overwhelming majority of global civil society opposes this 
WTO-led liberalisation and instead seeks transformative changes in the current rules of 
the global economy (Solon et al., 2004: 262).
While multilateralism persists as a driving force for international trade, WTO 
members are concurrently keeping themselves busy seeking other economic platforms 
through which to pursue liberalisation, for example through FT As, as demonstrated in 
Table 1.1. These maybe regional or cross-regional trade links5 (See Figure 1.1). It 
comes as no surprise then that we are witnessing an increasing trend whereby the
Regionalism, which is used primarily in reference to interactions among states in a particular geographic 
area, where there is a certain degree of economic and often organisational cohesiveness. Regionalism remains a 
difficult term to define due to its connotation with geographical proximity and also a sense of cultural, economic, 
political or organisational cohesiveness (Cohn 2002: 275-276).
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competitive liberalisation of trade exerts itself through the WTO, as well as increasingly 
via FT As (Ju2003:2).
Korea has traditionally been a staunch supporter of multilateralism in 
international trade and was one of the original members of the WTO when it replaced 
the GATT in 1995. Korea has developed economically since joining GATT in 1967 by 
using an export promoting strategy6. Generally, this strategy was considered to be 
successful and largely beneficial in a multilateral trading environment7. It is therefore 
understandable that the Korean government supported GATT and the WTO system.
Only in 1998, however, did a break with the past occur when Korea8 embarked upon an 
historic course of action by advancing the possibility of negotiating a series of bilateral, 
sub-regional, and even cross-regional trade agreements (Choi 2004c: 113).
The Asian financial crisis9 catalysed a re-examination of Korea’s traditional 
foreign economic strategy because the crisis revealed that the Korean economy -  
shielded from foreign competition -  could not cope well with aspects of the process of 
globalisation. Consequently, Korea embarked on an ambitious program of economic 
liberalisation and deregulation. A critical element of this program was overhauling the 
regimes for foreign trade and investment, including exploring FTAs with Korea’s trade 
partners (Kim 2004a; Lee 2003 a). In taking this initiative, the Korean government 
initially took a rather cautious approach (Choi 2004d: 87; Kim 2002d. 294), due to the 
fact that Korea had no previous experience in FT A negotiations. Here, we see how the 
changing nature of world trade helped motivate Korea in pursuing its first FT A (Cheong 
2006; 2005a: 30-31). Korea's other motivation was the expectation of a boom in 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in response to the improved protection of overseas 
investors’ interests that FTAs would provide. FTAs have since emerged as a critical
From the end o f the Korean War to the early 1960s, President Rhee Syng-man’s main economic growth 
strategy (1948-1961) was an import substitution policy. However, the primary structure o f Korea's current trade 
policy originated from the Park Jung-hee’s Government. Park’s government, which held the reins o f  power through 
the 1961 coup, pursued an export-driven economic growth strategy under stringent leadership.
There are four important GATT articles which outline special treatments to developing and less- 
developed countries; first, GATT article, XXVIII (b) the needs o f less-developed countries for a more flexible use o f  
tariff protection to assist their economic development and the special needs o f these countries to maintain tariffs for 
revenue purposes; which is more focused on helping developing countries' import policies. Articles XXXVI,
XXXVII and XXXVIII are intended to permit measures that promote exports o f  developing countries. There is also 
an ‘Enabling Clause’ based on decisions around differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller 
participation in developing the Generalised System o f  Preferences (GSP), which in particular, helped Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
This change occurred soon after Japan adopted a similar strategy.
Prior to the crisis, regionalism in East Asia was noted for its relative lack o f formal institutions; many 
analysts stressed the role o f private businesses in fostering a regional economy (Peng 2002: 425); however, Post­
crisis regionalism is being led by the state and encompasses both monetary and trade dimensions (Bowles 2002: 244).
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policy tool, both as a way to create economic opportunities for Korea and as a way of 
simultaneously rewarding allies such as the US, in tangible terms, cementing new 
economic, political and military alliances. Viewed in this light, the rise of the FTA has 
unquestionably been one of the most important foreign economic policy developments 
in Korea. Furthermore, the Korean government promoted the image of an open trading 
country -  one of the long-term aims of the Korean government -  backed by the 
establishment of FTAs.
The Roh Moo-hyun administration (in 2003) set about establishing the rule of 
free and fair markets as the primary goal of national economic policy. In tandem to 
setting such a goal was the realisation that only sustained economic reform would allow 
Korea to enter the ranks of developed economies. As an integral part of this reform and 
liberalisation policy, the Korean government established an “FTA roadmap' in 
September 2003. The roadmap targets the formation of an extensive network of FTAs 
with major economies and emerging markets. In order to accelerate the formation of 
such a network, the road map calls for active, multi-front FTA initiatives with several 
partners in unison. Therefore, the government has been pursuing FTA talks with many 
trading partners simultaneously, believing it is “more desirable’ to seek FTAs in this 
way rather than one at a time. This explains why the Korean government laid down the 
ambitious target of pursuing FTAs with at least 15 countries by 2007.
As of July 2009, the Korean Government has sealed FTA deals with Chile 
(2004), Singapore (2006), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA 2006) and Asia 
(Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)10 2006 and 2009). The 
government signed the Korea-US FTA in 2007, and agreements with India and the EU 
in 2009. There are also negotiations underway with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Peru and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). There are also feasibility studies underway 
with several countries such as Japan, China, Russia and Turkey* 11.
Furthermore, a look at the geographical distribution of Korea’s FTA partners 
shows that Korea’s FTA initiative is not overridingly driven by geo-political 
considerations. The three FTAs already concluded are with countries in South America 
(Chile), Asia (Singapore) and Europe (EFTA). The FTA negotiations underway cover
In the FTA with the ASEAN, the modalities for liberalisation o f  trade in goods were concluded in 2006 
and liberalisation o f  services and investment in 2009.
11 http://www.fta.go.kr/user/index.asp (as o f 05-08-2009).
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Central America (Mexico). The joint studies for FTAs are with countries in South 
America (Mercosur) and Asia (China). For some partners, political considerations did 
come into play. But in general, Korea’s FTA initiative is driven by practical economic 
considerations12, taking into account such factors as the current status of bilateral 
economic relations, growth potential, the level of economic development of candidate 
countries and the expected overall impact of the FTA on domestic industry and interests.
The global surge in FTA agreements has continued unabated since the early 
1990s (See table 1.1). So much so is this the case that FTAs are now a seemingly 
irreversible feature of today’s multilateral trading system. Compared to previous 
decades, the number of FTAs has steadily increased over the last ten years. As of July 
2005, only one WTO member, Mongolia, was not party to a regional trade agreement. 
Indeed, as the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, have evolved, a myriad of FTAs 
have been concluded by WTO members. By 2010, it is estimated that more than 400 
such agreements will be active (See Figure 1.1).
Table 1.1: World total FTA status (As of 18 July 2008)
NOTIFICATIONS OF RTAs IN FORCE TO GATT/WTO
A c c ess io n s New RTAs Total
GATT Art. XXIV (FTA) 2 115 117
G A TT  A rt. X X IV  (C U ) 6 7 13
E nab ling  C lause 1 25 26
G A TS  A r t  V 3 52 55
Total 12 199 211
* Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm
Interview conducted with Cho Je-hong, Managing Director of the Department of FTA Trade Policy- 
Making, MOFAT, Seoul, October 29th, 2005; Interview conducted with Son Chan-hyun, a senior researcher at 
Korea's Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). Seoul, October 31st, October 2005.
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the world, 1948-2009
Notfied RTAs (jgoods, sermces & accessions) 
Cumulative RTAnodiIcations Cum ulate active RT/te
* Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm
This enthusiasm for FTA formation has redefined the world trade landscape and 
represents both a fundamental challenge and a unique opportunity for the WTO. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that aside from a debate on whether FT As will be 
"building’ or ‘stumbling* blocks to greater multilateral liberalisation (Lee and Park 
2005; Adams et al., 2003; Krueger 1999; Lahiri 1998; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1999, 
1996; Lawrence 1996, 1994; Bhagwati 1993), considerable interest has also been vested 
in weighing up the factors that induce either ‘trade creation or diversion13.’
While these debates continue without being resolved, an important question that 
remains for us to ask is; what theories explain the underlying factors that cause 
countries to sign FT As? A short answer might be; either exogenous or endogenous 
explanations.
Many studies have attempted to analyse the conditions influencing whether 
states choose multilateral or bilateral strategies. There is considerable evidence that the 
creation of FTAs is guided by strategic interaction (Mansfield 1998; Fernandez and 
Portes 1998; Baldwin 1997; Pomfret 1997; Yarbrough and Yarbrough: 1992). There are 
three mainstream perspectives of the causes of FTAs: frustration with the WTO
The conceptualisation o f  trade creation and diversion was first looked at in detail by Viner’s (1950) study 
o f ‘the custom union issue.' He distinguished between trade creation, whereby countries lowering their tariffs shifted 
away from a reliance on high-cost domestic industry, to imports from the lower cost partner countries; and trade 
diversion, where low cost production in the rest o f  the world is displaced by higher cost production in the partner 
country. For discussion o f  trade creation and diversion, see Krueger’s (1999) analysis of'trade creation and trade 
diversion under North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).’
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impasse14, the domino theory and the bandwagon -  or contagion -  effect15. These 
explanations are all notably related to exogenous factors. While endogenous factors 
have been somewhat underestimated, Ravenhill (2008: 130), Jiang (2008: 187-189), 
Yoshimatsu (2005) and Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003: 858) argue that domestic 
conditions are an important influence on a state's decision to enter FTAs. It was found 
that democracies are more likely to join such agreements than autocracies, economically 
smaller states are generally more likely to do so than their larger counterparts, and 
economic downturns tend to promote FT A formation. Another important underlying 
dynamic for pursuing FTAs, drawn from an endogenous perspective, is that trade 
liberalisation -  such as FTA policy -  creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ who will either 
support or oppose FTAs, depending on how their interests are likely to be affected. For 
example, companies located in non-member countries find that FTAs place them at a 
competitive disadvantage. This provides an incentive to lobby their governments into 
signing an FTA (for example the KEIDAREN’s role in persuading the Japanese 
government to negotiate a Japan-Mexico FTA (Yoshimatsu: 2005)), where such 
possibilities exist. These situations demonstrate that domestic factors can be as 
persuasive as exogenous factors in FTA policy debates.
These findings highlight the obvious, but importantly, they point out that FTAs 
can be influenced by various factors. Even though no single theoretical approach or 
explanation will suffice to fully explain their proliferation (Mansfield and Reinhardt 
2003: 858), the one accord throughout this is the popularity that FTAs will most likely 
continue to enjoy. Korea is no exception to this consensus.
Since the Seattle (1999), Doha (2001) and Cancun (2003) ministerial meetings have been in impasse, the 
Hong Kong Declaration, the outcome o f the WTO’s 2005 ministerial meeting, only managed to provide avenues on 
how to surmount obstacles that have blocked progress in agriculture, manufacturing, and services since the Doha 
Round began in late 2001. There were no real outcomes by way o f  agreements. However, due to the collapse o f  the 
WTO mini-ministerial on July 30th, 2008, recriminations are again flying thick. The US is blaming India and China, 
particularly India, for adopting a rigid stance on Special Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM) while the developing 
countries are accusing the US o f  refusing to budge from its stance on agricultural subsidies, SSM, special products 
and Nama, among others.
The domino theory introduced by Baldwin (1993) highlights idiosyncratic incidents where FTAs 
triggered a multiplier effect that knocked down bilateral import barriers like a row of dominos. In particular, the 
announcement o f  the US-Mexico FTA created powerful forces for inclusion that led to North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) (Baldwin 1997: 877-884). Bandwagoning or contagion effects exist where the new interest in 
FTA was primarily a defensive response to development elsewhere.
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Research Questions
There is little doubt that an important motivation in Korea's adoption of an FTA 
policy framework was the changing nature of world trade, but what about domestic 
factors? To put it another way, how do societal factors influence these policy decisions?
This thesis explores how domestic actors may have affected the outcome of 
FTA negotiations. It recognises that FTA negotiations are essentially two-level games: 
governments are negotiating simultaneously with a foreign partner and with various 
domestic interests. Accordingly, the actual outcome of negotiations may be 
substantially determined by the foreign partner- although this will clearly vary 
according to the specific bargaining assets and skills the partner brings to the table. The 
primary focus here, however, is not on the bargaining between the Korean government 
and foreign partners but on the domestic politics of FTA negotiation in Korea.
If one looks across the spectrum of Korean FT As, notable differences become 
apparent between the agreements. If one compares the Korea-EFTA FTA, the Korea- 
ASEAN FTA and the Korea-Singapore FTA with the three cases examined in detail in 
this thesis (Chile, Japan and US FTAs), specific differences are apparent.
First, while some FTAs are concluded within the expected timeframe, others 
have far exceeded these timeframes. These differences in outcomes have occurred 
despite the negotiations taking place within the same international and domestic 
political contexts. What explains these differences?
While the development of FTAs with Singapore, ASEAN and the EFT A were 
relatively straightforward -  within the expected timeframes of the Korean government -  
FTA negotiations with other countries have presented sometimes insurmountable 
difficulties. Some of these negotiations have evoked a serious and ongoing FTA 
conundrum, especially Chile, Japan and, more recently, the US. In the case of the 
Korea-Chile FTA, negotiations were drawn out to almost five years, while the Korea- 
Japan FTA has remained in virtual deadlock since the commencement of official 
government negotiations in late 2003 (despite support from the government ministry 
with overall responsibility for foreign trade policy (MOFAT)). Furthermore, although 
the Korea-US FTA talks that began in 2006 have concluded, the FTA remains subject to 
an ongoing and intense debate preceding possible domestic ratification (despite a 
government majority in the NA). These three FTAs present an important puzzle: How is
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this variance in FT A policy outcome generated in a context that nonetheless enabled 
such agreements as the Korea-Singapore, Korea-EFTA and Korea-Mexico FTA to be 
concluded successfully? To what extent has this variance in outcomes been determined 
by domestic politics within Korea?
Second, the outcome of these FT As differs greatly in the sense that some are far 
closer to what the parties proposed in their original negotiations while others depart 
dramatically from the parties’ opening bargaining stances. For example, the Korea- 
Chile FTA was originally planned to include the exportation of apples, pears and grapes 
to Korea, and Chile would reciprocate and accept Korean demands for opening up its 
financial sector. The end result saw both demands excluded from the final agreement. 
Another good example would be that of the Korea-US FTA. This agreement was the 
most comprehensive agreement of all FTAs entered into by a Korean government. The 
final agreement excluded many issues originally proposed by the two parties, including 
some trade in agricultural goods (including rice), pharmaceutical reform, Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISD) and anti-trust law, amongst other things. What was it that led 
to these items being excluded? Were domestic interests responsible for changing the 
composition of the final agreements reached with foreign partners or were international 
factors the reason?
Third, who initiated these FTAs? A brief glance would probably result in the 
assumption that the Korean government (or the partner government) initiated each FTA. 
While it is certainly true for most FTAs that the Korean government has agreed to, this 
is not the full story. There are some FTAs that do not fit these criteria. It is arguable that 
the Korea-Japan and Korea-US FTAs saw the involvement of domestic groups outside 
of the government that proposed their initiation.
Finally, who were the key actors? The FTAs that are not included in the three 
case studies contained herein can quite comfortably be described as government 
dominated, which means to say that the government was the key player at the 
negotiation table and was able to decide on its position without having to pay undue 
heed to domestic or not-state stakeholders. This is certainly not the situation for our case 
studies. While the fact is that it was the government at the negotiation table in all FTAs, 
it would be similarly true to state that, for our case studies, the government was under 
duress to represent key domestic stakeholders for a variety of reasons. Lead among
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these stakeholders was the agricultural coalition and the FKI led coalition.
Much of the literature on foreign economic policy argues that both international 
and statist approaches do not allow for domestic societal influences to have any 
significant impact on foreign economic policies such as FTAs (for further details see 
Chapter two). In other words, the systemic approach sets the parameters for the 
domestic political context yet treats it as a ‘black box’ of the state and society, while the 
statist approach emphasises the ability of policymakers to advance the ‘national interest’ 
(Ikenberry et al., 1988: 10). Neither approach can satisfactorily analyse or explain how 
domestic societal interests permeate or influence the processes and outcomes of trade 
policy. In this thesis we seek to go beyond these factors to provide an in-depth 
examination of the domestic factors that have affected the negotiation of Korea’s FTAs.
This central research question creates the need to establish the environment in 
which Korea's FTAs are being negotiated, and therefore some further questions are 
explored: How does Korea’s contextual setting affect its FTA policy formulation? How 
do systemic, statist and societal approaches deal with attempt to explain Korea’s FTAs? 
In order to evaluate the societal approach in detail we need to answer some further 
questions, such as; who are the key domestic stakeholders and why did they adopt their 
respective positions? Most pertinently, did they influence policy outcome? And if so, 
under what conditions are domestic societal groups’ interests translated into policy 
outcomes?
We focus in particular on the role of domestic interest groups (stakeholders) in 
FTA policy responses. More specifically, I argue that coalitional interest groups 
influence FTA policy process (and outcomes) according to their varying degrees o f 
capacity (see Chapter Two). In particular, the Korea-Chile, Korea-Japan and Korea- 
US FTA cases provide good examples of trade policy that developed out of a domestic 
political struggle mainly among economic interests. In this respect, to understand the 
outcomes of Korea’s negotiation of FTAs one must consider it in terms of the domestic 
arena.
Purpose of this study
The role of interest groups in Korean international trade policies has suffered 
from a lack of recognition in discussions of trade politics. Thus, this thesis critically 
reviews the societal approach against both systemic and statist approaches (see Chapter
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One).
This study then elucidates Korea's FTA context. This is critical in understanding 
how domestic stakeholders influence FTA policy outcomes. Each of the three Korean 
FTA cases under examination (namely Chile, Japan and the US) will identify both 
supporter and opponent coalition groups attempting to influence policy outcomes to suit 
particular interests. A further aim then is to investigate the reasons why such groups 
adopt certain positions and to evaluate the means by which they articulate their interests 
into FTA policies.
Analytical Framework
Although the current literature is sufficient in explaining international contexts 
and domestic political institutions, it does not adequately consider interest articulation 
structures and fails to identify the specific communication structures available for the 
expression of political demands. Channels of access are dependent upon the structures 
of political and social communication available in a society. Therefore, the nature of 
these access channels for interest group articulation in a given society is of great 
importance in determining the range and effectiveness of group demands (Almond and 
Powell 1966: 81). This has been commented on by Duverger (1972: 121—125) who 
presents the argument that interest groups act on two different levels; direct pressure on 
government organisations and indirect pressure on the populace. Similarly, Almond and 
Powell (1966) also categorise interest group articulation structures (in particular, 
channels and means of access); formal and institutional channels, and physical channels 
such as public demonstration and violence. Finally, Park (2001: 77-80) separates legal 
approaches (usually using political institutions) from illegal approaches (such as violent 
demonstrations). Although their interpretations of the details of channels differ slightly, 
they do share a common denominator, which is to influence government policies 
through political institutions and/or informal channels16.
Drawing from their common understanding, I adopt these two channels and 
break them down further into three key structures of channels of influence: Public 
Influence (PI), Level of Proximity to Politicians and Policy Makers (PPPM) and, finally,
16 Some studies (Bae 2002, 2001; Lee 1996; Lee 1990; Sin 1987) have been conducted that relate to the
activities o f  Korean interest groups. Even though most o f  their work provides some general knowledge o f interest 
group activities in Korea, there are some limitations in explaining the specific channels o f  articulation.
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the ability to Influence Political Institutions (IPI); (see Chapter Two).
The extent to which groups utilise these various channels depends on their 
Organisational Power. For example, when groups (such as the FKI) easily overcome 
their collective action problems, their access to more formal channels is amplified (such 
as IPI) while those who are less easily able to overcome their collective action problem 
(such as agricultural collectives) have more success with informal channels, such as PI. 
Furthermore, groups' OP can determine how effective their use of specific channels can 
be. This can be translated into an overall effectiveness ranking of channels of influence 
depending on the type of OP a group has. These three channels of influence, PI, PPPM, 
IPI, are used to analyse how interest coalitions in Korea strategically articulate their 
demands and produce policy outcomes which suit their preferences. In view of the 
interest groups affecting the FTA cases in this thesis, I later utilise this framework in 
order to analyse interest articulation structures in Korea’s FTA political arena.
There are correlations that can be drawn between certain interest groups and the 
methods, or channels, they utilise to take part in FTA policy discourse (Details in 
Chapter Two). Industry associations, for example, have greater access to formal 
institutional channels such as political parties, legislatures, ministries, and cabinets and 
are therefore more likely to utilise these. Notwithstanding the direct pressure they exert 
on these political institutions, such interest groups also commonly use informal 
channels of communication in the form of the media.
On the other hand, agricultural coalitions and labour unions are more 
prominently associated with informal channels, such as public demonstrations and 
protests17. This indirect pressure on the populace may produce a public attitude that will, 
in turn, influence government leaders and politicians, who are always attentive to public 
opinion (Duverger 1972: 121). In every regime, political power is concerned with 
public opinion. This is especially true of democracies where those in power must 
regularly face the challenge of an election and the verdict of the voters. Consequently, 
by acting to influence public opinion through informal channels, interest groups can 
indirectly influence formal political institutions. This is especially the case for National
Interest groups do so in two ways; either through propaganda or by violence (Duverger 1972: 123). Some 
forms o f violence develop as part o f the normal activity o f interest groups in their efforts to impress, influence and 
persuade public opinion and, at the same time, force the government to yield to their demands by creating intolerable 
situations (ibid: 125). Violence (or physical demonstration) thereby is a means o f access available to any group 
wishing to articulate their interests in society.
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Assembly (NA) representatives in rural areas.
Methodology
This research investigates the critical role of domestic interest groups in three 
selected case studies; Korea’s FTAs with Chile, Japan and the United States (hereafter 
referred to as US). Compared to other Korean FTA cases, such as those with Singapore 
and the EFTA18, these cases feature the embedded dynamic domestic activities that 
provide and promote an in-depth understanding of Korea’s trade policies. In addition, 
this thesis primarily focuses on developing an approach that facilitates a detailed 
explanation and understanding of the specificities of Korea's FTA policies and the 
influence domestic actors have on their outcomes (Korea’s FTA policy)19. The three 
case studies will enable comparison across the spectrum of competing interest groups 
within the trade policy decision-making process.
This research will also analyse how interest groups have responded to the 
development of FTA processes and outcomes. Empirical evidence and interpretations of 
interest coalitions’ influences will be sought through an analysis of primary and 
secondary sources such as government FTA resources (publications and policy 
documents), newspapers, monthly magazines, journals and books. Newspapers are a 
very useful tool for understanding the process of each FTA, the participants’ activities, 
opinions and the particular circumstances at the time. It is true that, although an almost 
endless, rich supply of documents and primary materials relating to FTA policies is 
available, some sources lack sufficient credibility in regard to particular decision­
making events.
Secondary sources are supplemented by a total of around 50 (in Appendix I) 
interviews, which were conducted during three fieldwork visits to Korea. The 
interviews involved bureaucrats, academics, researchers, politicians, as well as various 
civil and interest groups. Interviews with key individuals within interest groups are a
As these two cases evoked little or no domestic opposition, the government was able to pass the 
legislation without having to renegotiate any of the set outcomes.
Some critics argue that a single case study is of very limited value given that it is neither directly 
comparable nor can we generalise from its result (Ebbinghaus 2003: 14). Within a single case study, however defined, 
multiple observations of theoretically relevant variables normally can be made. Selecting one case of a phenomenon 
need not mean making only one theoretically relevant observation (Odell 2001: 162).
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crucial means of accessing reliable and meaningful conclusions, beyond those based 
solely on an analysis of secondary material.
The Significance of This Study
There have been various studies relating to FTA policy in Korea. Most of these 
studies have been conducted by economists and have focused on economic effects 
(Cheong 2004a, 2003; Kim 2003a; Schott and Choi 2001). While they give a general 
understanding of economic benefits and future possibilities for Korea's regional based 
FTAs, given their strictly economic focus, they do not attempt to explain the key 
domestic factors involved. Recently, however, a few studies were conducted which 
focused on role of domestic interest groups in FTAs (Ahn 2003a; Choi 2001; Yoo 
2002).These are devoted to thick descriptions of the role of interest groups in Korea’s 
economy and politics. In general, this still leaves very little known about the critical role 
played by interest groups in the FTA policy process. Equally important is the question 
of how they systematically articulate their interests in FTA policy outcomes through the 
various channels at their disposal.
In addressing this important role of interest coalitions in Korea’s FTAs, this 
thesis contributes towards the study of international political economy. It focuses more 
on the demand side of trade policy in Korea than most literature on the subject, which 
generally centres more on the study of statist determinants of policy decisions and 
outcomes. While the trade politics literature has generally avoided focusing on how 
domestic coalitions articulate their interests in a country’s trade policies20, this study has 
placed greater emphasis on how societal preferences affect such policies. There has 
been little systematic research conducted at this level of detail, which explains how the 
political economy of Korea’s FTA policymaking is affected by domestic interest groups. 
In this regard, the theoretical contribution of this thesis helps the societal approach 
towards a more comprehensive understanding of the role of domestic interest groups.
By focusing on the effects of interest groups on FTA policy outcomes using 
formal and informal channels of influence (in particular three channels of influence),
In the US, the involvement o f interest groups in public and foreign economic policy has been studied in 
more detail than in East Asia (detailed literature on this is discussed in Theory Chapter).
23
Introduction
this dissertation addresses the important but relatively overlooked issue of Korean 
interest groups in the field of international trade. Moreover, while most studies of 
interest groups in trade politics focuses on the US, this dissertation provides some 
insight into the importance of interest groups in a particular developing country that can 
be applied to other countries of a similar economic and social profile.
An overview of the Dissertation
This thesis consists of seven chapters. In the next chapter, I will provide a 
review of the literature within the study of international political economy, especially 
within the field of international trade, which could be used to explain the variance in 
Korea’s FTA policies. I will then sketch out my own arguments. In chapter three, I map 
out Korea’s FTA context in greater detail and the three key structures of channels of 
influence and organisational power that societal groups have. Finally, the three 
empirical chapters (Chapters Three, Four and Five) will analyse and evaluate the three 
FTA cases in terms of who the key domestic stakeholders were, their rationales, 
channels of influence and the resultant variance in FTA policy outcomes. The central 
research question will then be brought together with the case studies in the concluding 
chapter.
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Chapter One: Literature Review and Theory
Introduction
In constructing explanations of countries' foreign economic policies, scholars 
have employed a diverse range of analytical and theoretical approaches (Ikenberry et 
al., 1988: 1). Accordingly, a number of categorisations for the various theories have 
been put forth (Mundo 1999; Grossman and Helpman 1995; Verdier 1994; Cowhey 
1990; Ikenberry et al., 1988).1 Perhaps the most widely cited is that of Ikenberry et al., 
(1988), who developed a common theoretical framework for explaining US foreign 
economic policy based on the interplay of three explanatory approaches: system- 
centered, state-centered and society-centred explanations. Within such a diverse body 
of literature, it is hardly surprising to find numerous points of controversy as well as 
areas of shared agreement (Cohen 1990: 267). As Odell notes, each of the perspectives 
proves to have some theoretical value, yet none has managed to dominate the field 
(1990: 140). Ikenberry et al., (1988) however, highlighted the need to go beyond more 
conventional system-centered explanations and look within the “black box” of the state 
and society, which has received some considerable academic debate over the years.
In sum, it is a prerequisite for this chapter to examine the three prominent 
theories and to critique them before selecting what this thesis regards as the most useful 
approach to explaining Korea’s FTA policy. Before looking at each of the three sets of 
approaches, it would be first better to identify their most crucial tenets. First, the 
international approach emphasises that a nation's foreign trade policy is fundamentally 
derived from the nature of the international system. As such, the formulation of policy 
derives more or less rationally from the constraints that the international system 
imposes. Second, the statist approach emphasises the autonomous role of the state in 
pursuing foreign economic policy. The societal approach, on the other hand, attributes 
policies to variations in demands made by interest groups with its primary tenet viewing 
policy as the outcome of a competitive struggle among affected groups for influence 
over particular policy decisions.
On the other hand, others like Odell (1990) and Rohrlich (1987) have employed a different analysis; the 
realpolitik analysis, behavioural analysis and the economic culture analysis or the market perspective.
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Systemic Approaches
Systemic approaches conceive of an “outside-in” dimension that gives 
precedence to the external pressures and challenges faced by nation-states in 
conducting foreign policies (Sorenson 2001: 9-10). Such approaches attribute trade 
policy to the demands or opportunities generated within the international political 
economy and prevailing distributions of power in the international system; the norms 
and principles embedded in international regimes; or the imperatives of international 
economic structures. These have all been invoked as systemic explanations of foreign 
economic policy. From this perspective, some argue that systemic theories deserve a 
certain primacy over other levels of analysis with the analysis of foreign economic 
policy reducible to an examination of the international system. Succinctly stated, 
scholars within this tradition assume states to display a unitary character with their 
policies exogenously derived (Ikenberry et al., 1988: 4; Gourevitch 1978: 904). 
Accordingly, this systemic approach understands the international structure as an 
independent variable in explaining foreign economic policy such as FTAs.
Interdependence
The nature of foreign economic policy process changes as the world economy 
evolves. Changing circumstances thus require new arrangements of people, resources, 
institutions and politics (Gourevitch 1978: 892). National economies have become 
enmeshed in a web of economic interdependence from which they cannot easily escape, 
and from which they derive great economic benefits (Gilpin 1975: 39). The term 
interdependence was coined in the late 1960s to describe the growing 
interconnectedness of national economies. The overall effect is weakening to national 
autonomy.
According to the proponents of the interdependence approach, states are 
depicted as losing control over important issue areas, especially economic ones. Instead 
of explaining foreign policy, which is implicitly state-centred, the emphasis is on 
explaining international regimes and the international system and how countries differ 
in these issue areas according to their “sensitivity” and “vulnerability” in various 
domains (Gourevitch 1978; Gilpin 1975). Nye and Keohane (1989) call this model 
“complex interdependence.” Complex interdependence alters domestic structures
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because it entails shifts in power away from certain governmental institutions toward 
other ones or even shifts outside the government to private actors, or international actors 
(Gourevitch 1978: 893). A similar perspective suggested by Gilpin (1975: 40) is that the 
rise of the welfare state and the increasing sensitivity of national governments to the 
rising economic expectations of their societies have made them dependent upon the 
benefits provided by a liberal world-economic system.
The international political economy thereby generates pressures that, in 
principle, encourage states to pursue policies that would in some way compensate for 
the uncertainties, instability, and systemic risks that interdependence creates (Weiss 
2003 : 27). Other interdependence analysts propose a different mix of politics and 
economics; Keohane and Nye (1977) argue that economic changes do not negate 
politics but create a new type of politics. Their alternative conception of 
interdependence entails a combination of international relations; realism and liberal 
international political economy. What interdependence does is to create new sources of 
power; it produces networks of mutual asymmetric dependence (Crane et al., 1997: 14). 
The economic interdependence of countries is simply a given; the natural consequence 
of market-driven specialisation within a global division of labour. The nature of the 
strategic setting at the international level becomes the ultimate determinant of policy 
choices at the national level (Cohen 1990: 276). This approach focuses on the rise of 
interdependence as a major factor in the increase in FTAs. As economic 
interdependence increases, states have turned to economic liberalisation to promote 
their exports and attract foreign investment However, the multilateral GATT and WTO 
based trade regime has encountered numerous problems2 and FTAs have therefore 
become established as an alternative route for promoting trade linkages.
Following this argument, Korea has proved to be no exception in “obeying” 
such international trends. It can be argued that Korea’s change in foreign economic 
policy and the promotion of FTAs can be traced to two main systemic or international 
factors.
Foremost, the Asian financial crisis, which broke out in the summer of 1997, 
brought about major economic and political changes in much of Asia. This crisis caused
The failure o f the Seattle Trade Ministerial in December 1999 to launch a new round o f multilateral trade 
negotiations dealt a major blow to the WTO. The Seattle meetings exposed significant policy differences among the 
WTO member countries as well as shortcomings in the way the WTO conducts its business and interacts with other 
international and non-govemmental organisations.
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the Korean government to shift its focus away from WTO multilateralism towards 
policies favouring bilateralism and regionalism* 3. Moreover, in this context, the 
government did not want to be left out in the growing trend towards FTAs. Second, this 
change in emphasis was further accelerated by the failure of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle in December 1999 to launch a new round of global trade 
negotiations. Given the deadlock in the international system and the ravages of the 
financial meltdown, the Korean government acknowledged FTAs as an alternative route 
for pursuing economic stability4. Accordingly, the above demonstrates that the 
international dimension has been an important influence in compelling Korea to join the 
bilateral FTA league.
Limitations
Notwithstanding the salience of the international approach, it does display some 
limitations in adequately explaining the variance that exists in these case studies. Based 
on the fundamental premise of game theory, the international approach conceives of 
actors to be purely unitary and rational. Whereas this simplification generates useful 
insights into the subject, it fails to account for the fact that actors such as the state and 
their actions are not wholly reducible to the dictates of the international system. Thus, it 
may be asserted that interdependence derives from state policy, not the other way 
around; that is, it exists because states allow it to exist (Gourevitch 1978: 894). 
Consequently, the idea that the state is like an opaque billiard ball which reacts to the 
pressures of the international environment necessitates an artificial degree of 
simplification (Andrews 1975: 521). What is more, in treating the state as unitary, it 
fails to open up the “black box” of domestic politics. Accordingly, it does not account 
for the role of different parts of the state, interest groups and domestic political 
institutions (Milner 1997a; Ikenberry et al., 1988: 243). Approaches that derive policy 
wholly from the exigencies of the system effectively ignore the rich fibres of domestic 
structures and can, therefore, do little more than explain broad policy characteristics 
under certain historical episodes; failing to penetrate the complexities of the decision­
making process at the domestic level (Hocking and McGuire 2004: 1-17).
Interview conducted with Ahn Ho-young, Deputy Minister of Trade, MOFAT, Seoul, October 10th, 2005;
Interview conducted with Choi Kyoung-lim, director of FTA policy Bureau in MOFAT, Seoul, September 29th, 2006.
4 Ibid.
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Having established this, the international approach is therefore inadequate for 
answering the more specific questions posed in this thesis. For example, in applying the 
latter approach to the Korean context, it is not concerned with the attitudes of domestic 
political actors to trade agreements. Accordingly, it does not explain why some FTAs 
(Korea-Singapore and Korea-EFTA) were signed with little difficulty while others 
(Korea-Chile, Korea-Japan and Korea-US A) were anything but. To explain this 
variance, we need another approach to unravel this puzzle. Central to the concerns of 
this research is the domestic approach, with particular emphasis on the analysis of 
actors within state and society. Both approaches are examined, in turn, below.
Statist Approaches
The ‘state’ almost vanished in the 1960s and 70s from the academic workbook 
as theorists strived for greater parsimony in the social sciences. In this vein, both 
international and society-centred approaches relegated the state to a passive actor. 
However, since the 1980s there has been a re-evaluation of the role of the state by re­
examining its role in formulating and executing policy strategies (Verdier 1998; 
Simmons 1994; Skocpol 1985; Krasner 1984). State-centric approaches therefore 
sought to retain the integrity of the state as an analytical construct and to reassert its 
autonomy5 (Seabrooke 2002: 6). Accordingly, one of the central concepts in the 
literature on theories of the state has been that of “state autonomy.” Autonomy in this 
context refers to the assumption that states can and do act independently from the 
pressures of interest groups in formulating and implementing policy (Oatley 2004: 109). 
It is in the above academic landscape that the discussion over state autonomy has 
emerged as a significant issue in the field of political economy and, more specifically, 
in our understanding of foreign economic policymaking. Thus, in several contributions 
to the above field, it has been persuasively asserted that the state should be understood 
as possessing the capability to pursue its own interests and that these may be distinct 
from societal interests (Skocpol 1985; Nordlinger 1981; Krasner 1978).
The state and the government can be used interchangeably and the relationship between the two is very 
complex. For the purposes o f  my research, the government is treated as being synonymous with the state. However, 
it must be made clear that I am not referring to the government in a narrow sense, in terms o f the ruling party, but 
rather I conceptualise the government in a broader sense as constituting three components: judiciary, legislature and 
the executive.
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The key question, therefore, in explaining policy revolves around whether the 
state should be regarded as an actor in its own right with its own specific interests, and 
not one whose interests will be subordinated to other interests. In short, it is reasonable 
to contend that the state might adopt positions and executes policy strategies such as 
FTAs, which are not merely reflection of those of societal actors.
Issue o f state autonomy
The basis for much of the literature on state autonomy derives from Max 
Weber’s assumptions. He conceived of states as associations claiming control over 
territories and the people in them and, as such, he postulated that the state may pursue 
goals and plans that do not reflect the demands of powerful groups (1978). More 
recently, Nordlinger, in the early 1980s, emerged as one of the most important 
proponents of state autonomy, and systematically developed work on the issue. 
Nordlinger’s aim was to account for public policy by asking how democratic states 
frequently act autonomously in translating their own preferences into authoritative 
actions even when they diverge from those held by the politically weightiest groups in 
civil society (1981: 203). In other words, state centric theorists such as Nordlinger 
argued that policy is not primarily a reaction to pressure from interested social groups. 
Instead, they suggest that the state should be seen as far more autonomous from societal 
pressure than imagined in pluralist approaches. In their view, the state has interests and 
policy preferences of its own, as well as the capacity to impose these preferences 
against societal resistance (Skocpol 1985; Nordlinger 1981; Krasner 1978). 
Notwithstanding the latter, it is important to realise that state autonomy may -  but does 
not necessarily -  mean that the state's interests are not the same as some societal 
interests. They can and do overlap. However, the key issue is that the state is capable of 
deciding for itself which preferences it will pursue.
Nordlinger identified three levels of autonomy with the foremost existing when 
the state effectively persuades the people of the desirability of its policy preferences. At 
the lower range of autonomy, the state's room for manoeuvre is dependent on whether 
the best endowed societal actors disagree or when state and society interests coincide 
(Nordlinger 1981: 74-143). In view of that, autonomy does not possess a fixed quality,
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but rather its degree varies according to a number of factors, especially the extent to 
which opinion among leading societal actors is divided. This means that it is wrong to 
view state autonomy in absolutist terms -  i.e. that the state always acts unchecked. 
Instead, there is a need to regard autonomy as relative in that it varies according to the 
strength of society. Consequently, the state is not always dominant and independent. 
Instead it is potentially autonomous. The latter is something that is particularly 
expounded upon by Skocpol (1985: 5-9), who bemoans the society-centric approach’s 
oversight of the potential for autonomy. Rather than viewing the state as an 
accumulation of fragmentary pieces of bargaining practice in a political process 
dominated by powerful interest groups (in a pluralist sense), she regards it as an actor 
possessing bureaucratic capacities to enforce a coherent and strategic pact of policies, 
achieving intended goals of development. The conceptualisation of the state will be 
further detailed in the next paragraph, but here the case is put forward that the state 
should be viewed as a separate actor. In a similar vein, Krasner is another key proponent 
of state autonomy and argues that the objectives of the state are not a simple 
aggregation of private interests. He goes further to argue that each state will pursue 
foreign economic policies that reflect domestic economic needs and external political 
ambitions without much concern for domestic interests groups (Krasner 1978).
The three authors differ in their focus of support for the thesis of state 
autonomy. While Krasner argues that the state is predominant, Skocpol focuses instead 
more on its potential (for domination). Nordlinger’s basic objective, on the other hand, 
is to demonstrate that the preferences of the state are at least as important as those of 
civil society in accounting for what the democratic state does and does not do. Whatever 
the divergences in emphasis, the aforementioned authors establish the argument that the 
state should be at least acknowledged as an actor in its own right.
Within the above context, the Korean state has conventionally been regarded by 
scholars as having a high degree of autonomy relative to society in pursuing its policies. 
Moreover, this has been linked with literature on the developmental state, which asserts 
that the state is the primary actor in formulating and executing economic goals6. FT As, 
at least in the agenda-setting phase, have proven to be no exception. According to the
Developmental Capitalism (DC) is exemplified by Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and most other 
East Asian counters. In economies characterised by the DC, the state plays a central role in coordinating economic 
activities (Dicken 2003).
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statist approach, it was the Korean government that not only acknowledged the 
importance of FTAs as an important strategic implement for future economic growth 
but it also chose Chile as its first partner. Again, using the statist approach, the start of 
official negotiations vis-ä-vis the Korea-US FT A demonstrated the government's 
autonomy in formulating policy still further for it chose to go ahead regardless of the 
domestic societal debate.
Conceptualisation of the state
Having established the importance of considering the state as an actor, there is 
also a need to conceptualise the state for analytical purposes. There are two main 
perspectives: the unitary model and the bureaucratic politics model. The difference 
between the two is important because it affects our understanding of how the state 
formulates and executes policy. First, the unitary actor model conceives of the state as a 
unified actor with state officials with common interests operating in a unitary way to 
achieve specific goals for the state. The argument draws upon explanations involving a 
rational actor, and promotes a realist type reasoning about the state, in which the state 
becomes a unitary actor (Gourevitch 1978: 903). On the other hand, the bureaucratic 
politics model of policy making focuses on the interactions among executive branch 
agencies -  interactions that determine policy outcomes (Allison and Halperin 1972; 
Allison 1971). The argument contends that the state is composed of bureaucracies, and 
that key decision-makers are largely limited in their making of rational and deliberate 
decisions by the structure of bureaucratic organisations, which have different 
responsibilities and powers according to policy areas (Smith 1980: 27). Each 
bureaucracy tends to assume its own parochial interests and, therefore, foreign 
economic policy, for example, is understood not as the rational choice of a unitary 
government but the product of compromise and bargaining between key agencies. From 
this point of view, there is a “tug of war” between different parts of the state that 
contradicts the unitary model (White 1986: 64-70). While the bureaucratic politics 
model does not necessarily exclude society (as it can be argued that the state is 
comprised of different factions, which represent or at least support particular societal 
interests), it is also the case that the state can be conceived of as a bureaucracy with its 
own interests to pursue without being influenced by societal actors.
Moving on, it is necessary to insert the Korean case within the debate over the
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conceptualisation of the state. Accordingly, Korea is not a unitary state as described 
above, but it corresponds more to the bureaucratic model, particularly in the context of 
FTA policy. As already explained, the latter line of thought scrutinises the internal 
workings of the state itself, debunking the notion that it is a unitary, ‘rational' actor. 
Instead, it points to bureaucratic infighting and turf battles between different ministries 
(Moon and Prasad 1994: 361-370). As far as Korea is concerned, the evidence7 goes to 
show that the various Ministries within the government compete with one another for 
jurisdictional control and influence over FTA issues. Not only this, but they have 
extensive long-term relationships with their respective industries. For example, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF) has been a strong opponent of FT As and 
has worked closely with agricultural interest groups, especially in the Korean-Chile 
case. Conversely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trades (MOFAT) is a staunch 
proponent of FTA policy and has cooperated closely with interest groups such as the 
FKI.
Limitations
While a state-centred approach directs our attention to the important role that 
states play in shaping foreign economic policy, it does have some notable limitations.
For one, states are not necessarily autonomous of all societal interests and policies are 
often shaped by the constellation of societal groups upon which the government’s 
power rests. To expand on this further, the domestic dimension of autonomy does not 
mean that all of the initiatives come from the government; nor does it necessarily imply 
an immobile society or a permanent arm twisting from government to society. Therefore, 
to focus on state interests alone is inadequate without considering societal and other 
constraints that shape the policy process. While this does not detract from the need to at 
least consider the state as an actor in its own right, its significance in determining and 
executing policy is dependent on its degree of autonomy. The fact that the state is not 
always prevalent is something recognised by some theorists (Nordlinger, Skocpol) of 
state autonomy themselves. Autonomy, furthermore, is not the sole variable of a state’s 
ability to formulate and execute policy. There is also a need to take into account other
Interview conducted with Park Myung-jae, Minister o f Public Administration and Security (MOPAS), 
Seoul, March 3rd, 2007. He had more latitude for independence due to Roh Moo-hyun’s administration finishing at 
the end of 2007.
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variables such as state capacity (the state may have considerable autonomy but not the 
capacity to carry out certain policies)8 and different policy areas. For example, the latter 
is particularly true of FT As, which have important distributional consequences for 
society that serve to mobilise affected interest groups. More recent literature on the 
subject has sought to develop a state-society framework showing how the state is 
embedded within society that creates a kind of synthesis between the two actors (Weiss 
1998; Evans 1995, 1985; Katzenstein 1978a). Therefore, it is misleading to see the 
argument as state versus society.
To conclude, whether the state possesses and pursues its own independent 
interests or not, it does not mean that they automatically correlate with the state’s 
desired trade policy outcome. This is central to the puzzle of this thesis. In Korea’s case, 
the statist approaches (like the systemic approach) do not provide a clear answer to our 
main research question. If the statist approach were valid, one would perhaps infer that 
the Korean state should have had fewer difficulties in successfully concluding FT As 
with more countries. However, the fact remains that the government has encountered 
substantial problems.
First, it has only managed to conclude three FT As despite its prediction that it 
would have signed more by now9. Second, as is discussed in the empirical chapters in 
detail, the content of the signed FT As do not fully reflect the government’s initial 
proposals. This variance tends to suggest that interest groups have influenced the 
content by managing to force certain concessions10. Third, concerning consistency, one 
observes a large degree of divergence in the time frames of different FTAs. For example, 
the Korea-Singapore FT A only took one year from the initial negotiations until its
In talking about capacity, Skocpol highlights that autonomy on its own is not enough to ensure the state’s 
predominance over policymaking and outcomes, but that the state must also possess the necessary capacity. There is 
contention over how it should be defined. For Migdal (1988), a state’s capacity is related to its infiltration of society, 
the regulation of social relationships, the gathering of resources such as taxes, and the utilisation of these resources. 
Huber (1995: 167) broadens the scope of this to include a wider array of functions, such as the enforcement of laws, 
the promotion of economic growth, obtaining compliance from the population, and the distribution of societal 
resources. In a similar manner, Grindle (1996: 3-8) weighs a state’s proficiency by its performance of a number of 
institutional, technical, administrative and political functions to a high degree of efficiency and responsiveness. It is 
clear from this discussion is that there are different levels of state capacities. Creating and implementing strategies 
with industrial objectives demands a different style and degree of state capacity. Furthermore, state capacities are 
dynamic: they can change from time to time and from country to country. In a very general formulation, a capable 
state would be able to govern itself and then govern the society.
This prediction is based on the interview conducted with Ahn Ho-young, Deputy Minister of Trade, 
MOFAT, Seoul, on October 10th, 2005. He had envisaged the successful completion of more FTAs to date; for 
example with Japan and Mexico.
Of course one must also attribute concessions to the needs of negotiating with the partner country. This is 
the case, for example, in the Korea-Chile FTA when the Korean government was forced to concede in restricting its 
export of cars and electronic goods. On the other hand, important concessions also stem from domestic resistance.
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ratification. Similarly, the Korea-EFTA only took eight months. On the other hand, the 
Korea-Chile FTA took more than four and a half years. The long time scale of the latter 
is particularly important for it shows the limitations on the Korean government in 
pushing through FTA policy in the face of societal constraints. If the Korean 
government enjoyed high autonomy and capacity one would expect consistently short 
time frames across the empirical cases. Furthermore, the Korea-Chile FTA is not the 
only example, the Korea-Japan FTA has not reached a conclusion despite the elapse of 
nearly six years. Consequently, in order to explain the variance in the latter three FTAs, 
chosen as my case-studies, we cannot ignore the impact of societal interests and 
pressure.
Societal Approaches
Societal approaches to the study of foreign economic policy focus primarily on 
the effects of demands for protection by pressure groups11 (Mansfield and Busch 1995: 
724). These groups create coalitions which are engaged in support or protest vis-a-vis 
trade policies. The balance between the opposition coalitions opposing FTAs and those 
favouring them creates the 'demand' by society. Accordingly, civil society is seen to be 
made up of a plethora of diverse, fluctuating, competing groups of individuals with 
shared interests and with many effective political resources available to them (Krasner 
1984: 226). Trade policy is thus commonly observed as a product of domestic interest 
group politics. In the '‘demand" explanation of protection, the state is seen as the empty 
receptacle (container or vessel) of societal bargaining with no independent voice or role 
(Lake 1988: 33). Theoretically, much of the literature on trade policy tends to 
emphasise the ‘demand side12’ of trade policy in that it focuses on why different 
elements of society have different preferences concerning trade policy. This literature 
links governments’ policy choices to the preferences of interest groups that mobilise in 
reaction to changing conditions in the international economy. Schattschneider’s study of 
trade policy in 1935 was the first to engage deeply with the issue of how key domestic
It should also be noted, however, that some works such as that o f  Milner look at the interests o f societal 
groups in their demands for liberalisation. For example, this can be observed by the Japanese free trade movement 
and also the Korean Chaebol in regard to the Korea-USA FTA (Choi 2001; Milner 1997b).
In this regard, Frieden and Martin (2001: 16) (who emphasise the Stilger-Peltzman approach to the 
political economy o f regulation, the analysis o f  rent-seeking and the analytical Marxism), argue that governments 
weigh benefits to special interest groups, and different levels o f  concern over broad public goods.
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stakeholders influenced the making of US laws by providing an analysis of the role of 
lobby groups during the passing of the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. The 
important question, to which the societal approach responds, is why different groups in 
society hold different trade policy preferences. In order to understand and answer this 
central question, one must examine the distributional consequences of international 
trade. Not everyone benefits in the short term from international trade, for it brings 
rising incomes to certain groups while others are adversely affected. Therefore, the 
issue revolves around the distributional consequences of FTAs (winners and losers) that 
have transformed the relationship between public-private sectors and given rise to new 
policy networks.
In short, the FT A arena can be understood to be a struggle between domestic 
forces that are pressuring government agencies to pursue frequently divergent positions 
on trade policy (Ravenhill 2004: 59-60; Gilpin 2001: 341-61; Mansfield and Milner 
1997: 5-14).
The political conflict connected to FT A policy typically involves high 
economic stakes for the country as a whole, or short of that, major economic 
consequences for parties immediately affected by international trade. The process and 
outcome of the Korea-Chile FTA provides a typical example of trade policy that 
encapsulated a domestic political struggle among different economic interests. What is 
more, the Korea-Japan and Korea-USA cases share striking similarities in terms of this 
struggle.
Factor endowment versus Specific-factors model
In trying to engage with the issue of how different groups benefit or lose, two 
main perspectives have emerged in the literature. One school of thought, here referred 
to as “the factor-endowment model,” links policy preference to ownership or usage of 
the factors of production, which are broad categories of inputs of production such as 
land, labour and capital (O'Reilly 2005: 654). Working within the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, Ronald Rogowski’s Commerce and Coalitions (1989), asserts that 
international trade has profound effects on the distribution of societal wealth and 
resources among different interest groups. He also argues that increasing levels of 
exposure to international trade are advantageous to owners of factors of production in
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which a country has a relative abundance and disadvantageous to them in which a 
country has a relative scarcity. Furthermore, by applying a simple model of politics, 
alliance structures were used to demonstrate how policy choices are often reflections of 
the underlying preferences of the strongest and best-organised interests in society 
(Keohane and Milner 1996: 7-8; Midford 1993: 535-564; Rogowski 1989: 1-20). 
Accordingly, the Korea-Japan FT A is regarded as fitting this line of argument.
In other words, the labour sector, in particular, perceives the FT A as a contest 
of labour against that of capital, which is in greater abundance than labour in Korea. 
However, this model does not fully explain the other two cases outlined below.
Another school, which emphasises societal preferences in explaining policy 
decisions, argues that interest group preferences form along industry lines instead of 
factor endowment lines. The model, called the “specific factors model,” characterises 
the domestic politics of trade policy as a competition between industries rather than as 
a competition between labour and capital. In other words, instead of individuals’ 
preferences reflecting membership in abundant or scarce factors of production, they 
will reflect the international competitiveness of industries in which individuals are 
employed. Thus, members of both abundant and scarce factors of production will 
mobilise behind trade liberalisation (or protectionism) if they are employed in export- 
oriented (import—competing) industries, and we will see divisions within factors or 
classes rather than between them. In this context, Jeffrey Frieden uses the “specific 
factors” model to analyse political conflicts over foreign economic policy in the US in 
the inter-war period (1988), economic liberalisation in newly democratising Latin 
American countries (1991a) and the distributional and political impacts of 
liberalisation in financial market (1991b). Peter Gourevitch (1986, 1984 and 1977) also 
employs a factors approach to analyse how the US and various European countries 
responded to international economic downturns in the 1870’s, 1930's and 1970’s and 
claims that such policy response reflected the preferences of politically dominant 
interest groups. What is more, Michael Shafer argues in Winners and Losers (1994) 
that sectoral characteristics such as production flexibility, capital intensity, economies 
of scale and asset-factor flexibility all affect how industries respond to international 
economic shocks and how governments respond to the demands of those industries. 
Contrary to the factor endowments model, the specific factors model can be applied to
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the Korea-Chile and Korea-USA FT A cases. Broadly speaking, it could be argued that 
the two FTA cases correspond to a conflict of interest between agricultural sectors 
(import-competing industries) and large manufacturing industries (export-competitive 
industries).
The implication of this argument is that those interest groups that are more 
likely to mobilise and become politically active are more likely to succeed in 
influencing states’ policy (Frieden 1991a: 23; Gowa 1988: 24). Essentially, then, the 
“demand side” literature argues that overcoming collective action problems13 is a key 
determinant of political influence. Whereas groups with large numbers of members are 
ineffective for realising common objectives, those with a relatively small number of 
producers not only have a large incentive for collective action, but they find it easier to 
organise their preferences and can much more effectively lobby government for their 
desired trade policy. In consequence, this helps us to understand why producers’ 
interests dominate trade politics while consumer interests are often neglected.
While the two models agree that the losers from international trade prefer 
protection while the winners from international trade prefer liberalisation, they posit 
different assumptions as to factor mobility14. Whereas the factor (endowment) model 
assumes a high degree of factor mobility, the specific factors model (or sectoral model) 
presumes that the factors cannot be easily reallocated from one industry to another in 
response to changes in relative prices. Yet the aggregate conclusions from such political 
economy studies of trade policy offer contradictory arguments and evidence on the 
recent balance of the relative level of factor mobility in the USA (Ladewig 2006: 72).
Whatever the debate in conceptualising distributional consequences, an 
understanding of the societal approach is certainly necessary for understanding 
countries' policy outcomes. For example, Germany’s response of high tariffs to the 
1870s depression reflected the preferences of a coalition of protectionist farmers and 
industrialists15. Likewise, Britain’s continued commitment to free trade reflects both
Olson (1965) argues that groups do not always effectively lobby because o f  the collective action problem. 
Thus, even though consumers share a common goal and common benefit, due to the costs o f  organising such large 
numbers, the collective action problem prevents them from exerting pressure on their governments or politicians to 
achieve their goal and benefit.
It refers to the ease with which labour and capital can move from one industry to another in response to 
the changes in relative prices caused by international trade.
In 1897, Germany changed its course and adopted the 'iron and rye' tariff. Explanations concentrate on 
domestic groups within Germany. As owners o f  grain producing farms in Eastern Germany, their interests were 
damaged by transportation costs that translated into plummeting grain prices in Europeans markets. While Gourevitch
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the weak position of farmers who favoured protection and the might of industrialists 
and financiers in London who favoured maintaining open markets. In this case, policy 
debates during economic crises are characterised by intense political disagreements and 
competition among interest groups with divergent policy preferences. The eventual 
policy responses to these crises demonstrate to some degree that the preferences of 
coalition interest groups influence policy outcomes. For example, all the domestic 
winners of the Korea-Chile FTA are the FKI which produces, for instance, automobiles 
and electronic goods. The latter had a substantial influence in the FTA policymaking 
process in conjunction with their strong relationship with the government. The losers, 
on the other hand, were typically farmers. In other words, the benefits of the FTA were 
unfairly distributed between the agricultural industry and industrial manufacturing 
sectors, thus also fuelling political dissent against the government. In consequence, one 
of the most serious issues arising from the Korea-Chile FTA (and also recent debates in 
regard to the Korea-USA FTA) was the government's confrontation with the domestic 
farm lobby; in particular the ability of Korean farmers’ organisations to muster their 
political weight in attempting to influence the government's FTA negotiations with 
Chile16.
Focusing on actors' preferences as the driving forces behind foreign economic 
policy thus raises an important question: what determines who wins policy conflicts over 
foreign economic policy? Whose preferences matter? Further, how do societal 
preferences correlate with policy processes and outcomes? As the next section makes 
clear, the current societal approach by itself does not fully address such questions. In 
attempting to answer these questions, interest groups scholars often emphasise 
characteristics of interest groups themselves that purportedly affect their ability to exert 
influence on states’ policy choices. Many scholars of this approach focus on public 
goods theories of collective action to explain which groups are the most powerful 
demanders. For instance, Avery (1998) and Pincus (1975) explained how interest 
groups pressure the government for trade protection. Prior to the US Civil War, the
(1986) applies to a specific factors model approach to explain the adoption o f  the ‘iron and rye' tariff in 1879, 
Rogowski (1989) applies a Heckscher-Ohlin (Stolper-Samuelson) approach to analyse the adoption o f the ‘iron and 
rye' tariff.
It is, however, very difficult to apply this same logic to other FTAs such as that o f  Korea-Japan and 
Korea-USA. Because the Korea-Japan FTA is not the same as Korea-Chile in terms o f  representing a threat to the 
domestic agricultural sector, the latter has voiced little opposition. On the other hand, the Korea-USA FTA has 
experienced much more resistance.
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structure of protection could be explained by the incentives for collective action among 
different commodity-based interest groups. In another case, Caves (1976) analysed 
tariff structures of Canada and found that the labour intensive industries received the 
highest levels of protection from international competition. Ray (1981a; 1981b) 
scrutinises the cross-national pattern of the tariffs and argues that while the tariff- 
protected industries in the US have been the labour-intensive industries and low-skill 
industries, the European countries did not do the same. Other scholars also argue that 
highly concentrated industries with a small number of firms have a greater chance of 
gaining protection (Godek 1985 and Olson 1965)17.
Essentially then, the society centred literature argues that overcoming collective 
action problems is a key determinant of political influence (Gowa 1988). Those groups 
that are most likely to mobilise behind their preferences will benefit from the greatest 
effect on policy decisions. Moreover, the extent to which interest groups can overcome 
collective action problems relates to the characteristics of the groups themselves.
Limitations
The societal approach, however, is not perfect. There are some issues which 
need redressing before we can attempt to shed any light on this thesis’ contribution to 
international political trade economy. Among these issues is; factor mobility models 
and their questionable assumptions. Furthermore, societal approaches allude to domestic 
actors and their impact on outcomes but -  and this is of vital importance to this thesis -  
provide no method of actually evaluating the relationship between domestic actors and 
final outcomes. Each of these areas shall be dealt with in turn.
Despite their conflicting assumptions about factor mobility, both the factor 
endowments model and the specific factors model stress collective action costs as a 
major variable in affecting the extent to which social preferences translate into policy 
choices. Upon closer examination however, each model suffers from imperfections that 
cast doubt on their ability to make accurate predictions about the ability of interest 
groups to influence policy making, because assumptions that underlie those predictions 
are often questionable. The predictions themselves often lack convincing empirical
The point is that a particular factor has an interest in seeing a high domestic price for the good it 
produces and so favours protection. They are often few in number and thus find it easy to mobilise themselves in 
order to influence their governments. This is overcoming the so-called 'collective action problem' described by Olson 
( 1965) .
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support.
First of all, let us examine the factor endowment model. While it makes clear 
predictions about mobilisation, the logic behind those predictions is somewhat tenuous 
because the preferences of societal actors are not as unambiguous as the model assumes. 
Societal actors may draw income from more than one factor, and this in turn can create 
conflicting preferences if some of those factors are more abundant than others.
Moreover, actors with uncertain preferences will have less incentive to become 
politically active and may not mobilise despite their potential ability to do so 
(Coneybeare 1983). Second, the specific factors model; factor mobility ensures that 
owners and users of abundant factors can relocate into expanding export oriented 
industries with ease, regardless of whether they actually contribute to the association’s 
activities. Similarly, protection assists all owners and users of scarce factors since they 
can relocate into protected industries without needing to be politically active (Kim 
2000a; Alt and Gilligan 1994; Caves 1976; Pincus 1975). When factors are mobile, it is 
then difficult to exclude societal actors from the benefits of trade policies. Consequently, 
Rogowski's expectations of mobilisation need not come to pass unless the costs of 
collective action are somewhat low. When labour is flexible and portable from industry 
to industry or region to region, efforts to mobilise politically will encounter great 
difficulty, since membership of worker organisations may be unstable, making it more 
difficult to solicit constitutions from workers. Factor mobility therefore may present 
considerable problems for collective action that Rogowski does not adequately address 
in his work. Furthermore, the specific factors model attributes variation in the level of 
mobilisation to various industry level characteristics such as factor specificity. Since 
characteristics such as factor specificity need not be correlated with the degree of 
international competitiveness or import competition, the specific factors model cannot 
make clear predictions about the relative inherent abilities of the competing interests to 
engage in collective action in response to external demands. If the model is truthful, any 
economic shift should be followed by the mobilisation of both export oriented interests 
and import competing interests regardless of the nature of the shift. Regardless of the 
weaknesses of the two models themselves, each model can help us to understand the 
expected interests of societal actors.
In sum, societal approaches consider trade policy as the result of competition
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among interest groups and the other non-state actors affected by commerce. Essentially, 
the societal approaches' literature argues that overcoming collective action problems is 
a key determinant of political influence (Gowa 1988). Moreover, the extent to which 
interest groups can overcome collective-action problems is a function of some 
characteristics of the groups themselves, such as the specificity of the factors of 
production of which they are members or whether they profit from changes in the level 
of a country’s international trade. However, the ability to overcome collective action 
problems and mobilise for political purposes need not guarantee influence over policy 
matters (Keohane and Milner 1996; Alt and Gilligan 1994; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; 
Odell 1990; Goldstein and Lenway 1989; Nelson 1988; Krasner 1984). This weakness 
points to a certain importance of institutions which may intermediate between societal 
pressures and policy outcomes; affect the relative abilities of different interest groups to 
influence policy-making and thus help determine the outcomes of competition over 
foreign economic policy.
A critique of current literature of institutions
Much of this literature has attempted to develop the link between state 
institutions and policy outcomes^. Put simply, preferences do not automatically 
translate into policy decisions. Within this conceptualisation of institutions, Ikenberry et 
al., (1988) argues that institutions range from ‘specific characteristics of government 
institutions’ that affect channels of access to policy-making to ‘more overarching 
structures of state’ that influence the distribution of decision-making power within the 
state to the ‘normative social order’ that sets bounds on acceptable forms of state 
intervention in the economy. If domestic political institutions affect the ability of 
different interest groups to influence policy, they will affect whether or not countries 
stay on the path towards greater economic openness.
One popular argument is that the magnitude of policy change is negatively 
correlated with the “number of veto players,” which is defined as the number of
Closely related to the specific topic under examination in this study, Katzenstein asserts that "the 
domestic structure o f the nation state is a critical intervening variable without which the interrelation between 
international Interdependence and political strategies cannot be understood” (1978a: 3). He analyses six advanced 
industrial states and contends that differences in domestic structures and the international context in which they are 
situated have led to the adoption o f different strategies o f foreign trade policy, such as quotas, invisible tariff barriers, 
direct subsidies to import-competing industries, and different forms o f  foreign exchange controls.
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institutional actors whose assent is necessary for a policy change (Tsebelis 2002). He 
emphasises the effect of veto players, which he defines as ‘an individual or collective 
actor whose agreement is required for a policy change (1995: 93).' These veto players 
could block policy proposals for reform. Furthermore, an increase in the number of veto 
players disperses decision-making authority. The greater dispersal of authority will 
therefore limit the extent to which any demand for altering the status quo will actually 
influence policy decisions (Tsebelis 1999; 2002)19. As Garrett and Lange (1995) point 
out, decision makers within different veto points may have sharply differing views on 
policy reform when the institutions themselves represent different constituencies and 
aggregate preferences in different ways. Presidents for instance, generally represent 
national constituencies and are more likely to view issues through the prism of the 
national interest than are individual legislators (Destler 1995). From this, one may 
conclude that federalism may over- represent particular regional interests hostile to 
certain policy proposals (Verdier 2001; 1998).
In a more comparative vein, Rogowski (1987) argues that different electoral 
systems create different incentives for distributional politics. Larger electoral districts 
generally contain a more heterogeneous collection of interests. This diversity of 
pressures can give representatives more autonomy while in small districts, 
constituencies are more homogenous and the influence of any one interest will increase. 
As the size of the district increases, representatives will have more autonomy and more 
ability to act on their own views rather than those of their constituents, which works to 
the disadvantage of rent-seeking protectionists (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Garrett 
1995; Rodrik 1995). Such works demonstrate that institutions can affect the levels of 
access to policy makers which interest groups have in the area of trade policy. 
Katzenstein has also suggested a natural affinity between trade dependence and 
proportional representation in the smaller European states as a lucky historical accident 
motivated principally by domestic social conflicts (1985: 150-156). Following on, 
Oatley (2004) argues that general elections, which many would suggest constitute the 
defining characteristic of democracy, are crucial as they create powerful incentives for 
politicians to present the economic interests of their constituents. In order to maintain
In more recent years though, Mansfield et al., (2002) have argued that the fragmentation of power within 
post-communist countries has been a potential force for trade liberalisation. In post-communist states, where power is 
fragmented within the national government, the newly elected leaders or elites have had weak ties to the old regime.
43
Chapter One
their political office in this system, representatives must make policies that satisfy the 
demands of the constituents or domestic stakeholders in their districts. In a single­
member district electoral system, therefore, national trade politics will be characterised 
by competition between industries because political representation is directly linked to 
specific territorial districts with unique economic characteristics (Oatley 2004: 97).
By comparison, electoral systems based on proportional representation will 
more likely encourage trade coalitions built upon factorial rather than sectoral positions. 
In this manner differing electoral systems affect the creation of divergent trade politics. 
In this way a single-member system will cause sector-based competition, whereas 
factor-based competition stems from proportionally represented electoral systems.
The review of the institutional literature demonstrates that domestic political 
institutions have critical effects on national political responses to external pressures. 
Many scholars (Tsebelis 1999; Hall 1992; Haggard 1990; Rogowski 1987) provide 
theoretical logic that formal political institutions, such as the number of veto players, 
the level of bureaucratic autonomy, the government type, the party system and the 
electoral system could be important institutional variables.
In developing this argument, Frieden and Martin (2001) seek to highlight 
interests and institutions as being the most viable perspectives in explaining and 
understanding the outcome of foreign economic policy. Furthermore, they categorise 
two functions of institutions; aggregation and delegation (ibid: 23-24)20. Some 
institutions aggregate the ability of interests groups to organise and the weight they will 
have in the political process. Others achieve this by delegating decision-making 
authority to particular actors. In one way or another, Frieden and Martin's primary 
emphasis is on delegating authority (electoral, legislative institutions and bureaucratic 
institutions), which serves to mediate the pressures brought to bear by organised 
interests and the general public, transforming them in ways that directly affect policy­
making.
The importance of these studies cannot be overlooked. They have a
While mentioning aggregation, the above authors do not clarify it sufficiently for my purposes. Thus, 
while utilising Frieden and Martin’s ideas in terms o f juxtaposing interests and political institutions, I find it more 
conducive to employ Milner's terminology when referring to political institutions. Consequently, Milner (1993) 
classifies two types: representative and administrative institutions. She argues (in a study o f three countries: France, 
Britain, US) trade policy outcomes is seen to be specifically dependent on legislatures, political parties, elections and 
bureaucratic apparatus. It is exactly through the aforementioned political institutions that interest groups in Korea 
attempt to influence FTA policy.
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demonstrated track record in explaining the political institutional determinants of trade 
policy. Leading explanations of such kind usually focus on the role of proportional 
representation versus electoral systems based on plurality (Persson and Tabellini 2000; 
Mansfield and Busch 1995; Rogowski 1987). However, this argument cannot account 
for all of the variation in trade policy between and within countries, and generates 
numerous anomalies that still need to be explained. Other studies into the role of 
presidentialism or party discipline suffer from similar limitations.
However, the fact is that the vast majority of the above literature is derived 
from studies examining the US. This US-centric approach inevitably overlooks 
differences that exist in how state and non-state actors might act outside of a US context. 
Hence the role of political institutions fails to explain why the Korea-Japan ETA 
reached a deadlock. Other anomalies remain when the outcome of the Korea-Chile and 
Korea-US FTAs are examined using the institutional argument (e.g. the extended 
duration of the ratification process of both despite support from the government).
This thesis contends that a societal approach will help towards bridging these 
possible gaps in our understanding and so it is to this theory that we shall return. 
Problematically, the current literature has not been clear in defining the link between 
overcoming collective action problems and policy outcome. Fortunately, there is a body 
of literature (influence lobbying) that offers us some clues as to how to go about 
building an analytical framework which can explain how interest groups preferences are 
transferred into policy outcome through channels of influence. This literature includes 
the work of Milbrath (1963) who distinguished between tactics and strategies of interest 
groups, Berry (1984) who described four different types of interest group strategies (use 
of law, protests, releasing research papers and constituency influence), Gais and Walker 
(1991) who explored links between insider and outsider strategies and Victor (2007) 
who argues that lobbying tactics can be divided into two categories (insider and outsider 
lobbying). This thesis has utilised these analyses to develop a framework consisting of 
three key channels of influence (PI, PPPM, and IPI) (for details see Chapter Two) that 
describes how interest groups convert preferences into policy outcomes.
By employing this analytical framework, this thesis demonstrates the 
practicability of applying the societal approach in explaining how interest groups act as 
a key variable in Korea’s FTAs.
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Chapter Two: Korea’s FTA Context
Introduction
While the previous chapter discussed the theoretical framework upon which this 
thesis will build, this chapter explores the analytical framework in order to demonstrate 
why I believe the societal approach is the most appropriate method for examining the 
variances in Korean FTAs to date. Particularly germane to this approach is the 
explanation of the distinguishing features and the factors that produce domestic 
stakeholders. Therefore the initial purpose of this chapter is to examine how societal 
actors have evolved or developed within the context of international, statist and societal 
approaches, through reviewing a brief historical context of Korea's political and 
economic development (particularly foreign economic policy) during and immediately 
after Korea’s period of democratisation in 1987.
The second issue the chapter addresses is to explain how domestic stakeholders 
translate their influence into policy preference. We attempt to do this by defining three 
key channels of influence; Public Influence (PI), Capacity to influence political 
institutions (IPI) and Proximity to key politicians and policy makers (PPPM). PI refers 
to processes by which bodies attempt to gain public support for specific positions. The 
media, such as television and the Internet, play an important role in this politicisation 
and will be examined in detail. IPI refers to the way in which societal actors' demands 
go through the existing institutions. Within Korea's FTA policy making process we 
examine in particular the two important veto players (President and the NA). This 
analysis provides both a demand and supply side interpretation which makes for a better 
understanding of Korea's FTA dynamics. PPPM describes the relationship that many 
groups in Korea have with individual politicians and key policy makers and the 
influence that can be gained through these relationships.
The chapter will then discuss the defining characteristics of FTA procedures, 
namely the agenda-setting, negotiation and ratification phases. Following on from this, 
we shall examine how political bodies, individuals and domestic stakeholders operate 
through these three phases.
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Democracy in Action and the evolution of interest groups
The democracy announcement of 1987 ushered in not only a new era of 
political democracy, which was a decisive turning point for domestic freedom but also a 
period of new-found growth for Korea's new foreign economic policy. However, the 
expansion of the political space altered the characteristics of state cohesiveness and 
allowed a broader array of social groups to become active, independent actors. Three 
foreign economic policy cases will be discussed to place the evolution of interest groups 
in context. These are beef imports in 1987, the UR negotiations in 1993 (focusing, in 
particular, on the opening of the rice market mentioned in the Introduction) and the 
Korea-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1998.
The case involving beef imports highlighted the considerable difficulties the 
Korean government had when dealing with the conflicting interests between farmers 
and exporters1. Coalition groups comprised of primary producers managed to draw the 
NA's support on this issue by organising nation-wide demonstrations opposing the 
imports. The one-quarter of the NA members with constituencies in rural areas had little 
choice but to oppose the imports. This prevented the Korean Government’s attempt to 
open beef markets despite domestic pressure from the industrial sector, coupled with 
threats of US retaliation.
Even more remarkable was the involvement of the film industry in the Korea- 
US BIT, which the Korean government pursued fervently for several years. From the 
time of the initial negotiations, however, the controversial screen quotas2 issue had 
been a major hurdle in clinching this treaty. Facing continued strong resistance from the 
film industry - which was allied with civil groups and took advantage of strong media 
exposure - lobbying both opposition and governing party members of parliament, the 
Korean government backed away from the negotiation, thus bringing the BIT 
negotiations to a halt. Finally, in January 1999, the Korean NA passed a resolution that 
the screen quota should stay in its contemporary form until the local film industry 
obtained 40 percent of the market (Choi 2006:3). This once again demonstrates the
The US insisted and warned Korea regarding the beef issue in 1987 that it would request a GATT dispute 
settlement for Korean violation o f its obligations under GATT, and threatened to add a retaliatory tariff o f 100 
percent under Section 301 o f the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness to all Korean products exported to the 
US.
For the details, see Choi (2006) 'When culture meets trade-Screen Quota Conundrum, ’ Ewha Womans 
University, August, 2005.
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potential for interest groups to sway policy thinking and outcomes on trade policy issues.
The common factor in these cases was the strong voice of domestic coalitions 
in the foreign economic policy making process. Even in the face of state ambition and 
international pressure, their influence produced outcomes quite removed from the 
original positions assumed by the Korean government. This established an early 
position for interest groups as influential actors in foreign economic policy making.
These two foreign economic policy episodes, including the UR negotiations 
discussed in the introduction, make it difficult to support a statist argument that Korean 
foreign economic policy outcomes, including FT As, are solely shaped by national 
interest as defined by the government of the day. Rather, they demonstrate that many 
foreign economic policy outcomes are managed to some extent by societal actors or, to 
put it less forcefully, compromised by domestic political processes. Furthermore, these 
episodes also provide some insight into the characteristics (means) of interest groups’ 
channels of influence, which are key analytical tools for this thesis. The following 
section of the thesis examines the principal channels of influence.
The three key structures of channels of influence
As has already been noted in the analytical framework, Duverger (1972), and 
Almond and Powell (1966) broadly distinguish formal (direct pressure on government) 
and informal channels (public demonstrations). These two categorisations cover a 
complicated matrix of relationships that dictate the flow and transfer from preference to 
influence to policy outcome. Other scholars have elaborated this distinction by 
identifying the tactics and strategies that many interest groups use.
We know that groups choose categories of lobbying tactics for strategic 
purposes. For example, groups may use direct lobbying and grassroots in one situation, 
or indirect lobbying in different circumstances. Milbrath (1963) has suggested that 
tactics are external activities in which groups engage (e.g. meeting with MPs), while 
strategies involve the use of a combination of tactics to influence a given situation.
Some groups may choose either direct or indirect lobbying based on their 
organisational resources and prior experience in using the tactics (Berry 1997). Gais and 
Walker (1991) draw upon this and distinguish between insider and outsider strategies.
48
Chapter Two
They found that groups inside the political process use tactics such as legislative 
lobbying, litigation and electioneering, while outsider strategies consist of protests and 
grassroots lobbying. Victor (2007) has argued that lobbying tactics fall into two 
categories: direct and indirect lobbying. Direct lobbying (or ‘insider lobbying’) is 
defined as close consultation with political and administrative leaders, relying mainly 
on financial resources, substantive expertise and concentration within certain 
congressional constituencies as a basis for influence. Direct lobbying is therefore made 
up of one-on-one contact and the provision of information to try to influence legislators. 
Indirect lobbying (or ‘outsider lobbying’) is aimed at influencing the views of the 
general public in the expectation that these will in turn affect the preferences of 
legislators (Victor 2007: 827; Kollman 1998: 9; Berry 1997: 121). When the public is 
highly aware of an issue, it is more difficult for NA to ignore the demands of groups 
regarding that issue.
Several of these studies drew many of these conclusions together and the result 
was that they distinguished four different types of interest group strategies. The first 
type of strategy utilises litigation and administrative interventions. The second type 
includes acts of protest and public relations. Third category was informational strategies 
such as publishing research reports, conducting presentations to government ministries 
and agencies and giving congressional testimonies. The final strategy consists of 
influencing MPs at the constituency level, publishing voting records and campaign 
contributions.
Although this thesis stresses the role of formal and informal channels that 
interest groups utilise to express their preferences, it would well behoove us to delineate 
further categorisations that would help evaluate the case studies in further detail. This is 
not to say that the formal and informal channels would be subsumed by these 
categorisations, it would rather be a case of the former resting upon the latter. In other 
words, we shall retain the use of the distinction between formal and informal channels 
but shall apply more specific categorisations where appropriate to help shed light on the 
specificity of the link between domestic stakeholder influence and FTA outcome.
While Duverger and Almond and Powell have elucidated the importance of 
both formal and informal channels of influence, there are further nuances that later 
theorists have developed which we need to examine from the perspective of this thesis.
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Some of the works discussed above share overarching similarities. Both Gais and 
Walker and Victor point out the duality o f ‘insider' versus ‘outsider' tactics (or 
lobbying). These forms of influence work through two main areas, political institutions 
and public influence. This duality, as we shall see in our case studies, is also applicable 
in a Korean context. Milbrath’s argument that interest groups utilise strategies that 
consist of one or more tactics also fits in with what we would expect to observe in the 
debates over Korea’s FTA policy. In utilising these arguments for the purpose of this 
thesis, I shall describe three categorisations, which are PI, IPI and PPPM.
Public Influence (PI)
Public Influence (Gais and Walker’s ‘outsider strategy’, Victor’s ‘indirect 
lobbying’ and Berry’s ‘acts of protest') is the ability to influence the public in one's 
favour. This is an informal channel of influence and consists primarily of street protests 
and demonstrations (both violent and non-violent) and media campaigns.
Demonstrations by themselves, however, are not necessarily of any great 
import if the public at large remains ignorant of them and the rationale behind them. In 
this regard, PI in Korea cannot be explained without invoking a group's relationship to 
the media.
It is generally accepted that in the wake of political democratisation since 1987, 
the autonomy and influence of Korean media has increased as state control has 
gradually diminished (Chang & Park 2000: 85-86; Lee 1999: 210-211). In other words, 
the Korean media could succeed in strengthening its own power and influence, 
penetrating into the vacuum of power in which the authoritarian regime lost its grip in 
the process of political democratisation (Chang and Park: 2000).
Since the 1990s, the Korean media has developed in terms of ideological 
preference (Cho 2008; Chang and Park 2000). More importantly, during the ten years of 
the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presidencies, when all the three cases examined 
in this thesis took place, television became more left-leaning (Lee 2006; Oh 2005; Kim 
& Choi 2004). According to a recent study examining the public influence of media 
(Choi & Kim 2008), the ideological bias of the press has played a critical role in terms 
of media exposure of specific interest groups. For example, left leaning media have 
supported the agricultural sector while more conservative media have supported the
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position of the FKI (Chang & Park 2001).
Internet and television have much more influence on the public in general than 
newspapers in Korea (Lee 2008; Song and Park 2005). In particular, Internet resources 
on politics will be used primarily by those citizens who are already politically well 
connected, educated, and have been motivated via traditional channels of influence, like 
mass media, political actors, and grassroots activists. Furthermore, evidence suggests 
that increased communication capacity raises the degree of political participation in 
general (Whang 2001). With regards to the political effects of media use patterns, 
people who read newspapers, for example, tended to have negative attitudes towards the 
Roh Moo-hyun administration whilst those who watch television news or use the 
Internet, in contrast, were likely to have positive attitudes (Cho 2008: 20-22; Min 2007). 
Typically, conservative people in Korea tend to be older, educated individuals who read 
conservative newspapers (Hwang 2001; Chang and Park 2000: 90-91), while the 
younger generation tends to be comparatively more left-wing and reliant on online news 
sources (Lee 2008; Choi and Kim 2008).
Television programs such as ‘PD Notebook' and network news, for example, 
covered issues such as US beef imports (28th April, 2008). The programme clearly 
opposed the government decision to restart imports and helped paved the way for the 
mobilisation of massive public protests against US beef imports. Suffice to say that the 
role of the media in helping to build up the momentum for public demonstrations, 
willingly or not, cannot be overlooked.
Historically, opponents of the various FT As have been more astute at 
harnessing PI. A simple explanation for this phenomenon is the fact that supporters of 
FT As tend to rely more on formal channels than informal. There are several reasons for 
this. Lead among them is the fact that business groups' access to OP is more focused 
that that of their opponents and places them in a position that gives them superior access 
to political institutions. To use the terminology of Gais and Walkers's and Victor's 
duality of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, the role of ‘outsider’ is the remaining avenue for 
opposing groups. Also, the FKI tends to shy away from publicly supporting FTAs in 
case they are subjected to boycotts by their opponents (see Chapters Three & Five, 
Korea-Chile and Korea-US for further details).
Power to influence political institutions (IPI)
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The thesis mainly focuses on the demand side of Korea’s FTA policy making 
processes and outcomes to explain the effects of interest groups on FTA policy. 
However, this does not mean that the supply side should be ignored (Milner 1997a). In 
this regard, some institutionalists (Tsebelis 2002; MacIntyre 2001) argue that domestic 
political institutions can intervene between interest group demands and policy decisions 
and thus affect the extent to which the preferences of interest groups influence policies 
that the state implements. In particular, they argue that the ability of interest groups to 
affect policy is a function of the number of veto players within a state.
One of the great advantages of a veto player framework is the ease with which 
it can be applied to diverse constitutional and party configurations to highlight the ease 
or difficulty, on average, of affecting policy change (MacIntyre 2001: 88). Tsebelis 
(2002) emphasises the concept of the veto player, which he defines as “an individual or 
collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo” (1999: 
593). He describes two types of veto players. The first type is the institutional veto 
player (e.g. presidents, chambers of legislatures), which is created by the state 
constitution, for example, and has fonnal veto power on policy matter. The second type 
is the partisan veto player, which consists of parties in governing coalitions. Tsebelis 
(2001) examined the effects of veto players and argued that large numbers of such veto 
players hinder efforts at policy reform. In other words, veto players are in a position to 
water down or block any proposals for policy change, and an increase in their number 
leads to increased difficulties in changing policies (Immergut 1990).
To test the logic behind the theory, many studies have been undertaken in a 
wide range of areas: among them, for instance, in response to Asian financial crisis of 
1997-1998 (MacIntyre 1999, 2002), and the liberalisation of capital controls (Kastner 
and Rector 2003). In the area of trade policy, Biglasier and Brown (2001), having 
focused on the effects of partisan veto players, concluded that trade liberalisation in 
Latin American countries is more extensive when there is a larger number of parties in 
legislatures because this creates coordination problems for protectionist parties. They 
thus arrive at similar conclusions to those studies carried out in different fields. As the 
above example illustrates, domestic political institutions can act as a brake on efforts to 
change existing policies and thus foil the efforts of interest groups who wish to revise 
the status-quo so that economic policy is more to their liking.
52
Chapter Two
Applying Tsebelis' analysis to the Korean context, we can identify two 
institutional type veto players; the office of the President and the NA. Partisan veto 
players (such as governing groups), as Tsebelis defines them, are not really applicable 
to the Korean case because of the fractious, constantly changing nature of Korean 
politics, where parties change names and members on a regular basis. This has meant, 
contemporarily speaking, that coalitions have not found enough political space to form, 
let alone survive, therefore preventing a possible partisan veto player from arising.
Given that various studies have concluded that the higher the count of veto 
players within a system results in greater difficulty in changing policy, one could 
assume that the converse would hold true. That is, a lower count of veto players would 
mean it would be easier to change policy. Following on from this assumption, 
considering that, in the Korean case, there are only two institutional veto players, one 
might expect to find less difficulty in passing policies that affect the status quo. 
However, the reality is somewhat different. Therefore, in order to better understand 
Korean FTAs, a richer and fuller account could be achieved by layering in the societal 
factors. Before we look at these societal factors, let us first examine the Korean 
institutional veto players, the President and the NA, and why the central assumption of 
the veto players literature does not fit with the reality of the Korean situation.
Veto players in the Korean FTA policy-making structure
South Korea ’s FTA policy-m aking process
Based on theoretical adaptations it is essential to examine South Korea's FTA 
policy structure in terms of the formal FTA policy-making process.
Figure 2. 1: South Korea’s FTA policy structure.
The President
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Cho (2003: 638) describes an overall FTA policy-making process that is 
summarised in Figure 2.1. The Figure shows that Korea's key actors comprise of the 
President, the national assembly, political parties and relevant interest groups. Based on 
his analysis of Korea’s FTA policy-making process, there are five possible key actors; 
the President, key ministries, political parties, the national assembly and interest groups. 
These administrative clusters are separated into either formal or informal participant 
groups. Based on this framework, the President, along with relevant Ministries and the 
NA has formal authority. While political parties and interest groups are part of this 
policy structure, they do not have this formalised status in the Korean FTA policy­
making process. We hope to refine this model further by examining the role of the NA 
and the president as veto players and how domestic stakeholders are active participants 
in this policy structure. We look at the role of the NA and the president in this chapter, 
whereas we examine the role of domestic stakeholders in greater detail in the empirical 
chapters.
President
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Based on Korea's trade policy-making structure, we can see that there are two 
important veto players: the President and the NA. The current Constitution basically 
adopts a presidential system of'checks and balances' between the executive and the 
legislature, even though it incorporates some elements of a cabinet system (Mo and 
Moon 1999). However, the Korea FTA policy-making style can be characterised as an 
authoritarian developmental style which revolves around the President, despite recent 
increases in democratic development (Blondel 1996a).
The President is authorised to enter into and ratify treaties with foreign 
countries. The President's formal influence in foreign policy therefore seems to be much 
greater in Korea than in other developed countries. The President’s role in advocating 
FT As as a legitimate economic policy option in Korea has proven to be very important 
{JoongAng Daily, 07/03/2006; 13, 29/01/ 2007). For example, both Presidents Kim 
Dae-jung (Korea-Chile FTA) and Roh Moon-hyun (Korea-US FTA) were instrumental 
in moving forward the FTAs launched during their administrations and played pivotal 
roles in Korea’s shift towards bilateral FTAs. It is difficult, however, to find evidence of 
President Kim playing a decisive role in the process of Korea-Chile FTA (Ahn 2003:
68). It should be noted that although the Korea-Chile FTA was eventually passed under 
President Roh's administration, it did so at a very high cost, both financially (i.e. side 
payments to interests adversely affected by the agreement of around 1.3 trillion Won) 
and in political capital. More recently, President Lee Myung-bak has been highly visible 
during the Korea-US FTA ratification phase. Despite this visibility the Korea-US FTA 
has failed to be ratified by the NA. The fact of the matter is that although the presidency, 
as an institution, claims veto power, presidents themselves are subject to the whim of 
the electorate, just like any other politician. Hence, we cannot overlook the role that 
elections play. Oatley (2004) argues that elections are very important because they 
create incentives for politicians to represent the economic interests of their constituents. 
In this regard, one key tactic of interest groups in general, is to utilise presidential 
election campaigns as an important means to state what their group's preferences are, 
which many would suggest constitutes the defining characteristic of democracy. This 
aspect is crucial as it creates powerful incentives for politicians (including candidates 
running for the presidency) to represent the economic interests of the voters they would 
hope to sway. For example, both the Korea-Chile FTA and Korea-US FTA ratification
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processes took place during the 2002 and 2007 Presidential elections (details in Chapter 
Three and Five) and were accordingly placed on the back-burner during these 
campaigns. Neither FTA had the outright, public support of the president during the 
elections and neither passed its ratification phase the year of the elections either.
To summarise, although the President does have a veto role in the FTA process, 
this veto role does not give the President with a preference for FTAs the power to pass 
these FTAs that are opposed by institutions or groups other than the president. It is the 
contention of this thesis that domestic stakeholders can be counted among these groups 
that stay the hand of presidents (as veto players) with a preference for FTAs.
National Assembly
The NA is supposed to play an important role as a democratic controller of 
executive power and has constitutional powers in FTA policy-making, notably the 
requirement that it must ratify trade agreements. It is this ratification process that has 
attracted the influence of domestic interest groups in the FTA policy-making process. 
The Executive relies on obtaining NA approval for its foreign economic policies. 
Generally the government obtains this support without much difficulty and the role of 
the political party amounts to supporting the government’s foreign economic policy. 
However, when the issue of FTAs began to arise in the NA, the typical support that has 
been given to the government when it came to foreign policy became more difficult to 
mobilise. This can partly be explained by looking at the forces acting on politicians and 
political parties.
As a general description of Korean political parties, there are no parties that 
represent specific social classes and interest groups (Helgesen 1998: 194; Cotton 1989). 
Therefore, there is generally a weak relationship between political parties and interest 
groups. Interest groups accordingly often have to rely on informal channels such as 
public demonstrations, to generate media and public attention to articulate their 
preferences in the case of FTAs.
On the other hand, farmers as a group enjoy a certain amount of influence in 
political circles. During the Korea-Chile FTA ratification process, parties allowed 
discretionary authority to their members due to an intra-party row. Therefore, rural 
members (MPs) were allowed, regardless of their party affiliation, to conduct
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themselves as members of a "Rural Party." In this manner, the distinctions between the 
ruling party and the opposition, the left and the right were blurred. The only salient 
division was between the rural community representatives (MPs), who were very 
conscious of the farmers’ strong FTA opposition, and the non-rural community 
representatives (MPs). Under these circumstances, the political party structure actually 
helped to protect farmers' interests.
This phenomenon is due to the special nature of Korean electoral institutions. In 
the Korean case, electoral institutions created as a result of political calculations have 
tangible consequences on FTA policy. The apportionment of electoral districts has 
serious political implication in terms of representation (Park 2005: 90). The key feature 
of malapportionment has been the over-representation of rural areas and the under­
representation of urban areas.
The electoral law was the result of political manipulation of apportionment by 
authoritarian governments since the early 1960s (Netherlands 1988: 63). The most 
salient voting pattern of Korean voters in the authoritarian period (Park Jung-hee and 
Chun Du-whan administrations) was 'rural voters vote for the ruling party, while urban 
voters vote for the opposition party’ (Kim 1989: 488; Netherlands 1991: 25). In order to 
secure a majority in the NA, the ruling party deliberately increased the number of rural 
districts, which traditionally supported it. Although this voting behaviour is no longer 
the dominant voting pattern in Korea due to the existence of regional based voters, the 
most important voting pattern of Korean voters today, the vested interests of lawmakers 
make it impossible to reduce the number of rural districts even after the Constitutional 
Court ruling3 and heavy criticism to the election law.
Most over-presented districts are predominantly rural areas, while most under­
represented ones are urban and mostly in the Seoul area (Yu 2006: 667). Consequently, 
the rural interests are over-represented in the Korean NA, despite attempted election law 
reform since 1995. Specifically, agricultural coalitions have successfully managed to 
make use of this gerrymandering of Korea's electoral constituencies. Therefore, 
agricultural interests have been able to protect their monopolistic interests over national
In December 1995, the Constitutional Court judged that the then current election law, which allowed a 
maximum ratio 1 to 5.9 in terms of the population between the two districts with the largest discrepancy, was a 
violation of the Constitution and suggested a maximum 1 to 4 ratio. Accordingly, in the 2000 election, the maximum 
discrepancy between two extreme districts was narrowed down to 1 to 3.74. Furthermore, in October 25, 2001, the 
Constitutional Court ruled again that the 1 to 4 ratio was still in violation of the Constitution and recommended 
narrowing the discrepancy to 1 to 3 until the end of 2003.
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interests. To put it another way, regardless of whether a governing party supports an 
FTA or not, the dominance of rural districts in the NA makes it difficult for any 
government to ratify an FTA that is perceived to be detrimental to Korean agricultural 
interests.
Proximity to key politicians and policy makers (PPPM)
While IPI is a critical means for domestic stakeholders to exert their influence 
through formal channels, it should be noted that domestic stakeholders also have access 
to informal channels, such as meetings with key politicians and so on.
Victor (2007), Gais and Walker (1991) and Berry (1997) all describe access to 
important politicians as a channel of influence but while Gais and Walker and Victor 
describe it within the confines of the ‘insider’, Berry puts it in the context of a more 
informal strategy. Many groups in Korea had ties to individual politicians and key 
policy makers and they took advantage of these where possible in the discussions over 
FT As. The FKI, an important group which represented large Korean corporations, had 
many former policy makers as members and deliberately groomed close ties with 
current policy makers4. During the Korea-Japan FTA, the FKI worked closely with 
many of these key policy makers before their about-face on the FTA (see Chapter Four). 
Another good example is the Korea-US FTA. In this instance, the FKI met with the 
trade minister from the MOFAT to share their ideas regarding the benefits of a Korea- 
US FTA (see Chapter Five).
It was not only the FKI that had such connections, many civic groups (e.g.
PSPD and CCEJ) -  especially after the Roh Moo-hyun administration -  held close ties 
with many important policy makers5. The agricultural sector also had close ties with 
MPs and policy makers, particularly MPs whose constituencies were in rural areas. The 
agricultural sector often used such informal access to important individuals to gain
According to the Ministry o f General Administration (1995), members o f the Korean business 
community had joined 78 advisory, consultative and decision-making commissions attached to the government and 
the FKI had made an average o f thirty formal policy suggestions every year to the economic bureaucracy since the 
1980s. The government accepted 90 percent o f  the FKI’s policy suggestions since the 1990s (Shatter 1994: 25).
The Dae-Jung Kim government, which had a progressive character, promoted the idea o f participatory 
democracy, a main current o f the New Left that emphasises citizens’ active participation in the policy-making process 
and democratisation o f industrial relations. Many o f  the policy ideas adopted by the government were supplied by 
reform-minded civic organisations such as PSPD and CCEJ (Lee 2005: 296). Furthermore, As o f December 31,2000, 
257 NGO leaders are participating in 92 advisory committees o f  the central government agencies (Kim and Moon 
2003: 560). When Roh’s turn came to run for the presidency, in 2002, civic organisations seized the opportunity to 
establish a firm political foothold.
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influence (for example, persuading rural MPs to vote against FTA ratification, such as 
Korea-Chile FTA and Korea-US FTA).
Organisational Power (OP)
According to the statist argument, the ability of interest groups to overcome 
collective action problems and mobilise for political purposes will not necessarily 
guarantee influence over policy matter (Alt and Gilligan 1994; Odell 1990; Krasner 
1984). The ability to overcome collective action problems, however, is the prerequisite 
for any interest group to influence policies. But how do groups overcome their 
respective collective action problems? For example, small, focused groups (e.g. 
business federations and special interest groups) actually have higher organisational 
power than large, collective groups (e.g. consumers) who suffer from barriers to 
mobilise (e.g. Tree rider’ problems). This characteristic helps us to understand why 
producers' interests dominate trade politics while consumer interests are often neglected. 
The implication of this argument, explicitly stated in Friden (1991a) is that those 
interest groups that are more capable of mobilising are more likely to succeed in 
influencing state policy because policy makers are more responsive to those who are 
politically active.
For example, Olson (1965) argued that interest groups that have relatively few 
members, particularly those with a business orientation that have greater organisational 
capacity, were better able to mobilise to exert political pressure in their special interest 
than were groups with many potential members who sought only benefits for the 
collective. To put it simply, groups with higher organisational power find it easier to 
organise their preferences and can much more effectively lobby government for their 
desired trade policy.
However, OP is about the potential of interest groups. In fact it is a group's 
capacity to organise that allows them to express, via other means, their policy 
preferences. ‘Demand side’ scholars often emphasise characteristics of interest groups 
themselves that are meant to affect their ability to exert influence on states’ policy.
More specifically, they argue that a key factor that explains whether the preferences of 
societal actors actually work their way into policy decisions is whether actors with 
common preferences overcome collective action problems and mobilise for political
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purposes. Those groups that are more likely and better able to organise are better able to 
realise their goals because they will have greater ability to pressure policymakers to act 
upon their wishes.
Rogowski (based on the factor endowment model), for instance, argues that 
actors who benefit from changes in trade flows will have more material resources that 
subsequently can be used for collective action and political activity. Those who suffer 
from changes in levels of trade, meanwhile, are politically disadvantaged by those 
changes, since they have fewer resources that they can devote to political activity, 
which reduces their ability to mobilise for political purposes (Rogowski 1989; 1987). 
Consequently, those who benefit from changes in the level of international trade are 
better placed to organise politically than those who lose. Both groups may have equally 
intense preferences, but the beneficiaries have more resources at their disposal and thus 
are more able to actually organise.
Proponents of the specific factors model, meanwhile, assert that the extent of 
interest groups' mobilisation is affected by sector specificity because factor specificity 
determines the intensity of actors' preferences on trade policy. As factors become more 
specific to the sectors in which they are currently employed, they have fewer alternative 
uses in which they can profitably employed, which increases the costs of relocation into 
other industries in reaction to external economic pressures. Thus, greater factor 
specificity creates more intense preferences, which is expected to lead to greater levels 
of mobilisation and, in turn to greater political influence.
Other related sector-based models also offer good additional arguments 
(industrial concentration and the effect of industry size) for which sectors will actually 
overcome collective action problems and become politically active. While more 
concentrated interests are more influential, since they can mobilise with greater ease 
than less concentrated interests (Busch and Reinhardt 2000, 1999; Lopez & Pagoulatos 
1996), industries which are larger and employ more workers wield more influence 
because they command more votes and thus receive more attention from politicians 
with electoral concerns (Marks & Mcarthur 1990; Cameron 1988).
Using this framework, we see that much of what has been stated holds true for 
our case studies. For example, we can see that the role the FKI plays during the multiple 
FTA phases of several negotiations is almost a textbook example of what Frieden,
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Olson and Rogowski et al, have described in their theories. The FKI, although it is a 
representative organisation with 481 of members, in reality is an organisation 
dominated by Korea's largest corporations and is a vehicle for promulgating their 
preferences. The specificity, the number of influential members and unified purpose 
(within reason) are all good factors which explain how it is relatively easy for this group 
to overcome collective action problems.
The agricultural umbrella groups that came about during both the Korea-US 
and Korea-Chile FT As display many of the characteristics suggested in the literature as 
making it more difficult for groups to organize effectively for political action. For 
example, in contrast with the FKI, these umbrella groups contain many more actors. 
Consequently, it took longer for these groups to actually overcome their collective 
action problems. During the Korea-Chile FTA, the primary issue originally of concern 
for agricultural producers was related to the importation of fruit; it was pursued by a 
small number of largely non-influential farming lobbies. This agenda was gradually 
expanded upon by the farming groups, from fruit to the wider implications of 
agricultural importation. Inevitably the potential membership of the agricultural lobby 
rose, increasing the collective action problem. However, along with increasing the 
numbers, the actual debate itself morphed from one based on importing fruit to one of 
globalisation and the Korean sacred cow, rice. These lightening rod issues managed to 
unite a wide group of people, helping the agricultural groups in overcoming their 
collective action problems and to unite as one large, influential umbrella group. One of 
the most important strategies taken by the agricultural sector was to build a good 
working rapport with the network that civic groups had established (i.e. organisational 
power). The network itself was created as a result of the processes of the UR agreement 
(Kim 1995: 160; Chang 1994: 36-39). These civic groups stressed that the FTA would 
have a negative domino effect by creating the political and conceptual space for further 
FT As and, furthermore, was directly linked to the process of globalisation, whose 
consequences were perceived as undesirable by many civil society actors.
What follows from these facts is rather simple. While both the FKI and farming 
umbrella groups overcame their collective action problems, the manner in which they 
did so determined the types of channels of influence that they were most likely to use, 
or in other words, which channels of influence would be more effective for them to use.
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For example, although both groups used PI, the actual details are strikingly different.
On the one hand, the FKI utilised direct access to conservative media (e.g., newspapers, 
etc). On the other hand, the farming umbrella group utilised street demonstrations. Both 
fall within the rubric of PI but both are very different aspects of this channel of 
influence. Moreover, the actual channels that each group used reflect this level of 
Organisational Power, which means to say that although the FKI and the agricultural 
umbrella groups utilised similar channels of influence (IPI, PI, and PPPM), their 
different levels of OP meant that they would use different aspects within each channel 
of influence. This topic will be examined in more detail in the relevant case studies.
Next, each empirical chapter will analyse these channels of influence and the 
role that domestic stakeholders had in utilising them. The three empirical chapters will 
also explain why opponents and supporters utilise different channels of influence. In 
addition, we examine the three variables in order to discover if any channel of influence 
is more efficient than others in producing results. In other words, we hope to measure 
and rank the three variables in terms of efficiency and popularity of use. It is through an 
analysis of the use of these channels of influence and how domestic stakeholders impact 
government FTA policy that this thesis will examine whether a societal approach is 
valuable to explaining differences in Korea's FTA experiences. Beforehand though, we 
shall look at the three phases across which these channels of influence are used.
The three phases of an FTA process
Park et al., (2006: 143) adopted Mundo's framework (1999), concerning the 
domestic processes in their analysis of the Korea-Chile FTA. Based on this analysis, 
there are three phases that are consistent throughout each FTA that has been negotiated 
or ratified to date. The three phases of an FTA are as follows; 1) agenda-setting, 2) 
negotiation and 3) ratification.
The agenda-setting phase:
This phase can be defined as a devising of new policy or a reforming of 
old policy. For example; policy makers' recognition that a problem exists
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creates an opportunity to turn an idea into a credible solution (Mundo 1999: 19). 
The agenda-setting phase is, therefore, dominated by policy makers due to the 
fact that it is their decision whether to consider an FTA or not. Key interest 
groups may, however, prompt action from policy-makers. The FKI, for instance, 
has played a role in this early stage due to their relationship with the MOFAT.
The negotiation ph ase :
The negotiation of international trade agreements, such as FT As, 
between two countries essentially involves negotiations at both the domestic 
and the international level. During international level negotiations, each 
government attempts to forge an agreement that will not cause undue distress in 
domestic circles. During domestic negotiations, the government absorbs the 
concern of societal actors and attempts to build coalitions with them while 
defining a policy that permits the realization of agreement at the international 
level (Mayer 1992: 793-796). As this thesis’ focus is on domestic rather than 
international issues and the relative lack of impact international negotiations 
have on domestic actors, the primary focuses will be on domestic negotiations.
It is this phase where opponents and supporters begin to clash over details of -  
or even the fundamental rationale behind -  an FTA.
Ratification phase:
An agreement arranged, however, does not automatically take effect. 
Most countries have a final phase (ratification) which must be completed before 
the document can come into effect. For example, the US requires Congress to 
pass an agreement for ratification. Korea has a similar ratification requirement: 
an agreement has to pass through Korea's unicameral house with majority 
support for ratification. Specifically, the NA has to pass the bill to the 
Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee (UFATC) before it can be 
voted on in the NA for ratification. Similar to the negotiation phase, the 
ratification phase is also susceptible to political horse trading because elected 
politicians must meet the demands of their own constituencies in pursuing re-
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election (Bearce 2003: 766). In particular, the schism many MPs suffer between 
voting for the national welfare (national interest), along party lines (sectoral 
interest) or in accordance to the wishes of their constituency (public interest), 
results in a fractious assembly which, in turn, results in a situation where 
interest groups’ channels of influence have a played a major role.
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Conclusion
The aim of this chapter is to provide a framework for the following three 
empirical chapters and to introduce some of the key concepts that these chapters shall 
deal with. This chapter has emphasised the context of FTA domestic stakeholders and 
the use of channels of influence by these groups to effect FTA policies. First, we briefly 
looked at the background of domestic stakeholders in the field of foreign economic 
policies. We have also examined how channels of influence can be divided into the 
three structures of channels of influence for the purposes of analysis. While the three 
channels of influence are a means for domestic stakeholders to exert their influence on 
FTA policies, the effectiveness of these channels will be examined in the empirical 
chapters with a view to establishing which, if any, of the channels are more efficient 
than the others
Finally, in order to examine variance in greater detail, the main questions that 
require further elaboration are: Who are the key domestic stakeholders? What are their 
specific rationales? How, and to what effect, did they influence FTA policy? These 
questions go to the heart of this thesis and are dealt with in greater detail in the 
following empirical chapters.
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Chapter Three: Korea-Chile FTA
Introduction
The Korea-Chile FTA was the first bilateral trade agreement of its kind that the 
Korean government established. Although it took more than four years to come to 
fruition and was beset by wrangling over its terms and, indeed, was confronted with 
massive opposition to its very existence, this first FTA helps to reveal how key 
domestic stakeholders interacted with and gave shape to the agreement as it passed 
through each of its three successive phases. Furthermore, it establishes a paradigm 
through which to understand these channels of influence which have continued to 
function in virtually every FTA since.
This chapter opens with a brief background of the Korea-Chile FTA; the 
government’s reason in choosing Chile as, its first FTA partner, including the key issues 
concerning this decision. The primary aim of this chapter is to examine three important 
areas:
i. Identification of the key domestic stakeholders and their respective positions 
regarding the FTA.
ii. Examination of the channels of influence used during the three phases of the 
FTA; agenda setting, negotiation and ratification.
iii. Evaluation of the impact these influences had on the FTA.
A conclusion will follow these main points.
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Background to the Korea-Chile FTA
A Brief Chronology of the Korea-Chile FTA
The Korean-Chile FTA negotiation phase began in December, 1999 after the 
Korean and Chilean heads of state met and agreed to launch trade negotiations during 
the New Zealand, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit of the same year. 
By December 2000, the fourth round of talks were held and 80 percent of the 
agreement’s content was settled. In short, they seemed to have gained some momentum. 
However, the next two years proved to be a difficult period for the FTA. The 
negotiating parties had great difficulty in preventing controversial issues from derailing 
or stalling the negotiations. In the end, it proved to be too much of a task and after the 
4th meeting, the negotiations ground to a halt. The main reason behind the deadlock was 
the agricultural sector; Korean negotiators -  under duress from the agricultural sector -  
wanted to exclude grapes, apples and pears. Chilean negotiators, on the other hand, 
found it difficult to accept this proposal (Lee 2003c: 10-14). According to Yoo, the 
proposals to exclude these products were very much influenced by Korean domestic 
interests (2002:186-191). However, this does not mean to say that the agricultural 
sector alone was influencing the FTA process; other domestic stakeholders were also 
involved (FKI and key ministries, for example). These arguments tend to support using 
the societal approach to interpret the Korea-Chile FTA.
In May, 2001, the Chilean government sent a diplomatic telegram stating that 
unless Korea conceded on excluding certain products (i.e. grapes, pears and apples), the 
FTA negotiations would not continue. Korea’s subsequent intensive diplomatic efforts 
(i.e. the trade negotiation director's visit to Chile, bilateral talks, and a separate high 
level negotiation in Los-Angeles) resulted in the talks restarting in August of 2002 
(Cheong 1999a: 117-118). Taken in a vacuum, this would tend to support the statist 
approach, but doing so ignores the reason why such diplomatic efforts were required, i.e. 
the agricultural sector’s influence was successful in getting the MOAF to support their 
demands for exclusions (see below).
Both parties expected the deal to be finalised during the sixth round.
Eventually, the protracted talks between the two on the FTA drew to a close on October 
24th, 2002. On July 8th, 2003, the government submitted the bill to the NA. Despite this,
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the FTA had to wait another 14 months for the agreement to be ratified. Finally, on the 
16th February, 2004 the NA ratified the bill on its fourth attempt (See Table 3.1). The 
process of ratification demonstrated a certain susceptibility of the NA to influence of 
domestic actors and, furthermore, it was this influence that was integral in causing the 
14 month delay of the Korea-Chile FTA passing ratification in the NA. It should be 
noted that while the Chilean government similarly stalled their ratification of the FTA, 
this was done by a legislature that could have -  in the absence of any opposition -  
passed the agreement at any time of their choosing and, moreover, that this was done in 
reaction to the stalling of the agreement in the Korean NA.
The agreement to ratify the Korea-Chile FTA sailed through the Lower House 
of the Chilean legislature on the 26th of August 2003, the Senate assembly (September) 
and the second Senate assembly (December). The Senate opened a special assembly on 
22nd January 2004 and passed the Korea-Chile FTA unanimously. At the time, Chile 
was known to be postponing the Senate assembly proceedings-the final stage-after 
creating all the proceedings up to the second Senate assembly, putting forward as an 
excuse the delay of the Korean National Assembly’s proceedings. In short, the Chilean 
lower house had passed the pact and was awaiting ratification in the upper house. In 
Chile, the ratification of the pact was always only a matter of time as they were ready to 
ratify it any time the Korean NA showed any sign of ratifying its agreement (Choi and 
Lee 2005: 5).
Table 3.1: Chronology of the Korea-Chile FTA
Period Main Issues
N o v e m b er 1998 K o r e a  d e c id e s  to  p u rsu e  an  F T A , s e le c t in g  C h ile  a s  th e  fir s t p artn er  co u n try .
N o v em b er 1998
T h e  tw o  c o u n tr ie s  a g r ee  to  p u sh  fo rw a rd  an F T A  at th e  A P E C  su m m it m e e t in g  in
M a la y s ia .
A pril an d  June  1999 H ig h - le v e l  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f ic ia l  ta lk s  in S e o u l an d  S a n tia g o .
S ep tem b er 1999 T h e  tw o  c o u n tr ie s  a n n o u n c e d  o f f ic ia l  n e g o t ia t io n  start o n  an F T A .
D ecem b er 1999 F irst ro u n d  o f  ta lk s  h e ld , S a n tia g o .
F eb ruary  2000 S e c o n d  rou n d  o f  ta lk s  h e ld , S e o u l.
M ay  2000 T h ird  ro u n d  o f  ta lk s  h e ld ,  S a n tia g o .
N o v em b er 2000
B o th  p a r tie s  a g r e e  to  w o r k  hard fo r  an e a r ly  s e t t le m e n t  o f  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  th e  B ru n e i
A P E C  su m m it.
D ecem b er 2000 F ou rth  ro u n d  o f  ta lk s  h e ld , S e o u l ,  D e a d lo c k .
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Ju n e  and  O c to b er 2001 Both parties agree to resume talks.
F eb ruary  2002 High-level meeting held to resume talks on concession, Los Angeles.
A ugust 2002 Fifth round of talks held, Santiago.
S ep tem b er 2002 Two rounds of separate talks on concession on commodities, Geneva.
O cto b er 2002 Sixth round of talks held, Geneva Agreement reached.
F eb ruary  15 2003 Both parties signed an FTA.
F eb ruary  16 2004 The Korea NA ratified the bill on its fourth try.
A pril 4  2004 Took effect.
* Source: MOFAT: http://www.fta.go.kr/user/fta_korea/kor_chile.asp?country_idx=l 1
Why did Korea choose Chile as its first FT A partner?
The WTO’s failure to launch a new round of trade talks in Seattle in 1999, a 
fear of exclusion from an FTA-discriminatory trading bloc and the outbreak of the 
Asian financial crisis all helped to catalyse Korea’s decision to pursue FTA policy (Ong 
2003: 58; Solis 2003: 380; Terada 2003: 264—266). What emerged from this cauldron of 
circumstances was a general consensus within Korean policy circles that FT As would 
be crucial to Korean economic survival and competitiveness in a world of economic 
uncertainties1. As discussed in Chapter Two, these circumstances tend to support an 
intemational/statist analysis.
In choosing a potential FTA partner, the Korean government diligently factored 
in as many facets as possible; For example; the market size for investment and trade, 
compatibility between the two parties, location, commitment to bilateral trade and 
political and economical factors were all carefully considered before initiating 
negotiations (Cheong and Lee 2000: 14—26). However, according to the gravity model 
— which predicts bilateral trade flows based on economic size -  Korea would have been 
better off establishing an FTA with Japan or China (Im 2005: 446; Park 2004b: 205- 
206). Korea’s trade volumes with Japan and China -  in terms of economic size and 
geographic distance -  present greater advantages. From this perspective, choosing Chile
Interview conducted with Kim Young-tae, a Deputy director of Economic Cooperation Bureau, in MOFE, 
Seoul, September 12th, 2005; Interview conducted with Lee Kyoung-hyun, director of Trade Policy Division in 
MOCIE, in Seoul, on September 13th, 2005.
Which uses GDP measurements and distance between economies to predict trade flows (Frankel et ai, 
1997: 49-76).
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does seem somewhat puzzling because the Korea-Chile FTA is a typical example of an 
unnatural trading bloc, not only because an ocean separates the two countries, but also 
due to the fact that Chile's economy is relatively small in comparison (Park and Koo 
2007: 265).
The Korean government had sounded out countries that might have been 
interested in engaging in an FTA with Korea. Chile, Thailand, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Japan and Israel reacted positively to suggestions of an FTA with Korea. Due to 
the positive response received, the possible first partner country for an FTA with Korea 
was confined to one of these countries.
According to both the MOFAT (2003b) and the MOFE* 3 (2003)4, there were 
several reasons why Korea selected Chile as its first FTA partner. Firstly, the FTA 
would not adversely affect Korea's agricultural sector (Kim 2003b: 155-156; Cheong 
and Lee 2000); the Korean government justified this assessment by indicating that 
major imported agricultural products, such as grapes, have different cropping seasons 
and that the import volumes were minimal (Kim 2002a: 294; Cheong 2001a: 24). The 
government’s initial speculation was that if the FTA’s effect on the agricultural sector -  
which had the potential to cause the most difficulties -  was projected to be of minimal 
impact then Korea's first FTA would be less likely to encounter difficulties, at least 
from the agricultural sector5. Secondly, before establishing any FT As with larger 
trading partners, such as the US and Japan, Korea believed that Chile’s open trade 
policy and its rich experience in FTA negotiations would make the country an ideal 
candidate (Cheong and Lee 2000: 55-57). Thirdly, Korea could expand its market into 
Chile's manufacturing sector; the high tariff and relatively low priced goods from other 
FTA countries (i.e. Canada & Mexico) made it difficult for Korea to maintain its market 
share and competitiveness. Government ministries assumed6 that the Korea-Chile FTA
In 2008, the Ministry o f Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Ministry o f Planning and 
Budget (MPB) was merged into the Ministry o f Strategy and Finance (MOSF) in order to put under one
roof fiscal policy functions and inter-ministerial policy coordination. On the other hand, the MOFE's
authority on financial policies regarding the financial market was transferred to the Financial Services 
Commission.
4 MOFE (2003) ‘FTA as the Survival Strategy for Korea’s Economy,’ Policy Paper, 1 -55.
Interview conducted with Cho Je-hong, Managing Director in Department of FTA Trade Policy-Making, 
MOFAT; Interview conducted with Son Chan-hyun, a senior researcher in KIEP, Seoul, October 29th and 31st, 2005.
Interview conducted with Kim Young-tae, a leader of Economic Cooperation Bureau, in MOFE, Seoul, 
September 12th, 2005; Interview conducted with Lee Kyoung-hyun, director of Trade Policy Division in Ministry 
MOCIE, September 13th, 2005; Interview conducted with Cho Je-hong, Managing Director in Department of FTA 
Trade Policy-Making, MOFAT and KIEP Son Chan-hyun, a senior researcher conducted, Seoul, October 29th and 
31st, 2005.
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would help towards removing such obstacles and place Korean firms in a position to 
compete with those from Canada and Mexico. Korean automobile and electronics 
manufacturers7 not only agreed with the government’s arguments in favour of an FT A 
but they encouraged the promulgation of these views and actively supported the 
government’s position during the agenda setting phase.
From Chile’s point of view (Choi 2007a: 4; Kim 2003b: 155) Chile chose 
Korea because of the value it placed on Korea’s close linkage (trade and otherwise) 
with neighbouring Asian countries, despite the fact that rules of origin would prevent 
Chilean exports from accessing a wider Asian market. A symbolic bridgehead, so to 
speak. More importantly, Chile wanted an FTA with Korea as it was estimated that 
eliminating tariffs would not have much effect as Korea’s major industrial products 
were already dominant (see Table 3.2). Therefore, an FTA with Korea would not lead to 
a huge increase in imports from industrial products in Chile’s market. Moreover Chile 
was aiming to eliminate tariffs of certain farm products and, consequently, was eager to 
negotiate an FTA with Korea. Importantly, the Chilean perspective was that certain 
farm products (i.e. grapes, apples and pears) were more competitive than their Korean 
counterparts.
Table 3.2-Korean manufactured goods’ share of Chilean market
Items Share of Market Ranking
Automobile 26percent 2
Auto-Battery 38percent 2
Washing Machine 66percent 1
Refrigerator 31 percent 2
Microwave 69percent 1
Elevator 50percent 1
Colour TV 39percent 2
*Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA) as o f2000
In summary, Korea chose Chile as its first FTA partner because of a perceived 
minimal effect on the agricultural sector, high complementarity in trade structure and 
the potential lessons to be gained from Chile’s plentiful experience in regional trading 
agreements. Chile, on the other hand, chose Korea because Chile highly valued Korea’s 
close linkage with neighbouring Asian countries -  Chile could take advantage of 
Korea's trade linkage with Asia to widen Chile’s market access to other Asian countries
Interview conducted with Yoo Jong-sun, one of the managing directors of Korea Automobile 
Manufacturer Association (KAMA), Seoul, December 2nd, 2005 and March 20th, 2007; Interview conducted with 
Jeun Young-jae, a senior research of Economic Research Department, Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), 
Seoul, September 23rd, 2005.
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-  as well as the chance to open Korea’s highly protected domestic agricultural market.
The dichotomy between the two countries’ perspectives on agricultural markets 
eventually resulted in Korea having to pay a higher political and diplomatic tuition fee 
for its first FTA than it originally thought8. To put it another way -  and using an 
explicitly societal approach -  one of the most serious issues arising from the Korea- 
Chile FTA was the government's confrontation with the domestic farm lobby; in 
particular the ability of Korean farmers’ organisations to muster their political weight in 
opposition to the government's FTA negotiations with Chile. Furthermore, the protests 
by farmers, instead of being limited to the grape growers directly hit by the negotiations, 
evolved into a nationwide farmers' movement through the forging of political alliances 
between organisations such as the National Federation of Fanners (NFF) and NGOs 
such as the CCEJ9 and a variety of consumer groups (consumer protection 
organisations, citizens associations, etc.).
Debate concerning distributional consequences
The Korea-Chile FTA resulted in much public discourse and debate concerning 
possible economic effects. Inevitably the debate reflected the positions of those who 
supported and those who opposed the FTA. Of those who supported the FT A from 
within the ranks of the government, the KIEP (1999) calculated the positive economic 
effects of the Korea-Chile FTA. Its estimate was an increase of $660 million in exports 
and $260 million in imports. Therefore, the trade balance would improve by 
approximately $400 million (Cheong and Lee 2000: 54—56). Korea was also expected to 
see an annual improvement in welfare level by $960 million (Kim 2001: 410). 
Deleterious economic effects on both sides would be minimised because Korea and 
Chile’s industry structure were complementary; Chile exports raw materials while 
Korea focuses more on manufactured goods. The seasonal difference would also 
alleviate the concern of Korean agricultural sectors. Although fruit farmers were 
concerned about apples, pears and grapes, the seasonal differences would minimise the 
damage on the agricultural sector. Korea had no access to any FTAs, while if other 
countries were to establish FTAs, Korea’s economy would annually fall by 1.33 percent
8 Korea Times (21/11/2002).
The CCEJ sent a petition against the Korea-Chile FTA to the MOFAT, On February 19th, 2001.
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and would incur a loss of $34.4 billion in trade (Cheong 2001a: 30). For example, the 
market share of automobiles was on a rapid decline in Chile, from 28.3 percent in 2000 
to 17.6 percent as of October 2003 (Park et al., 2003: 23). In addition, market share of 
cell phones was also worrisome, as it continued to drop in Chile. The reality of the 
decline in market share may have been more complex, but fact is that this decline was 
defined by the FTA’s supporters as the result of a lack of an FTA10.
Cheong (1999b) analysed the economic effects of a hypothetical Korea-Chile 
FTA by using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model1 ’. Korea was expected 
to gain more from tariff elimination between the two countries. For example, 
preferential tariffs imposed by Chile on Canadian and Mexican exports through their 
respective FTAs were acting as barriers for Korea’s export products, such as 
automobiles and tyres. In this regard, the ratification of a Korea-Chile FTA would 
provide Korean products with price competitiveness, enabling them to better compete 
with other countries in the Chilean market.
However, not all sectors agreed with the picture painted by the government. 
There were claims by the MOAF and the Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI)
(1999) that the Korea-Chile FTA would not be economically beneficial to Korea’s 
agricultural industry nor would it generate much for the national economy. Agricultural 
organisations, such as The Korean Peasants League (KPL), the Korean Farmer’s 
Cooperation Council Association (KFCCA), and the Korean Grape Association (KGA), 
suggested that investigations and economic calculations from certain governmental 
institutions, such as the KIEP, were not aware of the reality of the Korean agricultural 
economy and claimed that the amount of damage predicted was far understated. Also, 
the government’s claim that seasonal differences between Korea and Chile would limit 
any damage to Korean agriculture was rebutted by the argument that with the 
development of the distribution of goods, seasonal differences had a minimal effect on 
production and consumption (Kim and Lee 2000: 56-73). Civic groups (CCEJ and 
National Minjung Association (NMA)) shared similar views regarding the FTA with 
agricultural coalitions. They both criticised the decision to choose Chile as the first FTA
Interview conducted with Lee Sang-ho, a director o f  Bilateral Economic Cooperation Committees, Korea 
Chamber o f Commerce and Industry (KCCI), Seoul, November 24th, 2005; Interview conducted with Na Hyung-kun, 
a director o f International Economic Research Department, FKI, Seoul, November 26th, 2005.
The CGE model is a general equilibrium model that is used to estimate the re-allocation effects o f  the 
resources caused by the cross-sectoral reallocation o f production factors, which the partial equilibrium is not able to 
deal with.
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partner rather than Singapore (which, they claimed, would not have resulted in the 
opening of the agricultural market)12. Their second argument was that the Korean 
government focused on perceived (and possibly exaggerated) economic benefits while 
possible damage to the agricultural sector was underestimated (Oe et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, the CCEJ13 criticised both the government’s unwillingness to seek 
consensus and its top-down decision making process as anti-democratic and indicative 
of the influence the FKI had over government.
Identification of the key domestic stakeholders
Due to the nature of FTA’s and their impact on society, there is an inevitable 
conflict of interest between those who stand to gain and those who stand to lose (or at 
least perceive themselves as loosing) from such agreements (Grossman and Helpman 
1995: 687). All groups who are affected by the terms of the agreement will attempt to 
exert influence on government negotiations or ratification. Those who stood to gain 
from the Korea-Chile FTA were the FKI (and their workers) that produced automobiles 
and electronic goods, and the losers were typically farmers (Kim 2001: 438—456). The 
government was accused of favouring industrial goods production over agricultural 
produce. In other words, the benefits of the FTA were unfairly distributed, thus fuelling 
political dissent and strong anti-FTA feelings among farmers and their supporters (e.g. 
civic groups). In this sense, the key domestic stakeholders were key ministries (MOFAT 
and MOAF) and the FKI who were to export their industrial goods to Chilean markets, 
the agricultural sector and civic groups.
The primary concerns over the opening o f the agricultural market in the Chilean FTA have remained. In 
the meantime, the success o f the FTA between Japan and Singapore further provoked Korean farmers’ criticisms o f  
the government and civic groups, as they questioned why Korea had not also pursued an FTA with Singapore, rather 
than Chile. However, the reason an FTA has not happened with Singapore lies beyond the control o f the Korean 
government; Singapore was simply more focused on developing the AFTA (Interview conducted with Kim Young-tae, 
a leader o f  Economic Cooperation Bureau, in MOFE, Seoul, September 12th, 2005; Interview conducted with Lee 
Kyoung-hyun, director o f Trade Policy Division in MOCIE, Seoul, September 13th, 2005; Interview conducted with 
Cho Je-hong, Managing Director in Department o f  FTA Trade Policy-Making, MOFAT).
Interview conducted with Lee Jae-kyoung and Yeun Sung-min, one o f  senior members o f CCEJ, Seoul, 
October 11th, 2005.
74
Chapter Three
Supporters of the Korea-Chile FT A 
Key government Ministries
As has already been mentioned (see Chapter Two), MOFAT plays a very 
important in devising trade policy. Also, MOFAT routinely exchanges views and shares 
economic and trade information with leading business groups, such as the Korean 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kor-Cham), the FKI and the Korean Federation 
of Small and Medium Businesses (KFSMB)14. MOFAT has operated 16 trade policy 
and private-sector advisory groups since 1998, which receive views on trade policy 
direction and strategies in sectors such as agriculture, automobiles and 
telecommunications. During the Korea-Chile FT A (and the Korea-US FTA), these 
affiliations gave the aforementioned advisory groups a very important role in the 
agenda-setting phase of the FTA process.
On the other hand, MOAF maintained close contact with Korean agricultural 
interests and saw its primary task as protecting the welfare of Korean agricultural 
producers engaged in import-competing agricultural production15. The MOAF 
presented opposing views on Korea-Chile FTA development. The MOAF did not have 
a particularly strong antipathy towards the FTA but its predilection was to look after the 
interests of the agricultural sector and therefore felt it necessary to offer some 
opposition16. In short, MOAF’s opposition can be described as a combination of its 
predilections and the influence of agricultural interest groups.
The FKI
Although the FKI understood that the distributional consequences were in their 
favour and were supportive of the agreement, they were far from vocal in this support. 
The FKI were not looking at this FTA purely in terms of short term economic gain but 
in terms of what future bilateral trade policies might hold (Kwon 2003; Park et al., 
2003: 7-25). Milner (1997b) claimed that support from endorsement groups and the
14 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (10/05/1999).
Interview conducted with Youn Jang-bae, Assistant Minister for International Trade and Cooperation in 
MOAF, in Seoul, October 17th, 2005.
Interview conducted with Lee Sung-chun, Vice-minister of MOAF, Seoul, September 27th, 2005.
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levels of their support were very important in helping to close the NAFTA. In contrast 
to this, the FKI who supported an FTA with Chile, were not very enthusiastic in 
supporting the government during the negotiation phase, despite being quite active 
during the agenda-setting and ratification phases. There are three reasons for their lack 
of active, public support during the negotiation phase. First, Korean market share of 
exports to Chile were already quite high (see Table 3.2), therefore the Korea-Chile FTA 
would have a minimal impact on increasing this market share17. Second, they were of 
the understanding that the government was using the Korea-Chile FTA as a ‘testing 
ground' for future FTA policies and that it was going to have a relatively easy passage 
through to ratification. Subsequently, they viewed it as less important than possible 
future FTA’s and, hence did not feel a great need to vigorously support the government. 
Third, there was the possibility that vocal support could spark anti-Chaebol sentiment 
(Cheong 2005a), such as launching a large scale economic boycott of goods from FKI 
members (e.g. Doosan large corporation)18 led by civic groups or agricultural worker 
bodies. As a result, the FKI came to the conclusion that the benefits from the FTA with 
Chile were not substantial enough to take a stand against the vehement opposition the 
agreement was receiving (Choi and Lee 2005).
The lack of open support during the negotiation phase had the effect of 
increasing the Korean government's vulnerability to opposing groups. This emphasises 
the state’s vulnerability to strong domestic opposition when attempting to execute 
policy initiatives, thus providing a role for domestic stakeholders in shaping FTA policy 
outcomes. In comparison, this ostensibly lackadaisical attitude stands in sharp contrast 
to their rigorous support during the negotiation phases of both Korea-Japan FTA and 
Korea-US FTA.
The FKI made a survey, called ‘Opinions o f  Korea's large corporations on the FTA" on 53 corporations 
under the FKI (September 2005). In this investigation most corporations (94.3 percent) answered that Korea should 
go forward with the FTA. However, when it came to the question o f which country, answers were for China 42.8 
percent, for the US 36.5 percent, for Japan 7.9 percent, for Mexico 6.4 percent, and for Chile 1.6 percent which was 
the lowest. As this investigation shows, Korean corporations were supportive o f  the FTA itself but were not very 
much in support o f  Chile as the first partner country, in comparison with the Korean government.
The most remarkable case was in 2002, when Doosan company owner Park Yong-sung (Chairman of  
KCCI) expressed support o f  the Korean-Chile FTA and in turn, a public boycott was issued against consuming the 
company’s (and Korean's) main alcohol beverage product - Soju.
76
Chapter Three
Opponents
Agricultural sectors
According to the KREI’s report (1999), a Korea-Chile FTA would damage 
Korea’s agricultural industry and would fail in generating much for the national 
economy. Moreover, agricultural organisations, such as the KPL, the KFCCA, and the 
KGA, suggested that investigations from certain sectors of the government, such as the 
KIEP, were not sufficiently aware of the relevant agricultural socio-economic 
background to estimate the potential impact an FTA might have on the agricultural 
sector. Also, regarding the government’s claim that the climate differences between 
Korea and Chile would lead to less damage on Korean agriculture, it was rebutted on 
the basis that with the development of the distribution of goods, climate hardly affects 
production and consumption. The opposition from agricultural bodies can be described 
in three phases (See Table 3.3). Furthermore, these three phases correlate to how the 
agricultural sector overcame its collective action problems and in so doing, describes 
the channels of influence that were most effective for them.
The first phase in opposing the FTA consisted of getting a hundred thousand 
signatures from the public, under the lead of grape and apple producers who opposed 
the FTA for quite specific reasons (i.e. the opening of the Korean fruit market).
Groups consider how the public views an issue before selecting a lobbying 
tactic. When more attention is drawn to an issue, some groups may be more successful 
bringing an issue onto the government's agenda or increasing the level of importance 
ascribed to an issue on the agenda (Victor 2007: 831). Berry (1997: 121-122) also notes 
that groups spend many resources in an attempt to educate and persuade the public so 
that NA and elected politicians will be forced to pay attention to an issue.
The main issue at this stage was the exclusion of apples and grapes from the 
negotiations. The second phase was a broadening of this single issue to one which 
concerned the entire farming community. This was aided by framing the issue as a 
question of globalisation, i.e. opening Korean agricultural markets to foreign 
competition. The opposition movement had now passed from the relatively few hands 
of concerned fruit farmers to huge farming bodies such as the KPF and the KFCCA
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(approximately ten thousand participated in a demonstration at Yeouido July 2001l0). 
The main issues of the second phase were The suspension of Korea-Chile FTA' and 
‘opposing the importation of rice'. The point of dispute was, thusly, greatly expanded 
from the original issues concerning fruit farmers (Yu 2002: 190).
Alliance with civic groups
The third phase expanded the debate to include civic groups and initiated a 
social campaign organised partly by NGOs, including the CCEJ, the NMA. By this 
stage, the opposition had evolved from fruit farmers arguing against Chilean imports 
into sections of Korean society20 opposing all international trade treaties based on a 
commonly perceived threat from a destructive idea, that of globalisation. This wave of 
support for the opposing groups had an inevitable impact on the government, 
particularly during the negotiation phase, a perfect example of "‘organisational power” 
as elaborated in ‘the three key structures of channels of influence' in Chapter Two.
Table 3.3: Evolution of opposition
First phase Second phase Third phase
Main
acting
group
KGA.
National Apple Association.
-KPL.
-Korean Advanced Farmers 
Federation (KAFF).
-NPL, NGO (CCEJ, NMA, and 
labour unions.
Major
political
issue
Exclude apples and grapes 
from negotiation.
-Expansion into an agricultural 
issue.
-Suspension of Korea-Chile 
FTA, opposition to import of 
rice.
—Expansion into WTO and open 
market issues.
-Opposition to FTA, WTO and 
Korea-US BIT.
Major
action
Petition with hundred 
thousand signatures (2000).
Demonstration of ten thousand 
at Yeouido (2001). Nationwide movement.
Resistance from the agricultural bodies placed the government in an invidious 
position, particularly when MOAF disagreed with the government and publicly stood 
with the anti-FTA alliance (Ahn 2003a: 60-61). The MOAF and National Agricultural 
Cooperative Federation (NACF) demanded the suspension of the negotiations. They 
recommended that the government suspend its FTA negotiation with Chile until after 
2005 when the WTO was due to finalise the new Doha round of global trade talks. 
Otherwise, the MOAF argued, the agricultural sector should be excluded from talks
JoongAng Daily Newspaper (20/07/2001).
This opposition was partly enabled by the five million people of rural extraction who live in cities and 
were raised with certain values and attachments related to their rural background.
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with Chile. One of MOAF’s key negotiators21 highlighted their ministry's position 
before the fifth negotiation meeting thusly:
“[MOAF] prefers to pursue an FTA with Chile only after the WTO maps out a broad picture for freer 
global trade under the Doha round framework by the end o f  2004.”
Based on this background, the next section will analyse why pro-FTA and anti- 
FTA groups each took their respective positions.
Rationales for positions the FTA -  supporters and opponents
Trade policy (such as FTAs) affects the distribution of wealth within the 
domestic economy, raising questions of who gets what and what they can do about it 
politically. While there are many interest groups, there are only two camps to which 
they can belong; those who support trade policy and those who object. In the case of the 
Korea-Chile FTA, the main interest group favouring the FTA was composed of 
manufacturers (the FKI), while the anti-FTA group was mostly made up of farmers’ 
organisations. What follows here is an analysis of supporting and opposing rationales.
Supporting rationale
Much of the literature is in agreement, declaring that the rush towards PTAs is 
largely the result of frustration with how multilateral trade liberalization under the 
auspices of the WTO had become dreadfully slow and opaque and a defensive response 
to the signing of PTAs by some of the world’s largest economies and trading blocs 
(Ravenhill 2005: 301; Okamoto 2003; Weintraub 2003: 9). The defensiveness noted 
here is important in that it indicates that some countries have adopted PTAs for reasons 
other than proactively seeking economic positive effects—for example, out of a desire to 
avoid highly costly trade diversionary effects, and to maintain current market share with 
existing trading partners (Lloyd 2002; Gruber 2001).
In this regard, the grounds and justification for FTA promotion set forth by the 
government and groups representing the FKI can be traced back to a fear of national
21 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (25/11/1999).
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loss that could occur should Korea not adapt to the growth of FTAs worldwide (Koo 
2006 140-141; KIEP 2004; Cheong 2001b: 19-26). A traditionally export-oriented 
economy, Korea feared that failing to correspond to the globally spreading FTAs would 
reduce relative export market size and increase opportunity costs (Lee 2007b: 105; Kim 
2004b: 65). Thus, it was asserted that procuring stable export markets was of vital 
interest to the future of Korea's economic growth in becoming a fully developed 
economy, and that FTA proliferation was an inevitable force (Hwang 2001: 7-13). 
Faced with rapid changes of international and domestic economic circumstances, the 
only feasible means to invigorate competencies of the troubled industries were 
fundamental and massive restructuring, encouraging foreign investment, and early 
reformations of political economic regimes (Sohn 2001a; 2001b: 5). It was the 
government’s perception that FTA strategies could contribute greatly to both domestic 
reforms and the securing of export markets . According to Krasner (1978) each state 
will pursue foreign economic policies that reflect domestic economic needs and external 
political conditions without much thought for domestic stakeholders. While this may be 
true in a general sense (i.e. the state deliberately pursuing a pro-FTA agenda), the 
specificities are that domestic stakeholders can have a large role to play in how the 
government achieves FTA outcomes.
Key government Ministries
Although not all ministries agreed on each detail concerning the FTA , with 
the exception of the MOAF, they favoured the agreement in general. It was also 
generally agreed that an FTA was necessary to invigorate foreign investment and access 
to overseas markets. Moreover it was thought that an FTA would also allow consumers 
to gain access to high quality goods from overseas markets at an affordable price. The 
MOFAT, especially, was the first to express the need for a bilateral FTA after the 1997 
financial crisis (Byun 2001: 44), as sources of foreign exchange capital were needed 
and ways to increase exports were being sought. The government was also aware that
Interview conducted with Kim Young-tae, a leader of Economic Cooperation Bureau, in MOFE, Seoul, 
September 12th, 2005; Interview conducted Lee Kyoung-hyun, director of Trade Policy Division in MOCIE, Seoul, 
September 13th, 2005.
23 For example, MOCIE did not agree with MOFAT in who to choose for a first FTA partner. Interview 
conducted Lee Kyoung-hyun, director of Trade Policy Division in MOCIE, Seoul, September 13th, 2005.
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there would be resistance to any reforms, considering how tentative the financial and 
social situation was in Korea at the time. In light of these conflicting circumstances (i.e. 
the need for reform and a nervous public wary of too much change), the government 
chose to adopt an FTA with Chile in the hope of pushing through reforms and 
simultaneously avoiding having to confront with detractors publicly over these same 
reforms.
It can be argued that the government’s aim was as much to reform domestic 
trade policies as to gain actual economic benefits24, or killing two birds with one stone. 
Consequent to these reforms, it was expected that trade and investments would increase 
and the economic exchange between the two countries would bring about further access 
to South American markets. The MOCIE also felt that, in the case of the Korea-Chile 
FTA, there was no need to be concerned about possible losses in domestic industry, as 
Korea would be able to increase exports of industrial products (Cheong 2001a: 25-26). 
In either case, according to supporting government ministries, most of the imports from 
Chile would be raw materials and agricultural products. The MOCIE’s remit was, 
significantly, regulation of products that were to benefit. Needless to say, it supported 
the Korea-Chile FTA25.
Large corporations
The FKI pointed out that the more disadvantages Korean companies faced, the 
more their global competitiveness would suffer and that if Korea refused to engage in 
bilateral trade agreements, this lack of competitiveness would only be exacerbated26. 
Indeed, Korean industries had already paid dearly for the opportunity costs in exporting 
to non-FTA partner countries27.
Korean product exports to Chile provide several related instances. Korean auto
Interview conducted with Kim Young-tae, a leader o f Economic Cooperation Bureau, in MOFE, Seoul, 
September 12th, 2005; Interview conducted Lee Kyoung-hyun, director o f Trade Policy Division in MOCIE, Seoul, 
September 13th, 2005.
25 Interview conducted Lee Kyoung-hyun, director o f  Trade Policy Division in MOCIE, Seoul, September
13th, 2005.
For losses caused by non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and government regulation to a country without FTA, 
further details, see Lee and Chun (2005) 'Korea-Japan FTA non-tariff barrier and damaged industries.’
27 Interview conducted Lee Sang-ho, a director o f  Bilateral Economic Cooperation Committees, KCCI, 
Seoul, November 24th, 2005; Interview conducted with Na Hyung-kun, a director o f International Economic 
Research Department, FKI, Seoul, November 26th, 2005.
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and tyre exporters complained that they were having difficulties competing in the 
Chilean market because of Chile's FTAs with Mexico and Canada (Ravenhill 2004: 60). 
The FTA concluded between Mexico and Japan in April 2005 further afflicted Korean 
manufacturer's exports. It was reported that about 22 percent of Korea's overall exports 
to Mexico competes with or is at a comparative disadvantage to Japanese goods (Huh 
2004: 15). In addition, Mexico has only invited companies from FTA partner countries 
to tender for its government’s massive construction projects (Huh 2004: 3-10). 
Furthermore, 13 container ships carrying Korean automobile tyres for export had to 
return as Mexico increased tariff rate on the tyres from non-regional and non-FTA 
partner countries in 2006 (Oh 2004a: 165). Similar incidents took place in other 
countries as well. The US exempted Mexico and Canada from the protective measures it 
placed on US steel products, leaving Korea, one of the world’s most prominent ship 
building countries, at a disadvantage (KOTRA 2004). The circumstances concerning 
exports aggravated other areas as well (e.g. Brazil and European countries reinforced 
standard inspections on products from non-FTA partners, such as Korea).
In a similar vein, the FKI industries involved in the manufacture of automobiles, 
cellular phones, elevators and most electric home appliances were hoping for 
considerable increases in their exports with the Korea-Chile FTA. For example in Chile, 
these products made in Korea were competing fiercely against Canadian, Mexican and 
Japanese products for a greater market share (Cheong 2005: 33). If the Korea-Chile 
FTA were to succeed, then Korean manufacturing industries would be elevated to a 
more competitive market position while at the same time opening the policy door to 
further FTAs.
In summary, overall supporters’ policy preferences towards FTAs were, 
broadly speaking based on a defensive response. Key ministries largely focused on FTA 
policies as an inevitable tool for not only overcoming the Asian financial crisis but also 
for reforming the Korean economy and addressing an increasing lack of 
competitiveness that was feared should Korea exclude itself from FTAs.
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency.
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Opponents’ Rationales 
Agricultural coalitions
The key industry that was most likely to be hit hard due to the FTA was the 
agriculture industry, or more specifically, fruit farms. It was predicted that grape 
growers would suffer the most among farmers. According to Ahn (2003a: 65), fruit 
farming products other than grapes would not be affected as much due to the already 
occurring import activities from the US and New Zealand. Despite projected limited 
forecast, the groups that came to lead the anti-FTA protests were nationwide farmers’ 
organisations. Their main concern was that Korea-Chile FTA would be The starting 
point’ of many other FTAs which in turn, would gradually open the Korean agricultural 
market29. They were afraid that a series of FTAs would destroy the farming industry. 
They also argued that the FTA with Chile was not necessary since it would not create 
much of an economic benefit to Korea due to the relatively small size of Chile’s Gross 
National Products (GNP). Farmers instinctively related to the Korea-Chile FTA as the 
thin edge of a wedge that would introduce more FTA’s which would, in their turn, 
weaken the farming industry still further (Choi 2004a: 20-25).
Using this background, agricultural opposition can be broken down into four 
distinct analytical parts. Our first analysis of the standpoints of both supporters and 
opponents relates to unequal income distribution that an FTA can cause. Korea's FKI 
member industries are competitive in Chile’s market, while agricultural industries are 
not (Oe et al., 1999: 3-5). This follows the basis of Ricardo's theory of comparative 
advantage. This explanation is also supported by the Stolper-Samuleson theory (see the 
Theory Chapter), which helps explain why some domestic groups are free trade oriented 
and other groups are protectionist. In this regard, Rogowski (1989) also argues that 
trade coalitions form in the shape of broad factor-owning classes to anticipate broad- 
based conflict among owners of land, labour and capital in trade politics.
The second analysis pays attention to the level of factor mobility, in particular, 
Korea’s agricultural industry. Their factor mobility levels are low (Sung and Jeon 2006: 
150). In Korea’s agricultural industry, the movement of requisites for production is very
Interview conducted with Park Jun-young, a leader o f the NPL, Seoul, February 3rd, 2007; Interview 
conducted with Lee Hae-young, one o f the co-leaders o f  the KoA, Seoul, February 2nd, 2007.
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low. Firstly, the rate of agricultural workers moving into non-agricultural jobs is 
minimal. Moreover, the aging population in agricultural districts means that 94 percent 
of Korea's current agricultural workers are in their forties, and 51 percent of them are 
over sixties (Yu 2006a: 80-81). However the rate of agricultural workers moving onto 
non-agricultural jobs is 3-6 percent in their twenties, but this falls to only one percent 
in their forties (Kim 2004c: 3). Furthermore, the limited changes to move into non- 
agricultural industries and the education and skills needed in these jobs make it all the 
more difficult for agricultural workers to move into other industries (see Theory 
Chapter, factor mobility). These circumstances show that Korea’s agricultural industry 
is extremely sensitive to any competition from FT As and, concomitantly, this 
vulnerability can manifest itself as opposition to free trade given the right conditions.
Our third analysis uses Hathaway's argument (1998) as a prism. He proposes 
that the potential benefit of voice (i.e. demonstration) and the perceived chance of 
success are the two key determinants of the trade policy strategies for producer groups. 
In this regard, agriculture's major motivating reason was to claim a bigger slice of 
compensation like side payments, for example. The result was fairly in their favour.
The most important are capital intensity, trade dependence, and factor 
specificity (Hathaway 1998: 580). The perceived chance of success is the expected 
probability that an industry will be successful in its efforts to obtain protection. It 
depends on the receptiveness of the administration and Congress to protectionist 
arguments, the size of the industry, the level of industry distress, and the past success of 
similar efforts. Based on his analysis (1998: 583)30, Korea’s agricultural industries could 
be type IV31 (Type IV industries are those for which the costs of pursuing protection 
are outweighed by the benefits). These industries are the most protectionist and will 
consistently choose voice over adjustment.
I apply Hathaway’s analysis to Korean agricultural industry.
Type I industries are those for which the costs o f  pursuing protection outweigh the benefits. They will 
choose to adjust rather than pursue protection in either the administrative or legislative arenas. For these industries, 
both the benefits o f  obtaining protection and the perceived chance o f  success are low. Type II and type III industries 
may choose voice or adjustment or some combination thereof. Finally, type IV industries are those for which the 
costs o f pursuing protection are outweighed by the benefits. These industries are the most protectionist and will 
consistently choose voice over adjustment (Hathaway 1998: 583).
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of Four Industry Type
Korea’s Agricultural Industries
Potential benefit
C apita l In tensity L
Trade D ependence L
F a cto r Specific ity H
Chance of Success
R eceptiveness o f  adm inistra tion H
R eceptiveness o f  the NA H
Size  o f  industry H
Past success H
While the above analyses are related broadly to economic factors, the final 
analysis is one of psychology, or more specifically, farmers’ psychological reactions. 
Farmers believed that the FTA with Chile was the beginning of a wider opening of the 
agricultural market. From their perspective, an FTA with Chile would invite other 
countries, including the US and other strong agricultural producing countries, to ask for 
access to the Korean agricultural market. The central argument here is that the FTA 
with Chile was not just about the opening up of the Korean agricultural market (nor was 
it just apples and pears), but the viability of Korean agriculture in the face of 
international competition. Along with farming organisations, civil organisations32 -  
who opposed liberal economic policies based on economic globalisation -  joined the 
opposition coalition. Both groups believed that the liberalisation of the economy would 
only serve the interests of foreign and transnational capital at the expense and autonomy 
of the Korean economy. For them, an FTA was one form of trade liberalisation and 
along, with financial liberalisation, would cause the Korean economy to develop a 
dependence on western economies. The key personnel of civic groups (CCEJ and 
NMA) occasionally worked for interests groups (outside of civic groups) as advisors 
and, as such, their intellectual influence was often augmented by mutual association 
through civil society groups.
In summary, the main reasons behind opponents' attitude to FTAs is that they 
interpreted the FTA as a face of globalisation which they opposed for four reasons. First, 
they opposed it on the grounds of increased competition, second, unequal income 
distribution was anticipated to be the result of any FTA, third, low factor mobility in 
farming would have made alternative employment difficult and/or less profitable, and 
finally, the sought the potential benefits of voicing their opposition (i.e. gaining side
They were The KPAFW, CCEJ and Korean Catholic Farming Organisation (KCFO).
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payments).
In this section, we have analysed the rationale of Korea-Chile FTA’s 
supporters and opponents. We will now focus on how they influenced the overall 
Korea-Chile FTA processes (Agenda-Setting, Negotiation and Ratification phase).
The three phases to an FTA are as follows; 1) agenda-setting, 2) negotiation 
and 3) ratification.
The agenda-setting phase
This phase can be defined as a devising of new policy or a reforming of old 
policy. For example, policy makers’ recognition that a problem exists creates an 
opportunity to turn an idea into a credible solution (Mundo 1999: 19). When the Korean 
government endured the Asian financial crisis and witnessed FTAs mushrooming across 
the globe, the government recognised FTAs as a possible economic policy tool. The 
agenda-setting phase is usually dominated by policy makers due to the reality that it is 
their decision whether to consider an FTA or not. In the Korean case this also holds true, 
as can be seen by the involvement of MOFAT in initiating and dominating this early 
phase.
The analysis in the previous chapter of channels of influence and the three 
phases of an FTA process helps to explain the context in which domestic stakeholders 
wield influence during the three main phases of an FTA process. Clearly, groups (i.e. 
domestic stakeholders) are strategic actors. They have limited resources and seek to 
maximise the impact of their actions. Groups also make strategic decisions on how to 
influence based on information on the targets of their lobbying, their own group 
characteristics, the characteristics of other groups lobbying on the issue, and the 
characteristics of the policy they seek to influence (Victor 2007: 829).
It is hardly surprising that these domestic stakeholders utilise what channels of 
influence are available when the circumstances allow (Ehrlich 2008; Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicoud 2007; Damania et al., 2005; Mundo 1999; Alt and Gilligan 1994; 
Grossman and Helpmanl994; Trefler 1993).
During the Korea-Chile FTA, the agenda setting phase was dominated by 
MOFAT and large corporations. The negotiation phase was dominated by opponents
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while the ratification phase began in favour of opponents but was eventually dominated 
by supporters. Even though the Korea-Chile treaty was eventually ratified, it would be 
wrong to suggest that this was a victory for those who supported the FT A from the 
beginning. A truer reflection would be to say that although the FT A passed all three 
phases, the final agreement included accessions to key domestic stakeholders who 
opposed the agreement. A further analysis of this based on ‘the three key structures of 
channels of influence, and their relative importance to each other, will be offered in the 
next section.
Agenda-Setting phase 
Supporter's victory
In the aftermath of the unprecedented 1997 financial crisis, the Kim Dae-jung 
administration had to make fundamental adjustments to Korea's trade policy. Up to that 
point, Korea’s key export market had been heavily dependent on the US and Japan. 
Kim’s administration's aim was to diversify Korea’s export market (Lee 2005a: 284- 
290). From this base, the government reformed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into 
MOFAT so as to comprehensively coordinate foreign policy on trade and trade 
negotiations. Moreover, MOFAT also has executive powers to formulate FTA policies. 
Other ministries are involved according to their spheres of responsibility. MOFAT, as 
its name suggests, is the key agency managing foreign affairs and trade in Korea, 
although it normally works with FTA-related divisions in other agencies such as the 
MOFE, MOCIE, MOAF, national policy research organisations and carefully selected 
civil organisations. It therefore plays a more significant role than other agencies in 
foreign economic policy formulation: while there is a division of labour; external 
negotiation (level 1 based on Putnam's two level games) is carried out by the MOFAT 
and internal negotiation (level 2) is coordinated by the MOFE. However, not only was 
MOFAT a visible actor in support of the FTA, the ministry was also targeted by 
opponents33. MOFE did not want to be a visible actor even though it was in charge of
Interviews conducted with Lee Mi-hyun, the head o f  multilateral trade cooperation decision in MOFAT, 
Seoul, August 14th, 2009.
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domestic negotiation34. Furthermore, the media also focused on MOFAT rather than 
other ministries.
When Chile was chosen as the first FT A partner-country, there was only one 
dissenting voice among government ministries. MOAF opposed MOFAT's initiative. 
FTA policy fonnulation was dominated by MOFAT without much hindrance despite 
MOAF's opposition (Park and Koo 2007: 268).
Furthermore, the government had strong backing from the FKF They continued 
to express their concern over losing their competiveness in Mexico and Chile due to the 
discriminatory nature of FTAs. The FKI pressured the government to start negotiations 
without delay35. They used these formal channels (IPI) to address their concerns directly 
to the government.
Supporters of the FTA can be split into two non-arbitrary groups, private (large 
corporations) and public (MOFAT and supporting government agencies). It is important 
to note the distinguishing line between them in order to analyse the channels of 
influence supporters had access to. The FKI used MOFAT itself as a channel of 
influence, despite the fact that MOFAT was also a supporter of the FTA. MOFAT 
played a dual role during the FTA process, acting as both supporter and channel of 
influence. Naturally, neither the FKI nor MOFAT wanted opposition groups at the table 
dunng this phase. This helps to explain two important facets of the agenda setting 
phase; 1) why the agenda setting phase was so dominated by the FTAs supporters and 
2) why only formal channels were utilised at this early phase. This exemplifies prime 
key structure, “power to influence political institutions” (the FKI’s influence on 
MOFAT). Due to the lack of information in the public arena, opponents of the FTA 
were not aware that the agenda setting phase was in progress. This lack of information 
and consequent lack of organisation impeded any coherent and effective opposition. 
Civic groups had concerns from an early stage, particularly over choosing Chile as an 
FTA partner but they also suffered from lack of information. It would be fair to say that 
MOFAT chose to obfuscate the agenda setting phase in order to avoid any 
disagreements over what the agenda was going to be. The negotiation phase, however, 
was a different kettle of fish.
Interview conducted with Kim Sun-min, a member o f  FTA Promotion & Policy adjustment Authority 
division, October 2nd, 2009.
Interview conducted with Na Hyung-kun, a director o f International Economic Research Department, 
FKI, in Seoul, November 26th, 2005.
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Negotiation Phase 
Supporters
Following roughly a year of successful agenda setting by the Korea-Chile FTA 
supporters, negotiations began in September 1999. A hubristic sense of accomplishment 
settled on the FTA's supporters once negotiations began, which was to have 
consequences for all involved during the latter stages of the process. Although there was 
broad support for the agreement among government ministries (excluding MOAF), 
issues which had not been resolved during the agenda setting phase began to appear as 
fissures during the negotiation phase. In order to elucidate this point, let us look at two 
examples of this friction among government ministries. First, ministries had different 
standpoints in relation to the level of financial incentives offered to the agricultural 
sector to persuade them to adopt a more pro-FTA stance. A survey carried out on 
government employees on this matter predicted tension between the two main groups 
on how much support should be given by the government; for instance, the MOFAT and 
the MOCIE36 went for 77 percent non-monetary support whereas the MOAF went for 
56 percent of monetary support from the government (Ahn 2003a: 70). According to 
White (1986), the ‘tug of war’ between interests is understood not as the rational choice 
of a unitary government but the result of bartering between key ministries. This 
argument would be categorised as supporting the bureaucratic politics model of the 
statist approach. Second, one of the last points to be disputed during the negotiation 
phase37 was related to the financial sector. The MOFE was concerned that the MOFAT 
was rushing to conclude the FTA for the sake of coming to an agreement (as opposed to 
negotiating for a comprehensive deal that would benefit all sectors of the Korean 
economy). Specifically, MOFAT refused to have the Korean financial sector on the 
table for discussion despite MOFE arguing stringently that it should be, as Korea’s
President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008 and merged MOCIE with elements o f  the Ministry o f  
Information and Communications, the Ministry o f Science and Technology, and the Ministry o f Finance and 
Economy. The resulting body was an enhanced government instrument capable o f  meeting new challenges o f the 21st 
century: the Ministry o f Knowledge Economy (MKE).
During the 6th negotiation (October 18th ~  21st, 2002), an agreement was made on the negotiations for 
Korea’s agricultural products which had been the deal breaker till then, when finance services came up as a point in 
dispute. Chile, like Korea had gone through a foreign exchange crisis and was reluctant to open finance markets. 
Therefore the 6th negotiations were broken off. Finally, Korea agreed to exclude negotiations on finance until further 
negotiations after four years, thus reaching an agreement.
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financial sector was more competitive than Chile’s38.
This fractiousness was not confined to government ministries. What appeared 
to be a blessed union between the FKI and government ministries was to display its own 
weaknesses during the negotiation phase. By the time the negotiations began both 
MOFAT and the FKI had come to certain conclusions about each other. MOFAT 
concluded that the FKI would engage in active, public support for the FTA, while the 
FKI were under the assumption that the FTA was something of a done deal. It is 
noteworthy that the Korean business sector was lukewarm and even critical of having 
the FTA with Chile, while they embraced the necessity of making FTAs (Choi & Lee 
2005: 10)39.
When the mistakes in their assumptions arose it was too late to change the tide 
of battle during the negotiation phase. The government had worked well with the FKI 
during the agenda setting phase and had presumed on their continued support. In actual 
fact, the FKI pushed hard for a conclusion to the agenda setting so that an FTA could be 
put into place as soon as possible, thus MOFAT expected a strong level of support for 
the agreement. However, neither expected the level of opposition to the FTA which 
occurred (Ahn 2003a: 60-61). Their projections led them to conclude that the 
agreement would have a minimal impact on the agricultural sector40.
However, this is not to say that the FKI sat on their hands during the 
negotiations. In July 2002, the Korean Automobile Manufacturers Association (KAMA) 
filed a petition that urged its government to conclude the final round of FTA 
negotiations with Chile sooner rather than later. The KFI cooperated with MOFAT and 
MOCIE, providing economic data which demonstrated that the FTA would help boost 
the Korean economy and bring not only cheaper fruit prices for the general public but 
would simultaneously protect the income of Korean fruit farmers by importing from a 
country (i.e. Chile) with southern hemispheric seasonal differences. The most 
enthusiastic organisation in its support of the FTA was Korea International Trade
A high official o f  the MOFE complained, ‘[i]f the FTA reaches an agreement, the scale o f  trade to 
increase greatly so naturally there will be problems on establishing more financial institutions and liberalising 
monetary exchange. Therefore this agreement has no meaning if  negotiations on financial areas are totally excluded’ 
(JoongAng Daily Newspaper 19/10/2002).
According to a survey, conducted by FKI in September 2000, 94.3 percent o f respondents agreed with 
the idea o f FTAs. As for the ideal FTA partner, China was the highest with 42.8 percent, followed by the US with 
36.5 percent, and Japan with 7.9 percent. Chile only garnered measly 1.6 percent. Reflecting this mood, the business 
sector remained rather silent throughout the ratification process (Choi and Lee 2005: 10).
Interview conducted with Kim Young-tae, a leader o f Economic Cooperation Bureau, in MOFE, Seoul, 
September 12th, 2005.
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Association (KITA). It strongly supported the government's steps in coming to an 
agreement on an FTA with Chile and appealed to the government to finish the FT A with 
Chile post haste. Informally, each group met with key policy makers and politicians to 
deliver their support for the FTA.
Furthermore, they adopted and deployed another key structure of influence, 
‘‘public influence"; a media campaign (in particular using conservative newspapers: 
Chosun, Dong-A and JoongAng Daily News Paper) to publicise the necessity and 
inevitability of an FTA with Chile. However, all of this support was, in a sense, private 
or hidden from view. Even the media campaign kept the guiding hand of the FKI from 
full view.
But what irked the MOFAT was the fact that the FKI were not vocal enough. 
What the MOFAT failed to consider were the FKI’s sensitivities regarding the anti­
chaebol movement. This movement has had a strong undercurrent throughout Korea’s 
recent history and the FKI were wary of agitating any opposition with anti-chaebol 
predilections (Lee 1998: 73-74; Kwon 2002: 23-25). Furthermore, the MOFAT 
completely underestimated the potential for domestic resistance and how easily the 
anti-chaebol movement would raise its head.
A combination effect was to take the wind from the sails of the supporters. This 
internal fractiousness prevented a coherent alliance and expression of will during the 
negotiation phase which combined with an unwillingness on behalf of the FKI to 
publicly stand full square behind the agreement. The lack of cohesion and public 
support handed the initiative to the FTA’s opponents. Looked at through the paradigm 
of structures of channels of influence, the failure of the FTA’s supporters to harness 
sufficient “organisational power” and, concomitantly, “public influence” resulted in 
their less effective use of this channel of influence.
Opponents
In comparison to the FKI and the MOFAT, who relied virtually entirely on 
formal channels, opponents of the Korea-Chile FTA resorted to more of a mixed bag, 
using all three key structures of channels of influence. An important question is; why 
was this so? One of the main reasons behind this predilection was that only specific 
types of informal channels (i.e. public demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc.) could
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raise public awareness of the issue as opponents saw it which in turn would ensure a 
more emotional and negatively charged debate, thus accessing “public influence” as a 
channel of influence structure. As an inevitable reaction to this, the government would 
have to pay more attention to what the FTA's opponents had to say. Another reason for 
the reliance on informal channels was that their access to more formal channels was 
limited by the fact that most government ministries stood behind the FTA, with the 
unique exception of MOAF.
Influence of Political Institutions
One of the more effective means utilised by the agricultural groups was to use a 
certain formal channel-power to influence political institutions which ran through 
political gatherings and councils held by the MOAF41. In order to draw up the FTA 
framework proposal, the MOAF held many policy consultation meetings and frequently 
invited farmers’ organisations to express their views. These meetings helped revise the 
framework proposal several times on the basis of farmers’ demands. Besides the 
Ministry's openness towards farmers during the framework proposal process, it also 
continuously defended Korean farmers' interests and position when negotiating with the 
Chilean government. Farmers’ organisations usage of this channel occurred mainly 
during the time when the Korean government was preparing its framework proposals 
during the third round of negotiations. Leading the Korean farmers’ interest was the 
KFCCA42 which -  along with many other farmers’ associations -  communicated their 
demands both directly and indirectly to the MOAF. The ministry’s efforts in protecting 
farmers’ interests were constructive and effective. By submitting petitions and 
recommendations to the Ministry, the KFCCA were able to effectively place their 
demands (i.e. that apples and grapes were to be excluded from the negotiations) straight 
onto the negotiating table. Although the MOFAT and the MOFE had reservations 
concerning the MOAF’s consistent position on the tariff free exception issue43, there
At these gatherings and council meetings many groups were present, such as: agricultural groups, the 
NACF, civic groups, primary producer groups such as the National Grape Council (NGC) and investigative 
organisations for government policies, such as KIEP; where offers were put forward and opinions exchanged.
The KFCCA consisted o f 21 different groups, such as the KG A and Korean Pork Association (KPA). It 
represented somewhere between 80-90 percent o f Korean farmers.
Interview conducted with Kim Young-tae, a leader o f  Economic Cooperation Bureau, in MOFE, Seoul,
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was little they could do about it.
According to Yu (2006b; 2002), the MOAF’s opposition to the Korea-Chile 
FTA was rooted in its opposition to the opening of the agricultural market to foreign 
competition rather than any influence the agricultural sector may have had over the 
ministry. Furthermore, the ministry went as far as to use farmers’ opposition as a 
justification of their position and were only happy to allow the farmers’ organisations to 
take the front line in opposing the FTA. The reason MOAF was happy to see them take 
this position was due to their reluctance to be the focus of a movement opposing the 
FTA because of the view that a) government ministries did not operate as independent 
actors outside of government circles and b) they did not want to seen as a deal-breaker. 
However, Yu seems to have underestimated the influence and power wielded over the 
MOAF by the agricultural sector. While the MOAF clearly had its own preference 
regarding an FTA with Chile, it is critical to note that had the ministry lacked strong 
external support (i.e. outside government circles), its opposition almost certainly would 
have withered in the face of an allied front of government ministries, conservative 
politicians and the President. In fact, without the vivifying support of the agricultural 
sector, there is little doubt that the MOAF would have acceded to the MOFAT’s 
demands. Although the agricultural sector did not actually change MOAF’s opinion on 
the matter, they did supply the backbone necessary for it to withstand the slings and 
arrows from other ministries. Although it would be difficult to prove that the 
agricultural lobby changed the ministries views on the various provisions, considering 
their shared views, according to interviews conducted by the author, ministry officials 
stated that the agricultural lobby was extremely effective in getting the MOAF to focus 
on three specific items (i.e. apples, pears and grapes)44.
Initially, the ministry was not in a decisive position to stop or delay the process 
or decide on the tariff free exemption items. After a huge amount of public support by 
the KFCCA, the Ministry justified its reluctance in agreeing with the FTA. This helped 
to foster a strong bond between both groups that resulted in a more confident MOAF 
and a closer dialogue between the groups. This relationship was quite productive and 
resulted in the ministry adopting the agricultural sector’s demands to exclude specific
September 12th, 2005; Interview conducted with Cho Je-hong, Managing Director in Department o f FTA Trade 
Policy-Making, MOFAT, Seoul, October 29th, 2005.
Interview conducted with Youn Jang-bae, Assistant Minister for International Trade and Cooperation in 
MOAF, in Seoul, October 17th, 2005.
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products from the FT A negotiating table. Even though MOFAT had overall strategic 
command of the FTA negotiations with Chile, MOAF performed on a more tactical 
level by negotiating directly with its Chilean ministerial counterpart. The MOAF, in 
reflecting agricultural interests, was reluctant to open the Korean fruit market. 
Specifically, at an FTA agricultural open forum45 in February 2001, to discuss the 5th 
round of negotiations, the MOAF made a proposal that dealt with some of the major 
issues. Chile, however, found these proposals unacceptable, which ultimately led to a 
deadlock between the two governments. This example clearly displays how interest 
groups use formal channels to articulate and press their interests.
The agricultural sector’s formal channels were not limited to a single 
government ministry; they also accessed channels that ran through political parties and 
their representatives on a formal level. Even though the line between formal and 
informal -  at the level influencing individual representatives -  could (at times) seem 
less than distinct, the purpose was to gain influence over political parties. This was a 
purely formal channel. In fact, the agricultural sector was to use informal channels in 
order to gain access to more formal channels.
At first, the agriculture sector put pressure on local assemblies46 in areas that 
grew grapes and apples to argue in their favour with the NA and to take up resolutions 
to stop the FTA negotiations. Soon, MPs of both governing and opposition parties were 
present at mass rallies held by agricultural groups expressing their support for the 
farming community. MPs from rural constituencies argued that agriculture should be 
excluded from the FTA at the Committee of Foreign Affairs and trade (COFAT). 
According to a key member at the MOFAT47, most representatives from rural 
constituencies agreed on the importance of FTAs in principle, however they wished to 
exclude agriculture. These MPs also applied pressure on key individuals at the 
Ministries related to the FTA negotiations. The KFCCA had requested for a suspension 
of negotiation or an exclusion of agricultural products at gatherings with the Grand 
National Party (GNP) and the Democratic Party (DP). This is a prime case for how 
interest group utilised a direct lobbying style (Bearce 2003; Berry 1997; Wright 1996) 
of influencing elected politicians and made a domino effect style of influence, not only
Representatives from groups such as the KFCCA, NACF, KPL, and KPAFW were present.
For example, they are Gyeongnam province, local Assembly, Chungbuk province, local Assembly, and 
Chugbuk province, local Assembly etc.
Interview conducted with Ahn Ho-young, Deputy Minister of Trade, MOFAT, Seoul, October 10th, 2005.
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to political party and but NA as well. It is important to note this demonstrates that 
agricultural interest groups were able to influence at least one veto player in Korean 
politics.
As a result of the gradual accumulation of pressure applied from both formal 
and informal channels, the parties accepted these demands. However, formal channels 
were not the opponent’s mainstay.
Public Influence
Unlike large corporations’ groups, farmers’ organisations -  which were the core 
organised constituent of the anti-Korea-Chile FT A movement -  used mostly informal 
channels. One of Korea’s leading farmers' organisations, the KAFF was guiding the 
anti-FTA movement from the very beginning. The KAFF's website petition and news 
resource page displays many examples of anti-FTA activities. According to the 
information provided on its website, from October 2002, when the international 
agreement was reached, to the approval of ratification in February 2004, informal 
channels made up 76 percent of all activities conducted by the KAFF. A total of only 
four instances out of 17 utilised formal channels. In all other instances, informal 
channels were used consisting of street demonstrations, burning ceremonies, occupation 
of public facilities, ceremonial head shaving, fasting, and arson. The use of -  sometimes 
violent -  informal channels was predominant. These indirect, or outside lobbying tactics 
(Gais and Walker 1991: 103; Victor 2007: 827) were aimed at influencing the views of 
the general public which was in turn expected to affect the preferences of elected 
politicians and key policymakers. In other words, “public influence,” is a key structure 
of channel of influence.
Some of these cases require highlighting to provide evidence that informal 
channels were both numerous and diverse. During the early stages of Korea-Chile FTA 
negotiations, the main organisation which represented the Korean farmers’ interest was 
the KFCCA. This organisation, for example, expressed strong opposition towards FTA 
after the 4th negotiation on March 6th of 2001. On that day, 2000 members of the 
KFCCA gathered in front of government buildings in Gwa-Chun, Kyung-Gi province,
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demanding an immediate suspension of the negotiations . They argued that reaching an 
FTA with Chile -  a farming powerhouse -  would threaten the survival of Korean 
farmers’ livelihoods. This was an important demonstration for the purposes of 
catalysing a sense of ecumenical unity between all sectors of the farming community. 
This example of solidarity among farmers developed like a contagion and expanded to 
other citizens' organisations such as KPAA, Korean People's Solidarity (KPS), and 
CCEJ and Korean Coalition of Farmers’ Association (KCFA). These civil groups 
stressed that the FTA would have a negative domino effect by creating the political and 
conceptual space for further FT As and, furthermore, was directly linked to the process 
of globalisation49. In order to block this ongoing trend, they emphasised the need for a 
strong political campaign in order to persuade the most important constituent of the 
debate, the public, of the egregiousness of signing any FTA that had designs on Korean 
agriculture. The KPAA, KPS and KCFA thought that a campaign of typical proportions 
would be insufficient and, therefore, non-typical campaigning methods would be 
required. Some of the key leaders of the KPAA who penetrated the government 
building in Gwa-Chun staged a three day sit-down demonstration at the MOAF in 
October 17th, 2002. The situation deteriorated, creating a media storm, and as a direct 
consequence, the DP members (the then ruling party) and opposition party members 
also showed up at the demonstration pledging to begin an anti-FTA petition in the NA.
A Korean farmers rally, sponsored by the KAFF, was held on October 22nd, 
2002 and about 1000 farmers demonstrated violently at BoRaMae Park. Even after the 
rally, they continued to demonstrate by marching towards Yeouido where the NA 
building is located. During this protest, the demonstration became violent, resulting in 
injuries during a clash with riot police. At the same time, many major highways and 
national roads experienced severe traffic jams due to road blockades created by 
farmers50. Third, in November 13th, 2002, the KCFA organised a rally opposing the 
WTO free trade of rice around Yeouido's Han River waterfront and as many as 70,000 
farmers participated in it. The presidential candidate, Roh Moo-hyun, had to endure
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (06/03/2001).
Interview conducted with Park Sung-jun, one o f  leader o f the KCFA, Seoul, March 5th, 2007. In similar 
vein, most o f  other agricultural organisations' leaders and members (NMP and KFCCA) that I interviewed expressed 
their concern about FTA and globalisation.
50 Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (23/09/2002).
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having eggs thrown at him by the farmers at the rally51. However, it was not all 
demonstrations and throwing of eggs, however.
One of the most important strategies taken by the agricultural sector was to 
build a good working rapport with the network that civic groups had established (i.e. 
taking advantage of their organisational power). This network (See Table 3.3) consisted 
of an association of individuals and civic groups who shared a common interest in 
monitoring public policy (how it was executed and its impact on the public), who 
formed to provide mutual assistance and helpful information. Although civic groups 
were established shortly after democratisation, the network itself was created as a result 
of the processes of the UR agreement (Kim 1995: 160; Chang 1994: 36-39) and, 
particularly, the opening of the agricultural market. Civic groups were able to influence 
the FT A by using their experience in generating momentum for issues, as well as their 
capacity to gain support and negotiate with the government. During the negotiation 
phase of the Korea-Chile FTA, agricultural groups united with the CCEJ and People’s 
Union (PU) to maximise their ways and means of influencing both the public and 
government. This was another aspect which helps explain how the FTA’s opponents 
expanded the issue of the Korea-Chile FTA beyond a farming issue concerning apples 
and pears to agricultural products in general. This alliance was most successful in 
drawing media attention to the ongoing debate and, simultaneously, helped to lend more 
gravitas to their argument.
Most economists who have worked for civic groups have, at one point or 
another, worked in either the private sector or, more popularly, in MOAF. Invariably 
these economists would have specialised in agricultural issues. Agricultural economists 
tend to think in terms of protectionism when it comes to Korean agriculture. Almost as 
a corollary to this, many -  if not most -  have conservative impulses and are supportive 
of Korean agriculture because of its cultural significance, the issue of food security and 
the level of dependence in rural communities. Furthermore, this ‘network within a 
network’ had access to backchannels within MOAF (due to the ongoing relationships 
between individuals and organisations) which ultimately favoured the agricultural sector. 
Or, the “Proximity to key politicians and policy makers (PPPM)” as defined by the three
Maeil Business Daily Newspaper (09/01/2003).
52 For instance, Kim Sung-hun, former minister o f  the MOFA. After retirement from office, he became a 
counsellor at KFCCA, and now acts as an interlocutor between citizen/agricultural groups and the Ministry.
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structures of channels of influence. This network influenced the government’s 
agricultural policies greatly and, ultimately, the Korea-Chile FTA. The synergy effect 
of applying pressure on MOAF through both formal and informal channels galvanised 
an already pliant MOAF to their cause.
In conclusion, a deadlock was reached by the end of the 4th round of negotiation 
(see table 3.1 for the relevant dates). The primary reason behind this was the influence 
that the anti-FTA alliance wielded. However, the negotiation phase did not remain 
deadlocked indefinitely.
When the negotiations began again with the 5lh round, although the agricultural 
proposals remained what they were during the 4th round, it was Korean industry 
(specifically concessions on washing machines and refrigerators) which had to make 
room for a Chilean return to the negotiations. It was key ministries’ (particularly 
MOFAT) doggedness which also helped persuade the Chileans to come back to the 
table.
In summary, supporters were not as effective as they could have been due to the 
FKI’s lack of involvement during the negotiation phase. Their main channel of 
influence during this phase was IPI (which was their primary channel) even though it 
had PI as complementary channel (secondary channel). For agricultural groups, on the 
other hand, their key channel of influence was PI (primary channel) which allowed 
access to IPI (secondary) and PPPM (tertiary).
Ratification Phase
In December of 2002, a presidential election was held as the negotiation phase 
drew to a close and was to provide an important backdrop to the ratification phase. As if 
this factor was not enough to complicate issues, a general election was due to be held in 
April 2003. As has been noted in Chapter One, Oatley (2004) argues that elections are 
very important because they create incentives for politicians to present the economic 
interests of their constituents. In a 'first past the post' electoral system, national trade 
politics are characterised by competition between industries because political 
representation is directly linked to specific territorial districts with different economic 
characteristics. Or, according to Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003: 307), electoral rules
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matter because they dictate what a politician must do to get elected. Naturally all parties 
and many individual MPs running for the upcoming elections felt that they had an 
interest in the FTA ratification phase. Amongst these individuals and groups there were 
opponents and supporters of all stripes and shades. Prior to the election, President Kim 
Dae-jung officially supported the FTA, however this support remained ‘inactive’ due to 
his concern over both the presidential and general elections. This is also similar to the 
Korea-Japan FTA (see next chapter). The new president, President Roh, was a different 
prospect. He publicly and unambiguously supported the FTA both as he ran for election 
and during his term. Needless to say, this was something of a boon to those who 
supported the FTA. The president was not alone, the governing party was also publicly 
supportive of the FTA. That, however, was not the end of the story. The NA, prior to 
this, stalled on the issue of the FTA (which had become an emotive, public issue) until 
after the elections. Ratification was yet to take place in the NA and, at the end of the 
day, there was still a lot of horse-trading, compromises, arguments, debates and 
wielding of influence left to be done before anything was signed.
Given this background of FTA ratification and upcoming elections, a perfect 
breeding ground for the involvement of domestic stakeholders was set. As an aside, the 
similarities between this FTA and the current Korea-US FTA are worth noting; 
presidential and general elections were held during the ratification phase of both FT As 
and both times the NA stalled on making any decisions until after the election and both 
new presidents were very supportive of the FT As.
Opponents
During the negotiation phase the anti-FTA alliance had held the upper hand. 
Although the alliance did manage to have the bill watered down in its favour during the 
negotiation, and, importantly, had the bill delayed for 20 months in the NA, it failed to 
have the bill rejected from the assembly. This was to be the pinnacle of the anti-FTA 
influence. From then on, pro-FTA groups were to have things more and more their way.
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Loss of formal channel access (IPI)
The access opponents had to formal channels was reduced significantly during 
this phase. The MOAF consisted of civil servants headed by an elected government 
official and once the international negotiation phase was reached, MOAF’s alliance 
with the FTA's opponents became ultimately meaningless (i.e. they had no vote in the 
NA). Furthermore, President Roh -  who was elected on a broad platform while publicly 
in favour of the FT A -  was less likely to meet or look favourably on the demands of the 
anti-FTA alliance. Due to the success of the pro-FTA alliance in influencing not just 
members of the public (via the media and the fact that the ratification process had 
stalled for 14 months, thus creating a countervailing public force in favour of passing 
the bill), but also individual MPs and political parties (due to both the success in 
influencing the general public and a more consistent rationale which resonated with the 
public, e.g. the major papers had disseminated information that the FKI were losing 
market share in foreign markets due to FT As and that a successful Korean FT A would 
rectify this, increasing the economy as a whole). This all helped to create a bolder NA 
that supported the FTA across party lines. A total of 70 MPs who had allied to create a 
de facto ‘Rural Party (RP)\ representing rural communities in the NA, were 
unsuccessful in derailing any party's support for the FTA.
Splitting the Opposition
The KFCCA, which had been a stalwart opponent of the FTA and a leading 
member of the anti-FTA alliance, was not to remain within the fold of the opposition 
for very much longer. The government finally succeeded in persuading some groups53 
(KAFF, KFCCA) to cease opposing the FTA by increasing the FTA special fund from 
its original 800 billion ($0.8 billion dollars) to 1.3 trillion Won (11th November 2003), 
giving extra funds as a countermeasure for debt, lowering the interest of political funds 
from its then current 4 percent to 3 percent, increasing the period of special taxes for 
farming and fishing areas, and extra 119 thousand billion Won support for ten years (Yu 
2006b: 668). As a result, it fractured the opposition and drove what remained of the
An association of 20 farmers’ groups agreed to support the ratification of the FTA under these side 
payment policies (Choi & Lee 2005: 16).
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anti-FTA alliance (see below: informal channels) further from access to formal 
channels and placed the remaining farmers groups in a position where increased 
militancy was viewed as the last option of resistance54. It has been analysed that out of 
the 119 thousand billion Korean Won ($11.9 billion at the time), when one excludes the 
51 thousand billion Won, the current government promised until 2008, the 68 thousand 
billion Won belonged to the next government's budget between the years 2009 and 
2013; therefore, unless it was legalised, it would be impossible to get this promise of 
financial support after 2009 unless it was given through subsequent government’s 
budgets55. Moreover, the 119 thousand billion investment plan reflected the budget 
interest of 7.3 percent of the MOAF already, and it was not invested separately from the 
budget. Due to the strings attached to the government’s proposal of support funds, 
opposing groups continued to rally against ‘Korea-Chile FTA’ on the December 29th, 
2003.
In May of 2003, farmers opposing FTA ratification in the NA, gathered under 
the name of the Nong-Min Power (NMP). Unhappy with the moderate stand taken by 
the KFCCA, nine of its affiliated organisations such as the KCFA, the KAFF, KCFA 
and few others came out to form a new radical coalition. It argued that the KFCCA was 
simply not capable of conducting effective anti-FTA political activities. According to 
the NMP, it had the ability to protect and foster the political interests of farmers. 
Whereas the KFCCA consisted of 21 associations, the NMP garnered only nine 
associations, while its unyielding and uncompromising stance fuelled more militant 
anti-FTA activities.
IPI efficiency
Given these circumstances, the use of formal channels became an almost 
pointless exercise on behalf of the NMP. There were a few cases where farmers 
officially met with political parties to discuss their demands, but the circumstances were 
completely different to meetings held during the negotiation phase. Talking to 
government officials at the party level was looked upon as a pointless exercise due to 
complete lack of success. The NMP’s last attempt to access a formal channel was a
54 IB Times, ‘Trade Adjustment Assistance,' (22/03/2008);
http://news.jknews.co.kx/article/news/20080322/5465486.htm.
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (04/05/2003).
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meeting with the President and on January 6th, 2004, members of the NMP demanded 
President Roh Moo-hyun reconsider the FT A ratification on the basis that it would 
harm the agricultural industry in Korea. However, the president was especially 
enthusiastic about the FT A while firmly expressing his position that their demands were 
‘difficult to accommodate at this point in time56.’ He tried to persuade them that the 
‘open market is the general tendency that must be followed57.’ However, he promised to 
establish policy and legislation plans to minimise farmers’ losses. The following day he 
met with the ‘moderate’ farmers’ organisation, the KFCCA.
The loss of access to formal channels did not occur overnight but was the result 
of several factors previously discussed. During this period, the anti-FTA alliance 
managed to delay the ratification process by 14 months. By the end of those 14 months, 
their influence had waned while that of the supporters of the FTA had waxed (see 
below). With the swing in “public influence” as a structure of influence -  if not in 
support of the FTA then at least away from the opponents -  and the concomitant 
gradual loss of the “power to influence political institutions” as defined by one of the 
three key structures of channels of influence (i.e. during ratification, the influence of the 
MOAF was significantly reduced), the anti-FTA alliance became more reliant on 
informal channels.
Informal channels (Public Influence)
The ratification bill was passed eventually. This was, from the narrow 
perspective of the ratification phase, a victory for those who supported the bill.
However, it must be stated that the process of ratification was an extremely difficult 
period for its supporters. The bill was delayed for 14 months and during these months 
the anti-FTA groups applied enormous pressure to have the bill either thrown out or 
altered significantly in their favour. As had been true in the past, so it was during this 
phase of the process, the anti-FTA groups' use of informal channels was their most 
successful strategy. The anti-FTA alliance was not confined to one informal channel 
either; they had access to a broad spectrum during their opposition to the FTA’s 
ratification, ranging from violent and disruptive demonstrations to more peaceful events.
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (04/05/2003). 
Maeil Business Daily Newspaper (07/01/2004).
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After July 2003, disorderly activities such as blockading highways and national 
roads, fasting, and sit-in demonstrations, were repeated routinely. The FT A ratification 
approval motion passed in the UFATC on December 26th and the intensity of farmers’ 
defiance increased considerably. On December 28th, a large scale farmers' 
demonstration occurred in Jeollabuk province and some demonstrated by occupying and 
shouting anti-FTA chants at the graveyard of an Uri Party member's deceased father. 
The next day on the 29th, about 3,000 NMP coalition members assembled in front of 
the NA in Seoul and shouted anti-FTA slogans. Some farmers tried to get inside the 
main building, while others got together in groups of ten to occupy each of Seoul’s 13 
Uri Party district headquarters. This demonstration continued for two days and during 
the process there were successive occurrences of arson, vandalism, and injuries.
The reality was that politicians considered the FT A a very hot potato during the 
first 7 months and were reluctant to broach the subject in the NA, hence it sat on the 
sidelines for so long. There was also access to more conventional informal channels (i.e. 
PPPM). Similar to the militant demonstrations, the more conventional methods of 
applying pressure had individual MPs, their parties and the entire MP as their targets.
During a consultative meeting in June 2003, the MOFAT urged that the NA 
proceed with all due haste on ratifying the FTA because Chile was aiming for 
ratification as quickly as possible. The government hesitated in submitting the proposal 
due to strong opposition from the farmers and several members of NA. In the end, the 
government and the DP (the governing party at the time), convened a consultative 
meeting of ranking administration and party officials and had heated discussions 
regarding ratification. The result was not to deal with it during the extraordinary session 
of the NA in June 2003. In fact, the DP argued for postponement, emphasising 
‘planning countermeasures before ratification’ (e.g. funding farmers, investing in rural 
communities, etc.) in order to help deflect the expected strong opposition from farming 
groups58. This was the first cancellation of the ratification process and it was not to be 
the last.
One month later, on July 8th, 2003, an NA ratification consent proposal was 
submitted to the standing Committee under the NA, the UFATC. It took six months for 
the submitted ratification proposal to pass approval and be introduced on the agenda.
Maeil Business Daily Newspaper (11/06/2003).
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Some of the UFATC members, concerned by a potential agricultural sector backlash, 
succeeded in slowing down the process. A petition against Korea-Chile FTA 
ratification signed by many members of the NA (more than 90) was enough to scare 
away pro-FTA supporters from publicly endorsing ratification or passing it in the NA.
For these reasons elucidated above, hesitation and a stop/start approach marked 
the passage of the bill under the UFATC until December 2003. Finally, approval of 
FTA ratification in the UFATC was given on December 26th, 2003 with 12 votes in 
favour, 7 against, 1 abstention, and 3 non-attendances. The UFATC was eventually able 
to approve the motion of ratification in the NA once the media, the public and 
government official opinion had shifted in favour of the FTA59.
PPPM efficiency
The ratification proposal, however, continued to have a bumpy ride in the NA. 
Rural MPs became anxious of voter discontent in their constituencies. These members, 
regardless of party, fonned an alliance among themselves, the so-called ‘RP,’ in order 
to block ratification. The FTA ratification was supposed to be approved on December 
29th, but RP members (around 70) from the DP and the GNP threatened to occupy the 
plenary session to stop the ratification. Lee Gyu-taek and ten other members threatened 
to occupy the chairman's chair during the session60. In the end, chairman of the NA, 
Park Gwan-yong, gathered four leaders from each party and decided to hold off on the 
approval process. There was an attempt to pass the bill the next day, but again the ‘RP’ 
members occupied the chairman’s office. These obstructions hindered the process and 
prevented immediate approval. The New Year did not initially bring about any change 
to the situation. On the morning of January 8th, the day when ratification was to be 
approved, President Roh Moo-hyun visited the NA to seek cooperation with chairman 
Park Gwan-yong, the GNP representative Choi Byung-ryul and the DP’s Cho Soon- 
young. The Presidential visit to the NA to seek cooperation, instead of delivering the 
National Policy Address, was the first visit of its kind in the history of Korean
There was a public-opinion poll taken about the passing o f  Korea-Chile FTA on December 5th and 6th 
2003. The interesting thing is that 50.2 percent were for the Korea-Chile FTA and 46.8 percent were against. Next, on 
the possibility o f  ratification the votes were 69.5 percent high and 25.6 percent low. As a result the public opinion of 
the Korea-Chile FTA were almost half-half, however more than two thirds estimated that it would be passed easily at 
the NA.
60 Flankyoreh Daily Newspaper (30/12/2003).
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constitutional government (i.e. in search of support for policy). However, the collective 
obstruction by the RP once again defeated the FTA ratification attempt. The third 
attempt (post UFATC) was on February 9th, however it also failed. It was delayed while 
the NA was deciding which voting methods to use (secret ballot, open ballot or 
electronic ballot). After the consultation with the representatives from three parties, 
chairman Park Gwan-yong decided to deal with the ratification approval the following 
week because more time was needed to persuade the RP representatives. He wanted to 
set up a compromise proposal by arranging talks between Prime Minister and the 
farmers' organisation before going ahead with the ratification. He also suggested 
initiating a meeting between the government and members of the RP and providing 
additional aids to farmers.
While the final compromise did not persuade the RP members to vote in favour 
of the FTA, it did have an effect on farming organisations and their supporters.
Out of 271 NA members, 234 turned up for the ballot and it resulted in 162 
ayes, 71 nays and 1 abstention. Most urban region members voted in favour and rural 
region members voted against it. After going through these internal processes, the 
Korea-Chile FTA came into effect in April 1st’ 2004.
Supporters
Formal channels (IPI)
While the negotiations with Chilean representatives were taking place, the FKI, 
which were pro-FTA, were quite confident that the agreement would be reached 
without any major problems61. Since the government chose Chile as its first ever FTA 
partner, Korean officials assumed great responsibility in achieving success in the 
negotiations. Therefore, the FKI felt at ease regarding government’s attitude and a 
positive outcome. However this sentiment slowly changed as the domestic phase of 
ratification got underway. As the resistance and the opposition by the anti-FTA groups, 
especially from the farming and agricultural organisations, developed more aggressively
Interview conducted with Jeun Young-Jae, a senior research of Economic Research Department, SERI, 
Seoul, September 23rd, 2005; Interview conducted with Na Hyung-Kun, a director of International Economic 
Research Department, FKI, Seoul, November 26th, 2005.
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than expected, the pro-FTA groups became more proactive in expressing their 
arguments and point of view (Kim 2003a: 155). This was achieved, in part, by adopting 
a more ‘full spectrum’ approach, i.e. using both formal and informal channels (IPI, 
PPPM and PI).
The stakes increased with the submission of the FTA for ratification approval to 
the UFATC in July of 2003. In order to act more cohesively in applying pressure to the 
UFATC, the pro-FTA industries gathered under the umbrella of the so called big five 
leaders of the industrial organisations in Korea: KITA, Korea Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (KCOCI), FKI, Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business 
(KFSMB), and Korea Employers Federation (KEF)62. From late 2003 until February of 
the following year, when the ratification motion was finally passed in the NA, the FKI 
had produced a total of five recommendations regarding government FTA policy 63. It is 
widely considered an exceptional deed to have generated so many collaborative 
recommendations regarding a single policy issue in such a short time. It was also 
demonstrative that the threat of anti-FTA groups’ resistance was real and demanded 
attention.
In addition to all these recommendations and activities, most high level 
communications (the business groups’ spokespeople met several times with the 
President, party leaders, prominent members of the NA, and other high ranking 
government officials) were converted automatically into public policy activities by 
Korea’s major media outlets (see below). This acted as an additional means for the 
industrial groups to justify their more open support. For example, the Seoul 
Broadcasting System (SBS), one of Korea's largest broadcasting companies, reported 
the reality which Korea's industries faced and showed that the market share of 
automobiles was on rapid decline, from 28.3 percent in 2002 to 17.6 percent as of 
October 2003. Market share of Korean automobiles in Chile ranked fifth in 2003, which 
was three ranks down from the previous year. Market share of cell phones was also a 
serious concern, as it continued to lose market share in Chile due to the fact that Korea 
did not have an FTA with Chile. In a similar vein, the pro-FTA groups portrayed this
Among them, the KCOCI and the KFSMB chairman carried out his function as representative for SMEs 
but regarding foreign economic policy area, and especially for the Korea-Chile FTA, their interests were almost in 
accord with those o f large corporations.
Recommendations urging for a speedy ratification approval at the NA were announced July 15th and 
October 20th, 2003 and February 9th, 11th, and 15th, 2004.
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information so as to convince the general public that an increase in large corporations’ 
output and turnover would boost the Korean economy. This was based on their 
contribution to the Korean economy and that a loss of agreement on the FT A would hurt 
not only the corporations but also the general public via the national economy. This 
rationale was efficacious in persuading sections of the public and resulted in an increase 
in public support (Kim 2003a: 159-160; Kim 2003b). Furthermore, this rationale was 
also helpful in persuading undecided politicians to support the FTA in the NA. Their 
influence over politicians, however, was not only through the influence structure but 
also through the “power to influence political institutions-i.e. NA.”
Informal Channels
In utilising informal channels, besides setting forth recommendations, pro-FTA 
groups articulated their position on FTAs by arranging frequent informal meetings with 
key political leaders such as the President, party leaders, prominent members of the NA, 
and other high ranking government officials64. These unofficial meetings were crucial 
for the pro-FTA groups not only to re-emphasise their enthusiastic support for the FTA 
but also to reinforce informally what had been expressed formally and to maintain 
pressure on politicians to support the FTA, which defines the structure of channel of 
influence PPPM. This allowed the pro-FTA groups to apply pressure more efficiently. 
Political pressure applied from two directions is always going to be more advantageous 
than applying it from one and ensured that their ideas were well aired.
It is evident from reading that Korea’s five most read daily newspapers’ 
editorial articles that they were in unanimous support of the Korea-Chile FTA65. During 
the period between July of 2003 and February of 2004, when the FTA was a key issue 
for both the public and major domestic stakeholders, there were 35 editorial articles 
about the FTA published by the five major daily newspapers. Among them, only two 
articles from the Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper urged a cautious approach, while the
For instance, on February 8th, 2004, members from each o f the big-five industrial organisations urged the 
government to conclude the ratification process as rapidly and actively as possible, meeting core government officials 
such as the Uri Party's Chung Dong-young Chairman and other members (Maeil Business Daily Newspaper 
08/02/2004).
As o f September 2002, Korea's five most read daily newspapers were the Chosun Daily Newspaper, 
JoongAng Daily Newspaper, Dong-A Daily Newspaper, Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper, and Korea Times (Pressian 
26/09/2002).
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remaining 33 articles, or 94percent of all editorials, expressed supporting arguments for 
the FTA66. A case availing of the structure "public influence” if ever there was one. The 
media’s position was undoubtedly beneficial for the pro-FTA groups. The media's 
detailed reports about the need for an FTA and their justifications meant that they 
fulfilled the policy communication role pro-FTA groups had hoped they would (see 
below). In brief, the media’s selective reporting and editorials in favour of large 
corporations’ interests helped to shape a more positive opinion among the general 
public regarding the FTA. Conservative newspapers complained vociferously about the 
NA when the ratification bill was blocked three times. Furthermore, members of the NA 
were criticised greatly because of their attitudes in pursuing their own interests and 
concerns regarding the election results and their apparent lack of concern for national 
long term benefit. For instance, when having failed to ratify the country's first FTA for 
the second time, the business sector took measures to exert its own pressure on the 
legislators. FKI announced that it would analyse and circulate a list of the National 
Assemblymen opposing the bill to its member corporations and promptly published the 
list of what it designated “anti-business lawmakers” in its newsletter (Choi & Lee 2005: 
21).
Furthermore, Korea’s leading media -  such as Chosun Daily Newspaper and 
Dong-A Daily Newspaper -  created an atmosphere of urgency regarding the progress of 
the FTA by covering in depth negative reporting day after day about politicians. Large 
manufacturing corporations, trading companies, political pundits, economy experts and 
even public opinion generally expressed the need for a conclusion to this matter67. 
Politicians, especially the leading members of both parties, had to be considerate of the 
general public’s criticisms of the process.
These informal channels (Public Influence through media) bore fruit not only in 
how the FTA was perceived by the general public but also in terms of how formal 
channels reacted. This is best exemplified by how PI affected public opinion and,
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper, editorial columns (21/11/2003 and 11/02/2004).
A survey (300 respondents) was conducted in February, 2002 jointly by Korean Economy Newspaper 
and LG Economy Research Centre among various economy expert groups such as government officials, enterprisers, 
university professors, and research workers. 68.3 percent o f  the respondents responded that market liberalisation 
(such as FTA) should be strongly promoted (Korean Economy Daily Newspapers 24/12/2002). Meanwhile, a result o f  
another survey (261 business respondents) conducted by Korean Trade Association with a focus on trading business 
groups showed that 89 percent o f  the respondents were supportive o f  FTA ratification (Segye Daily Newspaper 
10/10/2004). A similar trend is also found among university students. A result o f  a survey conducted in January, 2004 
by the FKI among 237 university students showed that 90 percent o f the student respondents were supportive of  
Korea-Chile FTA settlement (Chosun Daily Newspaper 16/02/2004).
108
Chapter Three
therefore, helped to provide supporting MPs and parties with a viable raison d ’etre for 
their stance regarding the Korea-Chile FTA.
The party that felt the most pressure was the GNP, as they were the majority 
party in the NA. Therefore they were the most actively involved party in resolving the 
situation. On February 16th, 2004, the fourth ratification attempt, the GNP held two 
unscheduled general meetings in order to verify that party members were towing the 
party line. “Our party which is the majority party in the NA will suffer great losses if we 
do not pass the bill today. It is the matter of life or death for our party,” the party leader, 
Choi told its members68. He pressured the party by telling them that members who go 
against party line would face dire consequences69. Ultimately, the party's stance was 
achieved by a politically coerced consensus.
The Uri Party, in power in October 2003, also decided to vote for the approval 
and it encouraged its members to follow the party’s line. Although the DP was supposed 
to vote according to members’ discretion, party leader, Cho Soon-hyung pressured 
members of the party by saying that they should vote for the interest of the country as a 
whole. Thanks in part to the efforts of party leaders, the bill passed within 20 minutes of 
taking ballot. Most urban region members voted in favour and rural region members 
mostly voted against it. After going through these internal processes, the Korea-Chile 
FTA came into effect on April 1st, 2004.
Tie GNP was a conservative party and was widely seen as supporting the FTA. Furthermore, they 
received the tucking o f  FKI on this issue and the party leadership viewed failure to support ratification (or failing to 
get the FTA passed) as something that could cause the party irreparable damage, losing support from both the 
corporations aid conservative public who supported the FTA.
69
25 rural members o f the GNP clearly expressed their intention to vote against the FTA bill. Excepting 
those rural members, any party member who opposed the bill, the party leader strongly warned, would not gain a 
position o f  wcrth after the next general election (Munhwa Daily 16/02/2004).
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An evaluation of the impact the domestic stakeholder’s influences had 
on the FT A
Agenda—setting phase —  Supporters ’ dominance utilising IP I  as the prime 
channel o f influence
Agenda-setting is, by its very nature, dominated by government ministries 
involved in formulating foreign economic policy, such as FTAs. In Korea’s case, the 
ministry with institutional power (based on the Government Organisation Act) was the 
MOFAT. Furthermore, the MOFAT had a symbiotic relationship with the FKI and was 
sympathetic to their demands. The MOFAT was not alone; virtually all government 
ministries were supportive of the FTA with the sole dissenter being the MOAF. 
Ineluctably, the ager.da-setting phase was weighted to favour those who supported the 
FTA with Chile. Due to a lack of information regarding this phase to be found in the 
public arena, those v/ho were to become the FTA’s most stringent opponents were kept 
out of the loop and tius prevented from altering the agenda during the initial phase. The 
FTA was set accord ng to the paradigm laid out by MOFAT and the industries. The 
pro-FTA groups rel ed solely on the key structure of influence, the “power to influence 
political institutions' -  or formal channels -  at this point.
MOFAT pUyed a dual role during the FTA process, acting as both supporter 
and channel of influence. At the same time, President Kim supported the FTA policy. 
With such support available it was not really necessary for the FTA's supporters to seek 
other channels of inluence other than IP I. Given this background, it would be almost 
redundant to discus: OP and channels of influence. The FKI was not involved during 
the agenda settling piase, neither were any of the agreement's future opponents. Suffice 
to say that the govenment, in the roles of MOFAT and the President, was supportive of 
the FTA and was intitutionally in control with little to no outside interference.
The dominaice of pro-FTA groups and the absence of opponents led to an FTA 
agenda that firmly epresented the wishes of those who supported it. While this may 
seem to have b een ; complete success for those who supported the FTA, the situation 
was, in fact, tbe caln before the storm and it was to sow the seeds of discontent that was 
to follow. The suppliers’ got what they wanted, but this was to prove the old adage 
right; be careful foiwhat you wish for because you might just get it.
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Negotiation Phase —  Opponents ’ ascendency utilising PI as the prime channel 
o f influence
The negotiation phase was almost a role-reversal of the agenda-setting phase. 
The supporters took a backseat while the anti-FTA alliance grew from strength to 
strength. Government ministries, which had earlier had a united goal, began to drift and 
argue with each other over details (although MOFAT remained a permanently engaged 
actor) while the large corporations, fearful of stirring up anti-Chaebol sentiment and 
simultaneously quite hubristic regarding the FTA’s chances due to both government 
support during the early phases, effectively shut themselves out from the game.
Whereas the MOFAT actively supported the FT A, the FKI was publicly 
lukewarm for fear of stirring up anti-Chaebol sentiment. This weak alliance had poor 
(tertiary) access to PI even though they utilised conservative newspapers. Other than the 
editorials and articles printed, there was very little public support, besides that given by 
the government, for the FTA itself. Hence their key channel was limited to IP I, similar 
to the agenda-setting phase, with PPPM as secondary. The fact that the FKI felt 
inhibited due to a potential backlash meant that their utilisation of channels of influence 
was net commensurate with their OP. Their use of PI was almost clandestine; the FKI 
was net willing to support the editorials various conservative media printed, leaving 
them to exist in a virtual vacuum. This meant that their access to PI was drastically 
limited. Their utilisation of IPI and PPPM was also not as effective as could be, given 
the fact that the FKI viewed the direct benefits of an FTA with Chile as not particularly 
bountiful.
The agreement’s opponents, on the other hand, were efficaciously involved, 
partly because they had been sidelined and effectively shut out from the agenda-setting 
phase Their primary channel was to be PI and this was determined by several factors. 
First, he FTA's opponents wanted, indeed needed, to raise public awareness of the issue 
as the/ had limited access to IPI and PPPM (i.e., these were groups of farming 
organsations and civic groups whose limited OP did not give access). Should 
opporents gain access to PI, this would then ensure more attention would be paid to 
what hey wanted. Second, previous experiences, such as beef imports in 1987, the UR 
negotations in 1993 and the Korea-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1998, 
suggested that PI would be the most productive channel to access.
I ll
Chapter Three
Their use of both informal (PI as primary channel) and formal (IPI as secondary 
channel) was extremely effective, particularly their use of informal channels, such as 
street demonstrations, which involved the public and, concomitantly, politicians. This 
dual wielding of influence and ability to access all three of the key structures of 
channels of influence was to have almost immediate and ongoing results. Their use of 
PI (public demonstration) was determined by the OP. Given their weak OP they did not 
have immediate and effective use of IPI nor PPPM and, in fact, it was inevitable that 
they would access PI as their primary channel thereby gaining more effective use of IPI 
(MOAF) and PPPM (rural MPs).
The overall outcome during this phase was a result for the anti-FTA alliance 
(see table 3.6). They achieved several goals during this process, although they failed in 
their main goal; to have the agreement killed off.
i. The FTA was stalled for 20 months (between the 4th and 5th round negotiations) and some of the 
key sensitive items that concerned the farmers were taken from the tabie.
ii. Korean apples, pears and rice were sensitive items for farmers and were treated as deal- 
breakers in negotiation phase due to the success anti-FTA alliance. Finally, they were taken out 
of the deal and, furthermore (see Table 3.6), Korea had many agricultural products which were 
in exempted in the final agreement.
Table3.6: Com [larison of items exempted from Chile/Chile’s FTA partner countries
Countries Number of items exempted
Number of items exempted for 
Chile
Canada 96 75
Mexico 82 105
Korea 394 54
iii. The Korean tariff tables are more complicated than the Chilean counterparts (see table 3.7 & 
3.8) and this is the result of the pressure applied by the anti-FTA alliance. According to 
interviews with senior MOFAT officials70, some of the tariff bands applied were at the behest 
of opponents of the FTA and were inserted against the wishes of both MOFAT and the Chilean 
government (i.e. After Tariff rate Quotas (TRQ) and Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
renegotiation and after DDA renegotiation). There are ten tariff categories (see table 3.7) in 
total while Chile’s tariff categories are made up of the following six categories (see table 3.8).
Table 3.7: Tariff Categories of Agricultural Products Imported from Chile
Categories Number of Items Major Items
Year 0
(Immediately) 224
Seed bull, breeding pig, breeding chicken, lard, fertilized eggs, assorted feed, 
rawhide, fur, oil and fat, pelt, wool, wheat, rye, oats, African millet, millet
Year 5 545
Horse, sheep, chicken, turkey, other animals, edible offal, eggs, royal jelly, tulip, 
lily and other flowering plants (dormant), root of chicory, rose, orchid, carnation, 
mushroom germ, Chinese cabbage, lettuce, radish, bamboo shoot, bracken
Year 7 40 Canned peaches, jam, juice(grapes, strawberry), peaches(dried), turkey meat,
Interview conducted with Cho Je-hong, Managing Director in the Department of FTA Trade Policy- 
Making, MOFAT, Seoul, October 29th, 2005.
112
Chapter Three
c o m (se e d ) , p e a  an d  b e a n ( re ff ig e ra tio n ) , o th e r  v e g e ta b le s (re f r ig e ra tio n ) , p o ta to e s , 
w a ln u t, ra sp b e rry , so u p
Y e a r  9 1 O th e r  fru it ju ic e
Y e a r  10 197
P ork , m u tto n , ed ib le  o f fa lfb e e f  an d  so  o n ) , c h ic k e n fu n c u t an d  re fr ig e ra te d ) , y o g u rt, 
h a tch e ry  eg g s , b i r d 's  eg g s , c h e e s e (a ll) ,  sa u sag es , to m a to e s , c a rro t, tu rn ip , cu c u m b e r , 
lem on , ra is in , p each e s , s tra w b e rry , k iw i f ru its , g ra p e  ju ic e ,  sw ee t p e rs im m o n , 
ap rico t, m e lo n , fru it ju ic e fo ra n g e s , a p p le s , and  p each e s)
Y e a r  16 1
P o w d ered  m ilk , o th e r  f fu ita g e (d r ie d ) , d e lic a te s se n , p e a rs  and  
s tra w b e rr ie s fm a n u fa c tu re d  an d  s to re d ) , p ro c e ss e d  g o o d s, b le n d e d  ju ic e (a p p le s , 
g ra p e s  an d  o th e rs )
S e a s o n a l
D u tie s
12 G rap es
A fte r  T R Q  + 
D D A
re n e g o tia tio n
18
B eef(4 0 0  to n s), w h e y  (1 ,0 0 0  to n s) , C h ic k e n  m e a t(2 ,0 0 0  to n s ; re fr ig e ra te d , 
m a n u fac tu re d  an d  s to red ) , ap r ic o ts (  1 ,000 to n s) , m a n d a r in (1 0 0  to n s), an d  o th e r  
v e g e ta b le s  (1 0 0  to n s)
A fte r  D D A  
re n e g o tia tio n
3 7 4
O th e r  v eg e tab le s  an d  f lo w e rin g  p la n ts  lik e  red  p e p p e r  and  g a rlic , c e rea ls  lik e  b a re ly  
and  b ean s , s to c k  fa rm  p ro d u c ts  lik e  fro ze n  p o rk , b u tte r  an d  ch eese , fru its  lik e  
m a n d a r in  an d  ju ju b e , w a te rm e lo n , g reen  tea , se sam e
E x c e p tio n 21 R ice , A p p le s , P ea rs  an d  so  on
T o ta l 1432
Table 3.8: Chilean Tariff Categories of Products Imported from Korea
________________________________________________________________* (Chile HS code 8, percent)
Offer Total Industrial Farm Forest Marine Major products
C ategory products products products products
Immediate 2 ,4 5 0 (4 1 .8 ) 1 ,4 7 8 (3 0 .6 ) 6 7 7 (9 2 .9 ) 9 6 (1 0 0 ) 199(99 ) TV, cars, computers,
elimination cell phones
Elimination 1 ,9 9 4 (3 4 .1 ) 1 ,9 9 2 (4 1 .3 ) - - 2 (1 .0 ) polyethylene,
withm 5 years transport vehicles
Elimination 1 4(0 .2 ) 14 (0 .3 ) - - - oil filters
within 7 years
Elimination 1 ,1 9 9 (2 0 .3 ) 1 ,1 8 0 (2 4 .4 ) 1 0 (1 .4 ) - - storage batteries,
within 10 
years vacuum cleaners
Elimination 1 5 2 (2 .6 ) 1 52 (3 .1 ) - - - iron ore, textiles,
over 5—8 years 
1)
clothes
Excluded 5 4 (1 .0 ) 12 (0 .2 ) 4 2 (5 .8 ) - - washing machines,
refrigerators
Total 5 ,8 5 4 4 ,8 2 8 729 96 201
*Source: the MOFAT: http://www.fta.go.kr/user/fta_koreaAor_chile.asp7country_idx=l 1
1) Elimination o f  tariffs within 6~13 years o f entry into force o f  agreement.
2) Number o f  products is due to change in division o f products and HS code.
Compared to the agenda-setting phase which was dominated by the pro-FTA 
groups, this phase was dominated by its opponents and the results indicate that the final 
compromise during the negotiation phase favoured the FT As opponents more so then its 
supporters. The crucial issue (or most sensitive issue) was that of farming products and
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the opening of Korean farming to outside markets. While the opponents had achieved 
their secondary aims (i.e. altering the FTA), the fact was that the FTA was still on the 
table and there was a lot to play for in the final phase of the process.
Ratification phase — A battle won, but what o f the war?
The opponents came into the final phase in form and on top. They continued to 
perform strongly and had the bill delayed by 14 months in the assembly. However, this 
period masked a rot that had taken root in the formal influence channels that the anti- 
FTA alliance had utilised up until then. In fact it was partly their success which helped 
to shape this downfall. The government realised that an agreement was going to have to 
be made with some (or all) of the farmers’ groups. The resultant agreement split the 
KFCCA - divide et impera - and resulted in a much weakened opposition (NMP) -  
which correlated to a weak OP -  who resorted to more militant demonstrations (PI as 
primary channel) and a more centrist KFCCA who supported (or at least did not 
oppose) the FTA.
The result was that splitting the opponents of the FTA as the government did 
resulted in weakening their OP. Regardless, the fact is that up till that point, PI (public 
demonstrations) had been the most successful channel of influence for the opponents 
and they continued to rely on this channel throughout the ratification phase. The 
increasing desperation of their position, given the weakening of the OP, resulted in 
some demonstrations that resulted in violent confrontations. The use of IPI became a 
strong secondary channel given the role the 'Rural Party' played in the NA. Their 
attempts to access PPPM were non-productive and, hence, a tertiary channel.
In tandem with a weakening of the anti-FTA alliance, the pro-FTA groups 
grew in strength during the ratification phase, utilising formal (PPPM as primary 
channel) and informal channels (PI and IPI as secondary and tertiary channel-probably 
having learned the hard way from their opponents). Given their strong OP meant that 
there were constant informal meetings with key leaders such as the President, party 
leaders, prominent members of the NA and other high-ranking government officials that 
occurred throughout this duration, PPPM was the supporters' primary channel of 
influence. Access to PPPM allowed supporters to apply pressure effectively. Their
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secondary channel was PI, notably the use of conservative media and notably, the FKI's 
announcement that it would circulate a list of Mps who opposed the bill as “anti­
business lawmakers.” This played an important role in heaving some MPs off the fence 
and into their court. Finally, IPI was tertiary; the five recommendations produced by the 
FKI were submitted to government and were converted in short order into public policy 
activities. Additionally, the FKI managed to create a public sphere for the dissemination 
of their views without risking a public backlash against the Chaebols while the MOFAT 
was able to construct a more critically resilient rational for those who supported the 
FTA. Critically for politicians, those who supported it were now capable of publicly 
endorsing it without committing political hari-kiri.
To conclude, the FTA was passed but did so under much duress and was 
drastically different to what was originally planned. Those who opposed the FTA failed 
to have it thrown out of the NA but they did get some of their demands included and 
gained a huge side payment. The supporters of the FTA won the last battle but did they 
win the war? Areas of the agricultural sector remained out of bounds, which was a 
failure on behalf of supporters. However, as opponents were wont to point out, the first 
FTA was to be the first of many and regardless of how sacrosanct portions of the 
farming market were, the first inroads to opening them had been made in the face of 
enormous opposition.
Conclusion
To reiterate, the purpose of this thesis is to present evidence to investigate the 
argument that domestic stakeholders had a decisive impact on Korean FTA policy and 
final outcome. The key stakeholders in this process were; key government ministries 
(MOFAT and MOAF), the FKI, the farming sector and civic groups. These stakeholders 
were divided between supporters (MOFAT, FKI) and opponents (MOAF, the 
agricultural sector and civic groups).
During the three phases of the FTA process, each of these groups' access to the 
three key structures of channels of influence (formal and informal) and their relative 
successes varied. The agenda-setting phase was dominated by supporters who used 
formal channels (IPI as the primary channel). This was an inevitable result of how FTA
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policy was formulated. MOFAT, which dominated foreign economic policy, was in 
favour of having an FTA and partly co-opted -  and was partly co-opted by -  the FKI in 
formulating this policy. The negotiation phase was dominated by opponents who used 
both formal, as secondary channel (IPI, i.e. through MOAF), and informal channels, as 
primary channel (PI). Partly due to their sense of hubris over a job well done, the 
supporters stood back and were almost overwhelmed by the aggressive and popular 
movement established in opposition to the FTA. The opponents’ popularity was based 
on their intelligent manipulation of informal channels (PI). This lesson was not to be 
lost on the FTA’s supporters. The final phase (ratification), see-sawed between 
opponents and then supporters. The anti-FTA alliance utilised access to both informal 
(PI as primary) and formal channels (IPI as secondary) while supporters gained access 
to both-IPI and PI as primary and secondary channels, respectively (whereas they had 
previously been confined to formal channels). This situation resulted in the FTA being 
passed, though with major modifications from what was originally planned. This first 
case is not unique in that domestic stakeholders had the power to shape and direct 
Korea's FTA policy.
When it comes to veto players, the President had an important role in initiating 
the FTA. However, President Kim Dae-jung did not play an active role in the 
negotiation phase. Finally in the early stages of the ratification phase, President Kim did 
not play a critical role in supporting ratification due to the upcoming presidential 
election. The NA, as the other veto player, also had a limited role due to the agricultural 
sector's influence on rural MPs.
Although the agenda-setting phase can be interpreted using a combination of 
statist and systemic approaches, once we enter the negotiation phase (forced 
concessions on agricultural products) and ratification phase (inordinate delay despite 
support from the president and major political parties) these approaches are not 
sufficient by themselves to account for the variances that occurred. Hence the 
application of a societal approach to help us understand these nuances that the former 
approaches do not explicate.
This FTA was to set the stage for subsequent battles over future FTAs. Indeed, 
it could be said that not only was an FTA a new economic paradigm but also a new 
social paradigm for the domestic stakeholders who both opposed and supported
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subsequent FTAs. Any FTA since which has included sensitive factors for domestic 
actors, has triggered heavy involvement by these or equivalent actors. The following 
chapters deal specifically with this scenario; Korea-Japan Chapter Four and Korea-US 
Chapter Five.
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Chapter Four: Korea-Japan FTA
Introduction
With the Korean-Japan FTA, although not as accentuated as other FTAs in 
terms of uniqueness (Korea-Chile) or controversy (Korea-US), key domestic 
stakeholders were also to have an immense impact on the FTA negotiations. What was 
unusual in this case was that key business associations (FKI) changed their position vis- 
a-vis the FTA mid-process (an uncharacteristic move on their part given the fact that 
they have backed every other FTA to date). This naturally raises the question why they 
changed their position and, most importantly, what result this had on the FTA process 
itself. The corollary to these questions might then be how alliances were structured and 
who exactly was allied with whom?
Whereas the Korea- Chile and Korea-US FTAs saw a broad spectrum approach 
to utilising channels of influence, the Korea-Japan FTA was also unusual in that two 
structures of channels of influence (power to influence political institutions and 
Proximity to key politicians and policy makers) dominated throughout the process, and 
neither of them were public influence. Although labour unions did access informal 
channels, their success was severely limited due to domestic factors.
Based on this background, the purpose of this chapter is to examine three main 
questions;
i. Who are the key domestic stakeholders in the Korea-Japan FTA process?
ii. Why they took their respective positions.
iii. What channels of influence were utilised and why they were utilised.
iv. Finally, we shall assess the impact these factors had on the FTA process.
Concluding remarks will follow this examination.
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Background to Korea-Japan FTA
Brief summary of Korea-Japan FTA Chronology
Official government references to an FTA between Korea and Japan date back 
as far as 1998. On September 16th, 1998, the Japanese ambassador to Korea, Ogura 
Kazuo, spoke about the desirability of a joint study on a possible FTA between the two 
countries. The official proposal for a joint study on a Korea-Japan FTA was proposed 
by former President Kim Dae-jung when he visited Japan on October 8th, 1998. In 
return, former Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (1999) expressed a positive desire 
in strengthening the two countries’ bilateral relations, beyond the scope of existing 
economic agreements. The KIEP and its Japanese counterpart, the Institute of 
Development Economics (IDE), hosted the first symposium on a potential Korea-Japan 
FTA in May of 2000. According to the estimation of IDE and KIEP (2000a), 
international competitiveness of both countries would be enhanced under a Korea- 
Japan FTA. Accordingly, both countries’ global exports would increase; Korea by 30 
percent and Japan by 34 percent and world trade would increase by 0.71 percent1.
In 2000, President Kim eventually proposed a Korea-Japan business forum to 
enable an exchange of views between their respective private sectors. Utilising this 
proposition as a starting point, both countries established the Korea-Japan Business 
Forum in 2001. In 2002, the forum adopted a joint statement declaring that both 
governments should hasten to conclude an FTA. This in turn led both governments to 
form a government-led joint study group (a governmental, business, academic Joint 
Study Group (GBA-JSG) was established in July 2002) which was to help provide the 
impetus and supporting rationale for an FTA. Finally, both countries officially started 
the first round of negotiations in December, 2003. Between December, 2003 and 
November, 2004, six rounds of negotiations were held2. These six years were eventually 
to bear fruit, although not of the variety expected. Japan and Korea signed the BIT in 
2002, which guaranteed that non-domestic firms would be treated as domestic for 
investment purposes, at the level of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) standard. Bilateral negotiations on the FTA, however, were
IDE and KIEP (2000b) 'Toward closer Japan-Korea Economic Relations in the 21st century,’ Paper 
presented on May 24th, at the International Joint Symposium on toward a Korea-Japan FTA: assessments and 
Prospects, Seoul.
2 Negotiation had taken place every two months.
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suspended at the sixth official negotiation in Tokyo on November 11th, 2004 (see table 
4.1).
Table 4.1- Chronology of the Korea-Japan FTA
Date Main Activities
O c to b e r 1998
President Kim proposed a 'K orea-Japan Partnership Action Plan fo r  the 2 Ist 
Century’ and a Joint study on a possible FTA.
M ay  1999
Prime Minister Obuchi proposed to strengthen the relationship beyond the economic 
cooperation through ‘K orea-Japan Economic Agenda 217
M ay  2000
KIEP in Korea and IDE in Japan presented ‘ Joint Study on a potential Korea-Japan
FTA 7
S e p tem b er 2000 President Kim proposed holding 'K orea-Japan FTA Business Forum.'
Jan u a ry  2002
Korea-Japan Business Forum adopted a Joint Declaration to suggest the promotion 
of an FTA to both governments.
M arch  2002 GBA-JSG was formed.
Ju ly  2002 The GBA-JSG 1st meeting took place.
S ep tem b er 2003 The GBA-JSG had hold 7th meeting.
D ecem b er 2003 1st official negotiation started
N o v e m b er 20 0 4 6th official negotiation and subsequent stalemate (to date)
*Source: The MOFAT(MOFAT), http://www.fta.go.kr/user/fta_korea/infb.asp7country_idx=12.
The official reason stated by both governments was the failure to organise 
subsequent negotiation agendas due to differences of opinion. In particular, Korea 
disapproved of Japan’s 50 percent exclusion target for the agricultural produce market 
(Korea wanted 90 percent access)3, whereas Japan criticised Korea’s reservations in 
delaying the opening of its industrial products market4. The nature of these negotiations 
meant that frictions did not come entirely as a surprise; heated debate during 
negotiations was expected due to the similarities with the Korea-Chile FTA 
negotiations and their subsequent suspensions and Korea-US FTA. It was expected that 
-  in order for negotiations to advance -  political incentives to resolve these frictions 
were necessary, as had happened during the negotiation and ratification phases of the 
Korea-Chile FTA and Korea-US FTA. However, the Korea-Japan FTA did not follow 
the template exactly as set out by its Chilean counterpart. Instead, it reached a stalemate 
and has remained in stasis ever since (as of September, 2009)5.
Some would argue that Japanese government might be a major factor in
Korea wanted 95 percent of the industrial sectors opened and 90 percent of the agricultural sectors, 
wiereas Japan wanted 99 percent and 50 percent respectively in any FTA between the two countries.
Interview conducted with Choi Kyoung-lim, a director of FTA policy Bureau of MOFAT, Seoul, 
September 28th, 2006; Korea Times (15/02/2005) and JoongAng Daily Newspaper (17/02/2005).
April 21st, 2008, the new President Lee Myung-bak and the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda 
pioclaimed a new era of "future-oriented' relations. After several years of strained relations, the two countries now 
stem ready to pursue a course of cooperation. They enumerated five points, of which the third point stated; to 
st engthen economic ties by holding working-level talks to resume negotiations on a free trade agreement, while 
redressing the trade imbalance between the two countries through, among other things, relocation of Japanese parts 
aid materials manufacturers to Korea-the aim being to re-launch the stalled negotiations.
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explaining this deadlock. For example, Korean Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon has said 
that the bilateral talks would have gone smoothly if Japan had agreed, as it had 
promised, to open more than 90 percent of its agricultural market. Kim also showed 
cautious optimism, warning that if the FTA talks resumed hastily only to fall apart, this 
could cause more problems in Korea-Japan relations6. However, to the contrary, the 
facts are that the Japanese government tried to reopen FTA negotiations with Korea in 
2007 and 20087, to which the Korean government did not display much enthusiasm.
While there have been various interpretations suggested that lay the cause for 
these developments at the feet of the Japanese government, this chapter studies the 
argument that Korea’s domestic stakeholders, in particular Korea's large corporations’ 
business associations (i.e. the FKI led coalition), are the principal factor behind the 
current deadlock (Details in later section). Domestic resistance to market liberalisation 
was not unusual during FTA negotiations. As discussed in the previous chapter, Korean 
domestic resistance was significant in shaping the final outcome of the Korea-Chile 
FTA. What is different about the Korea-Japan FTA negotiation is that, even though the 
negotiations were suspended, the Korean government has not displayed the political 
will to resolve the current impasse, despite positive noises from the Japanese. This 
contrasts sharply with how the Korean government finally grasped the initiative and 
pushed for a resolution of the stalemate of the Korea-Chile FTA negotiations and 
Korea-US FTA. This thesis' proceeding section discusses the reasons behind the 
initiation of a Korea-Japan FTA.
Why Japan was chosen as a potential FTA partner
There are two broad categories of reasons which help explain why Japan was 
chosen as an FTA partner; external factors (economic and international political factors) 
and internal factors (domestic political factors). This thesis looks at the argument that
6 The Korea Times (25/06/2008).
‘We are ready to resume FTA negotiations, which have been put on hold since November 2004, at any 
time and will intensify our call on Korea to restart the process at an early date,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa 
Shiozaki told a news conference," (Kyodo Daily Newspaper 03/04/2007). The Japanese government hopes to reopen 
the FTA with Korea that has been stalled for over three years due to differences between the two sides (Nihon Keizai 
Newspaper 12/02/2008). Recently, Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso called 
for the early conclusion o f a free trade deal during their summit on 28th June, 2009 and after, Korea and Japan held a 
working-level meeting to look into ways to resume stalled negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement.
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both external and internal factors worked in tandem to create a critical mass which 
resulted in President Kim Dae-jung’s government choosing Japan as a regional FTA 
partner but that it was domestic factors which dictated the outcome of the negotiations. 
We shall begin by looking at the external factors.
Possible partner countries’ intentions are an important factor as well. Japan 
rated Korea as its most appropriate partner for an FTA. Fukagawa (2000) argued that 
both countries would benefit from a Korea-Japan FTA, and ranked Korea as a very 
appropriate FTA partner8.
External Factors
Overcoming the financial crisis
As was previously discussed in Chapter Three, Korea—Chile FTA, the financial 
crisis of 1997 left a devastated South Korean economy in its wake. Floundering policy 
makers were looking for a light at the end of the tunnel and FT As, along with regional 
cooperation9, were seen as offering the silver lining that was sought. While the Korea- 
Chile FTA was begun under the premise that it would be a stepping stone for further 
FTA’s without bringing much FDI itself, the Korea-Japan was initiated under the aegis 
of developing Korea’s economy through Japanese FDI (Kim 2002b: 3; Cheong 2001c; 
Im 2002). Thus, an FTA with Japan was, in effect, being sought to bring about a 
renewal of foreign capital inflow. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) highly rated Korea’s promotion policy of attracting foreign investment that was 
adopted after the crisis. Japan's FDI to Korea sharply decreased after 1994 but 
rebounded after 1997 (Kim and Kim 2002: 5-10). Japan’s share made up 8.1 percent,
According to ‘Japanese Strategies on FTAs’ announced by its Foreign Affairs Ministry, Japan seeks to 
choose FTA partner countries depending on economic, geographical, political and diplomatic criteria and FTA 
feasibility. Considering these, Japan considered that Korea is appropriate for Japanese FTA strategies, 
http://meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/index.html. And according to Nihon Geizai Daily Newspaper (10/05/2004), 
Korea was the first country o f  desirable FTA partner countries to Japan (among countries being examined or under 
negotiation).
Enhanced sentiment in favour o f cooperation within the region in 1998 and 1999 also encouraged the 
strengthening o f a new regional grouping that brought the Association o f  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member 
countries together with Japan, China and Korea into the 'ASEAN+3.' ASEAN member countries were particularly 
interested in maximising the benefits from Japan for all members- including those not hit by crisis. And the 
multilateral platform o f  ASEAN+3 was seen as a springboard for strengthened bilateral ties in the region -  
particularly between Japan and Korea and Japan and China. This strengthening, in turn, was seen to provide greater 
overall regional stability.
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7.8 percent and 9.7 percent of Korea’s total FD1 in 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively, 
amounting the $550 million, $1 billion and $1.98 billion (1m 2002: 69-78).
By concentrating on the areas of international competitiveness based on 
comparative advantage, each country could allocate economic resources more 
efficiently and expedite restructuring in both countries. For example, Korean exports 
were expected to enjoy greater international competitiveness and easier market access in 
technologically lower-end products such as apparel, leather products, and agricultural, 
fishery products while the Japanese exports were estimated to do so in more 
sophisticated trades such as machinery, metal, and chemical products.
Korea, by itself, was too small of an economy to compete directly with either 
Japan or China a fact that led policy makers to the conclusion that Korea should expand 
its global market share by establishing FTAs with major trading partners (Shotaro 2006: 
3; Moon 2006: 50; Sohn 2002: 10). While Japan possessed a generally higher 
international competence, both Korea and Japan were suffering losses from excessive 
and redundant investments and competitive price reductions. Furthermore, the Korea- 
Japan FTA would fundamentally transform the mindsets of both countries regarding 
market liberalisation; both countries were, and still are, known to be two of the most 
protectionist economies among the major trading countries. Therefore, the Korea-Japan 
FTA was considered to be able to provide effective strategic cooperation between large 
corporations of both countries (Korea—Japan FTA business Forum on July 7th, 2002). 
The FTA was expected not only to ameliorate problems associated with the intense 
competition that existed between the two, but also to strengthen the potential for 
sustainable economic growth by prompting more active restructuring (Bark and Kim 
2005: 23-26; Choi 2001: 477). Furthermore, without a Korea-Japan FTA, Korea stood 
to lose a potentially great economic opportunity, particularly should Japan chose to 
conclude an FTA with another South East Asian economy (Sohn 2002: 7).
Security considerations
Security considerations may have also contributed. During the North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis of 2000, Kim Dae-jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy10, ran counter to the harder
The Sunshine Policy was the South Korean doctrine towards. The doctrine emphasises peaceful 
cooperation, seeking short-term reconciliation as a prelude to eventual Korean reunification. Since its articulation in
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line taken by the Bush administration and subsequently the Korean government felt 
alienated at the six party talks (Yu 2006: 80-81; Sohn 2002: 10). This isolation resulted 
in Korea acknowledging the necessity for closer ties between Korea and Japan.
These considerations -  typically addressed as systemic approaches -  attempt to 
explain the context of Korea’s adaptation of free trade policy. However, the outcome of 
the Korea-Japan negotiations underlines the problem of adopting a purely systemic 
approach in that it does not successfully explain the role that domestic stakeholders 
played in influencing the FTA’s outcome.
Internal Factors
FTAs aren’t always bad for agriculture
The Korean government arguably used its FT A negotiation with Japan as a 
showcase to demonstrate that FTAs do not always damage Korea’s agricultural 
industry". The agenda-setting phase for the Korea-Japan FTA progressed alongside the 
difficult negotiations with Chile (Cho and Kim 2002: 136; KIEP 2001). The Korean 
government ascertained that Korean agriculture was more competitive than its Japanese 
counterpart and strongly requested that Japan open its agricultural markets during the 
FTA negotiations. In this regard the government tried to show that an FTA could benefit 
Korean agricultural sectors12.
Expectation that a broad spectrum of supporters would by far outweigh 
any opposition
Initial research13 into establishing an FTA with Japan by several bodies 
(including joint study groups) concluded that opposition to the FTA would be sparse
1998 by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, the policy has resulted in greater political contact between the two 
countries and one o f  historical moments in Korean peninsula, two Korean summit meetings in Pyongyang (June 
2000) which broke ground with several high-profile business ventures, and brief meetings o f separated family 
members.
Interview conducted with Park Myung-jae, Minister o f MOPAS, Seoul, March 3rd, 2007.
12 Pressian On-line Daily Newspaper (13/10/ 2003).
Korean Institute for Economics (KIE) (2000); Satoru Okuda (2000) How can Korea take advantage of 
changing Japanese market? An application o f Gravity Model and RCA Analysis,’ presented at the APEC Study Centre 
Japan Consortium Conference at Makuhar, December, 16th-17th.
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and far less effective than that which the Korea-Chile FTA was facing. Key ministries, 
industrial sector representative groups -  even the agricultural sector14 initially -  all 
expressed positive opinions concerning an FTA with Japan. This does not mean to say 
there was no opposition, the labour movement vehemently opposed any FTA with Japan 
but government scenarios forecast a weak opposition incapable of mounting an effective 
disturbance; the 1997 financial crisis weakened the Korean labour movement with 
layoffs and union membership decline (Kwon 2001: 217). When negotiations began, 
these expectations proved to be unfounded (Kim et al., 2006: 25-30).
Main issues
There are several important issues involved here that this section will analyse. 
These are the issues that often came up in the public sphere and were debated by 
supporters and detractors. These are as follows; economic issues (i.e. potential 
economic outcome and the opening of the domestic market) and domestic restructuring 
(i.e. how sections of society that stand to lose out adapt to their changing circumstances, 
i.e. labour and large corporations).
Economic issues
Some researchers considered a bilateral FTA to be a win-win situation (Fukao 
et al., 2005: 333-336; Kang et al, 2005: 13-18). Several researches (Moon 2004; 
Yamazawa 2001; Nakajima and Kwon 2001; IDE and KIEP 2000b; KIEP 2000) pointed 
out that a Korea-Japan FTA would produce significant long-term and dynamic benefits 
for Korea. First of all, the elimination of tariffs would affect the level of real GDP. 
Cheong (2001c) indicated that Korea’s GDP would increase 0.22-0.30percent, and IDE 
and KIEP (2000a:21-23) expected a slight increase 0.37 percent in Korea’s real GDP. 
Secondly, the bilateral tariff elimination could have affected the welfare level of each 
country. The Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (KIET) report (2002) 
estimated that the welfare level of Korea would increase by 0.48 percent, which was 
attributed to the expansion of private consumption stimulated by the reduction of prices 
of Japanese imports after tariff elimination. Cheong (2001c) also expected that Korea
Interview conducted with Lee Jung-bak, one of co-leaders of NFF, Seoul, October 7th, 2006.
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could expect to experience an increase in its welfare level by 0.28-0.33 percent in the 
short-run. Also, there could be significant effects on the total trade balance of each 
country (see Table 4.2). Although KIEP’s estimates of export and import growth rates 
(2.32 and 3.40 percent) were higher than KIET’s (0.43 and 1.0 percent), both studies 
equally expected that the growth rate of Korea’s total imports had the potential to 
exceed that of total exports, thus aggravating the overall trade balance. In contrast, IDE 
estimated that a growth in Korea’s total exports of 2.8 percent would surpass total 
imports of 2.47 percent. However, these researches did disagree with each other on 
some details, some simultaneously suggesting that an FTA would have a negative 
impact on the Korean economy. As displayed in Table 4.2., Korea's real GDP and 
welfare level were expected to decline by 0.07 percent. This caused opponents much 
concern, even though supporters argued that this figure indicated only static effects (Lee 
2001: 120).
Table 4.2: Macroeconomic Effects of a Korea-Japan FTA
Economic indicators (Korea) KIEP KIET IDE
Welfare (percent) -0.19 0.48 -
Real GDP (percent) -0.07 -0.07 -
Changes in total exports (percent) 2.32 0.43 2.80
Changes in total imports (percent) 3.40 1.00 2.47
Total trade balance (percent) -1.54 -0.59 0.29
‘ Source: IDE and K.IEP (2000a) ‘Economic Effects and Policy Direction for a Korea-Japan FTA,' Joint Symposium, Seoul.
Despite these researches, it was argued that such theories failed to reflect the 
full impact of such an FTA and that gains forecasted by such researches were, therefore, 
highly dubious (Kim 2002c: 7). Furthermore, the Bank of Korea15 reported that 67 
percent of Korean exports were in competition with Japanese, among which only 9 
percent had a higher competitiveness level than their Japanese counterparts. With the 
elimination of tariffs, as a result of the Korea-Japan FTA, Korean goods would lose 
ground quickly against Japan’s, especially in the short run. This argument received 
further confirmation from the results of the CGE models which indicated that Korea's 
trade deficit with respect to Japan would increase by 2-6 billion dollars in the short term 
(Nakajima and Kwon 2001: 3; Cheong 2001c: 6). Subsequently, it was argued that due 
to the relevant difference in economic scale and similarity of export structure, the 
effects would be felt more strongly in the Korean market and would, as a result,
Bank of Korea (BOK) (2000) ‘Korea-Japan FTA. competitiveness of Korean industries,’ Working paper, 
August, BOK.
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undergo more industrial restructuring. The difference between the FTA with Chile and 
Japan was that Korea's export structure was complementary with its Chilean 
counterpart whereas it was competitive with Japan's. For example, Korea competes 
with Japan in such industries as steel, automobile, ship building and electronics (Kim 
2004d: 50-56). Competition in these sectors would increase if a Korea-Japan FTA was 
established, and the battlefield would primarily be in the Korean domestic market. 
Currently, Korean large companies have maintained a certain level of market strength 
with the help of relatively high tariff rates (Lee and Chun 2004: 146). Upon the 
conclusion of an FTA with Japan, harsh competition would result with the elimination 
of the tariff and NTBs and would ultimately lead to industrial restructuring in the less 
competitive sectors (Lee and Chun 2004; Kim 2004d).
Restructuring Korean industry and its effect on labour
One of the objectives of the FTA was to increase intra-regional trade, which 
would increase the interdependency of the member countries. For example, the 
establishment of the EU, N AFTA and Mercosur have all resulted in a significant 
increase in intra-industry trade among the member countries (Shin 2003a: 250-251; 
Yeats 1998; Williams 1996: 53). Many studies concerning the effects of an FTA with 
Japan were carried out during the agenda-setting phase and many of the results tended 
to agree in principle that it would consist of short term pain and long term gain (see 
Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Possible Economic Effects of Korea-Japan FTA
S ta t i c  E f f e c t s D y n a m i c  E f f e c t s
K IE P ID E K IE P ID E
K o r e a
W elfa r e  le v e l (% ) - 0 .1 9 0  3 4 1 1 4 3 7  0 9
G D P  (% ) -0 .3 7 0 .0 6 2 8 8 8 .6 7
T ra d e  b a la n c e  w ith  J a p a n  
( U S $ 1 0 0  m illion )
- 6 0 .9 0 - 3 8 .8 5 - 4  4 0 - 2 4 6 0
T ota l tr a d e  b a la n c e  
( U S S I 0 0  m illion )
-1 5 .4 3 -2 .7 3 0 .1 4 4 0 8 .0 0
J a p a n
W elfa r e  le v e l  (% ) 0 .1 4 0  0 3 - 9 .2 9
G D P  {% ) 0  0 4 0 .0 0 - 10  4 4
T ra d e  b a la n c e  w ith  K o rea  
(U S $ 1 0 0  m illion )
6 0  9 0 3 8 .8 5 - 2 4  6 0
T ota l tr a d e  b a la n c e  
( U S $ 1 0 0  m illion ) -
5 4 .7 9 - 1 8 2 .0 0
* Source: GBA-JSG Report (2003) Korea Japan Free Trade Agreement.' October 2nd, 2003.
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However, the details provided plenty to argue over. On the one hand there were 
studies that suggested that although the short term results would not be absolutely 
positive, the long term gains would far outweigh these short term losses. Some16 argued 
that if Japanese firms introduced superior technology, Korean industries would have to 
confront strong competition and would lose their market competitiveness, but the 
Korean economy as a whole would gain much more 1) as the consumer benefits and 2) 
the productivity enhancement would be much larger.
With superior technology, Japan would specialise in the production of capital 
and technological intensive goods with high value added, while Korea would specialise 
in the production of less capital and technological intensive goods with low value added, 
or would be converted to an assembly centre (Kim 2004d: 60-62). Cohen argues that 
this kind of economic interdependence is the natural consequence of market-driven 
specialisation within a global division of labour (1990: 276).
However, considering that the wage level in Korea was already too high to host 
plants for simple assembly, and that Japan was already taking advantage of the low 
wage level in South Asian countries like Indonesia and Thailand, it was highly unlikely 
that Korea could be easily converted into an assembly centre.
Regardless of the outcome of these expectations, the real possibility was that 
Japan would take advantage of the FTA with Korea to extend its percentage of market 
share of industrial products (Lee 2005b; Lee et al., 2005; Cho and Kim 2002: 135). This 
would increase the competiveness of Japan overall and, simultaneously, increase 
Korean dependence on Japan (Kim 2000a: 57). In this process, the less competitive 
firms would go bankrupt and unemployment levels would increase17. An inevitable 
result of this scenario would be the agitation of labour unions and several affected 
industries (Ahn 2006a: 13). In other words, the process of industrial restructuring would 
be focused on the Korean economy because of its relatively weaker competitiveness. 
The potential for industrial restructuring provoked strong complaints and led to a 
demand for support from certain industrial sectors and even resistance in some quarters 
to the FTA (Lee and Chun 2005: 260-262). Industrial restructuring would, without 
question, provoke strong complaints and demands for support for those sectors affected 
by it.
16 Lee 2005b; Lee et al., 2005; Cho and Kim 2002: 135.
17 Munhwa Daily Newspaper (23/06/2006 and 02/10/2006).
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Identification of the key domestic stakeholder
The agreement's main supporters were; MOFAT, business associations 
(although their support was not long-lived) and East-Asianists (i.e. academics, public 
officials, political commentators, etc. who saw the East-Asian triumvir of Korea, Japan 
and China as the way to establishing Korea’s mark on the world stage, see below for 
further details).
While there is a strong sense of symmetry between the positions of the MOAF 
re Korea-Chile FTA and the Ministry of Labour (MOL) re Korea-Japan FTA, the 
actual role MOL played was far more neutral than MOAF . Following the almost 
public fracas over the Korea-Chile FTA, central government demanded that 
government ministries adopt a more pro-FTA attitude. Labour unions; Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU) were 
insisting that such an FTA would be detrimental to their interests19. The result was that 
MOL attempted to play it safe by adopting a more neutral approach, thus denying 
themselves an important role as a domestic stakeholder .
Those who opposed the FTA were; labour unions, business associations (see 
below) and anti-globalisationists. There are points of variance between the Korea-Chile 
FTA and the Korea-Japan FTA that are worth pointing out at this early phase. Both 
FTAs shared a similar supporting structure during the agenda-setting phase (i.e. key 
ministries and large businesses), however the later negotiation phase of the Korea- 
Japan is strikingly dissimilar from its Chilean counterpart in that large business 
associations had abandoned their earlier position of support to one of deflecting the 
agreement from proceeding. This dissimilarity is critical in explaining the dichotomy 
between the relative success of the Korea-Chile FTA and failure of the Korea-Japan 
FTA.
Interview conducted with Lee Sang-uk and Hong Jung-woo, international negotiation team in 
International Cooperation Bureau, MOAF, Seoul, on September 26th, 2006.
Interview conducted with Chung Byung-duk who was deputy-manager o f KCTU, Seoul, October 4th,
2006.
Interview conducted with Kim Jung-sun, deputy director o f  international cooperation bureau in Planning 
and coordination office in MOL, Seoul, October 13th, 2006.
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Supporters and their rationale
Three groups are analysed here; key government ministries, business 
associations and East Asianists. Despite the similarities in the rationale behind the 
support each of these groups gave to the Korea-Japan FT A, there is sufficient disparity 
in the details to warrant separate analyses.
Key government ministries
For many years the MOFAT has been the most important government ministry 
when it comes to organising trade agreements with foreign countries21. Of the 
government ministries involved in the Korea-Japan FTA, the MOFAT’s support was 
crucial to its survival. The MOFAT saw Japan as a rich source of FDI, as opposed to 
Chile, where the negotiation of an FTA was a more symbolic gesture (Choi 2001: 480). 
The MOFAT was also of the view that a competitive Japanese economy -  although 
potentially harmful to the Korean economy in the short term -  would revitalise and 
energise a lagging Korean economy. The ministry acknowledged22 that some sectors 
(FKI, KCCI, KITA and FSMB) of Korean industries would suffer comparative 
economic disadvantages.
MOAF
MOAF had, prior to 2003 and the election of President Roh Moo-hyun, sailed 
something of an independent course to the rest of the government regarding the Korea- 
Chile FTA. Following the elections of 2003, the MOAF found its wings had been 
snipped. Despite individual disagreements over government policy, the ministry as a 
whole followed the government line much more closely during the Korea-Japan FTA 
(Choi 2001:485).
Business Associations -  the FKI led coalition
There were several industrial business associations involved in the FTA process.
More details see 'Key government section" in the Chapter Three Korea-Chile FTA.
Interviews conducted with Choi Kyoung-lim, director of FTA policy Bureau in MOFAT, Seoul, 
September 29th, 2006.
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Of these, the most important were; The FKI, the KITA, FSMB and the KCCI23.
Together, they formed a coalition whose nominal leader was the FKI. Korean business 
associations were keen to display a receptive facade to the idea of an FTA with Japan.
An important factor to keep in mind when analysing business associations' 
support for the FTA is when the early phases of the Korea-Japan FTA agenda-setting 
phase occurred. Korea had just suffered an economic collapse and The FKI did not want 
to be seen standing in the way of necessary reforms that would alleviate the country’s 
distress. A prime example of this avoidance of confrontation over distasteful reforms is 
the ‘Big Deal24’ policy of July 1998, a policy package that aimed for corporate reform 
and increased financial liberalisation. The government instituted the Big Deal program 
to force the five largest chaebols to reorganise their business structure and concentrate 
on their mainline industries. The agenda-setting phase of the Korea-Japan FTA took an 
inordinate amount of time to conclude, so much so that the country’s leaders declared 
the financial crisis over by the time the negotiation phase began. Hence the FKI25 felt 
more insulated from harm should they decide to oppose said reforms.
The FKI and its Japanese counterpart, the Keidanren, reinforced the need for an 
FTA between the two countries through academic studies, formal channels of influence 
and other methods. Certainly, the FTA Business Forum had positive effects in gaining 
the support of business associations. For example, in the Korea-Japan FTA Business 
Forum of September 2001 that opened in Seoul, Cho Suk-rae, the Chairman of the 
Hyosung Group, argued that FTA formulation was necessary to escape the economic 
stagnancy that both Korea and Japan were experiencing. Park Yong-sung, Chairman of 
the KCCI, held a press conference where he presented the “Business Associations ’ View 
o f the Korea-Japan FTA,” stressing the necessity of an FTA in 2002. Park admitted that 
an FTA with Japan might have damaging effect on manufacturing industries, but argued 
that if complete removal of present tariffs were to take about ten years and particular 
industries were incapable of maintaining competitiveness, they should rightfully be
Korean SMEs in theory were in favour of the FTA. For instance, in a FTA related survey with 399 SMEs, 
86.1 percent were in favour, and 13.9 percent were not. Reasons for support were increase in exports (43.2 percent), 
decrease in prices o f  imports (38.4 percent), and increase in productivity (36.6 percent), while reasons for opposition 
were entry o f Japanese firms in Korea (71.6 percent) and worries o f  increase in Japanese imports (66.7 percent) 
(Venture Daily Newspaper 31/08/ 2003).
As a result o f the government' reform drive, Flyundai absorbed Hanhwa's oil refinery business; Hyundai, 
Daewoo, and Hanjin integrated their aerospace and railway carriage businesses to establish joint finl 15; and Hyundai 
absorbed LG‘5 semiconductor business (Lee 2005d: 293).
Interview conducted with Na Hyung-kun, a director o f  International Economic Research Department, 
FKI, Seoul, November 26th, 2005.
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weeded out“ .
Most importantly, the FKI suggested the Korea-Japan FTA as a primary step in 
realising the Korean government’s "Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation Plan 
(NAECP)”. Business associations' support created a synergistic relationship regarding 
both policies (at least initially), i.e. support for the NAECP tied in nicely with support 
for the Korea—Japan FTA and vice versa.
Although the FKI led coalition initially supported the FTA, as circumstances 
changed so did the level of their support (Cheong 2001c: 77). Support for the Korea- 
Japan FTA did not wane overnight, however. The process of shifting from support to 
opposition had three phases; from overall support to conditional support and, finally, to 
opposition. Overall support was marked by large corporations' unwillingness to seem 
intransigent in the face of the 1997 financial crisis. The move to conditional support, 
while not entirely fluid, is an important milestone in tracing this shift and consists of the 
FKI sending signals that dealing with the issues surrounding NTBs were vital for their 
support (see below). The worst of the '97 financial crisis had passed -  removing the 
need for the FKI to acquiesce to unpalatable government policies -  and, in the mean 
time, FKI had had time to digest the possible outcome of an FTA with Japan and most 
found it distasteful, hence the move to conditional support. The move to conditional 
support was part of the chess game that the FKI-led coalition was playing with the 
government. Conditional support was one step removed from opposition and this was 
the journey that the FKI led coalition was consciously undertaking.
East Asianists
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Korea has actively promoted East 
Asian regional cooperation and has been enthusiastic in its efforts to form a regional 
cooperative organisation for East Asia. The need to strengthen East Asian regional 
cooperation is a common argument heard in Korea (Chung 2006a: 115; Byun 2001: 43). 
As a response to the “regionalisms” of North America and Europe, East-Asian 
regionalism had gained popularity among many commentators (Pempel 2006: 242; 
Kawai 2004: 32; Desker 2004; 4—7; He 2004: 112). This trend dates back to President
Korean Economic Daily Newspaper (19/03/2002).
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Kim Dae-jung when, in 1998 at his recommendation, both the East Asian Study Group 
(EASG) and the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) were founded27. The fundamental 
philosophy behind this movement was one of regional integration, specifically an 
economic integration that would be to the benefit of all similar to the EU or NAFTA. 
Initially, China, Japan and Korea would initiate economic cooperation and clear a path 
for others to join. However, due to the realities of history and ideological differences 
such a triumvirate was impossible to forge at that moment in time (He 2004: 110; Kim 
2002b: 2). It was therefore suggested that bilateral moves towards such integration 
would offer more immediate success, such as a Korea-Japan FTA or a Korea-China 
FT A (Sin and Yoo 2003: 140).
These ‘East Asianists’ emphasised the necessity of East Asian regional 
cooperation in their support of the Korea-Japan FTA and advocated that Korea should 
actively participate in and lead the establishment of such cooperation. These academics, 
politicians and policy makers included, amongst others, Presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh 
Moo-hyun and their supporters (Hong 2006). Not all East Asianists were of one mind 
though. Some of their approaches may have differed but what is important here is that 
their support for bilateral/regional integration was a fundamentally defining 
characteristic. Some East Asianists (Park 2006; Lee 2004b; Lee and Jeon 2004; Lee 
2000) stressed integration on the basis of security while others on the basis of 
economics (Chung 2006b; Sakakibara 2003).
Of those who argued for integration on the basis of security, the lead among 
them was President Roh Moo-hyun. He adapted and developed President Kim Dea- 
jung's concept of Asian regionalism. He viewed Korea as a "balancer of power' 
between the US and China (Lee 2007a; Hong 2006; Chang 2005). In order to achieve 
his goal, it would be necessary to create a stronger well of political gravitational power 
in East Asian (i.e. Korea), helping to create a more secure region (and one of vastly 
more importance). Acting on this impulse, FTA agenda setting was initiated with both 
the US and China. However, the Korea-US FTA was completed and awaiting 
ratification while the China FTA had yet to get off the ground. This prioritisation and 
comparative ‘fast tracking’ was a spanner in the works of President Roh's attempt at 
regionalism. (The Korea-US FTA shall be dealt with in the following chapter).
As proposed by President Kim, the leaders of ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea agreed to 
establish the EAVG and EASG in December 1998 and November 2000 respectively.
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The second group -  those who supported regionalism on the basis of economic 
growth and stability -  was a larger, more vociferous group. The financial crisis of 1997 
resulted in a situation where measures were necessary to stabilise the economy. One of 
those measures that gained widespread traction was that of regional cooperation. For 
example, Lee Suk-young, a KITA former chairman, argued that -  in addition to 
cautious advancement of the agenda-setting phase of the Korea-Japan FTA -  the 
formulation of the FTA would contribute to regional cooperation in East Asia; ‘for a 
meaningful regional economic cooperation to be founded, the involvement of Korea, 
Japan, and China is essential and at present, the most feasible seems to be an FTA 
between Korea and Japan
Opponents and their rationale
Those who opposed the FTA with Japan consisted of a large number of people 
and a not inconsiderable number of groups; labour, agricultural sector, anti- 
globalisationists, some business associations and civic groups. Anti-globalists are not 
included under the ‘civic group’ rubric because they were (and still are) more of an ad 
hoc people’s movement rather than an organised civic group. Of those who opposed the 
Korea—Japan FTA, business associations and the agricultural sector would seem the 
strangest of bedfellows. Business associations had an interesting journey during the first 
few years of the agenda setting phase, from support (see above) to conditional support 
and eventually outright opposition (see below). As for the agricultural sector, their 
opposition flies in the face of what would seem to be their interests, i.e. that an FTA 
with Japan would suit Korean agriculture on the basis of comparative advantage (see 
below). This section will deal first with labour.
Labour Unions
Labour unions, from the outset, opposed the FTA because they understood that 
to compete with a more competitive economy (and, therefore, industries) would cause
Maeil Business Daily Newspaper (10/07/ 2003).
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losses to domestic industries which would inevitably be passed on to the labour force. 
Furthermore, FTAs were seen as an aspect of neo—liberal economic globalisation, of 
which one of the tenets of the “Washington Consensus'’ was labour flexibility and this 
was invariably interpreted as a) weaker job security and b) the casualisation of 
employment29.
The FKI and labour unions were of similar opinion regarding Korea-Japan 
FTA’s threat to Korean industry. The distinction between the two groups was that 
labour opposed the opening of industrial markets on the basis that this would increase 
the flexibility of labour markets, whereas business associations and large industrial 
employers took each FTA on a case by case basis (i.e. based on their competitive 
advantages) 30. Many of the major labour unions in Korea perceived the FTA as a 
device that would harshly impact upon Korean industries which, in turn, would affect 
job security and worsen general labour conditions.
Lee Su-ho, the leader of KCTU, described the Korea-Japan FTA as:
“a match between light-weight and heavy-weight, without any protections,” and said “the government 
that broke down the agriculture industry through the Chile FTA was the same government trying to 
destroy primary industries through the Japan FTA. We will fight the implementation o f  the Korea-Japan 
FTA31”.
The FKTU joined in the KCTU’s declaration and stood ready to oppose the 
Korea-Japan FTA. The fiercest opposition, however, was supplied by the National 
Metals Labour Union (NMLU), which included labour unions from the automobile 
industry (essentially Hyundai automobiles' labour union). The Daegu branch of the 
NMLU gave two reasons for opposing the Korea-Japan FTA, which are indicative of 
many labour unions' principles concerning the FTA32; the first point was the massive 
restructuring of industries -  such as automobiles, machinery and metals -  that would 
result from an FTA with Japan and concomitant labour flexibility. The second, and 
more important, reason is that Japan’s proposition for 13 matters -  concerning labour- 
management relations -  in the FTA negotiation was specifically designed to weaken
Interview conducted with Chung Byung-duk who was vice-manger o f KCTU, Seoul, October 4th, 2006. 
For example, while automobile industries were expected to suffer losses from the Korea-Japan FTA, they 
were expected to benefit from the Korea-USA FTA. Unsurprisingly, labour unions have opposed both. Large 
corporations (who stood to gain) supported the Korea-US FTA, while they opposed the Korea-Japan FTA.
KCTU (2004) ‘Suspend the Korea-Japan FTA, a neo-liberal gamble risking national economy.’
Interview conducted with Kim Hyung-sung, head o f regional director o f NMLU, Seoul, October 17th,
2006.
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labour unions. Hyundai Automobiles’ Labour Union (HALU) proceeded to announce 
that they “preserve [their] right to live, oppose the Korea-Japan FTA and there will be 
powerful struggles, including general strikes33.” The HALU sent protesters to join the 
nation-wide demonstration in front of the fifth round negotiation in Kyungju City on 
August 23rd, 2004. Much of this opposition from Korean labour unions had a similar 
philosophy to those who opposed the FTA on ‘anti-globalisationist’ grounds34.
Labour unions felt that the ‘97 financial crisis was evidence of how 
globalisation treated the labour market (Kwon 2001: 220-221). Furthermore, they 
viewed the FTA as another part of the process of globalisation. Considering the effect 
that the ’97 financial crisis had, they were understandably wary of anything that 
resembled further globalisation. A brief look at the result of the '97 crisis may help to 
put things in perspective.
A total of 22,828 firms35, most of which were small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) went into bankruptcy during the year of 199836. Firms that had survived 
financial pressure had to call off planned investment and downsize the scale of 
scheduled production. As a consequence, overall GDP growth recorded a 5.8 percent 
decline in 1998. Production in manufacturing showed a 7.2 percent decrease as the 
average operation rate in the manufacturing sector remained 13.8 percent below that of 
the previous year (Chung 2003 : 196). About a million lost their jobs dunng the first half 
of 1998, when the unemployment rate skyrocketed from 2.8 percent in 1997 to about 8 
percent at the end of the first half of 1998. Accordingly, real wages also decreased more 
than 9 percent during 199837.
The rebound from 1998 was not entirely to labour unions' liking either. The 
unemployment rate and bankruptcy rate decreased after 2000. By 2001, the 
unemployment rate was around 3 percent and the bankruptcy rate fell to a 
comparatively low level as well. However, such decreases were not followed by a 
narrowing of the gap between the wealthy and the poor. One of the reasons for the 
decrease in unemployment and bankruptcy rates relates to the employment structure
Labour Newspaper (02/10/2003).
Interview conducted with Baek Hyun-gi, executive director of FKTU, Seoul, October 22th, 2005.
The number of employees of SMEs in 1998 was about 7.65 million, 7.3 percent less than the year before, 
as the bankruptcy of SMEs increased since the IMF era (Hong 2002a: 112). That is, an unprecedented number of 
some 23,000 SMEs went bankrupt in 1998; a 33 percent increase to the bankruptcy rate of the year before (Yang 
2003: 360-361).
National Statistical Office (NSO) (2000) ‘Unemployment rate after the financial crisis.’
Labour Newspaper (10/12/2000).
136
Chapter Four
adopted through the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s Structural Adjustment Policy 
(SAP) (Shin 2007: 507). Although most dismissed workers were re-employed, many 
found themselves in worse working conditions than before. A sharp increase in casual
T O
labour post-'97 supports such a view. According to a report (2003) from the NSO, 
casual employees numbered around 7.37 million, accounting for 55.7 percent of all 
labour. The casual employee, which accounted for 44 percent of labour in the early 
stage of the IMF period, is now considered to be a more general mode of employment 
(Kim 2007b: 480-481). The decrease in the unemployment rate mentioned above is 
attributable to this casualisation of employment, i.e. without job-security or benefits.
The question as to why the decrease in the unemployment rate was not followed by a 
narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor, or a diminution of the poverty class, 
can be answered by realising that the casual labour wage is about half that of regular 
employee(Lee 2002a: 29).
The process of globalisation which labour unions opposed was well described 
in The KCTU’s report on the Korea-Japan FTA39.
Primary industries, such as machinery, automobiles, and electronics will be forced to compete against 
Japanese industries in the course o f  advancing into “highly developed industries” through the Korea- 
Japan FTA, and such a course will accompany extreme restructuring in the name o f  “effectiveness,” 
“economy o f  scale,” and “resolving the redundant investment issues.” This would set o ff massive serial 
dismissals and employment insecurity, as witnessed during the IMF period, and will go on to cause 
extensive casualisation o f the workforce. The more vulnerable members o f  society and labourers have 
always been most affected by intensified international competition. The cost and the competition 
pressures brought about by the Korea-Japan FTA will undoubtedly be borne by labourers.
Anti-globalisationists and civic groups
Both civic groups and anti-globalisationists groups opposed the FTA on very 
similar grounds and therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, have been included 
together for analysis. Although both did differ slightly on some issues, the broad strokes 
of their arguments consistently echoed each other.
However both groups were synchronised in their argument that Japanese 
comparative economic advantage would disrupt and adversely affect much of the labour 
force that worked directly under industries that would have to compete with their
‘NSO Survey o f Korea's current employee drift,' September.
FTA-DDA Korea Confederation o f Trade Unions Investigation, ‘The state o f  affairs o f  the Korea-Japan 
FTA and other measures,’ (August 31st, 2004).
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Japanese counterparts. This knock on effect was compared directly to the ‘97 financial 
crisis. Although the 1997 financial crisis and a Korea-Japan FTA are completely 
different phenomena, their association with ‘globalisation’ implied that the effects 
would be comparable (Park 2004a: 360).
The Asian economic crisis in 1997-98 led to a fundamental change in the 
administration of the Korean economy. The so-called ‘neo-liberal economic 
globalisation was on its way (Cheong 2004b). Civic groups opposing this process 
began to take shape and eventually led to anti-globalisation movements, similar to 
many movements which had taken shape around the world (i.e. Seattle WTO meeting, 
199940). The Korea-Japan, Korea-USA investment agreements, the Korea-Chile FTA 
and the Doha Round of WTO negotiations all inspired anti-globalisationists groups to 
further proliferate (Lim 2002: 187-188). Their consciousness of the issues rose at these 
negotiations and their willingness to engage in confrontation based on this knowledge 
were well displayed in the public declaration delivered jointly by the KCTU and the 
Anti-WTO National Movement, an umbrella organisation of anti-globalisation 
organisations (with civic groups acting as an enabler)41. On April 26th, 2004, the anti­
globalisation organisations organised a street demonstration demanding the suspension 
of the third round of Korea-Japan FTA negotiation.
We have consistently pointed out that all sorts o f investment agreements and FTAs promoted by the 
Kim Dae-jung regime are acts that threaten and destroy the fundamental rights o f the Koreans to live 
and work, while instigating the disposal o f fundamental industries o f the country, and benefiting only 
transnational capital. We denounce the government for ignoring such points and concluding the 
investment agreements with Japan. We will resist the agreement that only benefits transnational capital, 
till the end. Hereafter, we will protest to suspend the negotiation o f  the agreement, and our resistance 
will go on to fight Korea-USA investment agreements and the Korea—Chile FTA with further support 
from the people42.
They labeled the market liberalisation contained within FTAs and as 
promulgated by the WTO as part of a neo-liberal globalisation process that guarantees 
profits to the FKI while reducing the rights of labour unions and people, and criticised
The massive protests at the Third Ministerial Meeting o f  the WTO in November 1999 resulted from 
broad and accelerating changes in global social and political relations. Many protesting groups had been involved in 
previous struggles for global economic justice that shaped their identities and strategies in Seattle. There were the 
transnational activist linkages and a division o f labour was present whereby groups with local and national ties took 
on mobilisation roles while groups with routinised transnational ties provided information and frames for the struggle.
Anti-WTO National Movement (AWNM) and KCTU, “Denunciations on the decision to promote the 
Korea-Japan investment agreement and the Korea-Japan FTA,"’ (March 23rd, 2002).
42 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (27/04/2004).
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the FT A on the basis that it would cause a widening of the gap between the haves and 
have-nots, a drop in real wages, divestiture of work and increases in public service 
fees43. They opposed the Korea-Japan FTA specifically for similar reasons; they 
believed that while the Korea-Chile FTA threatened the rights of farmers, the Korea- 
Japan FTA would undoubtedly threaten labour unions, and emphasised that the Korea- 
Japan FTA would be an especially great burden on labour44.
The vice-chairman of the KCTU, Shin Seung-cheol, asserted that the 
outsourcing of factory labour was accelerating even before the FTA was signed or 
ratified. He stated that if the Korea-Japan FTA was ratified, it was evident that less 
competent companies would be encouraged to transfer their plants abroad and decrease 
jobs in order to achieve competitiveness45. Civic groups sympathised with the labour 
unions:
During the past decade, we have seen how destructive the liberalisation o f  investments and trade, 
removal o f  tariff and NTBs, privatisation o f public services, and neo-liberal restructuring could be to 
our economy and life. It has caused us nothing but a ‘flood o f tears,' by widening o f the gap between 
the wealthy and the poor, lowering real wages, aggravating working conditions, depriving us o f jobs 
and raising public service fees46.
In particular, the neo-liberal restructuring carried out after the economic crisis 
was disastrous to labour unions. As many scholars argue, under the IMF system, the gap 
between the wealthy and the poor has widened and the indigent class has rapidly grown 
(Yang 2004: 2). It was deemed unlikely for these circumstances to improve within a 
decade under the then current political and economic conditions. To the contrary, the 
labour unions feared that things would become more complicated should another neo­
liberal trade treaty (such as an FTA) be forced onto Korea. Chung Hae-jun, a statesman 
from Democratic Labor Party (DLP), defined FTAs as another form of neo-liberal 
globalisation47.
Interview conducted with Kim Sung-jong and Park Sung-jik, respectively leader National Confederation 
o f People, AWNM, Seoul, October 12th, 2005.
44 Labour Newspaper (27/04/2007).
45 Pressian On-line Daily Newspaper (26/04/2004).
Interview conducted with Seo Ju-won, secretary o f  The KPAFW, Seoul, October 6th, 2006.
47 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (13/03/2004).
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Farmers ’  Associations
According to the Korean government's available data on agricultural 
competitiveness, Korean farming held the upper hand48 in any FT A with Japan. 
Ostensibly at least, this would seem to have been a propitious beginning to Korean 
agriculture’s relationship with the Korea-Japan FTA. This was not to be the case. In 
fact, the agricultural sector did not oppose the Korea-Japan FTA, but neither did they 
support it (Lim 2004: 50). Before dealing with the next domestic stakeholder, it would 
be worth while analysing why exactly they did not play a major role in influencing the 
Korea-Japan FTA. Initially, during the early stages of the agenda-setting phase, many 
in the agricultural sector were not opposed to the FTA with Japan. The focus of 
farmers’ associations was the Korea-Chile negotiation and its eventual outcome. As 
time wore on and the final phase of the Korea-Chile FTA became more divisive, civic 
groups began publishing papers which countered the government's information 
regarding agricultural competitiveness between the two countries. As this information 
filtered through the agricultural sector and ratification of the Korea-Chile FTA began to 
look more and more likely, it caused large sections of the farming community to 
become more wary of supporting the FTA with Japan.
The fact that Korean agriculture lacked international competence was widely 
acknowledged. However, Japan was the only market to which Korean agricultural 
products could be exported competitively. Therefore, analysts expected that Korea 
would insist on opening the agricultural markets of Japan (Choi 2004b: 90; Lim 2004: 
50). In contrast, when the FTA with Chile received ratification from the NA -  a country 
whose agriculture was more efficient than Korea’s — farmer's associations and rural 
members of the NA strongly opposed the FTA during its ratification phase. The 
government wished to prove (through the Korea-Japan FTA) that FTA negotiations 
were not always detrimental to farmers49. However, civic groups argued to the 
contrary50. Finally, the farmers’ associations harboured similar reservations regarding 
both FTAs. Both were aspects of globalisation and, for reasons more fully elaborated in 
the previous chapter, both were opposed on this basis.
Choi Se-gyun (2004b) 'Korea-Japan FTA and agricultural effects and negotiation strategy.'
Interview conducted with An Ho-young, Deputy Minister o f Trade, MOFAT, Seoul, October 10th, 2005 
and the Korean government had tried to persuade famers in order to get Korea-Chile Ratification using Korea-Japan 
FTA which could bring benefits to them (Pressian On-line Daily Newspaper 30/10/2003).
Interview conducted with Seo Ju-won, secretary o f  The KPAFW, Seoul, October 6th, 2006.
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Business Associations
This section is broken down into three parts due to its importance to this 
chapter's main thesis and the fact that there are several strands here that have to be 
delineated. The first sub-section will deal with the importance of NTBs to the FKI 
led coalition and their position vis-ä-vis the Korea-Japan FT A. The second sub­
section deals with the business associations’ position of conditionality in more 
general terms while the last section deals with their opposition to the FT A.
The FKI's position on the Korea-Japan FTA was often characterised51 as 
“support of the collective businesses, opposition of the individuals.' In other words, 
Korean industries supported the principle of opening markets per se, but Korea-Japan 
FTA support was tagged with a specific set of conditions concerning NTBs. The fact 
was that Korean exporting industries experienced difficulties in accessing Japanese 
markets due to the various NTBs (see Table 4.4). Critically, the goal of the FKI led 
coalition was to flag the issue of NTBs on the understanding that this issue was a 
sensitive issue for the Japanese, thus creating an immediate roadblock to further 
negotiations52. In order to guarantee the support of the FKI and its affiliates, it was 
absolutely necessary that the MOFAT put this issue on the agenda. The efficacy of the 
FKI led coalition’s use of NTBs as a way to slow down the FTA is best demonstrated 
by displaying how relevant this issue was to Korean-Japanese trade.
Table 4.4: Case of Japanese NTBs'3
Cases of NTBs against Korean Products by Japan
i. Temporary blockade of automobiles by ship
ii. Discrimination of marine products
iii. Tariff quota of belts
iv. Import limitation of silk products
V . Complicated license acquisition process
vi. Harsh inspection standards for some agricultural and marine products
vii. Harsh government consumption regulations
viii. Recycling systems of electronic products
^Source: MOFAT 2003, “Trade Environment Abroad''
As can be seen in Table 4.4 and 4.5, Korean export industries had to pass
Such views are also vindicated by the remark from Hyun Min-kuk, vice president of FKI. He has 
commented Though supportive to Korea-Japan FTA is general, many of the industries demurred at each item,’ (Maeil 
Business Daily Newspaper 09/06/2003).
Interview conducted with Ahn Ho-young, Deputy Minister of Trade, MOFAT, Seoul, October 10th, 2005. 
For more details on the non-tariff related information refers to the following literature; Lee and Jeon
(2004).
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various NTBs to gain entry, receive inspection, and circulate their products within 
mainland Japan. The importance of NTBs in the Korea-Japan FTA can be seen clearly 
by their inclusion at the suggestion of the Joint Study Group in March 2002. Another 
relevant reason behind the importance of NTBs is that -  in addition to being conscious 
of Korean industries -  the principle of pursuing a balance of gains in the negotiations 
was important. To elucidate this point further; Korea had much higher tariffs in 
comparison to Japan and removal of tariffs by FTA formulation would be greatly 
disadvantageous for Korea. Subsequently, a removal of Japan's NTBs was deemed 
necessary to balance the equation to help resolve these of imbalances. The following 
comment by Fukao et al., (2005: 276), a Japanese specialist on Korea-Japan FTA, 
clearly shows this aspect of NTBs barrier discussion:
In the political background o f such discussions there is the fact that with regard to tariff barriers, Korea 
has higher tariff rates in place against Japan than Japan has against Korea (according to the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 4 Database the figures are 7.9 percent against 2.9 percent, 
respectively). Accordingly, in the event that tariffs are abolished through the Japan-Korea FTA, Korea 
would have to make greater concessions to Japan. Given the pervasiveness o f NTBs in Japan, Korean 
can increase its exports to Japan if reductions o f NTBs are included in a prospective FTA agreement.
The conditional support expressed by the FK1 was not entirely representative of 
its individual members, as noted above. Korea’s trademark industries — automobile, 
machinery, electronics and chemicals -  expressed some degree of dissension with the 
formulation of an FTA with Japan. This was to eventually blossom into out and out 
hostility and opposition during the negotiation phase (see below). The support given by 
business associations was dependent primarily on the issue of NTBs and this 
conditionality always meant that the support offered by the FKI was susceptible to the 
changing of circumstances surrounding NTBs. Business Associations expressed support 
at the agenda-setting phase for the government’s policies but chose to point out the 
dangers of the FTA in discussing possible side-effects, while clearly stating their 
demands54. These parties had their own discreet negotiation channels with the 
government, so they did not have to oppose the policies head-on.
According to the suggestions made by the FKI (28/04/2004) at the third Korea-Japan FTA negotiation 
conference, the FKI argued that they should delay the discussion and adopt the offer o f  exchanging the concessions 
rather than the request that was proposed by the Japanese. FKI International Economy Team (2004b), 'The View o f  
FKI on the Korea Japan FTA Core Issues.’
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Table 4.5: Japan's NTBs to Korean Exporters
Types /Vo. o f  cases M ain conten t
HS
classification 2
The inaccurate classification of raw materials in red ginseng. 
Not recognising a set of clothes as one item.
Inspection & 
customs 16
The absence of a uniform custom clearance form.
The requirement to complete excessively detailed packaging lists and 
charges of high tariffs.
The prohibition in using preservatives in cosmetics.
Time consuming customs clearance.
The requirement of non-genetically modified organism (GMO) forms. 
The high harbor taxes levied when using provincial harbors.
Market access & 
distribution 
barriers
21
Import tariffs paid by the exporting company.
The prohibition on using timber packaging.
Being pressured to use Japanese distribution companies.
Misusing the strict product quality requirements as a way to return goods. 
More favourable policies for the domestic products by the Japanese 
government.
The passive attitude of the Japanese dealers concerning parallel dealership.
Technological
barriers 6
The high cost and time-consuming process of obtaining Japanese 
Industrial Standards (JIS).
The extra costs associated with multiple authentication.
Favouring Japanese firms in satisfying standards and obtaining a 
certificate.
Living 3
The strict application of immigration rules on Koreans when they travel via 
Hong Kong or Thailand.
The difficulties in obtaining multiple 5-year visas for newly recruited staff 
of Korean companies.
Tax system 1 The undisclosed reasons behind the estimated calculations of Value Added Tax (VAT).
Total 49
^Source: KITA (2003) "The Non-Tariff Barriers in Japan, Chong et ai, (2005) et al„ eds., Korea-Japan FTA: Toward a 
Model Case for East Asian Economic Integration, KJEP.
Conditional support
Korean companies and the FKI indicated some degree of reluctance in their 
support during the agenda-setting phase. Although business associations displayed a 
united front of supporting the FTA with Japan, behind closed doors there were early 
signs of unease. This concern was flagged as early as May 2000. At a conference related 
to the Korea-Japan FTA, sponsored by KIEP, views opposing the FTA were offered by 
officials of the KITA. They insisted that Japanese companies would overwhelm Korean 
companies if direct competition was allowed. Also, a managing director from Samsung 
Electronics, Jang Il-hyung, warned that the Korea-Japan FTA would end up only 
increasing the importation of Japanese products55. Similar concerns were demonstrated 
at the 32nd Korea-Japan Business Conference in Tokyo, in June 2000. One of the 
Korean representatives, president of Samyang company, Kim Sang-ha declared, 
“Though (we) agree to the basic principles of the Korea-Japan FTA, sufficient
Munhwa Daily Newspaper (18/05/2000).
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discussions are required as there are discordances in each industry and field; therefore 
we have reservations about an early conclusion56.’' What is interesting here is that the 
very industrial sectors that chided the protesting farmers for their ‘collective selfishness’ 
during the Korea-Chile FTA were either “opposing” or calling for “prudence” in the 
Korea-Japan FTA._The important question remains as to why they changed their 
position in relation to the Korea-Japan FTA.
As the agenda-setting phase wore on, circumstances changed. By 2000, the 
government declared that Korea's financial crisis had passed, thus alleviating the 
pressure on the FKI to acquiesce to government policy they felt ran counter to their 
interests (Hong 2002a: 115). Furthermore, updated and more recent reports forecast a 
less than robust picture of an eventual FTA with Japan and were enough to give major 
industries and their associations second thoughts about possible benefits. The issue of 
conditionality gained traction among many industry leaders. The concept of 
conditionality, while of itself a useful bargaining tool, was also a means to delay the 
process. A delay at this stage, so the theory went, would allow the large industries, who 
were having second thoughts, time to come to a more considered opinion57.
According to the FKI, only 28 percent of 1,522 companies approved of the FTA 
with Japan, while 17.6 percent called for further studies, and 54.4 percent for 
amendment5^ . Similar views on the Korea-Japan FTA were repeated in another survey 
conducted by the FKI (see Table 4—6). As can be seen in this table (4-6), most 
companies’ views -  grouped according to industry -  on the Korea-Japan FTA were 
discouraging. Whilst only textile industries’ appraisal of the FTA was positive, steel, 
semi-conductor, and precision machinery industries judged it to be of little consequence. 
The remaining industries found it inauspicious. Primary exporting industries -  including 
electronics, automobiles, petro—chemical and shipbuilding -  described the FTA as of no 
benefit. These views were based on the fear that high-tech industries would suffer from 
competition against Japan and, hence, be forced to restructure to produce low-value 
products59. Despite a cajoling MOFAT, the FKI were aware that negligible Japanese
Chosun-Daily Newspaper (03/06/2000).
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director o f Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, October 19th, 2005.
Maeil Daily Newspaper (13/07/2004).
This is in conformity with Japanese intentions for the Korea-Japan FTA: the Japanese government and 
business leaders intended to reform their industries into high-value industries through the FTA and transfer low-value 
industries to Korea (Kim 2005c: 22).
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tariff barriers hardly compared to the seven percent Korean barriers and that, all other 
things being equal, Japan stood the most to gain (Kim 2003d).
T a b le  4 .6 : E ffects  to ea ch  in d u s tr y  b y  K o r e a -J a p a n  F T A
In d u stry E ffec t
E le c tro n ic
( - )
Im p o rts  fro m  Ja p a n  rap id ly  in c rea se  an d  r e s tru c tu r in g  o f  S M E s e x a c e rb a te d  i f  ta r iffs  rem o v ed .
E n d  p ro d u c ts : d isa d v a n ta g e s  in te c h n o lo g y  an d  b ra n d in g .
C o m p a ra tiv e  A d v a n ta g e s  to  so m e  p ro d u c ts  su c h  as  m o b ile  p ro d u c ts  an d  T h in  film  T ra n s is to r  L iq u id  
C ry s ta l D isp la y  (T F T -L C D ) .
A b s o lu te  d isa d v a n ta g e s  to  h ig h - te c h  c o m p o n e n ts  an d  m a te ria ls .
A u to m o b ile
( - )
S h a rp  in c re a se  in th e  im p o rta tio n  o f  la rg e  an d  m id - s iz e d  ca rs  ex p ec ted .
P o ss ib le  h u g e  in c rea se  in im p o rta tio n  o f  a u to m o b ile  c o m p o n e n ts : re s tru c tu r in g  o f  d o m e s tic  
c o m p o n e n t m a n u fa c tu re rs  in ev itab le .
G en e ra l
m a c h in e ry
H
- D e p e n d e n c y  o n  Ja p a n  ex p e c te d  to  g ro w  in c o re  c o m p o n e n t fie ld s , g re a te s t  d a m a g e  ex p e c te d  here .
- R e su lt o f  in d u c in g  Ja p a n e se  in d u s tr ie s  to  in v e s tm e n t d o m e s tic a lly ; m ed io c re .
P e tro ­
c h e m is try
( - )
- C u tth ro a t c o m p e titio n  ex p e c te d  d u e  to  e x c e s s iv e  s u p p ly  fro m  b o th  co u n tr ie s .
- A d v a n ta g e o u s  in g e n e ra l-p u rp o s e  p ro d u c ts  (P E ) , d isa d v a n ta g e o u s  in sp e c ia lty  p ro d u c ts  (e n g in e e r in g  
p la s tic s ) .
P re c is io n
m a c h in e ry
(0 )
- N o t m u ch  in f lu e n c e  ex p ec ted  as m o st o f  th e  item s w e re  n o t d o m e s tic a lly  p ro d u c e d .
F a b r ic s
(+ )
- O v e ra ll im p ro v e m e n t in th e  b a la n c e  o f  tra d e  as e x p o r ts  to  Ja p an  in c reased .
- H o w e v e r , in c re a se  in th e  im p o rta tio n  o f  Ja p a n e se  h ig h - q u a l i ty  p ro d u c ts  e x p ec ted  in tex tile s  
(sy n th e tic /c o tto n  fab ric s ).
S tee l
(0 )
- In s ig n if ic a n t in f lu e n c e  on  th e  raw  m a te r ia ls  o f  iro n  an d  stee l.
- S e c o n d a ry  iro n  p ro d u c ts  ( c a s t - i ro n  p ro d u c ts ) : c o m p e te n c e  re in fo rc e d  sy s tem a tica lly .
S h ip
b u ild in g
( - )
- G en e ra l v esse ls : in s ig n if ic a n t d u e  to  z e ro  ta r iffs , b u t  in c re a se d  im p o rta tio n  o f  sp e c ia l v e sse ls  (m o to r  
b o a ts , y ach t)  ex p ec ted .
- M a te ria ls  and  co m p o n en ts : in c rea se  in  im p o rta tio n s  e x p ec ted .
S em i­
c o n d u c to r
(0 )
- In s ig n if ic a n t d u e  to  zero  ta riffs .
- C o s t red u c tio n  in  raw  m a te ria ls  an d  e q u ip m e n t a n tic ip a te d , b u t sm a ll an d  m id -s iz e d  
e q u ip m e n t/m a te r ia l  re la ted  e n te rp ris e s  p o s s ib ly  v u ln e ra b le .
* General evaluations for the industries are given at the discretion of the writer (-: disadvantageous, 0: insignificant effect, +: 
advantageous) *Sources: FKI (2004c) “Effects o f Korea/Japan FTA on industry and m e a su resFKI Issue Paper
Opposition
By December, 2003 -  when official negotiations between the two countries had 
started -  the mood had definitely changed among Korean industries. During the 
agenda-setting phase, many corporations and industries had begun to show a distinct 
lack of enthusiasm and as this early phase drew to a close and the negotiation phase
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began, these feelings of discontent were to manifested quite openly60.
To many Korean industries, it became abundantly clear that they would be no 
match for Japan -  the world’s second largest economy -  in a deregulated marketplace61. 
Their call to government for a delay with the FTA with Japan and, instead, the opening 
of discussions with a less developed or less powerful economy than Japan (e.g. an 
ASEAN member or China) was tantamount to a declaration that Korea was not 
economically vibrant enough to compete with Japan via an FTA . Lee and Jeon (2004: 
150) argued that
Based on the competence o f  industries in both countries and tariff rates, analysis on the trade effects o f  
the Korea-Japan FTA has revealed that economic benefits to Korea are doubtful. Increases in exports to 
Japan can be expected in steel, fabric and clothing, agriculture, minerals, chemistries, and other 
intermediate goods industries by the Korea-Japan FTA.
The KIEP produced a report (see Table 4.7) in 2001 supporting this analysis, 
summarising the potential trade effects of an FTA with Japan on various parts of 
Korean manufacturing industries. What is immediately discemable from the table is that 
only the low-value industries, manufacturing industries, such as mineral fuels and 
clothing industries, would have enjoyed increases in trade. Other high-value industries, 
general machinery, precision machinery, electric products and automobiles, would have 
suffered from the Korea-Japan FTA as envisaged. Not only were these high-value 
industries of primary importance to the Korean national economy, they were also major 
industries with immense influence on numerous other subsidiary SMEs (Song 2004: 
84-85). Secondary knock-on effects were forecast in society had these industries been 
abandoned or restructured from high-value to low-value industries63.
Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I was 
accompanied by Kim Gi-ju, former director o f  administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21th, 2009.
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director o f Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates Seoul, October 19th, 2006.
Interview conducted with Choi Sung-hyun, Senior Research Fellow, International Affair Division in FKI, 
Seoul, October 20th, 2006.
Interview conducted with Ryu Hyun-jin, Director o f FKI Centre o f Large and Small Businesses 
Corporations, Seoul, October 21st, 2006.
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Table 4.7: Trade effects in the manufacturing fields based on the analysis of elasticity
_______________________ (Unit: million dollar, 2004 basis year, figures in parenthesis indicate change (percent))
_  „ Exports to Japan
3 e^or'  C hange in am ount
Im ports from  Japan  
C hange in am ount
T rade balance with Japan  
C hange in am ount
P roducts 1 177.9(0.9percent) 2.643.8(5.8percent) -2 ,4 6 5 .8 (-9 .7percent)
Primary
items
M ineral fuel(HS27) 50.7(1.5percent) 82.0(11.5percent) 3 1.3(1.2percent)
O nranic chem istrv(H S29) 9.3( 1.2nercent) 54.2(2.5oercent) -4 4 .9 (-3 .2 o e rcen t)
plastic! HS391 26.6(3. lpercent) 94.1(4.3oercent) -6 7 .5 (-5 .2 o e rcen t)
C lo th ing  and fabric (HS611 20.4(7.7oercenf) 1.4! 13.7percent) 18 .9(-7.5nercent)
steel! HS721 3.5(0.2nercent) 27.9(0 .5oercent) -24 .4 (0 .6nercen t)
S teel products! HS731 1.3(0.2nercent) 22.4(4.6nercent) 21 .0 (-15 .3oercen t)
M achinery  (HS84) 0 .0(0 .Opercent) 1.067.4112.5nercent) -1 .0 6 7 .4 (-1 8 .4 p ercen t)
E lectronic products IH S 8 5 ) 13.5(0.2nercent) 251.7(2.0oercent) -2.38. l(-3 .8 n ercen t)
A utom obiles and com ponents (HS87) 0.2(0. lnercent) 85.4(8.4oercent) -8 5 .2 1 -1 2 .5oercent)
Precision  m achinery (HS901 1.2(0.2nercent) 455.4(9.5nercent) —454 .2(-10 .6oercent)
others 51.1(1.8percent) 501.9(6.8percent) -4 5 0 .8 (-9 .8 p e rcen t)
^Source: K.IEP (2005) “Analysis on the economic expectations and influences o f  Korea-Japan FTA
Many researchers charged that the Korea-Japan FTA would have impeded 
rapid industrial growth in Korea (Lee and Chun 2005; Park 2004a; Lee et al., 2004;
Kim 2004d). While many Japanese products had secured superiority in Korean markets, 
Korean products were still comparatively weak in Japanese markets. Although the tariff 
rates imposed by the Korean government on its prime industries were 8 percent for 
automobiles and electronics, 7.9 percent for machinery, 7.7 percent for petrochemicals, 
7.3 percent for metals, and 7.2 percent for other manufacturing industries, the Japanese 
government hardly imposed any tariffs on such industries, with almost nil tariff rates for 
electronics, automobiles and vehicles; 0.2 percent for machinery and 3 percent for 
petrochemicals (Lee and Chun 2005: 250).
As a result, Korean industry structure would focus on low-value products where 
comparative advantage still held and may have lead to a drawback or curtailment from 
the then comparatively disadvantaged high-value industries. In such a case, the Korea- 
Japan FTA would have been responsible for causing a retrogression of industrial 
development (Kim 2005c: 19-20).
As well as Lee and Chun (2004), Nam (2007: 107) stated that the Korea-Japan 
FTA, due to an expanding Chinese economy, would encourage major domestic 
companies to transfer their plant bases abroad, accelerating the de-industrialisation of 
SMEs and subcontracted companies, with decreases in sales and bankruptcies of SMEs 
as a result. Lee Sang-yong, president of Asan Electronics and Asan Travel, 
emphatically supported Kim's view. He went on to claim:
Local SMEs are 100 percent against the Korea-Japan FTA. While the industrial structures of the two 
countries are similar, the quality of Japanese products is overwhelmingly superior to ours, with the 
exception of semi-conductors. Moreover, their price competence is strong: most of their plants have
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transferred to China, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries and only 30 percent o f  their 
production is domestic. The Korea Information Institution does not seem to realise these aspects64.
In the context of plant transfer to China and other Southeast Asian Countries, 
the choice of a further (or possible replacement) FTA partner country became an 
important issue, as concern over the Korea-Japan FTA grew (Nam 2007: 110). The FKI 
led coalition emphasised that any FTA with China or ASEAN countries must be made 
concurrently with the Korea-Japan FTA, if not in precedence, in order to attain the 
rapid development of industry (2004b: 12).
According to a survey, conducted by FKI in September 2000 among its 
members, 94.3 percent of the respondents agreed with the idea of signing FTAs. As for 
the ideal FTA partner, China was the highest with 42.8 percent, followed by the US 
with 36.5 percent, and Japan with 7.9 percent (Choi & Lee 2005: 10).
Additionally, another report65 published by business associations, dynamic 
international restructuring would enable Korean industries to specialise in more 
technologically intensive industries only alongside an FTA with other ASEAN 
countries and/or China, where Korean industries still held comparative advantage in 
manufacturing. Only then would the Korean-Japan FTA be able to contribute to the 
specialisation of Korean high-value industries in the longer term. Otherwise, Korean 
companies would suffer from the loss of comparative advantage if the Korea-Japan 
FTA were to be ratified before other FTAs (Cho and Kim 2002: 136-140).
While the Korea-Japan FTA attracted its own share of supporters and 
detractors, it is vitally important to understand that the transmogrification that the FKI 
led coalition went through, from supporter to opponent, left the FTA with only East 
Asianists and key government ministries as supporters. This left the trade agreement, in 
essence, without any major non-governmental supporter. Therefore, regardless of 
external or international pressures, the FTA was always going to have a difficult, if not 
impossible, journey from negotiation to ratification. The following section will examine 
this journey from agenda-setting to negotiation.
On the other hand, he appreciates the FTA with US. According to him, primary industries o f the two 
countries do not overlap. While US is competent in the munitions industry, high-tech Information Technology (IT), 
medicine, intellectual property, and the agriculture industry, Korea is competent in steel, semi-conductor, ship­
building. automobile, and fabric industry.
65 FKI (2004a).
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Setting the stage for a discussion of the channels of influence
For the sake of analysis, this chapter will divide the agenda-setting phase into 
two parts. The early agenda-setting phase, which was marked by large corporations’ 
support for the Korea-Japan FT A and the later agenda-setting phase, marked by a shift 
from overall support to conditional support.
Agenda-Setting
As discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter Three), the agenda-setting 
phase in an FTA has a strong tendency to be dominated by certain actors (most notably 
MOFAT, key politicians (e.g. the President) and policy makers). This is also true in the 
Korea-Japan case. However, to elucidate two key points; in comparison to the Korea- 
Chile FTA where both FKI and government worked in tandem to introduce and support 
the FTA from its inception, the Korea-Japan FTA was primarily a government led 
policy initiative66. Secondly, while the Korea-Chile FTA reached almost fevered 
proportions in public interest and involvement, the Korea-Japan FTA was a much less 
public affair. Despite the public infonnation campaigns on both sides, the level of 
public involvement and public reaction was considerably muted in comparison with the 
earlier FTA. Although labour unions did grasp the issues at stake, their public protests 
were confined to the period after the agenda setting phase67. Therefore, our analysis of 
the agenda-setting phase shall focus on supporters.
Due to the nature of the stakeholders present during the agenda-setting phase 
(i.e. access to formal channels as primary- or more specifically, the power to influence 
political institutions — was a matter of course and definition for the president, MOFAT 
and formal business associations), the medium of expressing preferences and agendas 
were formal channels of influence.
Interview conducted with Ahn Ho-young, Deputy Minister of Trade, MOFAT, Seoul, October 10th, 2005. 
Interview conducted with Baek Hyun-gi, executive director of FKTU, Seoul, October 22th, 2005.
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Early Agenda-Setting phase
During the early agenda-setting phase, the FKI was co-opted into discussions 
regarding a potential FTA with Japan by President Kim Dae-jung and the MOFAT. In 
1998, President Kim initiated the concept of a Joint Study Group to analyse the benefits 
of a potential Korea-Japan FTA. In effect, MOFAT took the baton from the president 
and laid the groundwork by establishing many of the early studies that, in turn, were 
offered to the FKI as a supporting conceptual framework for an FTA with Japan. The 
role played by the president and the MOFAT in establishing the agenda-setting phase 
and inviting Korean industrial associations made the use of informal channels(i.e. 
PPPM) by supporters obsolete68.
Later Agenda-Setting phase 
Business Associations
Similar to the early agenda-setting phase, this later phase was marked by the 
use of formal channels at the expense of infonnal and for the very same reasons. Before 
proceeding, there are a couple of key points that need elaboration; how were the 
underlying reasons for conditionality expressed using formal channels of influence? 
And, more specifically, how did the FKI deliver their concerns about NTBs to 
MOFAT?
As has been previously discussed, the FKI began to display concern regarding 
an FTA with Japan prior to the negotiation phase. Ostensibly, the FKI were supportive 
of the FTA and their stated desires chimed with those of government, hence utilising a 
channel of influence was a redundancy69. However, as this support began to wane, the 
FKI established a GBA-JSG in March 2002 whose aim was an exchange of ideas with 
the government concerning the FTA in light of data culled from the KIEP and IDE 
‘Joint Study' report and the Korea-Japan Business Forum’s ‘Joint Declaration (January 
2001).' The information contained in these reports was not as positive as previous
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director of Economic Research Division, KER1 in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, October 19th, 2006.
Interview conducted with Choi Sung-hyun, Senior Research Fellow, International Affair Division in FKI, 
Seoul, October 20th, 2006.
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reports and started to ring warning bells in the business community.
Power to Influence Political Institutions
Korean large business associations did not feel it was necessary, at any stage, to utilise 
public influence, or informal channels, as their access to government policy makers was 
virtually unfettered; e.g. access to such important institutions such as MOFAT and, via 
the GBA-JSG, to politicians was a given during the agenda-setting phase70. Hence a 
constant exchange of views regarding the FTA was in place. However, once these same 
business associations began to arrive at new conclusions (e.g. SME’s lack of 
competitiveness), they were able to translate this new-found hesitancy into concrete 
proposals for re-evaluating specific content (e.g. NTBs) despite the fact that their doubt 
concerned the entire edifice of the Korea-Japan FTA (Sohn 2001b: 3).
For example, the Chairman of the FSMB, Kim Gi-moon raised official 
concerns about Korea’s SMEs’ competitiveness compared to their Japanese 
counterparts, saying that ‘"even some FKI individually doubted their competitiveness; 
SMEs could be in a much more difficult positionf ]... Furthermore, if removal of tariffs 
in the Korean market takes place, this could force a lot of SMEs out of business due to 
the technological gap between the countries71.” He delivered the FSMB's concerns to 
the GBA-JSG in July 2002. Although the FSMB did not directly oppose the FTA, they 
asked MOFAT to take into consideration the seriousness of the situation that SMEs 
would face under the then current FTA policies and pressed for alterations that would 
favour its members. The KIET (2002)72 also raised concerns. Particularly, Korea’s 
mechanical engineering industries’ technological level was 60 percent that of Japanese. 
Lee and Chun studies (2005) also provided similar outcomes. The KIET cooperated 
with the FKI in delivering their concerns to the GBA-JSG in July 2002 while the KITA 
(after the Japan FTA Joint Study Group on April 11th, 2003) expressed similar concerns 
to the MOFAT73.
The FKI led coalition held regular meetings with the MOFAT and other
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director of Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates , Seoul, October 19th, 2006.
71 Korean SMEs Newspaper (13/03/2003).
KIET (2002) ‘Study on Korea's engineering industries competitiveness,’ discussion paper, June, 1-35.
JoongAng Daily Newspaper (13/04/2003).
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government ministries during which they expressed their dismay with the trade 
agreement due to the fact that NTBs were not on the table for discussion. This again 
indicates their preference to utilise formal channels such as IPI. These meetings, held 
under the auspices of the GBA-JSG, took place eight times and eventually bore fruit. 
The FKI’s success is best illustrated by the fact that NTBs were eventually included at 
the suggestion of the GBA-JSG in March, 2002.
MO FAT
The MOFAT was not averse to paying attention to what Korea’s large business 
associations had to say. Indeed, it could be well argued that the MOFAT recognised that 
the Korea-Japan FTA's survival depended on the support of these associations74.
During the early stage of the agenda-setting phase there was little that the FKI and 
MOFAT disagreed upon, creating a frictionless surface upon which the FTA moved. 
Later, as the FKI became more reluctant, the MOFAT continued to try to keep the FKI 
mollified by adopting the FKI's concerns as their own75. MOFAT’s support for the 
agreement was based on two things; the long term view that it would eventually benefit 
the Korean economy and to impress upon the agricultural sector that not all FTA’s were 
of detrimental value to their interests .
Negotiation phase
By the time the negotiation phase had begun, the FKI had come around to
opposing the FTA with Japan unequivocally. Labour had also engaged itself as a key
actor opposing the agreement at this point. The FKI maintained its use of formal 
channels (i.e. IPI) while labour focused on informal channels (i.e. PI as primary). What
is surprising here is the lack of support between these two key actors, neither side 
attempted to -  nor seemed willing -  to forge an alliance with the other77. Or possibly
not surprising, given the natural tendency (or at least an historical tendency) for capital
Interview conducted with Ahn Ho-young, Deputy Minister o f  Trade, MOFAT, Seoul, October 10th, 2005. 
JoongAng Daily Newspaper (11/02/2001).
KIEP (2001) 'Toward a Korea-Japan FTA: Assessment and Prospects,’ 79-81, Seoul, May; Interview 
conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I was accompanied by Kim Gi- 
ju, former director o f  administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21th, 2009.
Interview conducted with Baek Hyun-gi, executive director o f FKTU, Seoul, October 22th, 2005.
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and labour to oppose each other.
Labour Unions
Although labour did not enter into an alliance with any business association, 
they did find grounds for uniting on both a tactical and strategic level with anti­
globalists and civic groups. As previously elaborated, the motive for support amongst 
labour, anti-globalists and civic groups was compelling78. Furthermore, their access to 
informal channels of influence (i.e. PI) and the relative paucity of formal channels also 
helped to usher them towards a state of interdependence and support79.
As soon as the first negotiations began in December of 2003, labour unions (the 
KCTU and the FKTU) immediately launched a warning shot across the bow of the 
Korean government by way of a comprehensive nation-wide strike80. The government 
obviously chose to ignore this warning and negotiations continued in Japan. With the 
support of labour unions, ninety civic groups held a press conference condemning the 
Korea-Japan FTA and the WTO and protested outside the offices of the MOFAT on 
February 23rd, 2004 while the second round of negotiations were held in Seoul81. While 
the third round of negotiations were in progress (April 26th, 2004), many civic groups' 
organisations, including the National Confederation of People (NCP), the AWNM and 
the KCTU, protested in support of suspension of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations 
outside where the conference was held. However, the impact these demonstrations had 
on both politicians and the public was limited due to a couple of converging factors (i.e. 
Korea-Chile FTA ratification phase and the impeachment of the President) and shall be 
analysed in greater detail below.
A massive demonstration of more than 10,000 people held in Kyungju was 
sponsored by the KCTU in protest at the fifth negotiations on August 23rd, 2004. Four 
major labour unions from automobile companies (Hyundai, Kia, Daewoo, and 
Ssangyong) collaborated -  along with second and third tier company representatives -  
in protesting against the Korea-Japan FTA. The economic circumstances that forced
78
Interviews with Kim Sung-jong and Park Sung-jik, one of co-leaders o f  NCP and AWNM respectively, in 
Seoul, October 12th, 2005; Interviews with Seo Ju-won, secretary o f the KPAFW, Seoul, October 6th, 2006.
Pressian Daily Newspaper (02/12/2003).
80 Labour Daily Newspaper (10/12/2003).
81 Voice o f People Newspaper (23/03/2004).
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these automobile labour unions to oppose the FTA were well supported by some 
analysts (Lee and Chun 2005: 255; Park 2004a: 360-361). Kim’s estimation was that 
Japan’s share of the domestic mid-large automobiles market would increase to 4.1 
percent by the end of 2003 with a further increase to 15.6 percent by 2015 if the Korea- 
Japan FTA were to be concluded. Matters were not much better in the case of 
intermediate components markets. ‘The People’s Struggle Group Korea (PSGK)’ was 
formed in 2000 as an alliance of labour unions, anti-globalists and civic groups and 
went to Tokyo to protest against the FTA during the sixth round of negotiations. 
Although the group only consisted of about a hundred people, this display of 
organisational power was an important symbol and represented much more than the 
sum of its parts. This symbology was explained by The People’s Solidarity for Future 
Environment (PSFE) thusly, “The choice between becoming a slave to capital and 
pursuing the independence of labour82.”
Reasons for the relative weakness of labour unions’ channels of 
influence
Overall, labour and civic group's activities were well organised and executed 
flawlessly and their alliance was mutually reinforcing. However, the impact they had 
was, in comparison to the FKI led coalition of business groups’ representatives, of little 
consequence. There are two important reasons why this was so83. Firstly, their 
demonstrations were overshadowed during the first three rounds of negotiations by the 
Korea-Chile FTA. Secondly, during rounds four and five the clamour for presidential 
impeachment84 drew attention away from labour unions’ demonstrations and protests
PSFE, http://struggle.jinbo.net/bbs/zboard.php?id=main&no=91. On the contrary, the protests by the 
anti-globalisation groups focused on the opening o f  the market itself - taming the labours markets, and aggravation o f  
working conditions. Roh (2004), ‘Instead o f  resist the Korea-Japan FTA and Protect Korean industries, let us 
assemble to the front line o f  crush the tamers o f  labour markets and 'resisting the detrimental revision o f  the labour 
law,’ (on November 16th), http://go.jinbo.net/commune/view.php?board=cool&id=20262.
Interview conducted with Chung Byung-duk, vice-manger o f KCTU, Seoul, October 9th, 2006. He 
acknowledged their weak influence at that time. His viewed was also shared by Kim Dong-sung, one o f co-leaders o f  
PSGK, interview, Seoul, October 11th, 2006.
On March 12th, 2004, the NA voted to impeach President Roh Moo-hyun on illegal electioneering and 
incompetence charges. The impeachment motion, the first ever filed against an incumbent president in Korea, came 
after the National Election Commission ruled that Roh had violated the Election Law during a television debate by 
urging voters to support candidates o f his Uri Party. Roh refused to accept the demands by the GNP and the 
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) that Roh apologise for his remarks. The vote was 193-2, with Roh’s supporters 
abstaining from the vote. Roh’s executive power was suspended until the final decision was made by the 
Constitutional Court. The impeachment bid met with strong opposition from the public. On May 14th, 2004, the
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against the Korea-Japan FTA. To paraphrase, their organisational power failed to attract 
PI due to other factors. Regarding political capital, the agricultural sector had the ability 
to apply pressure in the NA due to rural communities and the layout of political 
constituencies. Labour unions, on the other hand, did not have such PPPM as Helgesen 
(1998) and Cotton (1989) argued in Chapter 2. Although based mainly in cities, their 
access to politicians via their constituencies was quite limited due to the political 
demographics of large urban settings. Finally, the relevant cultural importance of 
opening the agricultural sector to international competition via FT As dwarfed that of 
opening Korean industries to similar competition.
Business associations (FKI, etc)
The FKI led coalition, however, did not have to see their channels of influence 
endure such a loss in potency. During the negotiation phase, the FKI and its sister 
associations adapted both formal and informal channels of influence to their cause but 
again they relied predominantly on formal channels. The FKI led coalition was well 
aware that the MOFAT supported the FTA with Japan. This awareness enabled the FKI 
to adopt a nuanced approach to dealing with government ministries through the use of 
IPI. Instead of expressing their reservations directly to MOFAT during the negotiation 
phase, the FKI went to MOFE and MOCIE85 with the aim of persuading them of the 
veracity of their doubts and to coordinate their relationship with MOFAT vis-ä-vis their
o z :
stance on the FTA (though still within the confines of formal channels) .
The FKI led coalition of business associations was keen on adopting the most 
efficient channels of influence that were available. Their main channels of influence
Constitutional Court overturned the impeachment motion, restoring Roh as the head o f state. Opposition parties 
(GNP) faced a backlash in the NA elections. In the 17th general election on April 15th, 2004, Uri Party won 152 seats, 
while the GNP and MDP, 121 and 9 respectively.
Interview conducted with Kim Sun-min, a member o f  FTA Promotion & Policy adjustment Authority 
division, in MOFE (currently MOSF), Seoul, October 2nd, 2009; Interview conducted with Park Jeong-seong, Leader 
o f FTA Team, in MOCIE (currently MKE), Seoul, October 3rd, 2009. While the interviewees were not high ranking 
officials within either ministry, they did confirm that the FKI worked with MOFE and MOCIE during this time period. 
Requests for interviews by the author with high ranking officials have been submitted on several occasions but at 
time o f  writing, no interviews with any high ranking officials have been given.
Interview conducted with Lee Doo-chul, President, Ulsan Chamber o f  Commerce and Industry, Seoul, 
October 14th, 2005; Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I 
was companied by Kim Gi-ju, former director o f administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21th, 2009. He did not 
directly mention that MOFE and MOCIE were persuaded by FKI led coalition. However, he made clear that he was 
well aware that the FKI had a good relationship with both MOFE and MOCIE and, furthermore, that they shared a 
common goal in halting the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations.
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during this phase were formal channels; petition, publications, meeting key decision­
makers which Berry (1997) and Victor (2007) categorised as insider lobbying. They did, 
however, also utilise informal channels; i.e. media access, mainly conservative
87 .newspapers . There are several interweaving factors that help explain the position the 
FKI took on adopting certain channels and ignoring others. When a political situation 
changes quickly, a political scenario may demand a particular lobbying tactic (Victor 
2007: 829). Groups much prefer direct lobbying over indirect lobbying (Hojnacki & 
Kimball 1999; Gais & Walker 1991).
Firstly, their earlier position and their proximity to government ministries and 
important politicians placed these formal channels (i.e. direct access to the negotiators 
and influential policy makers) directly in their crosshairs88. Secondly, their use of 
publications to disseminate their views via GBA-JSGs, etc. in a very academic, 
objective fashion appealed directly to these same ministers and bureaucrats89. Thirdly, 
the domestic situation regarding Korea-Chile ratification and the presidential 
impeachment meant that the FKI was careful not to rely on informal channels due to the 
media frenzy surrounding these issues90.
In contrast, labour unions relied on informal channels to persuade the public of 
their claims. Fourthly, as indicated above, the FKI had ostensibly supported the FTA 
with Japan during the early stages of the agenda-setting phase and gradually adopted an 
opposing position. During the FKFs earlier manifestation as supporters, they dealt 
directly with and through the MOFAT91. As their position changed, so did their 
relationship with MOFAT. Although the FKI led coalition had worked hand in glove 
with MOFAT during the Korea-Chile FTA and the Korea-US FTA, during the 
negotiation phase of the Korea-Japan FTA the MOFAT was viewed as not as conducive. 
Given the fact that Korean business associations were inevitably going to have to work 
intimately with the MOFAT again in the future, the FKI decided to direct its energies 
towards the MOFE and the MOCIE, thus avoiding an open confrontation with MOFAT
They are Chosun Daily Newspaper, Dong-A Daily Newspaper and JoongAng Daily Newspaper. 
Interview conducted with Chan-Guk Huh, Director o f Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, October 19th, 2006.
89 Korea Herald (19/02/2004).
Interview conducted with Seo Ju-won, secretary o f The KPAFW, Seoul, October 6th, 2006.
Interviews conducted with Lee Mi-hyun, the head o f  multilateral trade cooperation decision in MOFAT, 
Seoul, August 14th, 2009.
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while simultaneously retaining the use of powerful formal channels .
Groups representing major companies began to express their opposition as 
negotiations between the two governments commenced in October 2003, which 
progressed rapidly to the 3,d round of negotiations in April 2004. The FKI led coalition 
opposed the FTA in earnest during the second conference of the “FZT Civilian 
Consultation ’ held in May 200493. The FKI invited the leading government authorities 
and representatives from every industrial field to this conference. The views expressed 
(by electronics, automobiles, petro—chemistry industries and SMEs) were that of worry 
and anxiety regarding not just the contents of the Korea-Japan FTA but also the speed 
of negotiations94. The government authorities (i.e. MOFAT) were lukewarm95 in their 
reception of these ideas, explaining that “the Korea-Japan FTA is a diplomatic 
agreement due at the end of next year and the Korea-Japan FTA must be considered 
from a comprehensive view, including the heightening of national competence through 
regional cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China, as well as the restructuring and 
trading aspects96.”
Subsequently, a document was published by the FKI in October 2004 (see 
Table 4.8), just after the 5th round of negotiations had finished -August 2004, urging a 
more thorough examination of the Korea-Japan FTA97.
Table 4.8: Impact of Possible FTA on Bilateral Trade Balances
______________________________________________(Unit 10 million dollars)
Countries Before FTA (2003) After FTAexport import Trade balance Export import Trade balance
Japan 172.7 363.1 -190.4 212.9(+40.2) 464.2(+101.1) —251,39(—60.9)
Singapore 46.4 40.9 5.5 47.0(+0.6) 53.2(+12.3) 6.2(—6.2)
Mexico 24.5 3.3 21.2 31.3(+6.8) 5.K+1.8) 26.2(5.0)
Canada 26.8 18.9 7.9 35.6(+8.8) 28.4(+9.5) 7.2(—0.7)
India 28.5 12.3 16.2 56.9(+28.4) 17.7(+5.4) 39.2(23.0)
USA 342.2 248.1 94.1 422.2(+82) 413.K+165) 9.1 (-83)
ASEAN 202.6 184.6 18.0 308.4(^105.8) 229.8(+45.2) 78.6(60.6)
EFTA 12.0 20.1 -8.1 18.6(+6.6) 27.5(+7.4) -8.9(-0.8)
* Source: FKI (2004a) “Recent trends in FTA promotion and complementary tasks for FTA Roadmap.”
Interview conducted with Choi Sung-hyun, Senior Research Fellow, International Affair Division in 
FKI, Seoul, October 20th, 2006; Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director of Economic Research Division, 
KERI in FKI affiliates, Seoul, October 19th, 2006. While mention of MOCIE and MOFE was not explicit, there were 
many references to ‘key governmental ministries' and. at this point of the process, the only other ‘key governmental 
ministries' besides MOFAT were MOCIE and MOFE.
FTA Civilian Consultation Committee (28/04/2004).
94 Korea Herald (19/02/2004).
Interviews conducted with Lee Mi-hyun, the head of multilateral trade cooperation decision in MOFAT, 
Seoul, August 14th, 2009.
‘Debates on the rapidity of Korea-Japan FTA,' (Seoul Economy Newspaper 05/05/2004); ‘Manufacturers 
oppose Korea/Japan FTA.’ (Maeil Economy Daily Newspaper 04/05/2004).
Money Today Daily Newspaper (30/09/2003); Seoul Economy Daily Newspaper (21/10/2003).
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Even within certain ministries, there was agreement with the view of the FKI. 
The MOFE insisted that it agreed with the MOFAT in principle regarding the FTA, but 
criticised the MOFAT in that it focused on long term benefit at the expense of short 
term, while the MOCIE was also critical of the MOFAT, finding the neglect of 
domestic industries worrisome98. This multi-faceted perspective tends to reflect the fact 
that individual ministries’ interests seem less to echo that o f ‘national interest' rather 
than that of sectoral interests (i.e. FKI).
To summarise, the FKI coalition became something of a bane to the Korea-Japan 
FTA through judicious use of available channels of public influence. FKI’s dominant 
channel of influence during the negotiation phase was IP I, i.e. through other ministries 
(MOFE and MOCIE) due to not directly confronting MOFAT, while labour unions' 
primary channel was PI which did not efficiently work due to the domestic political 
situation.
The FKI eclipsed the labour unions in efficiency of opposition and yet did so 
without alienating their erstwhile government partners, whom they effectively turned 
coat on midway through the FTA process. And they did so effectively, so much so that 
the Korea-Japan FTA is effectively deadlocked.
Chosun Daily Newspaper (02/10/2004).
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An evaluation of the impact the domestic stakeholder’s channels of 
influence had on the FT A
A critical look will now be taken at how the respective parties impacted the 
Korea-Japan FT A. To put it bluntly, there is no denying that domestic stakeholders had 
a telling impact on the direction the Korea-Japan negotiations took, although some 
certainly had more impact than others. Firstly, this thesis will examine the influence that 
supporters had over the direction the FT A negotiations took; supporters initially had 
dominance due to factors previously outlined but this dominance waned as 
circumstances changed and certain supporters became opponents. This will be followed 
by a look at how opponents managed to influence the final outcome of the agreement; 
opponents eventually gathered enough critical mass to halt the project before it had 
passed the negotiation phase.
Agenda-setting phase — Supporters; from positivity to doubt
The early stage of the agenda-setting phase was -  as in other negotiations -  
dominated by supporters of the Korea-Japan FTA. The MOFAT, who dominated 
proceedings, was aided by compliant and supportive corporations. The need to evaluate 
any influence at this point is redundant given the inclinations of those who were 
involved at this early stage. Suffice to say that each backed the other regarding the 
possibility of an FTA with Japan. With support from both MOFAT and the president, 
there was little need for the FKI to seek any channels other than IPI. Strong OP or not, 
its influence on persuading the government to carry forward with an FTA with Japan 
was not needed.
The later stage of the agenda-setting phase, however, was not so cut and dried. 
Business associations were taking a new slant on the FTA and their attitude to it was 
reflected in how they applied their channels of influence. Following on from the 
government funded bodies' (the KIEP & the IDE) publication of the ‘Joint Study on a 
potential Korea-Japan FTA (see Table 5-4)' in mid-2002 and the data provided within, 
several business associations began to raise concerns about specific points related to the
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FTA with Japan". On June 27th, 2002, Korean-Japan FTA seminar took place in Seoul. 
Before the seminar, the leaders of some major Korean industrial sectors officially met 
with key governmental policy makers to express their growing concerns about the 
short-term impact the FTA would have on their industries. The GSB-JSG100 held a 
seminar on December 4lh, 2002 in Busan attended by major figures from the Korean car 
industry who raised their concerns about the competitiveness of their Japanese 
competitors and the result an FTA would have on their industry.
The MOFAT, which had been quite confident regarding further support from 
the FKI led coalition, were left with no option but to include their concerns due to the 
fact that the MOFAT relied on the FKI coalition to maintain forward momentum. The 
MOFAT were beginning to wake up to the fact that they were not going to be able rely 
on the FKFs unwavering support, in other words, their organisational power, although 
as single units remained strong, taken together suffered greatly. Although the FKI began 
displaying concern regarding the hasty progress (at least as they saw it) of the FTA, 
they maintained access to IP I as their primary channel, expressing concern directly to 
MOFAT. Given the FKFs strong OP, they had effective access to IPI through MOFAT.
In summary, during the agenda-setting phase, MOFAT was supported by 
President Kim Dae-jung and FKI as key actors. Also, the FKI used IPI as primary 
channel.
Negotiation phase — The FKI and the storm before the lull
The negotiation phase, from beginning to deadlock, was less than one year, 
considerably shorter than the agenda-setting phase, which lasted almost five years. The 
first arrow in the heart of the Korea-Japan FTA, the issue of NTBs, originated during 
the agenda-setting phase and eventually poisoned the negotiation process. The Japanese 
government would not acquiesce to the demand that NTBs be put on the table and this 
issue was to plague the negotiations until deadlock was reached. The next eleven 
months of the negotiation phase saw the FTA take considerably more arrows. Although 
labour unions combined with vigorous anti-globalist/civic groups, their impact on the
JoongAng Daily Newspaper (14/03/2004).
The GSB-JSG met eight times from August 9th, 2002 to October 2nd 2003.
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FTA was quite limited. The fact that they did not ally with the FKI led coalition is 
hardly surprising but this also helped to limit their impact. The FKI led coalition itself 
was another matter, their fingerprints are to be found all over the body of the FTA. The 
MOFAT stood virtually alone, support from the East-Asianists was hardly a pillar to 
rest national economic policy on.
Informal channels (PI) were the mainstay of labour unions and anti-globalists 
and although civic-groups had access to formal channels in the past, their access to 
these channels during the Korea-Japan FTA was limited due to the dominance that the 
FKI led coalition had of these same channels. Furthermore, the actual influence that 
informal channels had during the period was severely curtailed due to the Korea-Chile 
FTA ratification process and the major issue of the day, presidential impeachment. At 
most, labour-unions and the anti-globalist/civic group alliance acted as tertiary support 
to the formal channels that the FKI led coalition brought to bear on the government.
The FKI coalition was wise enough to redirect its efforts to the MOFE and the MOCIE 
when it decided to oppose the FTA. Before the fourth round of negotiations were held 
in Tokyo, on 23,d June, 2004, the leaders of the FKI led coalition met key policy makers 
from the MOFE and the MOCIE and impressed upon them their antipathy towards and 
FTA with Japan101. Both the MOFE and the MOCIE delivered these concerns directly 
to MOFAT (Sohn 2002: 15-16)10“. Also, '’Recent trends in FTA promotion and 
complementary tasks for an FTA Roadmap” was published in October 2004 by the FKI 
led coalition that was highly critical of the MOFAT’s plans for an FTA with Japan.
Both the MOCIE and the MOFE were supportive of the papers findings103. The efficacy 
of this paper -  and the FKI led coalition's opposition to the FTA -  is illuminated by the 
events of the following month. On November 3rd, 2004 the negotiations over the FTA 
came to a halt.
Prior to this publication, the MOFAT was reasonably confident of eventually 
persuading key industries to support the Korea-Japan FTA104. This hubris dissipated 
with the publication o f ‘Recent Trends’. The MOFAT, importantly, also lacked the 
public support of the president, as he stood facing possible impeachment proceedings.
101 Hankyung Economic Daily Newspaper (25/10/2005); Chosun Daily Newspaper (24/10/2005).
102 Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I was 
accompanied by Kim Gi-ju, former director of administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21th, 2009.
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director of Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, on October 19th, 2006.
Interview conducted with Park Myung-Jae, Minister of MOPAS, Seoul, March 3rd, 2007.
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This left the MOFAT alone to face both the FKI led coalition and the honest, though 
rather ineffectual, labour union and civic groups' coalition105.
The fact is while labour formed a loose coalition with certain civic groups, they 
were (and continue to be) at a political disadvantage compared to their rural cousins. 
This disadvantage is defined by how the voting districts of Korea are divided, with an 
over-representation of rural voters in the NA. Second, although labour's OP may be 
ostensibly on a par with that of agriculture, the reality is that labour issues are neither as 
tendentious nor as publicly inflammatory as agricultural issues are. These facts were 
compounded by the political realities of the day, notably the dominance of the Korea- 
Chile FTA in the media and the upcoming impeachment of the President which 
conspired to leave the labour movement with little effectual access to PI. Furthermore, 
again given the contemporary realities, their access to IPI and PPPM were virtually non­
existent. This is also reflected in their levels of OP. The labour movement had weaker 
OP than agriculture in part due to the emotiveness of the issues involved and only had 
the potential to access PI (public demonstrations). The reality was, though, that the 
dominance of the Korea-Chile FTA and potential presidential impeachment had sucked 
all of the political oxygen out of the arena and left little for the labour movement to 
latch on to. The FKI were also affected, in that their access to PI was reduced. However, 
given their strong OP, their access to IPI and PPPM (key policy makers) did not suffer 
as the labour movement had.
In summary, during the negotiation phase, while opponents' effective use of 
primary channel, PI, was reduced due to the domestic political situation, FKI’s primary 
channel of influence was IPI (supporting MOFE and MOCIE). Their secondary channel 
was PI (access to conservative newspapers).
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was twofold; firstly, to examine the Korea-Japan 
FTA in order to answer the question whether domestic stakeholders' use of channels of 
influence played a part in dictating the outcome of the FTA process and secondly, in
Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I was 
accompanied by Kim Gi-ju, former director of administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21th, 2009.
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conjunction with the other two empirical chapters, to look at whether the FT A process is, 
in general, inclined to respond to domestic pressures. Although international factors (the 
popularity of FTAs combined with the financial crisis o f '97) helped to create 
conditions conducive to adopting FTA policy and the statist approach may help to 
explain why Korea chose to negotiate an FTA with Japan -  although this ignores the 
role the FKI had in lobbying the government -  these approaches do not help to explain 
the variance that occurs in some Korean FTAs. A look at what happened domestically 
offers great insights into the Korea-Japan FTA stalemate. We shall begin by looking at 
who the domestic stakeholders were.
The list of domestic stakeholders consists of two strains, supporters and 
opponents. Supporters; MOFAT, East Asianists and business associations (FKI, etc) 
(agenda-setting phase). Opponents; Labour unions, farmers’ associations, anti- 
globalisationists and civic groups and business associations (negotiation phase). The 
broad strokes of the supporting rationale were that an FTA (any FTA) was a good thing, 
regional integration was a positive and the increase in industrial activity that would 
result from the FTA was desirable. Those who opposed the FTA did so because they 
viewed it as detrimental to their interests (even if their interests were not one and the 
same). The fact that business associations changed their position regarding the FTA is 
cntical in understanding what eventually resulted.
During the early agenda-setting phase there was no opposition to the main 
thrust of the FTA. The MOFAT and business associations were united in pushing it 
forward. As the process entered the later agenda-setting phase and the worst of the 
fallout from the '97 financial crisis had passed, business associations began to take a 
more measured approach, raising points of contention where there had been none before.
Supporters’ primary channel of influence was IPI and was assisted by one key 
veto player, President Kim Dae-jung (although he was not actively supporting during 
the negotiation phase).
By the time the negotiation phase had begun, the business associations had 
adopted a similar attitude to labour unions, anti-globalisationists and civic groups, who 
had allied together. The differences between these groups were that the business 
associations did not ally with other groups and, most importantly, they had access to 
powerful formal channels (IPIs as primary) and PI as secondary, whereas the other
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groups had to rely on informal channels (PI). It was this difference that was to 
eventually condemn the Korea-Japan FTA to limbo.
The opposition supplied by labour unions, anti-globalists and civic groups was, 
at most, a thorn in the side for the government. Due to the threat of presidential 
impeachment and the predominance of the Korea—Chile FTA in the media, their use of 
informal channels was ineffectual. Also, their access to formal channels was quite 
limited in comparison to business associations' channels. The formal channels utilised 
by the FKI led coalition were not so ineffectual. Their access to MOFE and MOCIE 
was an inspired move as it allowed them to keep their relationship with MOFAT intact 
while simultaneously injecting their concerns and doubts about the FTA to MOFAT and 
the negotiators. MOFAT106 realised that it stood alone in favour of the Korea-Japan 
FTA, support from the East Asianists notwithstanding, and were unwilling to push too 
hard on that basis. This effectively deprived the FTA of the political oxygen it needed to 
survive in a hostile environment.
The key point here in relation to the overall thrust of this thesis is that it was the 
FKFs opposition to the Korea-Japan FTA that led to the breakdown. And it is precisely 
this outcome that the societal approach is equipped to deal with and analyse 
successfully, whereas an analysis using a combination of statist and/or systemic 
approaches would not produce such insight due to their inability to decipher the role 
played by domestic actors.
Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I was 
accompanied by Kim Gi-ju, former director of administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21th, 2009.
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Chapter Five: Korea-US Free Trade Agreement 
Introduction
Our final empirical chapter examines probably the most controversial of all 
FTAs that Korea has signed or engaged in thus far. Not only were the Korea-US FTA 
negotiations controversial but the Korea-US FTA is, without doubt, the most wide 
ranging of all FTAs that Korea has engaged with to date (Lim 2006b: 2; Jackson 2006: 
2). A natural corollary to this, considering the scope of the previous two chapters, is that 
the involvement of domestic stakeholders would be equally broad. Given the 
comprehensiveness of this agreement, the level of engagement by this broad collection 
of stakeholders was equally intense. The variance here -  an analysis of which would 
also help in comprehending the influence of domestic influence -  is; why was the US 
chosen as an FTA partner when government studies placed the importance of signing 
such an agreement as a medium to long term goal; and the suddenness of the decision to 
sign an FTA with the US.
i. Identification of the main domestic stakeholders, both pro- and anti-FTA. 
ü. A look at their respective rationales.
iii. The use of channels of influence.
iv. An evaluation of the impact that channels of influence had.
Concluding remarks will follow this examination.
Background and chronology
The official launch of negotiations for the Korea-US FTA was held in early in 
February 2006. However, the idea of a Korean-US FTA had been around since the 
late 1980s (Cheong 2004a: 13). Discussions concerning a possible Korea-US FTA are to 
be found in a report by the US International Trade Commission (USITC), which 
examined Asian Pacific FTAs in 1989, suggesting that Korea would be a suitable FTA
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partner for the US (Cheong 2004a: 11). Despite this there were several reasons1 that 
prevented this idea from materialising at that time.
After the 1997 Asian crisis, the Korean government suggested formulating a 
BIT with the US (Winder 2006: 3; Kim 1998: 96). The Korean government believed 
that such trade policies would supply the economic momentum necessary for recovery 
from the Asian currency crisis, and that increased trade could be achieved through a 
Korean-US FTA (Kim 2004c: 97-98). However, talks were suspended in 1999 due to
'y
Korea's screen quota system . The US did not display much enthusiasm for proceeding 
with an FTA with Korea, concluding that such negotiations were meaningless without a 
BIT. The Korean government displayed a similar lack of enthusiasm due to US pressure 
regarding the opening of the Korean agricultural market. The idea of a Korea-US FTA 
stalled and was not reconsidered again until five years later. In 2004, the issue of an 
FTA between the two countries was quietly resuscitated. US government officials began 
making positive noises concerning a possible Korea-US FTA while simultaneously 
placing conditions for such an FTA on four major issues: beef, screen quotas, 
automobiles and pharmaceuticals (Manyin 2006: 25).
President Roh Moo-hyun made steps to reopen the debate by suggesting an 
FTA between the two countries to President Bush at the APEC summit meeting in 
Pusan in November 2005. This was followed by an official announcement of the 
development of a Korea-US FTA in President Rolfs New Year speech of January 18th, 
2006. Then, much to everyone's surprise (Lim 2006a: 1; Jackson 2006: 2), on February 
4th, 2006, Kim Hyun-chong, the Korean Minister for Trade, and Rob Portman, the US 
Trade Representative announced that both countries would start official negotiations for 
an FTA. The governments of both countries, involved in a major trade partnership as 
well as a military alliance, foresaw that an FTA between the two countries would be a
The anti-American movement and disputes over tariff concessions in the agricultural sector under the UR 
(Kim 2003c: 240).
Negotiation on Korea-US BIT began in 1998, when President Kim Dae-jung proposed the idea o f Korea- 
US BIT out o f  a conviction that attracting as much as foreign investment as possible from the US - as well as other 
industrialised countries - was a way for Korea to recover from the Asian financial crisis o f  1997. However, this 
sparked a huge collective movement from the film industry in Korea; film makers, actors, distributors and the public 
who believed that the abolition or amendment o f  the screen quota system would destroy the film industry and, 
moreover, Korean traditional culture. Various civic groups formed coalitions such as Common Commission o f Civil 
Groups for Protecting Korean Movies and Emergency Commission o f  Korean Film Makers. Facing strong resistance, 
the Korean government finally agreed that it put off any talks about abolishing the SQS until local films account for 
more than 40 percent o f  the cinema market in Korea.
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win-win case for both countries (Cutler 2006; Choi 2006a: 6)3. Both proposed 
ambitious objectives for the negotiations.
A ‘high-level and comprehensive FTA ’ was proposed as the negotiations’ 
objective. ‘High-level' in this context pointed to the removal of almost every trade 
barrier including tariff and NTBs; while ‘comprehensive’ indicated the inclusion of 
almost every trade related field as the subject of free trade, including not only industrial 
products but also agriculture, service, investment, intellectual property rights, etc. Also, 
under the terms of the negotiations, the US proposed a settlement of the FTA by early 
2007 to meet the schedule for the US Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the body that 
had the power to negotiate trade deals without amendment procedures from the US 
Congress4.
The beginning of negotiations (March 6th, 2006) came shortly after Korea 
agreed to the ‘four preconditions to resume the importation of US beef, cut the 
compulsory screening days of domestic films from 146 days to 73, to grant auto makers 
with a low share of the Korean market an exemption, until 2009, from Korea’s 
regulation on ultra-low emissions, and to agree to set up an independent mechanism 
under which drug reimbursement decisions would be reconsidered (these preconditions 
indicate that the Korean state can and does act independently, which some Korean 
scholars5 argue is indicative of the state dominating policy direction similar to the 
developmental state of pre-1987). From the Korean perspective (or at least those who 
supported the proposed agreement), it would be a milestone in foreign trade relations 
(Hwang 2006): the US was Korea’s third-largest trade partner, after China and Japan, 
and its second-largest export market. According to Korean Customs data, two-way 
trade reached US$71.9 billion in 2005, only slightly below $72.4 billion in Korean trade 
with Japan but well below the $100.6 billion in Korean trade with China. And for the 
US, a bilateral trade deal with Korea, if completed, would mark the largest US FTA
The statement below, made by President Bush (Statement by the President, 2nd February 2006) shows the 
view o f  the US: 'A FTA with the Republic o f  Korea will provide important economic, political, and strategic benefits 
to both countries and build on America's engagement in Asia. The Republic o f Korea is our seventh largest trading 
partner and seventh largest export market, and this FTA advances our commitment to opening markets and expanding 
opportunities for America’s farmers, ranchers, workers, and businesses.’ The term 'win-win’ is frequently used when 
describing the expectations o f both countries regarding Korea-US FTA to indicate benefits in terms o f  both economy 
and national security.
The two countries were under pressure to wrap up the talks by the end o f March. US negotiators were 
required to present a deal to the Congress for a three-month review under President, George W. Bush’s TPA. The TPA, 
which was to run out on July 1st, 2007, required Congress to vote for or against a deal without making amendments.
(Lee 2007c: 285; Hong and Cheong 2006: 116).
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since the NAFTA in 1994 (USTR 2006; Schott et al., 2006: 1).
Korea and the US officially signed a bilateral FTA on June 30th, 2007, putting 
an end to 17-month long negotiations. The negotiations were not all plain sailing 
however. Negotiation teams representing both countries met almost monthly, alternating 
-  from their first meeting in Washington on June 5th, 2006, to their eighth in Seoul on 
March 12th, 2007 -  between the US and Korea. Three weeks after final meeting, both 
parties simultaneously held high-level working talks at a chief delegate- and trade 
minister-level to adjust the final issues. In Seoul on April 2nd, 2007, Kim Hyun-chong, 
the Korean Minister for Trade and Karan Bhatia, Deputy US trade representative, 
officially announced the successful settlement of the FTA, after twice delaying the 
negotiation deadline of March 31st (see table5-l). Prior to the final talks in Seoul 
starting on March 26th, both countries continued to narrow the gap between their views 
through eight official negotiations and non—official talks. Given these circumstances, 
the success of the negotiations was only possible due to the strong political will of the 
executive and governments of both countries (Flwang 2006: 2; Lim 2006: 8; Klinger 
2006: 13). A telephone conversation on March 29th, 2007 between President Roh and 
President Bush presumably played a major role in the final settlement6. Both parties 
were willing to close the deal before the end of March 2007 to meet the expiration of 
the US TPA (Cutler 2006: 5; Kim 2007b: 1).
Tabic 5.1: Chronology of the Korea-US FTA
Period Main Issues
Jan. 18, 2006 President Roh indicated an intention for a Korea-US FTA in his new year’s speech.
Jan. 26, 2006 Korean Prime Minister for Economy, Deoksu Han, announced the halving of the screen quota to 73 days, as well as the reopening of US meat importation.
Feb. 3, 2006 Korean Minister for Trade, Hyun-Chong Kim, declared the departure of the negotiations at the US Congress.
Jun. 5-9, 2006 1st meeting (Washington) -  Established the foundations of the negotiations by integrating drafts from each division
Jul. 10-14,2006 2nd meeting(Seoul)- First initial offers exchanged
Sep. 6-9, 2006 3rd meeting (Seattle)
Oct. 23-27 4th meeting (Jeju)
Dec. 4—8 5th meeting (Montana)
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (29/03/29).
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Jan. 15-19,2007 6th meeting (Seoul)
Feb. 11-14 7lh meeting (Washington)
Mar. 8-12 8th meeting (Seoul)
Mar. 19-21 High level talks (Washington -  on textiles; Seoul -  on agricultural products)
Mar. 26—31 Trade Minister-level talks (Seoul)
Mar. 31 Announced that the negotiation deadline was extended by 48 hours.
Apr. 2 Korea-US FTA officially concluded
* Source-MOFAT: http://www.fta.go.kr/user/index.asp.
According to Korea’s ‘FTA Road Map7’, a Korea-US FTA was regarded as a 
medium to long term project, driven more by high politics than economics and that it 
would impose significant adjustment costs not only on Korea’s agriculture but services 
as well, with less tangible benefits for the manufacturing sector (Lim 2006: 2-3; Choi 
2006a: 4-6). Some believed that there were economically superior alternatives to a 
Korea-US FTA that would derive a significantly lower political cost (Jeon 2005: 63). 
Considering this background, it would seem only natural that many Koreans wondered 
what had changed since the publication of the ‘FTA Roadmap’ to justify the 
government’s new-found enthusiasm for a Korea-US FTA. A curious question is 
whether the systemic, statist or societal approaches provide any answers as to why the 
agenda setting phase of the Korea-US FTA was begun so quickly, which is at odds with 
the agenda setting phase of every other Korean FTA. The following section deals with 
the issue of why Korea chose the US as an FTA partner.
Probably the most pressing issue is why President Roh’s administration 
suddenly initiated FTA negotiations with the US. Whereas all other FTA’s and their
This road map, created in September 2003 and revised in May 2004, set basic guidelines for the FTA 
policy of the Roh’ government, the criteria for selecting FTA partners and the list of prospective partner countries. 
This document elucidates the government's wish to develop comprehensive and high level FTAs with many countries 
simultaneously. Also, it suggests a list of FTA partner countries. According to this list, primary prospective FTA 
partners include Japan, Singapore, ASEAN, Mexico, the EFTA, etc. Countries that should be considered for the 
medium to long term are divided into three small groups. The first group includes countries that require an amicable 
mood for an FTA: the US, EU and China, and further, a Korea-China-Japan FTA and East Asian FTA can be 
considered. In other words, the goal was to create an environment for FTAs with large economic blocs. The second 
group includes countries that want to enter into an FTA with Korea: Israel, Peru, Panama, New Zealand, Australia, 
etc. The third group includes projections for the medium to long term: Canada and India. Such an order of priority 
cannot avoid necessary adjustments in practice. However, the sudden start of FTA negotiations with the US, which 
was set for the medium to long term, provided the main reason for criticism that an FTA with the US was developed 
without a proper period of preparation.
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agenda-setting phases shared certain similarities, such as participants and extended 
duration, the Korea-US was anomalous in both these regards. And it is these differences 
which really go to the heart of the matter regarding the main issues at stake here.
Of these issues, the first to be dealt with here are the questions why was the US 
chosen and why so suddenly. Three approaches are examined here to help explain these 
questions; systemic, statist and societal explanations.
o
Why did Korea decide to pursue FT A negotiations with the US?
In 2005, many substantial meetings between trade ministers were held to assess 
the adequacy of a future FTA. However, they were not expected to come to any 
immediate conclusions. An official announcement that both countries would commence 
negotiations for a Korea-US FTA was made in Washington at 4:00am Korean time on 
February 2nd, 2006. The announcement to launch formal negotiations followed Korea’s 
immediate concessions in four contentious areas: beef, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, 
and screen quotas. The majority of Korea’s media and political commentators were 
shocked (Park and Park 2006: 322). The official launch of negotiations for a Korea-US 
FTA came as a surprise to many Koreans, despite the Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong 
insisting that the Korean business community and general public overwhelmingly 
supported the idea of a Korea-US FTA9.
A bilateral FTA between Korea and the US had strategic implications; not only 
potential economic benefits, but for security relationships also. Furthermore, large 
economies have long been able to affect the economic incentives of smaller states by 
influencing regional and global market dynamics (Gowa 1994: 11-2). Although both 
Japan and Korea were security allies of the US, the relative strength of the two alliances 
had shifted over the years. The US-Japan alliance had been greatly strengthened over 
the past decade while the US-Korea alliance had suffered a series of political setbacks 
over a range of issues10.
This section (159- 166) has been published in the Korean Observer, Vol.40, No.3, 2009, title as “The 
role of domestic factors in international trade policy: Demystifying the sudden start o f the Korea-US FTA.”
In the October 2004 poll conducted by the KITA, 76 percent o f Korean trading companies responded 
favourably to an FTA with the US. In December 2004, a Korea Gallup poll showed that 80.4 percent o f  Koreans 
regarded the US to be a priority candidate for Korea's FTA partner.
These issues included the outcome o f a trial o f  two US servicemen involved in an accident which
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In light of the unsettled nature of the US-Korea alliance in Roh’s term, the 
success of the negotiations of the US-Korea bilateral FTA assumed an importance that 
transcended purely economic issues. A successful negotiation of an agreement and its 
subsequent ratification by the US Congress and the Korean NA would be a concrete 
manifestation of the overall health of the relationship. The decision to move forward 
with the Korea-US FTA negotiations illustrated that both governments were committed 
to a stronger and mature bilateral relationship (Klinger and Kim 2007; Cheong 2004a: 
15-16; Lim 2006).
But why was the US chosen? Many have attempted to offer answers, such as 
Kim (2007a), Schott et al., (2006), Jackson (2006), Lim (2006) and Lee and Lee 
(2005a). Many of these authors utilised primarily systemic or statist approaches in 
interpreting the Korea-US FTA. The analyses provided by these scholars are useful for 
the reason (once we exclude the societal approach) that the systemic approach helps us 
to see the situation from the outside in, whereas the statist approach offers a view from 
the inside out. However, once the societal approach is considered, we see that their 
analyses tend to neglect certain factors that played demonstrably important roles (i.e. 
key domestic stakeholders).
However, this thesis argues that domestic stakeholders played a defining role in 
the FTA and therefore shall argue that the societal approach best helps to answer the 
question; why the US?
Of the analysts listed above, only Lim does not rely heavily on the systemic 
approach, all of the others have a large dose of this approach in their interpretations. 
And while this approach does help to explain some of the factors, it does not explain 
other, equally important factors. Schott, Bradford and Moll (2006) extol the virtues of a 
spillover into broader regional and economic/political relations; an FTA would deepen 
already strong commercial ties and reinforce their political commitment to work 
cooperatively to deal with the security challenges in the region. Jackson (2006) waxes 
on about political aims. Choi (2006a: 3) speaks of exogenous factors; the cost of being 
excluded from the proliferation of FTAs and enhancing competitiveness. Lee and Lee 
(2005) speak of Korea enhancing its regional position. Kim (2007a) mentions further
resulted in the deaths o f two schoolgirls, the decisions by the Pentagon to move all US forces stationed in Korea 
south o f the Han River and to remove the second infantry division permanently out o f  Korea, and a disagreement 
between the two governments over the appropriate timing o f transfer o f  "wartime operational control’ over Korean 
forces to the Korean government.
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positive spillover effects also on broader bilateral relations; specifically that the US 
remain a strategic and economic counterbalance to China and Japan while producing a 
better climate for improving North-South relations.
Some Korean experts have also interpreted the Korea-US FT A using the 
systemic approach; arguing that the US wanted an FT A with Korea for international 
politics/security reasons rather than economic reasons. Prof. Lee Hye-young at Hanshin 
University, policy planning director of the Korean ‘Alliance Against the Korea-US 
FTA’ insisted that “there is not a single country with an FTA with the US that has 
strong military power.” The US tries to build economic and military/security bases 
through FTAs with less significant countries in each region (Lee 2006b: 10; 2006c: 6).
In a similar vein, Cheung Tae-in, the former Secretary of the National Economy 
contended, “We are strong in manufacturing as well, but the US can lead the agreement 
to their advantage through tariffs or trade barriers. Furthermore the US intention that 
they try to besiege China by including us in the FTA circle that would, by default, assist 
a solid US-Japan alliance is to plain to see1 V”
Finally, a compensatory approach (as a subset to the systemic approach) 
explains that the decision to initiate an FTA with the US was made with a view to 
managing the Korea-US relationship (i.e. to ‘compensate’ the US for the strains in the 
Korea-US relationship). Later in his presidency, Roh acknowledged that the North 
Korean problem had created a fissure in the Korea-US alliance and argued that bilateral 
economic ties would have to be strengthened to compensate for strained security 
relations12. However, the diagnosis and treatment for the anxieties over national security 
were handled quite differently between conservatives and liberals. Many conservatives 
believed that the Korea-US FTA would strengthen the alliance (Lee and Lee 2005a: 
138-146). But that leaves an important question unanswered; why did President Roh, 
whom they considered to be anti-American, support the Korea-US FTA? His anti- 
American stance and support for the Korea-US FTA would seem mutually exclusive.
However, many liberals criticised President Roh for initiating the development 
of the Korea-US FTA in the first place (Lee 2006d: 20-21; Choi 2007: 5-7). They
11 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (10/03/2006).
See Lee Joo-young, ‘Controversy over President Roh's motive to push for KORUS FTA negotiations,’ 
The Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (08/08/2006). The Blue House (presidential mansion) denied the story and 
threatened to take legal action against the newspaper. This was a rather odd response given that the article was a fairly 
straightforward piece based on interviews with unnamed ruling-party lawmakers. The Blue House subsequently took 
no legal action.
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believed the Korea—US FTA would perpetuate economic and military dependence on 
the US (see below). However, those who believed President Roh's good intentions 
interpreted it as part of his strategy to affect a compromise over the North Korean 
nuclear issue with the US.
In other words, the Korea-US FTA would bring advantages to the US and in 
return the US could lighten its hard-line policy against North Korea. From the liberal 
point of view, North Korean nuclear development was the result of a perceived US 
threat and the reason why the nuclear issue remained unresolved was due to this same 
hard-line US policy. Therefore, to encourage the US to ease its hard-line policy against 
North Korea, Korea should offer the US something to ‘sweeten the pie’, so to speak.
One manner of sweetening the pie was the dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq when war 
broke out. The other emolument that Korea could offer was a bilateral FTA.
While these explanations provide a geo-political context to help map out the 
systemic approach, they fail to address the movements of Korea’s domestic tectonics 
that also pushed for an FTA with the US, factors that were equally important.
At the same time, each of the analysts listed adopted, to varying degrees, a 
statist approach in helping to interpret the Korea-US FTA. And, at first blush, the statist 
approach does seem to deal articulately with many of the issues that are left unresolved 
when using a purely internationalist approach. A recurring theme under this approach is 
the economic factor. Schott et al., (2006) note that FDI, knock on improvements 
(locking in domestic reforms) and creating and setting a regional gold standard for an 
Asian financial hub were all relevant to the decision of choosing the US as an FTA 
partner. Jackson (2006) and Choi (2006) also mention economic factors; the evolution 
necessary for structural change in Korean industry and addressing polarisation. As did 
Lee and Lee (2005a) access to the US market was seen as a source of quality investment 
and a valuable transfer of technology.
173
Chapter Five
Identification of the Key Domestic Stakeholders 
Dominance of MOFA T
However, decisions on the development of a Korea-US FTA were possible 
only because MOFAT successfully persuaded the President in favour. The MOFAT 
framed the Korea-US FTA as an economic issue13 rather than a security issue, whereas 
the Korea-US relationship was viewed almost exclusively as a security issue. Thus 
creating a safe conceptual space by which discussions and policy-making decisions for 
a Korea-US FTA were possible as strong anti-American security issues were 
excluded14. The implicit corollary to this, given the outcome, was that discussions 
regarding the FTA with the US were held exclusively between the president and the 
MOFAT. This is in fact backed up by some important members of the administration. 
According to Jeong Tae-in, former Presidential Secretary for National Economy, until 
May 2005 when he left the Blue House (Presidential Residence) “no report on the 
Korea-US FTA was made to National Economic Advisory Council and International 
Economy Committee,” the highest level advisory organisations for extemal/internal 
economic policies. He also asserted that as far as he knew, there was no discussion on 
the Korea-US FTA in the ‘National Security Council (NSC)' or ‘Presidential 
Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative', both of which advise the 
president on foreign policy issues. He further criticised that the MOFAT bypassed the 
formal policy-making procedures and privately persuaded President Roh to sanction an 
FTA with the US15.
This situation -  ostensibly -  tends to favour a statist approach in that the FTA 
was obviously a deal favoured by MOFAT and it was MOFAT which helped to 
persuade the President to give the Korea-US FTA the green light.
The societal approach, however, seems to have attracted few adherents and yet 
it is by using this approach while analysing data provided in interviews that the answer 
to our question becomes less blurred around the edges. This thesis examines the role the
This is also shown in the comment made by President Roh, to 'negotiate by thoroughly focusing on the 
actual profit' (at the Cabinet Council on March 16th). In particular, President Roh said, ‘There are those who put too 
much emphasis on political aspects of FTAs, however no discussion is needed except for economic issues.’ He also 
told his Cabinet to ‘focus solely on economic profit; take it if it is profitable, otherwise no negotiations are needed’ 
(E-daily 13/03/2007).
Jeong Tae-in, ‘If you do not know yourself and your enemy, you will always fail,’ speech at the NA, the 
Korea-US FTA Special Committee Session (Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper 24/04/2006).
15 ‘Korea-US FTA should not happen.' (Maeil Daily Newspaper 03/04/2006).
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FKI led coalition played in getting the Korea-US FTA ball rolling.
In cahoots -  the MOFA T and the FKI
A societal approach to interpreting the choice of the US as an FTA partner has 
already been partly explored in Chapter Four and one that is of particular importance to 
this thesis. The FKI was an important player during the agenda setting phase of all 
Korean FTAs. And so they were here. Their relationship with MOFAT had taken 
something of a battering during the Korea-Japan FTA and, subsequently, they were 
looking at ways of mending their mutual relationship16. This is not to say that the 
relationship was irreparably damaged, far from it but what had happened was that the 
FKI led coalition -  during the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations -  had left the MOFAT 
somewhat wary of large corporations’ intentions regarding further FTAs17. Furthermore, 
the actual political climate gave these same corporations pause for concern. President 
Roh’s ‘independent’ streak (or as some might say, his mild ‘anti-Americanism18’) and 
its manifestation in public policy alerted the corporations to the possibility that 
increasing the political distance between the two countries (Korea and the US) could 
manifest itself in economic distance. A scenario they most certainly did not want to see 
come about (Kim 2006a: 16). However, in adversity lies opportunity. Given the 
president’s political stance, a direct approach from the FKI would probably not have 
yielded immediate or impressive results19. Combined with the fact that the corporations 
felt that they had to resolve some outstanding issues concerning the MOFAT20 and 
future FTAs and one could almost feel that fortune itself took a hand in directing the 
route they were to take. The FKI21 took their concerns directly to the MOFAT, with 
whom they maintained direct contact despite the Korea-Japan FTA debacle. The FKI’s 
approach consisted of advising strongly in favor of an FTA with the US and, given the
Interview conducted with Hug Chan-guk, Director o f Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, February 28th, 2007.
Interview conducted with Park Dong-sung, Director in KCCI, Seoul, February 29th, 2007.
18 Hong (2006: 50-51).
Interview conducted with Jeong Tae-in (Hankyorech Daily Newspaper 29/03/2006).
Interview conducted with Kim Sung-hyun, senior researcher in Korea International Trade Association 
(KITA), Seoul, February 25th, 2007; Interview conducted with Kim Tae-wan, manager o f Economic Research 
Department in SERI, Seoul, March 3rd, 2007.
Interviews conducted with Chang Kuk-hyun, former president o f  the Washington Office o f the FKI 
(retired in March 2009), Seoul, August 8th, 2009. He stated that the FKI and the Korean government (in particular, 
MOFAT) had closely collaborated in initiating the Korea-US FTA.
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trade minister's favourable stance regarding FTAs , they were pushing a door that was, 
if not completely open, at least already slightly ajar. The FKI had many former policy 
makers as members and deliberately formed close ties with the current policy makers23. 
Traditionally, many bureaucrats became business leaders as they progressed along their 
career ladders in Korea. This situation has created an identifiable community among 
bureaucrats and business leaders, the result being that the two groups tend to have easy 
access to one another (Miner 1997b: 656). Recently, for example, the former trade 
minister, Kim Hyun-chong became the chief executive officer (CEO) of Samsung 
Electronics in March 2009. This “revolving door” type of hiring policy adopted by 
major corporations highlights the intimate relationship between the upper echelons of 
the business community and the Korea government.
From late 2004 to early 2005, the FKI communicated their preference for an 
FTA to the MOFAT's trade minister through advisory, consultative, and collaborative 
commissions. This process was actually provided for under the “Provisions on the 
Procedures of FTA Ratification” (a presidential decree) where an FTA non­
governmental consultancy was established, composed of representatives from industries 
and academic circles. Despite their previous infidelity, once they had collaborated with 
the MOFAT over what route a fliture FTA might take24, the trade minister, Kim Hyun- 
chong, felt it was appropriate to bring the idea of an FTA with the US to the president.
The question is though, why did President Roh, given his political proclivities, 
agree with his trade minister even though this was to result in him losing support from 
the agricultural and labour sectors? First, even though President Roh was widely viewed 
as “anti-”American politically speaking, he has been a strong supporter of FTAs. For 
example, he actively supported the Korea-Chile FTA. Secondly, he arguably viewed the 
FTA with the US as a way of strengthening the Korean economy and thus, 
paradoxically, allowing him to distance Korea from the US politically (Lee 2008: 15;
Yeonguhoe 2007). The president became enamoured with the idea of an FTA with the 
US so much so that he was to become one of its most ardent supporters25. It is at this
Interviews conducted with Park Myung-jae, Former Minister o f  Public Administration and Security 
(MOPAS), Seoul, August 7th, 2009.
23 The government accepted 90 percent o f  the FKI’s policy suggestions since the 1990s (Shatter, 1994: 25). 
Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I was 
accompanied by Kim Gi-ju, former director o f  administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21th, 2009.
Jeong Tae-in, guest column in the Hankyorech Daily Newspaper (10/04/2006).
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point where the issue is elevated from a societal approach to that of a combination of 
statist/systemic approaches.
Economic debates
According to the proponents of the Korea-US FT A, expected benefits for 
Korea included preferential access to the US market and improvement in economic 
efficiency, especially in the service sector (McDaniel and Fox 2001). Korean officials 
extolled the catalytic effect that adherence to the disciplines of a ‘gold standard’ FTA 
with the US could have not only on the competitiveness of the Korean economy, but 
could also yield a more open and competitive domestic market (Schott et al., 206: 2). In 
addition, the FTA could play an important role in acting as a catalyst for ongoing 
domestic reforms (Choi 2006a: 3-4; Lee and Lee 2005a: 114—118). The FTA with a 
liberalised investment regime and service trade would unleash higher efficiency and 
productivities, generating faster growth for Korean economies (Choi 2006a: 4). 
Furthermore, an FTA with the US was predicted to produce significant economic 
benefits for the Korean economy, increasing Korea’s real GDP by as much as 2 percent, 
establishing a foundation for achieving a per capita income as high as $30,000, boosting 
exports to the US by 15 percent, and creating 100,000 new jobs26. The International 
Trade Commission (ITC) showed that Korea's expected benefit would be equivalent to 
0.7 percent of its GDP27.
Choi (2006a) , minister for economic affairs at the embassy of Korea in 
Washington, made many similar points, such as; that an FTA between Korea and the 
US would contribute significantly to bilateral trade; increase economic welfare and 
employment; provide more secure market access; lock in a variety of domestic reforms; 
generate greater efficiency, productivity, and economic growth, possibly motivating 
other countries to pursue FTAs with Korea and the US; allow Korea to seek longer 
implementation periods for vulnerable sectors, particularly agriculture and services; and 
develop domestic programs for adjustment assistance. Therefore, it would only be
Speech by Assistant US Trade Representative Wendy Cutler to the American Chamber o f Commerce in 
Seoul March 7th, 2006.
US International Trade Commission (USITC), US-Korea FTA: ‘The Economic Impact o f  Establishing a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the US and the Republic o f  Korea,’ (Washington, DC: USITC, 2001).
Choi Seok-young (2006) Testimony before the US International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., 
April 20th, http: //keia.org/4-1-fta.html.
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natural for Korea to choose the US as an FTA partner, which is the world’s most 
advanced economy. Furthermore, it would enable Korea to connect at all levels with the 
US economy, providing a much needed stimulus to accelerate economic reform and 
upgrade the economic and social systems.
However, many of these arguments have been challenged by opponents. A 
number of studies of a possible Korea-US FTA were carried out; Kiyota and Stem 
2007; Lee and Lee 2005a; Choi and Schott 2004, 2001; Mckibbin et al., 2001; Cheong 
and Wang 1999. These studies relied on CGE models, which provide an economy wide 
framework for analysis that takes into account the interdependencies that exist both 
within and between countries. Except for Lee and Lee (2005), in all studies29, the 
welfare effects of a Korea-US FTA on the US are very small, ranging from 0.01 percent 
of GDP to 0.23 percent of GDP for complete bilateral tariff removal and from 0.07 
percent to 0.13 percent of GDP with allowance for an increase in the capital stock 
(Kiyota and Stem 2007: 18).
For Korea to make a significant gain from preferential market access under an 
FTA, the difference between the counterparty's tariff rates applied to FTA-signatories 
and non-signatories has to be large, as in such countries as China. As the US average 
tariff rate was already quite low, at approximately 2.5 percent, Korea’s expected gain 
from preferential access to the US market was likely to be small. By contrast, because 
Korea’s average tariff rate was three times (7.7 percent) as high as that of the US, the 
US gain from preferential access to the Korean market were likely to be large. In fact, 
the KIEP estimated that in the medium- to long-term, Korean exports to the US would 
increase by $7.1 billion while the US exports to Korea would rise by $12.2 billion (Lee 
and Lee 2005a: 116). In the US there are some sectors such as textiles, sugar, and dairy 
products where high import tariffs30 are imposed to protect domestic producers. 
However, Korea’s prospects of making a significant gain in these sectors are rather
Cheong and Wang estimated (1999) that Korea's welfare would increase by $4.8 billion (1.7 percent o f  
GDP) and US welfare would increase by $3.7 billion (0.7 percent). McDaniel and Fox (2001) expected that US 
economic welfare would increase by $19.6 billion (0.23 percent o f GDP) and Korean economic welfare would 
increase by $3.9 billion (0.69 percent o f GDP). Choi and Schott (2004, 2001) calculated that Korea's economic 
welfare would rise by $4.1 billion (0.91 percent o f GDP) or $10.9 billion (2.41 percent o f GDP) in the two scenarios. 
The results are considerably smaller when agricultural liberalisation is excluded. US economic welfare would rise by 
$3.8 billion (0.03 percent o f  GDP) or $8.9 billion (0.13 percent o f  GDP). The Korea-US FTA is shown to increase 
Korea's economic welfare by $9.28 billion (1.26 percent o f  GDP), with $4.48 billion coming from the bilateral 
removal o f  manufactures barriers and $5.46 billion from bilateral removal o f the services barriers. US economic 
welfare is increased by $25.12 billion (0.14 percent o f GDP), with $7.27 billion coming from elimination of 
manufactures tariffs and $19.20 billion from elimination o f services barriers (Kiyota and Stem 2007: 55).
The US applies a weighted average tariff o f 13.1 percent textile and apparels (Choi 2006a: 6).
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bleak for several reasons.
First of all, these heavily protected sectors in the US tend to have strong 
political clout, and these vested interests are unlikely to make concessions unless they 
are amply compensated for their expected losses, as happened in other US FTAs (e.g. 
the Australia-US FTA)31. Second, restrictive rules of origin -  such as ‘yarn forward' in 
textiles -  are likely to prevent Korea from greatly increasing its exports to the US even 
after signing the FTA (see below). Third, The Korean government flagged its intention 
to discuss a number of controversial issues with the US32. Some of them were related to 
anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD), issues close to the heart of the 
Korean government (Lim 2006: 6). However, The US has never included any new 
alterations in these areas in any FTA to date. Furthermore, the TPA legislation clearly 
notes that the US Trade Representative (USTR) had no mandate to negotiate on these 
issues33.
In sum, the Korea-US FTA is unJikely to raise Korea’s share of the US market 
by a significant amount from its current level of 2.6 percent. General efficiency gain 
from the FTA is more likely, but this effect should not be exaggerated. According to the 
previously mentioned KIEP study (2004), Korea’s expected overall benefit from the 
FTA would amount to 1.99 percent of its GDP ‘over the long term’-not each year. 
Although this is not an insignificant figure, it is by no means large and is quite sensitive 
to the underlying assumptions of the estimation model.
The overall economic benefit from an FTA with US was a rather disappointing 
figure in view of the fact that the CGE models used in these studies assume costless 
adjustment. Furthermore, Korea’s agricultural output was projected to decline by $8.8 
billion if all tariffs on agricultural products, including rice, were abolished immediately 
(Lee 2005 et al., 1-5). The KREI (2006) allowed for less drastic adjustments and 
assumed that rice would be excluded and tariffs on major commodities to be only 
partially reduced. Even in this case, however, total agricultural production would 
decrease by almost $1 billion, while Korea’s import of agricultural products would
For example, the U S’s pharmaceutical research and manufacture o f America (PHRMA) lobbied US trade 
negotiators to seek Australian government commitments to refrain from trade distorting or discriminatory price 
controls. For further details, see. Flarvey (2004) 'Patents, pills and politics: the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme,’ Australian Health Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 218-226.
E.g. goods made in the North Korean Kaesong industrial complex as 'made in Korea,’ and to include 
Korea in the US visa waiver programme.
‘KOREA-US FTA Negotiations: Steady Progress, Challenges Still Ahead,’ February 2nd, 2007, 
http://www.dynamic-korea.com/opinion/view_opinion.php?keyword=visa&main=FTC&sub=&uid=200700030481.
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increase by $1.9-3.2 billion, and the employment within the agricultural sector would 
decrease by 70,000 to 140,000. Such adjustments would involve significant 
restructuring costs (Kim 2006b: 200).
More fundamentally, Korea's welfare gains derive primarily from allocative 
efficiency effects, related to reforms Korea undertakes; whereas the US welfare gains 
come from increased export opportunities in the Korean market34. This asymmetry 
makes it difficult for the two sides to balance their respective gains, unless the US
• • • • l  cagrees to make major concessions such as taking rice off the table .
In sum, Korea’s expected benefits from a Korea-US FTA might not be as large 
as claimed by its proponents. Moreover, the proposed FTA may have the effect of 
introducing new problems in some sectors. For example; the service sector accounts 
for around 55 percent of Korea’s GDP in 2004 (Lee 2006a: 188). According to 
KIEP's Study (2004), Korea was far behind the US in terms of labour productivity in 
every sector except in the electricity, gas and water service. This inferiority could 
negatively impact Korea’s manufacturing industry. Korea’s average applied 
agricultural tariffs were circa 50 percent with several tariff peaks, resulting in 
vulnerability to liberalisation. Korea allowed minimum market access (MMA) for 
rice through the use of quotas (Manyin 2006: 14). In December 2004, US and Korean 
officials announced an agreement under which Korea would double the amount of 
rice it imports over the next 10 years and provide guaranteed access for 50,000 metric 
tons (MT) of US rice each year (Manyin 2006: 14). After much debate, this 
agreement was ratified by the NA. Now, to sign a bilateral free trade agreement, 
Korea and the US must liberalise “substantially all” trade between the two countries 
under GATT/WTO Article 24 (Yang 2008: 130; Holwill and Andel 2006: 4). 
Supporters of the Korea-US FTA were keen to focus on the long-term benefits but 
were also willing to admit that in the short-term some restructuring would be 
necessary. Opponents, on the other hand, focused on the short-term impact on 
Korean industry and were not so sanguine about the long-term prospects. These 
distributional consequences and the perception of the FTA as a process of
For details, see Jeffrey J. Schott. Scott C. Bradford, and Thomas Moll, ‘Negotiating the Korea-US Free 
Trade Agreement,7 Policy Briefs in International Economics Number PB06-4 (Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, June 2006: 7).
There is some economic logic to taking rice off the table as its production is heavily subsidised in the US 
See Schott et al, (2006).
180
Chapter Five
globalisation help define the domestic stakeholders who were to take part in the FTA 
process. Which brings us to the question, who are the domestic stakeholders?
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Supporters and opponents
Inevitably, there were both supporters and opponents of the Korea-US FTA. 
Indeed it would probably be fair to say that the Korea-US FTA has been the most 
controversial to date and, as a corollary to this, has attracted the attention of more of the 
Korean public, groups and concerned parties than any other FTA to date (Choi 2006a:
5; Jackson 2006: 4-5). It is therefore doubly necessary to elucidate the groups and their 
rationales so as to distinguish between the various strains of support and opposition that 
existed (and are still extant). Despite the plethora of involved parties there is a simple 
dividing line which, at risk of stating the obvious, is as simple as those who support and 
those who oppose the trade agreement. A defining characteristic of those who supported 
the FTA (i.e. key government bodies, liberal reformers, pro-American conservatives, 
and FKI led exporters) was that of looking at the FTA through the lenses of economic 
benefit. For example, the US has the largest economy in the world and access to this 
market was considered an El Dorado by many. On the political front, a spill-over effect 
of an FTA with the US would help to reinforce the Korea-US alliance. Opponents (e.g. 
fanning sector, labour unions, film-makers & anti-globalisationists and the 
pharmaceutical industry) also looked to economic factors but rather instead focused on 
the negative aspects such as the destruction of Korea’s agricultural sector and the 
struggle that less competitive industries would face. We shall begin by looking at the 
FTA’s supporters.
Supporters of Korea-US FTA 
Supporting Rationales
Korea-US FTA supporters display many of the following characteristics. 
Firstly, they have a positive stance towards the opening of markets. They believe the 
only way for Korea to survive as a trading country (that has over 70 percent of reliance 
on trade), is to actively participate and compete in the global market. They believe that 
FTA policy would enhance business efficiency and bring more profit. Secondly, they 
believe an FTA with the US would result in the increase of competitive power. 
Furthermore, being the first country in East Asia to have an FTA with the US would
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create expectations of US market advantages and increased US market share of Korean 
products (Na et al., 2006: 23-24). Thirdly, they believe the Korea-US FTA would 
strengthen the Korea-US alliance and have a positive influence on Korea’s national 
security (Cheung 2006: 33-37). Fourthly, it might also lift Korea’s status in East Asian 
regional economic partnerships.
Key government bodies
As discussed in the previous two chapters, the MOFAT had an important role to 
play in supporting FT As, including the Korea-US FTA. Other government bodies in 
support were MOCIE. Significantly, as a reaction to the active public opposition 
generated by those who opposed the Korea-US, a government body, called the ‘Korea- 
US FTA Supporting Committee,' (KORUSSC) was formed by the government and 
financed using public funds36 in order to help counteract the effects that groups such as 
the KoA generated (see below). The chairman was a former Minister for Economy; 
committee members have included government officials, business leaders from Korean 
industry and government funded research institutions. The Committee focuses on 
promoting the Korea-US FTA, yet it also delivers industry positions to the negotiation 
team and controls the activities of other supporting groups such as a group of five 
leading Korean industry organisations led by the FKI, KFSMB, KEF, KIT A and KCCI.
Liberal Reformers
Although Korea achieved a Gross National Income (GNI) of $10,000 in the mid 
1990s and became an OECD member, the 1997 financial crisis caused an economic 
meltdown. Korea eventually overcame this in the early 2000s and reached a GNI of 
almost $20,000 (Sin 2006: 12). Yet many Koreans do not consider Korea to be an 
economically developed country (Yoo 2007: 103-105), and so they ask; how can Korea 
reach the threshold of developed countries? This is, without a doubt, one of the most 
important questions that many Koreans ask today. The answer to this question, with a
The committee was set up August 1 st, 2006, comprising seven key members from private sectors and 
seven from government ministries (further details; see footnote 16 in Chapter Three).
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risk of oversimplification, has two sides: one side emphasises the re-distribution of 
already existing wealth while opposing globalisation, whereas the other side emphasises 
continued growth and supports economic globalisation specifically. If the former can be 
called liberal nationalism, the latter can be called liberal reformism (Kim 2005a: 30-35). 
The most active supporters of the Korea-US FTA in Korea are liberal reformers.
Liberal reformers believe that advancing the Korean economy depends on 
increases in economic efficiency gained from promoting competition and structural 
reform via open markets37. They firmly believe that protectionism, based on 
government intervention in the national economy, which is a legacy of government-led 
economic development, and mercantilist foreign trade custom, cannot lead to successful 
global competition. Liberal reformers have a tendency to argue that a Korea-US FTA 
would present a great opportunity to advance Korean economic institutions and upgrade 
economic structures. They assert that opening markets is part of a global trend and that 
‘with a Korea-US FTA, opening and reform are the keys to opening doors for the future 
of Korea38’.
Liberal refonners abound in Korean society. A considerable amount of them 
are economists working in the likes of universities, economic research institutes, private 
businesses, etc. The majority of public servants in government ministries and offices of 
economy also think positively about opening markets, although they are not expressive 
on reforms in government regulation (Cheong 2005b: 30). Of course the MOAF, which 
manages agriculture, is an exception. Economic research organisations led by the 
government, including the KIEP, are generally liberal reformers. Needles to say, the 
MOFAT also actively supports opening markets. Liberal reformers also tended to share 
a similar outlook with FKI (Kim 2006e: 30).
Exporters or FKI led exporters
The US, next to China, is Korea’s second most important trade partner. In 2005, 
Korea exported $41.3billion in goods and services to the US and imported $30.6 billion
The liberal reformers’ views on supporting the Korea-US FTA are well presented in Cheong’s (2006) 
'Debate on the Korea-US FTA: What is the Truth'?'
38 Choi (2006a) and Park (2006), representative liberal reformers, suggest three reasons for an FTA: 'for the 
security o f the Korean peninsula, for new motivation for economic growth and for reform from the inside.' (Chosun 
Daily Newspaper 27/11/ 2006).
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worth (Lim 2006: 9). Hence Korea gained a large $10.7 billion trade surplus with the 
US. Such trade imbalances have stirred US discontent with Korea's economic policies 
and consequently the US has requested the opening of Korean markets to resolve this 
imbalance (e.g. automotive trade39). An important question to ask at this juncture would 
be what kind of impact would a Korea-US FTA have on trade between the two 
countries? Studies (Cutler 2006; Winder 2006: 15-26; Lee and Lee 2005a: 106—135) in 
the US and Korea have shown that trade would increase, but US exports to Korea would 
increase by a larger amount and therefore the trade imbalance would significantly 
improve (Lee and Lee 2005a: 109-112). However, such predictions are dependent on 
the exact content of the agreement.
One commonly predicted aspect is that the US would increase its export in 
agricultural products and services while Korea would do so in industrial products -  
especially cars, auto-parts, textiles and clothes. Based on these assumptions, the 
delineation between supporters and opponents becomes more obvious. Inevitably the 
large corporation and export orientated industry representative groups had much to say 
in favour of a possible Korea-US FTA.
The FKI stated that;
“the Korea-US FTA will increase trade between two countries and help our businesses to 
enter the US market, which is the largest market in the world and we will do our best to 
strengthen our competitive power through technology and management reform to make Korea 
one of the strongest, a developed country in the world40.”
The KIT A supported the FKI in its statement;
“FTA with US will raise competitive power of our products in the US market, which will help 
our exports to the US and will lead to an increase in the national income and unemployment.
It will be a stepping stone for us to become an advanced country through the globalisation of 
our economy41.”
The KCCI and KEF respectively stressed in its official comment;
For further details, see Manyin (2006> 1South Korea-US Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and 
Prospects for a FTA CRS Report for Congress, 15-17.
40 FKI (2006) Korea-US FTA, FKI Issue Report, February 4th, 2006.
41 Korea Herald (04/02/2006).
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“Korea-US FTA should be considered and approached on the level of national interest and 
beyond the interest of specific industries or groups; all businesses and economic bodies 
should cooperate to make our economy advanced and revitalised and this agreement will be a 
big help to our med/long term economic development and after this agreement, hopefully we 
will develop more FT As with many other countries. The government should establish 
supporting measures for agricultural industry and other relatively weak industries in this 
agreement42.”
FTA supporters are found in the export industry sector. However, the US has, 
on average, a very low tariff rate and so much of what Korean exporters wanted to 
achieve from the Korea-US FTA was related to NTBs. According to research done by 
the FKI, Korean businesses wanted to restructure NTBs that had a negative influence on 
Korean exported goods, such as those associated with difficulties in customs inspections, 
trade remedies, technology barriers, environment regulations and distribution of goods43. 
Table 5.2 displays the expectations that Korean industries had of the Korea-US FTA.
Table 5.2: Korea-US FTA Effect/Influences and Industry Standpoints by Industry
Industry Korea-US FTA Effect/Influence and Industry Standpoint
Automobiles
— Secured steady export market, reduced trade war.
-  Insignificant export increase effect due to tariff removal (2.5 percent).
— Market share of US automobile will increase when removing domestic tariff.
-  Korea-US FTA is necessary.
Electronics
-  Export increase in high end electronic products such as digital TVs expected.
-  Cellular phone and semiconductors are already exported without tariff.
-  Some items including electronic medical devices and measuring devices will have disadvantage.
-  Trade Remedy System including AD and CVD should be improved.
-  Welcome Korea—US FTA.
Machinery
— Investment vitalisation expected.
-  Cost reduction by more chances of entering US market and drop of import price of raw materials 
and parts.
— Import control including AD Duty System and technology barrier is in effect
-  Some cutting-edge products might have disadvantage, but a long tariff grace period should be 
secured.
Steel
— Non—tariff export, no direct effect from FTA.
-  US AD should be improved.
Textiles
-  Export increase expected when US tariff removed.
-  Yam Forward, non-tariff barrier, should be improved.
-  Against introducing US special safeguard system for textiles.
-  Special exception on outward processing of Gaeseong Industrial Complex needed.
Petrochemical
-  Unlikely to expect export increase, increase of high value added product import expected.
-  Protection for products under development or at initial phase of commercialisation needed.
-  No tariff should be applied to basic raw materials.
Fine
Chemistry
-  Increase of export of some items with high US tariff rate of 6.5percent expected.
-  Import of basic raw materials, medicine and cosmetics might increase.
-  Considering our competitive power is inferior, protection for domestic businesses should be 
maximised.
Maeil Business Daily Newspaper (04/02/2006).
43 The FKI (2006); Lee Hee-beom, at a conference held by the KITA, delivered the message as a co-chairman of 
‘FTA Industry Alliance' to the government that for successful settlement of the Korea-US FTA, US Trade Remedy 
System should be improved and it can be understood in this context. He pointed out that ‘for the past 25 years, 
$37.3 billion, which holds 6.8 percent of Korean export to the US, was restricted by AD and CVD and that to 
experience the effect of export increase to US, rationalisation of the Trade Remedy System is essential,’ (Seoul 
Daily Newspaper 02/07/2006).
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-  Mutual authorisation on various test evaluation criteria needed.
S h o es
— Increase of functional shoes export expected.
-  Moderation of criteria for confirming the place of origin, products manufactured in Gaeseong 
Industrial Complex confirmed as domestic products.
H ea v y
E lec tr ic
E q u ip m e n t
— Export will increase, but import of large volume generators will also increase
-  Supports the Korea-US FTA.
* Source: “Korea-US FT A, FKI Issue Paper, " No.61 (October 25lh, 2006).
Pro-American Conservatives
Many Korea-US FTA supporters are pro-American conservatives and many of 
these pro-American conservatives are also right-wing nationalists. Their basic ideology 
is a strong hostility towards North Korea and a strong confidence in the Korea-US 
alliance. There are various groups within this category. For example, the Retired 
Colonel Association is an organisation of retired colonels who consider themselves 
right-wing conservatives with strong representational powers. Under the name of the 
National Movement Headquarters, they frequently remonstrate against the North 
Korean government and any displays of Korean government tolerance of the North 
Korean regime (Roh 2007: 149).
More moderate right-wing Christian organisations, such as the Korean 
Christian Movement Council can be included in this category, along with the New 
Right, the Liberty Union and the Free Citizens' Alliance of Korea. The National 
Convention to Support the Korea-US FTA was organised by these same groups and 
reflects their views and stance towards the FTA. Pastor Seo Gyeong-seok, at the 
convention on July 12th, 2006, asserted that Korea-US FTA opponents are against it 
“because it will make the alliance between the two countries more solid44. They are 
against it because of their anti-American sentiment.” Park Ge-un, chairman of the 
Korea-America Friendship Society (KAFS), said, “the reason why we support the 
Korea-US FTA is that Kim Jeong-il and pro-North Korean left-wing groups who 
follow him were against it45.” Jae Seong-ho (Professor at Chung-Ang University), co­
representative of national union of New Right said, “the Korea-US FTA is not about 
ideology or conflict between left and right; it is essential in strengthening our country’s
Dong-A Daily Newspaper (13/07/2006).
Ohmy On-Line Daily Newspaper (12/07/2006).
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competitive power in this era of globalisation46.” Hong Jin-pyo, secretary-general of 
Liberty Union (LU), also said, “the FTA will maximise consumer profit in terms of 
lowering prices and increasing exports to US47.” This would suggest that for some, at 
least, the conflict within Korean society over the Korea-US FTA is viewed from a pro- 
and anti-American dichotomy. The actual size of these groups is small when compared 
to opponent groups in terms members. Not surprisingly, these pro-American groups 
find it difficult to mobilise on an effective scale for public demonstrations in support of 
the Korea-US FTA in comparison with the KoA. However, their ability to ruminate 
publicly on this issue is not confined by their lack of numbers. The Korea-US FTA’s 
opponents, on the other hand, suffer from no such lack of numbers.
Opponents of Korea-US FTA 
Opposing Rationales
Opponents of the Korea-US FTA share many concerns48. First and foremost is 
their negative view concerning the opening of markets. They believe that opening 
markets will cause employment instability and income inequality (Go 2006: 85-86).
They also believe that Korean markets are already too open and that further opening 
would cause losses rather than gains. Secondly, an FTA with the US would create no 
practical benefits for Korean businesses (KoA 2006a: 6-10). Korean goods exported to 
the US are exported mostly with either very low tariffs or none at all; therefore it is 
quite unlikely that an FTA would contribute to an increase in exports. Rather, the 
Korea-US FTA might cause the opening of domestic markets in Korea to US 
businesses. This concern is clearly displayed in opinion polls conducted by the 
JoongAng Daily Newspaper (see Figure 5.1) and the Hankyoreh49. According to the 
opinion poll by the latter, 47.5 percent opposed the FTA while 40.5 percent supported it. 
Other opinion polls offered different results. Interestingly, opponents and supporters
Chosun Daily Newspaper (06/02/2006).
47 Maeil Business Daily Newspaper (07/07/2006).
The following two books effectively articulate the opponents' arguments against the Korea-US FTA: 
edited by the KoA (2006b) 'National Report on Korea-US FTA,” and Lee Hae-young (2006c) “Unfamiliar Colony, 
the Korea-US FTA
The Joins.com co-conducted the opinion poll with Media Daum and Research & Research on April 4th, 
2007. The poll was conducted nationwide, through telephone interview on 700 people aged over 19 and evenly 
allotted by location, gender and age (JoongAng Daily 10/04/2007).
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provided different opinion poll results. Generally speaking however, the FTA's 
opponents received higher support prior to the 4th round of negotiations. For example, 
42.6 percent in favour vs 45.4 percent for opponents-MBC poll published on 9th July 
2006, 30.1 percent in favour vs 49.5 percent for opponents, MOFE 26th September 2006. 
After the 4th round of negotiation, support for the FTA increases in the polls. For 
example, 50.6 percent vs 43.0 percent for supporters, SBS 15th February 2007, and 48.0 
percent vs 35.0 percent for supporters, MBC 4th April 2007.
The fact that the nature of the Korea-US FTA is a comprehensive and far- 
reaching trade agreement implies the presence of many organisations opposing the 
Korea-US FTA. Many groups and organisations in Korean society fear the Korea-US 
FTA could damage their livelihoods. At the same time, the fact that it is an FTA with the 
US is also very significant. Indeed, many of the organisations belonging to the Korean 
Alliance against the KorUS FTA (KoA) are anti-American liberals (i.e. they are against 
the tightening of relations with the US in any situation). This is displayed by the fact 
that many alliances were formed in response to the negotiation phase of the Korea-US 
FTA, yet not against the FT As which the Korean government has negotiated with other 
countries. A KoA slogan often repeated at anti-FTA demonstrations is; “Bring down 
American Imperialism, Free the country50.”
Figure 5.1: Which one will have benefit from Korea-U FTA?
55.4
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US Korea Benefit for Loss for Do not
Both Both Know
Opponents also believe that a stronger Korea-US alliance, as a result of the 
FTA, would be an obstacle to improving relationships with North Korea and China, 
which may in turn have a negative influence on Korea’s national security. They view 
Korea’s relationships with China and North Korea as more important (Hong 2006: 50;
Field research on March 8th and 14th, 2007, in Seoul. I observed several anti Korea-US FTA 
demonstrations organised by the KOA. At every demonstration anti-American, anti-WTO and anti-FTA placards and 
slogans were much in evidence. Anti-American sentiment was quite popular and was regularly seen as a natural 
corollary to globalisation.
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Kim 2005b: 266-267). Furthermore, opponents assess the Korea-US FTA as a 
backward step in the trend of regional economic cooperation recently developed in East 
Asia; and this would eventually have a negative impact on Korean economic 
development. They consider the FTA sought by the US as a way of keeping a close 
watch on China and an interference with the regional cooperation of East Asian 
countries. Finally, they assert that any Korea-US FTA will reflect the power imbalances 
that exist between the two countries, which will lead Korea into a disadvantaged trading 
position. Such assertions are not completely baseless; many are supported by the 
evaluation of experts regarding the core issues of the settlement (Park 2006: 35—40; Lee 
2006c: 30-35). For example, an opinion poll by the PSPD, one of key civil 
organisations, conducted on experts shows the total score of-4=25points (see Table 5.3) 
51 (highest +5 points, lowest -5; a 10 point range measuring the Korean government’s 
negotiating successes).
Table 5.3: Evaluation Scores on Korea-US FTA Issues by Category
Issue Average
Investor-State Dispute Settlement -4.37
Anti—Dumping Duty and Trade Remedy —4.37
Medicine/Medical devices -3.80
Intellectual property right -3.80
Tariff removal on agricultural goods -3.61
Screen quota -3.49
Inclusion/exclusion of the negotiation issues by the government -3.31
Procurement -3.15
US beef -3.10
Automobiles -2.87
Financial services -2.85
Gaeseong Industrial Complex -2.50
Broadcasting -2.03
Telecommunication -1.81
H-l B visa quota, etc. -1.74
* Source: People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (2007).
Based on the PSPD’s analysis - as the Korean government lacks negotiation
54 experts published a comprehensive evaluation report on the Korea-US FTA titled ‘Korea-US FTA is - 
4.25 points on average (highest +5; lowest -5).' No agreement in each issue received points above average (0 points) 
and the worst agreement was ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISD)’ (-4.37) in which Korea accepted US requests 
from the beginning of the negotiation. According to this report, 89 percent (48) of experts said ‘negotiation processes 
are not transparent.’ To a question whether Korea-US FTA is based on nation’s consent, all 54 experts answered ‘No’. 
Regarding settlement within the US TPA, 53 experts had negative views. Experts chose; ISD Settlement; Opening 
sensitive agricultural goods including rice; Trade Remedy (AD Duty-related negotiation); Drug price-related policy 
including Drug Price Rationalisation as 'the core issues of the Korea-US FTA’ (in order of importance). For a deal 
breaker, 72 percent (39) of experts chose the ISD Settlement followed by opening public services; opening market of 
agricultural goods including rice; and Trade Remedy. ‘Worst agreements’ were the ISD Settlement and the Trade 
Remedy-related agreement (both -4.37 points). Although no items received points above average of 0, which could be 
considered relatively high, the highest was -1.74 points for agreements related to ‘securing H-l B visa quota and 
mutual acceptance of professions’. This report was prepared by professors, lawyers and patent agents, who have been 
monitoring Korea-US FTA negotiation process (Hankook Daily Newspaper 08/03/2007).
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strength and experience - Korea seems to have little to gain from negotiations held 
within the US TPA schedule. The PSPD was not the only group that opposed the 
Korea-US FTA.
Agricultural sector
There is little doubt that the Korea-US FTA had the most potential out of all 
FTAs to damage the agricultural industry (Im 2007: 131-134; Choi 2006a: 5). Korean 
agriculture simply does not have the ability to compete internationally (Kim and Ahn 
2007: 95). In fact, agriculture is a great obstacle to opening Korean markets. Even in the 
UR, WTO agriculture negotiations and FTA negotiations with Chile, the Korean 
government was forced to minimise the opening of the agriculture/livestock markets. 
Although the government has provided large-scale financial support to appease 
farmers5z, proof that shows Korean agriculture has gained increased international 
competitiveness is yet to be found anywhere. Having gone through the process of 
opposing previous FTAs, fanners had become well organised and had developed 
alliances with several civil groups (as in the case of the FTA with Chile). A similar 
scene was to be repeated during the Korea-US FTA negotiations.
Table 5.4: Impact of Korea-US FTA on Korean Agriculture
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Agriculture Production A22,830(-3.7)
A18,003
(-3.2)
A ll,552 
(-1.9)
Agriculture Import
31,719
(155.4)
25,265
(123.8)
18,353
(89.9)
Agriculture Employment A142,816 (-6.2)
All 1,494 
M -9)
A71,505 
(-3.1)
Unit: 100 million, person, percent, Note: Figures in ( ) indicate increase/decrease rates compared to those
of 2001 compared to rates of 2000 in case of employment).
Scenario one: Rice excluded, 50percent tariff reduction on high rate tariff items, tariff removal on the rest items. 
Scenario two: Rice excluded, 30percent tariff reduction on high rate tariff items, 80percent tariff reduction on major 
sensitive items, tariff removal on the rest items.
Scenario three: Rice excluded, 1 Opercent tariff reduction on high rate tariff items, 50percent tariff reduction on major 
sensitive items, tariff removal on the rest items.
* Source: Kwon Oh-bok (2006b), “Current Situation of the KORUS-FTA and Its Impact on Korean Agriculture.” 
Journal of flood management, Vol. 13, No. 2.
Table 5.4 shows the impact of the FTA on Korean agriculture in scenarios 
suggested by Kwon Oh-bok, director of the FTA team at the KREI. Scenario one shows
It was $570 million dollars in 1994 and $1,190 billion dollars in 2003.
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the strongest impact of tariff removal on agricultural goods; scenario two the medium 
impact; and scenario three the lightest impact. According to these estimates, damage to 
Korean agriculture by the Korea-US FTA ranges between 1,200 billion and 2,300 
billion Won in production; and would reduce employment from 143,000 to 72,000. 
Imports of agricultural goods would increase from 1,800 billion to 3,200 billion Won. 
This is further evidence of why farmers were -  and still are -  strongly opposed to the 
Korea-US FTA.
The NFF compared the FTA to k‘a nuclear bomb” for Korean agriculture . The 
main framework for their opposing argument is as follows: firstly, once the FTA is 
settled between the two countries, US agricultural goods would pour in (Yun 2006: 
164—165). Secondly, as the tariffs on agricultural goods are gradually removed, the 
damage would snowball; thirdly, special benefits from the NACF would be removed; 
finally, US multinational grain manufacturers would take on the Korean agriculture 
market, a Goliath vs. David scenario that would flip the biblical parable on its head and 
see Goliath squash David. The settlement in agriculture54 excluded opening rice market 
whose annual production is 9.7 trillion Won; however the settlement was predicted to 
damage livestock, fruit, vegetable and grain industries significantly. Initial offers on 
tariff-sensitive agricultural goods were as follows: Tariff rate Quotas (TRQ) would be 
applied to only five items; potatoes, soybeans, natural honey, powdered skim milk and 
powdered whole milk; current 50 percent tariff on oranges would remain during the 
circulation period for domestic production, from September to February, and 30 percent 
seasonal tariff would apply for 7 years (removed at the end of those 7 years); and US 
TRQ amount would be 2,500t annually55. And both countries agreed to 15 years for 
beef; 20 years for apples and pears; 10 years for pork and chicken, which continues the 
pattern of long-term tariff removal on most of the sensitive items. The Kwon (2006: 
202) estimated 1.4 trillion to 2.25 trillion Won for annual damage to agriculture. This is 
6.7 percent of 33.37 trillion Won of annual gross agricultural production. The
NFF, 'Once the Korea-US FTA is settled, our country will destroyed,’ http://www.ijunnong.net.
The real outcome o f agricultural negotiations cannot be precisely known until the agreement itself is 
finally ratified as it suffers under a kind of Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, i.e. the details cannot be precisely 
coordinated until the final deals are negotiated. According to Park Hong-su, o f MOAF, the FTA will immediately 
affect 576 agricultural items, which represent 54.5 percent o f total imports. There were 1,531 taxed items in overall 
agriculture division; 576 items o f  them were immediately removed. It holds 37.6 percent in the number o f items and 
54.5 percent in import amount. The items included grains for feed, coffee, animal/vegetable oil and wine. The US on 
the other hand, immediately removed 80 percent o f the items (Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper 04/05/2007).
55 Nonmin Daily Newspaper (04/04/2007).
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unemployment rate in agriculture was estimated to increase to seventy thousand to a 
hundred and forty thousand. Annual livestock production decrease would be 770 
billion; fruit, 370 billion Won; and grains except rice, 540 billion Won. The 15 percent 
tariff on beef would be removed within 15 years; and tariff on apples would be 
completely removed in 20 years; on pork and chicken in 10 years. In case of beef, 
where the most damage was forecast, the annual production was expected to decrease 
by approximately 200 billion Won; and pork, 130 billion Won. The price of Korean 
beef, whose annual market scale was about 3 trillion, would drop by 8.7 percent while 
the US beef rapidly would be expected to make inroads into Korean market. In fruit, 
apple production would decrease by 89 billion Won; grapes by 63 billion Won; and 
orange by 51 billion Won56.
The evidence in support of such calamitous forecasting provided ample 
justification for farmers’ anti-FTA protests, at least from their own perspective. In 
addition to the NFF, the KAFF, the National Farmers' Union (NFU) and other strong 
farmers' groups were formed to protest against the Korea-US FTA.
Labour Unions
There are two national level labour unions: the more moderate being the FKTU 
and the relatively liberal KCTU. Despite the rivalry that has existed between these two 
labour unions, they do share a similar view regarding the Korea-US FTA57. The KCTU 
has played a major role in securing necessary equipment and human resources for the 
KoA's activities.
Why are unions against the Korea-US FTA? Firstly, one might think that the 
FTA would not be unfavourable to labour, since the labour charter, which is to be 
included in the Korea-US FTA settlement, guarantees basic work rights. Despite this 
inclusion, labour unions are of the opinion that the labour charter would act merely as a 
set of guidelines and would therefore not guarantee any benefits or basic work rights 
(Lee 2007c: 284). They also believed the FTA would have a highly negative influence 
on overall labour-management relations. Three major reasons can explain this negative
No-cut Daily Newspaper (02/04/2007).
Interview conducted with Chung Byung-duk who was vice-Manger of the KCTU, Seoul, March 12th, 
2007; Interview conducted with Baek Hyun-gi, executive director of the FKTU, Seoul, March 18th, 2007.
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impression58.
Firstly, even if the FT A increased exports and foreign investment, there would 
be no effect on generating employment (Lee 2006c: 478-500). The unions suggest as 
supporting evidence for this view that the Korean economy had recently experienced 
‘growth without employment.’ They assert that more exports to the US or income from 
US capital does not necessarily increase employment. Since most investments are in 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as opposed to building new plants, they assert that it 
may increase unemployment through structural reform. Secondly, they argue that the 
Korea-US FT A would increase the demand for labour market flexibility, which would 
lead to less regular employment conditions (Kim 2007c: 150). The American Chamber 
of Commerce in Korea (ACCK) has constantly pointed to the rigidity of Korean labour- 
management relations as an obstacle for American businesses to enter the Korean 
market59. The unions assert that once the Korea-US FTA is settled, US requests will be 
accepted, which will lead to active structural reform throughout Korean businesses, 
which would result in American-style labour management relations, which they view as 
a detrimental outcome60. Thirdly, they believe that the Korea-US FTA would increase 
earning differentials in Korean society and deepen poverty, which would ultimately lead 
to an increase in social polarisation. While major businesses with international 
competitive power would gain (even though small), the majonty of SMEs would be 
damaged; even those who work in major exporting businesses would experience job 
insecurity and wage drop. A publication from the FKTU stated;
It is to be expected that a Korea-US FTA and its concomitant structural reforms will result in an assault 
on many o f  the workplace benefits that Koreans take for granted, such as the right to work. As people 
say; it will be ten times bigger than the IMF crisis, many people will be removed from their work once 
companies enter structural reform mode, regardless o f  fields. Some say over 500,000 will lose their jobs. 
Since the impact o f  unemployment will not be absorbed into the reform process right away, this will 
lead to an overall wage drop and worse labour conditions. In the end, the right to live and work might 
be violated due to structural reforms and labour flexibility61.
It is important to note that the Korean workplace has changed drastically since
For further details on labour unions' position vis-ä-vis the Korea-US FTA's see Cha and Lee (2006). 
ACCK (2006) US-Korea Business Council and American Chamber o f Commerce in Korea views on 
proposed FTA with the Korea, Testimony before the Trade Policy Staff Committee, March 14th.
They believe that there would be “a race to the bottom" due to neo-liberal structural reform (Ahn 2006b:
20).
61 FKTU (2006).
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the ’97 financial crisis. Until then, the Korean workplace was governed by tradition as 
much as law (Shin 2007: 520). Wage systems based on lifetime employment and the 
seniority rule, which were traditional facets of Korean labour-management relations, 
rapidly collapsed (Cha and Lee 2006: 595). Increases in unemployment and non-regular 
working conditions have resulted in a more flexible labour market (Cha and Lee 2006: 
590-591; Lee and Kim 2003: 135). Those who could protect themselves in such 
circumstances tended to be workers in major businesses that had well-organised labour 
unions. The power of Korean labour unions is renowned. These unions have provided 
job security and high salary increases through negotiations with their respective 
employers. An absolute majority of those who did not have unions, or worked in 
companies in poor financial condition did not enjoy such protection.
Film Makers
On January 26th, 2006, the Korean government announced a 50 percent 
reduction of screen quotas. This was a reduction of mandatory showing days for Korean 
films from 146 days to 73 days a year. The US had demanded the screen quota 
reduction for Korean films ever since BIT discussions were held between two countries 
in 1998 (Shim 2007: 420). Korean filmmakers were obviously strongly opposed to the 
decision. This was one of the four crucial issues on which the government capitulated in 
in order to initiate the Korea-US FTA. The Korean government explained that it was to 
reduce ongoing trade dispute issues. However, it soon transpired that this decision was 
part of the so-called ‘Four Preconditions.’ Needless to say, this gave FTA opponents 
cause for alarm, as the government surrendered a great deal before the negotiations even 
started.
Probably the most important reason why filmmakers had opposed the FTA is 
because they believed it would destroy the Korean film industry (Yoo et al., 2004: 120; 
Choi 2006c: 3). They argued that the Korean film industry could not compete with 
Hollywood's huge capital, global distribution network and markets62. They used 
Mexico as an example to support their view. After NAFTA was settled, Mexico reduced
The Coalition for Cultural Diversity in Moving Images(CCDMI) estimated damage of approximately 
$32.8 million for a one-day reduction in the screen quota; $3 billion for a ten-day reduction; and $10 billion for a 
fifty-day reduction in their study on economic effects of screen quota reductions (Lee 2006d: 10).
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their screen quota by five percent in 1992 and then abolished the quota system 
altogether in 1998. The Mexican film industry produced 53 films in 1993, then only 10 
in 1998 (Shim 2007: 414). Although the Korean film industry is growing under the 
protection of the screen quota system, there is fear that the film industry would collapse 
should the quota system be reduced or scrapped altogether. There are however, voices 
that counter this assertion. As Korean films have over 50 percent market share in the 
Korean film market, the film industry's opposition to screen quota reduction is criticised 
as a manifestation of selfishness by some sections of the conservative media63. This was 
based on the concern that the screen quota issue was interfering with international 
economic strategies such as the Korea-US FT A. It has suggested that filmmakers 
should not require screen quotas, but rather they should improve their competitiveness64. 
A small minority of filmmakers have made an impact opposing the Korea-US FTA by 
using their popularity65. Despite their tiny numbers, their media profile as movie stars 
gives them inordinate access to public influence.
But why was the Korean movie industry less successful with the Korea-US 
FTA than it was with the Korea-US BIT? The simple answer is that the agenda setting 
for the BIT was not held in secret, thus the Korean film industry was able to generate 
interest and opposition while the BIT was being discussed. In comparison, the FTA 
agenda setting was hidden from public, denying potential opponents the ability to 
organise and counter its component parts while they were being discussed, with the 
agreement announced almost as a fait accompli.
Anti-Globalisation movement and Anti-American liberals
The voices of Korean society opposing globalisation are powerful and 
multitudinous. Korea has experienced many aspects of globalisation from the opening 
of agriculture markets in the UR to the period of IMF imposed policies following the 
financial crisis. Many Koreans view globalisation as the cause of the fall of Korean 
agriculture -  particularly the policies enacted at the behest of the IMF -  due to the
Chosun Daily Newspaper and Dong-A Daily Newspaper.
Liberty Union issued two public statements (January 26th, 2006 and February 13th, 2006).
An Sung-gi, Jang Dong-kyun and Kim Hae-soo, o f  the most famous film actors in Korea, they protested 
in front o f  the NA from February 3rd, 2006 until April 24th, 2006.
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opening of markets (Kim and Ahn 2007: 94; Kim and Lee 2003: 97-110), increase in 
unemployment (due to structural reform) and deepening of earning differentials (Park 
2001: 80; Cho 2003: 67-70). Anti-globalisationists tend to put the country before the 
market and distribution before growth. In a nutshell, they think an FT A would make the 
worker weaker, create job insecurity and damage an already weak social safety net66. 
Included in this section are anti-American liberals. The reason for their inclusion under 
this rubric is the fact that in Korean society there is a blurring of lines between anti- 
globalisationists and anti-American liberals. Particularly when dealing with the anti- 
FTA movement, this blurring between American policy and the process of globalisation 
tends to be exaggerated considerably.
Anti-American liberals
After the process of democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s, an undercurrent of 
anti-Americanism has never been far from the surface of Korea politics (Lee 2004a: 
250-260). Following the election of President Roh in 2003 and his election promise to 
steer an independent course from America, the sense of anti-Americanism has grown 
considerably67. From the point of view of those who held an anti-American point of 
view, it was the US that supported and pushed the process of globalisation. Again -  
from the anti-American point of view -this close relationship between Korea and the 
US fostered hostile relations between North and South Korea.
Despite this somewhat vague historical rationale, the reasons that anti- 
American groups oppose the Korea-US FTA are varied68. First, the economic alliance 
forged through a Korea-US FTA, followed by military alliance, would -  they believe -  
result in a ‘perpetuation of military subordination to the US’ (Kim 2006a: 15-18). 
Second, a strengthening of the alliance with the US through an FTA would be harmful
This view is widely held by most liberal groups. This is identified by Cheong Ji-young (2006a), in 
'Actual Current Issue of the Korea-US FTA: Is It a Globalisation of Finance and Military led by US, National Peace 
or a Universal Right?’ (Newstoon On-Line Daily Newspaper, 10/06/ 2006).
Anti-Americanism takes numerous different forms. Some of the groups belong to the Korean Alliance 
against Korea-US FTA include: Unification Union for Realisation of 615 North and South Co-Declaration and Peace 
in Korean Peninsula (www.615tongil.org); National Union for Securing National Independent Democracy and Right 
to Live (www.minjung.or.kr); People’s Solidarity for Social Progress and National College Students’ Union.
Lee (2006c) 'Unfamiliar Colony, Korea-US FTA ’; Kim (2006a) ‘Outline o f National Report on Korea-US 
FTA’; The Korea-US FTA source books published by liberal groups such as the KFTU, F KTU and National Union 
(www.minjung.or.kr), without exception, contain criticism on strengthening Korea-US alliance through an FTA.
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to the national interests of Korea in Northeast Asia. Given the current situation in East 
Asia and the China-US competition for supremacy, the Korea-US FT A would have 
negative influence on the Korea-China relationship and would interfere with the 
developing relationship between North and South Korea (Lee 2006e: 30). In other 
words, they assert that Korea-US FTA would cause instability on the Korean peninsula 
and Northeast Asia69. Third, the Korea-US FTA would interfere with the currently 
developing East Asian regional economic cooperation initiatives (Lee 2002b: 110).
It is difficult to measure how strong anti-Americanism is as a counter­
argument to the Korea-US FTA. But one thing that is certain is that anti-Americanism 
has contributed to the spreading of anti-Korea-US FTA sentiment. Even those who 
oppose the FTA for reasons other than anti-Americanism, the fact is the ground-swell 
of anti-Americanism has interacted with anti-Korea-US FTA sentiment and created a 
synergistic effect70.
Setting the stage for a discussion of the channels of influence
This section will be divided into three subsections dealing with each phase of 
the FTA process. There is, however, one detail that differentiates the Korea-US FTA 
from the previous two; the ratification phase for the Korea-US FTA is still technically 
in operation and inevitably any interpretation of future events is inherently flawed. 
Nevertheless, it is this dissertation's argument that domestic stakeholders have 
influenced previous FTAs and equally so here, despite the current wrangling over the 
final issues (indeed, the current wrangling can also be explained as the result of pressure 
applied by these same domestic stakeholders).
The agenda setting phase, ad nauseum, is dominated by a select group of 
government policy makers. However, what is strikingly unusual in this case was the 
secrecy in which this phase was conducted and the limited number of government
Furthermore, opponents express extreme anti-American sentiment by associating the Korea-US FTA with 
strategic flexibility issues. Bae argues that American imperialism enhances political, military and economic alliance 
(subordination) by having FTA with countries in important locations for military/political strategy in each continent 
(2006: 65-66). The US uses FTAs as means to secure economic, political and military supremacy o f  American 
imperialism. As American strategic flexibility means using Korea as US omni-directional military base, the Korea-US 
FTA will isolate continents including China economically.
Interview conducted with Lee Hae-young, one o f  the co-leaders o f the KoA, Seoul, February 2nd, 2007; 
Interview conducted with Park Won-suk, one o f the directors o f  PSPD, Seoul, March 15th, 2007.
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players involved. The negotiation phase, in comparison, was not so secretive and, 
subsequently, more confrontational. By the time the negotiation phase of the Korea-US 
FTA took place, both sides of the debate had time to absorb the lessons of previous 
confrontations and, thus, the scope of the confrontation was wider and more intense. 
Add in the fact that there are more domestic actors involved in the debate concerning 
the Korea-US FTA than any previous FTA and it is understandable why a confrontation 
more akin to General Ludendorff s Total war' has taken shape than in previous debates 
over FTAs.
Succinctly, domestic stakeholders spoke of their concerns and had those 
concerns addressed, despite the monumental efforts on behalf of its supporters to have 
the FTA passed post haste. We shall begin by analysing the agenda setting phase first.
Agenda Setting Phase-Supporters ’ complete dominance
The agenda setting phase of the Korea-US FTA was, as has already been 
pointed out, a very secretive affair and therefore, one would presume, equally opaque to 
any discerning analysis. While this is true to a certain degree, it does not mean no 
analysis is possible. The roots of the Korea-US FTA can probably be traced back to the 
stalemate of the Korea-Japan FTA. The FKI led coalition of the latter FTA was quite 
successful in stalling the agreement, however in the process they stood to damage their 
long-term interests. The coalition believed in the opening of markets -  but only under 
auspicious circumstances -  and the spanner they threw into the Korea-Japan FTA had 
the potential to damage their excellent working relationship with both government and 
the MOFAT (i.e. the ability to access IPI and PPPM, See previous chapter). The 
MOFAT, on the other hand supported the opening of markets on point of principle and 
was eager to continue the trend of pursuing further FTAs71. And so the FKI coalition 
saw their opening to revitalise their ongoing relationship with the government and the 
MOFAT and, at the same time, avail of what is the biggest single market for Korean 
exports, i.e. the US market . Furthermore, it stood a chance of reconciling the two
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director of Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, March 4th, 2007.
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director of Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, March 4th, 2007.
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countries which had, in the FKI's view -  and much to their chagrin -  drifted apart73.
So, without further ado, the FKI set in motion a charm offensive on the 
MOFAT. They set up a series of meetings and conferences whose goal was an exchange 
of ideas and initiatives, all under the political radar using informal channels74, PPPM, 
and concomitantly due to the MOFAT's role as both key domestic stakeholder and 
political institution, IPI. Needless to say, the outlook both shared regarding the opening 
of markets (at least when it suited the FKI) was very much in lockstep. It did not take 
long for the Korean Minister for Trade, Kim Hyun-chong, to develop a keen awareness 
of the benefits, as outlined by the FKI, of an FT A with the US for Korean industry.
President Roh Moo-hyun, it should be pointed out, supported an unusual, 
though not unique, dichotomy. He was both a left-wing politician and a supporter of 
FTAs (his support of the Korea-Chile FTA was unabashed). While this may not seem 
particularly germane at first glance, it was the Minister for Trade's awareness of this 
dichotomy which enabled him to approach a left-wing president with a penchant for 
acting independently of the US with the idea of forging an FTA with precisely the 
country President Roh wished to act independently of. By using the president's support 
for FTAs and using singularly economic arguments, Minister Kim eventually convinced 
President Roh that a Korea-US FTA would be a good thing and might actually supply 
him with some political capital that he was desperately in need of75. With little delay 
and with the president’s support, the Minister of Trade visited the US in 2005.
The Minister of Trade, Mr. Kim made an effort to persuade his US counterparts 
on two fronts: one was direct persuasion of the US Congress and administration76. He 
also explained the necessity of a Korea-US FTA through talks with US trade 
representatives. A Korea-US FTA development was also a major issue in subsequent 
summit talks between the two countries. These talks between Korea and the US were
Interview conducted with Choi Sung-hyun, Senior Research Fellow, International Affair Division in FKI, 
Seoul, March 4th, 2007; Interviews conducted with Chang Kuk-hyun, former president o f  the Washington Office o f  
the FKI (retired in March 2009), Seoul, August 8th, 2009.
Neither o f the interviewees, from the KERI and the FKI, mentioned informal channels directly. I did, 
however, recognise that they repeatedly spoke about the close relationship between key governmental ministries and 
key FKI individuals. In particular, FKI senior members (those who used to work in government ministries in key 
positions) had met key governmental individuals repeatedly during this period. Interviews conducted with Chang 
Kuk-hyun, former president o f  the Washington Office o f  the FKI (retired in March 2009), Seoul, August 8th, 2009. He 
stated that the FKI and the Korean government (in particular, MOFAT) had closely collaborated in initiating the 
Korea-US FTA.
Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the chief negotiator). I was 
accompanied by Kim Gi-ju, former director o f administration Bureau in Blue House, August 21lh, 2009.
Kim Hyun-chong, the Minister o f Trade o f Korea, talked about Korea-US FTA negotiation with 
JoongAng Daily Newspaper (08/02/2006).
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held after the APEC summit meeting in Pusan in November 2005 and are considered 
the decisive starting point of the negotiation phase of the Korea-US FTA77. The other 
method of applying pressure on the US to sign an FTA was through Korea developing 
FTAs with other NAFTA member countries such as Canada and Mexico. Despite the 
halt put on the Korea-Mexico FTA due to circumstances in Mexico, official 
negotiations for an FTA with Canada began in July 2005. The Korean Minister of Trade 
stated that the Korea-Canada FTA negotiations played a major part in convincing the 
US to commence FTA negotiations with Korea78. In response to the Korean Minister of 
Trade, the US laid down a series of preconditions that had to be met should Korea 
seriously wish to engage the US in negotiating an FTA. These preconditions were met 
without delay.
Lack of opposition
As far as those who would oppose the Korea-US FTA were concerned, the 
‘Provisions on the Procedures of FTA Ratification (PPFR)’ explicitly stated that a series 
of public hearings would be necessary before any official steps were taken regarding 
FTA’s. They were of the opinion that this presidential decree set out the criteria for 
carrying any discussions on FTAs forward and that the public hearings were an integral 
part of the process79. Thus, they presumed to be included in the FTA process, from 
beginning to end. The first of such public hearings occurred on February' 2nd, 2006. The 
following day the government announced its plan for a Korea-US FTA. The opposition 
immediately decried that the government had deliberately hoodwinked them into 
attending what was essentially a rubber stamp meeting.
Kim Hyun-chong, the Minister of Trade in the MOFAT, interviewed conducted with JoongAng Daily 
Newspaper on February 2nd, 2006, he said that 'As I accompanied the President on an overseas visit in autumn last 
year, I told the President that we need a Korea-US FTA to become a leading trading country. It might be fruitful if we 
had a successful negotiation process, the President Roh then told me that we should give it a try if we needed it.’ 
Based on ‘the Establishment and Operation of Contracting Procedure Regulations of FTA (EOCPR)' 
(Presidential decree No. 121) and ‘PPFR" in June 2004.
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Negotiation Stage: Opponents ’ derogation o f the FT A
Battle lines drawn
Considering how cavalier the government was in abandoning its own ‘EOCPR,’ 
the opposition realised with the conclusion of the agenda-setting phase that 
confrontation during the negotiation phase was inevitable. And so the opposition 
immediately started to draw up plans for confronting the government’s FTA policy80. 
While many groups -  from labour to agriculture to civic -  were involved in opposing 
previous FTAs, there was a new impetus following the government's announcement of 
February 3rd, 2006. Their experience opposing FTAs had led them to conclude that 
strategic alliances were of great value in opposing government FTA policy. What had 
become obvious during previous clashes was that single disaffected groups were 
individually weak but allied together they presented a far more serious threat. Almost 
two months after the government's presumptuous announcement a whole range of 
Korean groups, organisations, affiliations and interested groups formed ‘The KoA\ The 
KoA consisted of entire sections of Korean society, from labour unions to the 
agricultural sector to civic groups to opposition minority parties and various other 
miscellaneous parties with vested interests (film sector, East Asianists, the 
pharmaceutical industry, etc.). The organisation comprised over 300 sub-organisations 
and had task forces for 14 sectors including agriculture, livestock, fisheries, culture, art, 
education, finance, health medicine, intellectual property rights and so on. Also, there 
were local task forces for each region81. Other large alliances were also formed82. All of 
which were clearly indicative of OP.
The KoA utilised informal channels of influence, public influence primarily (i.e. 
as one of the three key structures of channels of influence), with rare exceptions. One of 
their most powerful and aggressive protests against FTA was held on November 22nd, 
2006 in which nearly 75,000 people from many cities countrywide took part in, 
resulting in substantial damage to public and private property83. The KoA held large 
street protests whenever negotiations took place. Outside the building where the final
Interview conducted with Lee Hae-young, one o f co-leaders o f the KoA, Seoul, February 2nd, 2007; 
Interview conducted with Park Won-suk, one o f directors o f  PSPD, Seoul, March 15th, 2007.
The website o f  this organisation (http://www.nofta.or.kr) introduces the organisation and its activities as 
well as offering various materials that take a negative point o f  view towards the Korea-US FTA.
Such as PSPD, KPAFW, FKTU, KFTU, CCEJ, KPL, and DLP.
Chosun Daily Newspaper and Dong-A Daily Newspaper (23/11/2006).
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meeting was taking place, one protester attempted to bum himself to death.
On Saturday, November 25th, 2006, central Seoul saw 8,000 people protest 
against the talks with the US. Liberal civic groups, liberal-minded lawyers, far-left 
DLP members and a sprinkling of movie stars denounced President Roh for promoting 
the negotiations and for dancing to the US’ tune. The group, calling itself a “pan- 
national group to stop the FTA,” said Saturday’s rally would not be its last84. In 
opposition to the anti-FTA campaigners, a group of right-wingers gathered for a pro- 
FTA rally and denounced their opponents.
The catalyst for the explosion against the free trade talks appears to have been a 
former Blue House economic aide, Jeong Tae-in. He had long served as an economic 
adviser to Mr. Roh, but parted company with him over the issue of the Korea-US FTA. 
In an interview with an internet news outlet, he said, “It’s no use making peace with a 
scoundrel, what awaits us in the end is a fatal blow to ourselves, leading only to our 
downfall.” In a bitter, pejorative tone, Mr. Jeong also denounced the push for free trade 
talks as merely the “result of President Roh's haste to have a quick, visible achievement 
near the end of his presidential term.” Mr. Jeong claimed that core figures in the trade 
and finance ministry and other FTA-related offices have blinded the president and are 
pushing him into what he called disadvantageous negotiations86. The opposition was not 
alone in preparing for the struggle ahead.
The negotiation phase is markedly different from the previous two empirical 
chapters in one fascinating way. What is unique here is that one has a situation where 
the government -  in the shape of the MOFAT, the Minister of Trade and the president -  
was acting publicly as the sole supporter for the FTA and has continued to push for 
ratification (whereas with the Korea-Japan FTA the government was alone and stood 
aside). The opposition, in the meantime, was represented by the KoA behemoth. The 
result was that both sides of the conflict were represented by two immensely powerful 
bodies, either the government (pro-FTA) or the KoA (anti-FTA). This, in turn 
effectively meant that the opposition was by and large, confined to utilising informal 
channels (as primary) throughout the negotiation phase.
The negotiations were held alternatively in the US and Korea. Due to the logistical and
Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (27/11/2006). 
Ohmy On-line Daily Newspaper (20/04/2006). 
Hankyorech Daily Newspaper (12/04/2006).
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financial difficulties of opposing the FT A on US soil, the KoA ensured that each 
meeting of the negotiation phase of the Korea-US FTA which occurred on Korean soil 
was well opposed thus ensuring a high media profile.
Supporters
Instead of expressing their support individually for the Korea-US FTA, many 
businesses and FKI gathered by industry or national economic organisation -  in support 
of FTAs -  and attempted to contact government officials to deliver their demands 
quietly, through PPPM and IPI. There are similarities between the Korea-US and 
Korea-Chile FTAs in this regard.
There are a few reasons which help explain this87. Firstly, individual businesses 
believed that openly expressing support could lead to a boycott of their products by the 
FTA's opponents88. Secondly, export industries were concerned that openly supporting 
the FTA might lead to social compensation costs despite the fact that the government 
openly declared that neither specific businesses or industries would have to provide 
financial resources for compensation89. Thirdly, business and economic groups at the 
national level had direct, official channels to the government. For example, economic 
groups, which lead the FTA Industry Alliance, have a strong partnership with the 
government90. Another example is the Korea-US FTA Supporting Committee which is a 
government funded organisation, of which the chairmen of the KITA and KCCI are 
members of this committee. Given these close relationships, many industrial figures 
consider lending open support a poor tactical choice, considering the potential 
repercussions.
In terms of their relationship with the government and the trade barrier issue, 
Korean businesses tend to be rather passive in these matters. Korean businesses are
Interviews conducted with Lee Byeong-wook, director o f  Economic Research Division o f  the FKI; 
Interviews conducted with Cheong Jae-hwa, director o f Institute for International Trade o f the KITA 
were very helpful in laying out these arguments, Seoul, March 5th, 2007 and March 10th, 2007.
For more detail, see footnote 17 in Chapter Three.
Interviews conducted with Chang Kuk-hyun, former president o f the Washington Office o f  the FKI 
(retired in March 2009), Seoul, August 8th, 2009. Interviews conducted with Lee Mi-hyun, the head o f multilateral 
trade cooperation decision in MOFAT, Seoul, August 14th, 2009.
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director o f Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, March 4th, 2007.
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more accustomed to avoiding or overcoming international trade barriers by themselves 
rather than resolving the issues through the government91. In other words, they try to 
overcome US trade barriers through company strategy instead of actively demanding 
solutions to such problems from government.
Although the FTA's supporters were not numerous nor as publicly active as its 
opponents, groups such as the 'FTA Industry Alliance m formed by a group of five 
leading Korea industry organisations and the "Right National Movement Headquarters 
for Korea-US FT A (RNMH),’ a confederacy of FT A, supporting civil groups and social 
figures formed in 2006, did attempt to organise national awareness campaigns. They 
spread their viewpoint and criticised the FTA’s opponents via publications and the 
media. Some of their officials give lectures at events hosted by government or economic 
organisations and they released promotional material for distribution. The RNMH' 
organised street protests, yet its activities were insignificant compared to the activities 
of their counterparts. Why was this so?
While the above is true for such groups as the RNMH, for other supporters (i.e. 
liberal reformers) a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush; liberal reformers had a 
good channels of formal and informal influence relating to the government’s negotiation 
team. Also, many liberal reformers were working in government offices and as advisers 
for the negotiation team. In particular, the K1EP was the think-tank for the 
government’s FTA policies and the majority of economists were members of the 
advisory committees run by the government. Therefore, the influence of liberal 
reformers on the Korea-US FTA negotiation was very direct.
Also, the government put aside a payment structure for those who would be 
affected by the FTA to help persuade its opponents. The Korean government decided to 
provide 2.8 trillion Won ($2.9 billion) in financial support to companies and workers 
hurt in the fallout of the country’s new free trade agreements. The MOCIE publicised 
on April 10 , 2006, that the government planned to provide 2.6 trillion Won over 10 
years to companies that suffered losses from a sudden surge in imports caused by free 
trade pacts. The remaining 207.3 billion Won would also be allocated over 10 years to
Interview conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director o f  Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, February 28th, 2007; Interviews conducted with Chang Kuk-hyun, former president o f  the 
Washington Office o f  the FKI (retired in March 2009), Seoul, August 8th, 2009.
It was set up on April 18, 2007 and is composed o f  the KITA, KCOCI, FKI, KFSMB, and the KEF, 
comprising 14 industry categories such as finance, law, services and so on 
(http://www.yesfta.or.kr/committee/info_l.asp).
205
Chapter Five
workers who suffered as a result of the pacts. Manufacturers who had seen their profits 
or production drop more than 25 percent were also eligible for the funds. The supportive 
measure, designed jointly with the MOL, was modelled after the US “Trade Adjustment 
Assistance” program, which began in 1962 and has been considered a success. The 
MOCIE estimated that 10,700 companies and 100,000 workers would be eligible for the 
financial support93. This attempt to gain access to PI, however, was not successful.
Opponents
The KoA held a press conference on June 1st, 2006 where they expressed their 
intent to travel to the US to demonstrate in opposition to the Korea-US FT A, a further 
instance of the KoA focusing on their main channel of influence; PI. The two countries 
were scheduled to begin formal talks on an FTA in the US capital from June 5th to 10th. 
US-based activist groups and lawyers helped the KoA obtain permits to hold rallies at 
various places in Washington and the group promised that the rallies would be peaceful. 
The alliance complained the South Korean government was blocking activists from 
obtaining visas to travel to the US, claiming the government provided the US 
government with a list of senior members of civic groups94. In response, several 
government ministers issued a written appeal to anti-free trade activists to drop plans to 
travel to Washington, D.C., Han Duck-soo, the deputy prime minister for economic 
affairs, and the ministers of agriculture, labour, justice and foreign affairs said that the 
protesters’ plans would damage Korea’s international image and raise public concern. 
“[The plans] must be stopped immediately and the civic groups must follow legal steps 
in presenting their opinions95.” The wording suggests government concern that the 
demonstrations, like many here and those in Hong Kong at the WTO conference in 
December, would end in violence.
The MOCIE’s public Report (11/04/2006). 
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (10/06/2006).
Korean government public statement (19/05/2006).
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Korea-US FTA and public discord
Public support for the KoA was virtually guaranteed prior to the beginning of 
negotiations. The government’s failure to act according to the EOCPR was a decisive 
move in garnering public support for the KoA’s position. By mid-May, of the 17 
advisory boards that were promised under the PPER, only three had actually been held, 
one of which was the rubber-stamp meeting held the day prior to the launching of the 
Korea-US FTA. Also, the unilateral concession on the issue of the ‘four preconditions’ 
that were required by the US on behalf of the Korean government was seen as both a 
weak capitulation and a poor start to negotiations (Lim 2006a: 1). One generally does 
not concede valuable negotiating points before beginning to negotiate, or so many 
Koreans thought. When the public is highly aware of an issue, interest groups that are 
advantaged by conflict expansion, or public awareness, are best suited to achieve their 
goals through indirect lobbying (Victor 2007: 827). In this regard, the KoA's actions in 
the US received wide media attention in Korea and were an important step in the 
process of alerting the public to what exactly the KoA stood against. Once their 
representatives had returned another debacle ensued. Again, actions promised under the 
Provisions were denied. The KoA insisted that -  under the EOCPR -  the Korean public 
had the right to be informed as to the outcome of the first round of negotiations. Kim 
Jong-hoon, the chief negotiator, said that such a demand was preposterous and refused 
to reveal the status of the negotiations, stating “There is no country in the world that 
would disclose detailed information to the public in the middle of a negotiation.”
Despite the logic of his argument, the fact remains that this is exactly what was 
guaranteed by the EOCPR.
The KoA organised a demonstration on July 12th, 2006 in Seoul for the second 
round of negotiations which were running from June 10th-  14th. More than 100,000 
protesters took part in the demonstration. The KoA announced that peaceful rallies 
would start on the Monday and that the protesters would not resort to violence06. The 
government issued a call to the activist groups to seek a more peaceful method of 
protesting while warning that strong measures would be taken against any violent 
displays97. Despite the calls for restraint by both the KoA and government, violence acts
Korea Herald (07/07/2006).
Chosun Daily Newspaper (05/06/2006).
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were committed sporadically during the protest, with confrontations between the 
protesters and the police resulting in the shooting of teargas and stone-throwing. An 
inevitable consequence of such large and occasionally violent demonstrations that the 
issues surrounding the Korea-US FTA were brought directly into people's living rooms 
via media coverage.
The third round of negotiations were held in Seattle on September 6th -  9th, 2006. 
Following the template set down during the first round, the KoA again sent 
representatives to the US to demonstrate their opposition to the Korea-US FTA. The 
talks ended without violent protests, although 15 demonstrators, both Korean and 
American, were arrested on September 9th, after trying to enter the building where the 
negotiators were working98.
Also, a group of 23 Korean lawmakers on September 6th, 2006 filed a suit at 
Korea’s Constitutional Court claiming that the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s move to 
conclude an FTA with the US was unconstitutional due to the fact that it had ignored its 
own presidential decrees as set down in the EOCPR. This particular incident is 
important for two reasons, despite its failure to win the suit. Firstly, the suit filed against 
the government was indicative of the dependence the anti-FTA alliance had on informal 
channels and secondly, the symbology of the suit was important precisely because it 
was the only formal channel that was available to the anti-FTA alliance, as the 
government itself stood behind the Korea-US FTA and was therefore unapproachable. 
In other words, the KoA lacked the ability to influence political institutions directly and 
instead used their access to public influence to indirectly apply pressure to these same 
political institutions and key politicians.
The fourth round of negotiations were held on October 23rd -  27th, 2006. The 
KoA demonstration was held on October 22nd and was, without doubt, the most violent 
anti-FTA demonstration to date. 74,000 people from 13 cities nationwide participated. 
Protesters armed with bamboo sticks, square wooden clubs and stones entered local 
government offices and police stations, destroying property and setting offices on fire99. 
Outside the building where the final meeting of the fourth round was taking place, one 
protester attempted to bum himself to death. Public reaction to such a violent 
demonstration was predictable. While the violent scenes may not have converted many
Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (08/09/2006).
99 Dong-A Daily Newspaper (23/10/2006).
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who witnessed them to become ardent supporters of the FT A, it certainly did the KoA 
no favours. There was a noticeable falloff in support for the KoA immediately after the 
demonstrations of the 22nd October (see Public opinion polls in section of Opposing 
Rationales). Strategically speaking, it was not the wisest of moves of the KoA to 
organise demonstrations in 13 cities where control would prove to be difficult, if not 
impossible.
The sixth round of negotiations were held on January 15th -  19th, 2007. 
Probably the most important feature of this round of negotiations is the leaked 
document of the open-door briefing session100. Reports regarding the ongoing FTA 
negotiations were sent to 30 members (MPs) of the committee. However one copy was 
not retrieved and was leaked to two leftwing news organisations, the Hankyoreh 
newspaper and the online Pressian news service. The leaked documents contained the 
details of the Korean negotiating position and were presumably leaked to weaken the 
Korean negotiating team. What can be ascertained, from looking at the facts, is that the 
document was leaked deliberately. The document was therefore leaked not by those 
who supported the Korea-US FTA but by its opponents in the NA and describes the 
level of closeness that the KoA had to certain politicians. This is indicative of the 
relationship that opponents and supporters had in the NA (on an informal level), that 
some opponents of the FTA in the NA felt the leaking of such an important document 
was necessary points to an emotive issue that lacked a middle ground. Demonstrations 
and debate continued throughout the last two rounds of negotiations. The Korea-US 
FTA was concluded on April 2nd, 2007.
Ratification phase
Although the negotiation phase was concluded on April 2nd, 2007 and signed on 
June 30th, 2007, there was, and still is, much work to be done to get the FTA through the 
NA for ratification. The Korea-US FTA has to pass two basic stages for ratification, 
first it has to pass a vote in the UFATC. Once this hurdle is cleared, the FTA then has to 
pass an open vote in the NA itself. Not only does it have to pass these hurdles but there 
are also indirect obstacles in its path. The Presidential and general elections resulted in
100 Chosun Daily Newspaper (17/01/2007).
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pushing the issue of FT A ratification onto the back burner. Also, the beef issue played 
havoc with the ratification phase in the NA. This issue101 dominated proceedings for a 
while and the agreement’s supporters failed in pushing the FTA through the 17th 
Assembly as a result. While this is a failure on behalf of the supporters, the opponents 
of the FTA see it very much as a success on their behalf. Thus far, the FTA has not been 
ratified in the 18th Assembly either. See below for details (candlelight vigils section).
Delays, however, are par for the course. The Korea-Chile FTA was settled in 
October 2002; however ratification in a plenary session of the NA was not made until 
February 2004, one year and four months later (see Chapter Three). The agreement was 
thrown out of a total of three plenary sessions. The reason for such long periods for 
ratification by the NA is the result of two things; the lack of a ‘sell by date’, i.e. a 
legally circumscribed time by which an FTA must be passed once it enters the NA (e.g. 
similar to the US) and, more importantly, conflicts among different interests in diverse 
fields including products, services, investments, intellectual property rights, etc.
The fact remains that during the presidential and general elections the FTA was 
politically unclean and no politician in his or her right mind would associate with it 
during elections. Civic groups, labour unions and the farming sector all issued a 
political ‘fatwah’ against any politician who would support the FTA in any way102. 
These elections demonstrate the societal approach interpretation that interest groups 
compete to influence government policy. Within democracies, elected politicians must 
meet the demands of their own constituencies in pursuing re-election (Bearce 2003: 
766).
Also, according to Global Research’s public survey (Figure 5.2), in relation to 
the question on how much influence the Korea-US FTA could have on the coming 
presidential election, 63.4 percent (‘very much’ 13.1 percent; ‘to some extent’ 50.3 
percent) answered ‘it will have influence’; and 33.1 percent (‘none’ 2.6 percent; "not 
much influence’ 30.5 percent) answered ‘it will have no influence103'.
On April 18th, 2008, the Korean government agreed to authorise the imports o f all beef regardless o f  the 
cattle age, except for two specified risk materials-tonsils and distalileum- for the first time in about five years. The 
public anti-government sentiment centred on US beef imports and triggered street rallies and candlelight vigils across 
country for more than one month since April 18th. Demonstrations peaked with 300,000 people attending protests on
June 10th, 2007.
102 Interview conducted with Lee Hae-young, one o f co-leaders o f the KoA, Seoul, February 2nd, 2007. 
Pollee: the general public over 19 o f age; Area: Nationwide; Sample size: l,000(available sample), 
Sampling method: random sampling; Sampling error: at 95percent Confidence Level, ±3.1percent. Poll type: 
Telephone Survey; Date: April 4, 2007 (1 day); Survey organisation: Global Research Co., Ltd.
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In a similar vein, each party and political group have displayed a rather delicate 
approach in deciding their position regarding the agreement104. Given this context, a key 
factor in the ratification process was the position that both major parties -  the GNP and 
the Uri Party105 -  would take towards the FTA. Both parties’ leadership were expected 
to support ratification since they both viewed the FTA in a positive light. However, 
many agreed that no one could guarantee the ratification because support and opposition 
among political groups/lawmakers was clearly mixed, in contrast to the unanimous 
support of both leaderships106.
The GNP showed stronger support for the FTA than the Uri party; however the 
70 members who came from rural constituencies (similar to the Korea—Chile FTA) were 
a determining factor. These members opposed the FTA since they thought the 
government did not provide proper countermeasures, side-payments or compensation 
policies for the agricultural and fisheries industries; therefore they were expected to 
vote against ratification.
The Pan-ruling party, which included the Uri party, had a more complicated 
relationship with the FTA than the GNP. Kim Geun-tae, former Chairman leading
35 percent, 71 lawmakers, agreed to ‘ratification within 2007’ regarding a point of time for the Korea-US 
FTA settlement. 57 lawmakers (28 percent) opposed 'ratification within 2007.’ 70 lawmakers (34 percent) answered 
they will decide 'later’ after they observe the process. 46 members of the GNP agreed to ‘ratification within this year’ 
and 12 opposed. As for the Uri Party, 22 members agreed; 22 opposed; and 22 reserved, which makes exact three 
equal parts. As for the Unified New Party Group, party defectors, one agreed; six opposed; and seven reserved. As for 
the DLP, all nine members opposed (Chosun Daily-pro-FTA newspaper, 26/03/2007). Flowever, According to a 
telephone survey by '(the Voice of People 23/03/2007)’, an internet medium (anti-FTA internet newspaper) on the 
Korea-US FTA conducted on 296 lawmakers, only 59 lawmakers (33 percent) agreed to FTA out of 180 participated 
in the survey. 43 (23 percent), on the other hand, opposed and 78(44 percent) reserved, showing majority is ‘discrete’ 
about the issue (Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper 27/03/ 2007).
The party formed in November 2003 but, it was finally disbandment in August 2007 due to member's 
political survival for coming general election.
106 Chosun Daily Newspaper (20/10/2007).
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Democratic Peace Union (part of the Pan ruling party) insisted on discontinuing the 
negotiations by taking the extreme action of fasting, which put the ruling party in an 
awkward position. Also, a former chairman of the Uri party, Cheong Dong-young, 
publicly expressed negative views of the Korea-US FTA107. In addition, 18 members of 
the Public Welfare Political Group (a group of defectors from the Uri party) led by the 
DLP and a lawmaker, Cheong Jeong-bae, openly opposed the FTA; the DLP, which 
had many members from the farming sector, also displayed a strongly negative bias by 
stating that the FTA was a hasty negotiation. Merely taking the MPs mentioned here, 
over 100 members would ‘definitely’ oppose the FTA with the US. Following these 
figures, the Korea-US FTA was to arguably be the most difficult ratification process to 
date.
Korean presidential elections and support for the FTA
Although neither President Roh Moo-hyun nor President-elect Lee Myung-bak 
actually dealt with the issue of the FTA during the election cycle, once it was 
determined who had won, both felt comfortable in supporting the FTA, having 
obfuscated their affection for it during the election108. Both men met on December 29th, 
2007 -  ten days after the election -  to discuss the issue of the Korea-US FTA. The 
symbolism of this meeting, at least in hindsight, is quite strong; the changing of the 
guard meant little for government policy towards the FTA. They both agreed to 
cooperate closely for parliamentary ratification of the FTA while Lee praised Roh for 
concluding an FTA with the US and vowed to persuade lawmakers of the GNP to ratify 
the deal before the expiry of Roh’s term (in late February)109 or the expiry of the 17th 
session of the NA. The government submitted the Korea-US FTA bill to the UFATC, 
on February 11th, 2007. The eight members of The LDP led by Kang Gi-gap managed to 
block it initially but it was finally submitted on February 13th, 2007. On February 19th, 
2007 the Korean Chamber of Commerce (the Korcham) visited the NA and met with 
Kim Won-whong, the chairman of the UFATC, and delivered a document (containing
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (08/09/2007).
There were no FTA issues during the Presidential election and the general election, it was not raised as an 
issue during the election campaigns.
109 Korea Herald (30/12/2007).
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100,000 signatures), urging them to ratify the Korea-US FTA110, an obvious and 
legitimate attempt to access IP I.
However, the pending general election ensured that any discussion of the Korea- 
US FTA was kept from public view behind tightly closed doors. Once the general
thelections were held (April 8 , 2008), those doors were swung open with vehemence by 
the ruling party.
Mad cows and FTAs
President Lee and the ruling GNP tried to ratify the Korea-US FTA bill in the final 
extra parliamentary session of 17th NA, May 30th, 2008. What looked to the GNP as a 
case of a “slam dunk’' proposal was to prove anything but. All the GNP needed was 160 
votes and the GNP guaranteed 90, the old Uri party (now the United Democratic Party 
(UDP) guaranteed at least 80. President Lee and his party were confident that the UDP 
party would vote in favour of the FTA due to the role that their former leader and 
president had in initiating and supporting it. However what President Lee and the GNP 
failed to take into consideration was the effect the issue of the 'four preconditions' 
would have on proceedings and the role politics would play. Or more specifically, the 
role of beef and politics. The UDP party voted against the FTA, the opposition 
switching role from supporter to opponent, a new outlook to match their new position as 
an opposition party. This section examines in closer detail the role beef was to play in 
the unfolding drama surrounding the Korea-US FTA.
Korea started importing U.S beef in the 1970s, but banned all shipments in 
December 2003 after Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) 
was discovered in a Canadian-born cow in the U.S state of Washington. Korea resumed 
imports in April 2007, but that same month suspended further imports after illegal cuts 
(vertebrae) were found in a shipment* 111. Following the 2006 mid-term elections in the 
US, the Democrats held sway over the Congress. A key supporting group of the 
Democrats is the beef industry and their voice was soon heard in the NA. The US 
Congress, since the mid-term elections, had consistently demanded complete open
110 http://www.korcham.net/EconNews/KcciReport/CRE01102R.asp?m_DataID
=20080219032&m_CciID=A001.
111 Dong-A Daily Newspaper (15/04/2007).
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access to the Korean beef market as a precondition to ratification of the Korea-US FT A, 
one of the ‘four preconditions’. President Lee, in order to fulfill his promise of ratifying 
the FTA, was going to acquiesce to the US government's demands. And it was this 
specific demand, the Korea open its market to US beef as a precondition to the US 
engaging in an FTA with Korea, that was to cause major headaches for the Korean 
supporters of the Korea-US FTA.
Brief outline o f Candlelight Vigils
Meanwhile, US negotiators were pressing hard on their Korean counterparts to 
tear down almost all barriers to beef imports. The main weapon in their arsenal was a 
recommendation of the World Organisation for Animal Health (or OIE) which allows, 
in principle, beef exports without restrictions on age and parts for countries that control 
the risks of mad cow disease. In May 2007, the world body in charge of assessing meat 
safety unanimously concluded that American beef and beef products from cattle of all 
ages could be safely traded. It has also stated that American testing methods were 
credible. The OIE reports were the basis for the reopening of the beef trade, a process 
that began with the Roh administration. Subsequently, in April 2008, South Korea 
reached a deal to import U.S. beef from cattle of all ages as part of the 'four 
preconditions', ahead of their bilateral summit in Washington. However, who could 
have predicted that opening the Korean market to U.S. beef would have sparked what 
were some of the largest protests in Korea's recent political history?
At first, public opinion was not that negative. But the public mood deteriorated 
drastically within a very short time-frame. This change was largely fuelled by critical 
internet reports on the harmful effects of US beef on health and an April 28th broadcast 
of the Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC) news magazine program ‘PD Notebook’ 
that aired a highly negative report on the safety of U.S. cattle.
On 2nd May 2008, citizens, including young students who feared that their 
favorite idol singers might die from the human form of BSE, held their first rally at 
Cheonggye Plaza in central Seoul that had, ironically enough, been created by President 
Lee Myung-bak when he served as Seoul mayor. The protests spread nationwide amid 
escalating violence, resulting in a virtual state of anarchy in parts of Seoul.
It is difficult to deny that candlelight vigils in 2008 began as a spontaneous
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movement protesting what many who attended those vigils felt was the government’s 
poor and premature negotiations with the US, indifference to people's rights to health 
and poor absorption of public opinion in the implementation of policies. Meanwhile, on 
22nd May 2008, President Lee publically apologised for his administration's hasty 
decision.
Supporters
However, President Lee also argued that the public had been grossly 
misinformed regarding the beef issue and emphasized that the beef issue and the Korea- 
US FTA were not connected. Furthermore, he requested ratification of the Korea-US 
FT A.
This was not the only move on the part of the government to persuade the 
public that passing the FTA was the proper thing to do. Kang Man-su, the Minister of 
Finance (MOF) insisted that if the Korea-US FTA was delayed a year, the lost 
economic benefits for Korea could be as much as 15 trillion Won ($15 billion), citing 
the estimation of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry'. These were not the 
only efforts made . The Korean government, the GNP and conservative newspapers 
argued that the beef accord was a completely separate issue from the ratification of the 
Korea-US FTA.
This added fuel to the conflagration that was spreading across Korea. Many 
who took part in the vigils considered the claim that there was no connection between 
the FTA and the importation of US beef as thoroughly disingenuous. By 28th May 2008, 
the main opposition party UDP were obviously aware of the amount of public 
dissatisfaction and joined the Organisation of Korea’s Anti-Mad Cow (OKAC). On 10th 
June 2008, massive demonstrations occurred across Korea, more than a million people 
took part in nationwide candlelight vigils in several cities.
President Lee Myung-bak met N A ’s Speaker Lim Chae-jung and opposition (UDP) leader Sohn Hak-kyu 
to ask for their cooperation with the ratification o f the Korea-US FTA. The UDP controls 136 seats while the GNP 
holds 111, far short o f  the necessary majority to pass a bill in the current 291 member NA. Lee Yoon-ho, Minister o f  
Knowledge Economy (MOKE) also called on the NA to ratify the Korea-US FTA within 17th Assembly ends its four 
year term May 29th, 2008. However, the prospect was murky with the opposing parties opposing the bill and Korea- 
US FTA sparking a public and civic groups’ outrage over the government's agreement to resume imports o f  US beef 
(April 18th, 2008) which the Korean government allowed imports o f  American beef o f all ages and cuts into Korea, 
triggering massive public protest and opposition.
215
Chapter Five
Finally, Korea lifted a ban on U.S. beef imports on June 26 after the US agreed, 
on 21sl June, not to export beef from cattle older than 30 months to Korea.
One would argue that views on the vigils are poles apart depending upon 
ideological outlook (Ha 2008)113. For example, many on the progressive end of the 
spectrum saw it as a lightening rod issue that brought to 'light' the darkness of the 
conservative government, linking the protests to the 1987 pro-democracy movement 
that enacted a de facto democratic system in Korea114. Additionally, participants in the 
candlelit vigils were not only protesting the importation U.S. beef, they were also 
protesting against President Lee's general economic and social policies.
On the other side of the political spectrum, while many conservatives admitted 
to the spontaneity of the vigils during the early stages of the protests, they claimed that 
some left-leaning media outlets, including broadcasters and Web portals, made incorrect, 
inflammatory and irresponsible reports on the health risks of US beef, which, at least in 
part, caused many to take to the streets in protest. As anti-US progressives took the 
initiative, the protests were spoiled amid escalating violence and those who had been 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the presidential election in December 2007 also joined 
in.
On 13th June, 2008 thousands of people rallied in defense of President Lee and 
his beef import deal, with participants cnticising major media companies for their 
alleged unfair reporting of the beef issue. Some 8,000 people representing several 
conservative groups gathered at the Seoul Metro Station Friday afternoon and some 
participants later marched to major media broadcasters' headquarters to protest their 
news coverage, according to the Hankook Ilbo on 14th June, 2008. Groups represented 
at the rally included Vietnam veterans associations, with hundreds of Korean veterans 
attending the event in uniform. There were also participants from a number of religious 
associations as well as members from the conservative-leaning ‘Free Citizens' Alliance 
of Korea’ (FCAK) and ‘Committee against Kim Jong-il and Nuclear Proliferation.’ The 
protesters took issue with the country's television broadcast companies -the publicly 
funded Korean Broadcast System (KBS) and the MBC- and the way they had been 
portraying the beef import issue and the danger of mad cow disease. The groups
‘Protest Draws Contrast to Candlelight Vigils,’ (Korea Times 06/15/2008), 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/06/! 13_25913.html.
114 Korea Herald (10/06/2008).
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claimed that both KBS and MBC were involved in biased reporting and in inflating and 
exaggerating the issue associated with US beef. They insisted that KBS and MBC had 
been unfairly targeting President Lee and his administration. These protesters were 
particularly upset at MBC TV's popular news magazine program ‘PD Notebook' which, 
they claimed, exaggerated the dangers associated with US cattle.
Opponents
However, regardless of validity or veracity of either argument, this incident 
provided a perfect opportunity for those who had opposed a Korea-US FT A. It began 
with the PD Notebook programme that did an 'expose' on the potential health effects of 
US beef on 28th April. This programme was aired by MBC, a broadcasting channel 
known for its left leaning views. Within 36 hours, a major public gathering protesting 
the importation of US beef was witnessed in Seoul. Several figures involved in 
organising this protest were also members of the KoA. Does this mean there was 
organisational planning between the KoA and these vigils from the very beginning? 
Probably not, but what can be said is that within a very short time, the KoA was directly 
involved. On 8th May 2008, 1700 civic groups and internet-based communities 
mobilised into one big umbrella organisation called ‘Organisation of Korea’s Anti-Mad 
Cow’ (OKAC). Although the OKAC may have been a larger umbrella group, these 
organisations were virtually the same ones that constituted the KoA.
On 9lh May, in Seoul, 30,000 people participated in a candlelight vigil which 
was the largest protest since President Lee's administration announced it would begin 
importing US beef under more lax regulations. For the most part, these vigils were 
organised using internet blog sites and personal contacts between familiar civic groups 
that had plenty of experience protesting the Korea-US FTA over the previous two years. 
The KoA, under a new acronym, the OKAC, mobilising massive organisational power 
garnered from the politicisation of the beef issue and collating it with the issue of the 
Korea-US FTA, were able to exert heavy influence through PI (primary channel) on 
President Lee's administration. Understandably, the amount of nationwide, massive and 
ongoing demonstrations produced an enormous amount of PI pressure. This influence 
was so wide-ranging that it crossed over into IP I (secondary channel). This influence
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accessed IPI through both political veto players, namely the President and the NA. 
Neither was willing to face down such massive public opposition. To do so would 
surely spell political suicide. Furthermore, to say that the KoA accessed PPPM would 
be incorrect; rather the huge demonstrations countered any move the FTA's supporters 
could exert through their use of PPPM. So much so, in fact that the Korea-US still has 
not passed, despite the government both favouring the FT A and holding a majority in 
NA.
Opposition parties (the UDP, the DLP and the Liberty Forward Party (LFP)), 
and civic groups immediately issued statements calling for the cancelation of the beef 
deal, which they said threatened public health. “The beef agreement is tantamount to 
giving up the human right to health,” said the left-wing DLP. The Hanwoo Association, 
a lobbying group for the Korean beef industry, also called the agreement “insulting”, 
saying that the Korean government had made too many concessions'15.
The beef agreement was the perfect instrument for those who opposed the FT A. 
Considering the public support for the issues raised by the FTA’s opponents, the 
opposition was not going to look a political gift horse in the mouth. The political 
opposition in the NA were quick to denounce the government’s plans to ratify the FTA 
and did not hesitate to vote against it116. Subsequently the ratification was blocked.
While this does not rule out ratification in the 19th session of the NA, the situation in the 
US does not look as sanguine as it did several months ago. The US president elect has 
intimated his less than positive view on the Korea-US FTA. Then Senator Barack Obama 
called on President George W. Bush on May 22nd, 2008 not to submit the bilateral FTA 
for a congressional vote. Obama’s attempt against the FTA cast a dark cloud over the 
parliamentary approval for the bilateral free trade accord not only in Korea but also in 
the US. Considering the tight political timetable ahead of the November presidential 
poll in the US, analysts cautiously predicted that the ratification of the FTA might be 
delayed until after the election. Obama called the Korea-US FTA ‘badly flawed' in a 
letter sent to President Bush, resorting to his party’s protectionist trade policy. It is 
apparent that the letter reflected US automakers’ dissatisfaction with the FTA. Senator 
Obama argued that the agreement, particularly the provisions on automobiles, gives 
Korean exports ‘essentially unfettered access to the US market.’
115 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (25/04/2008).
116 Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (02/05/2008).
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The beef issue embodies and typifies the three key structures of channels of 
influence. Supporters of an FTA with the US, through PPPM and IP I, managed to 
convince the US Congress to sign up to an FTA bill with Korea in return for the re­
opening of the Korean market to US beef. However, they failed to take into account the 
levels of opposition that this would encounter in Korea. Upon finding out the particulars 
of the deal, the KoA mobilised massive organisational power, managed to collate the 
two issues (FTA and US beef importation) and garnered huge public support and 
influence for their position. This had the result of influencing the NA (a key political 
institution and veto player) to such an extent that despite the governing party's majority, 
they could not get the FTA introduced to the NA for ratification.
Korean domestic stakeholders will probably have the last word on the Korea- 
US FTA. Having dealt with previous FT As, the organisations that fall under the current 
KoA umbrella group had the knowledge to deal some serious body blows to the 
agreement with the US and although they are not likely to knock it out, their impact on 
the outcome is undeniable. It is to this impact we turn to next.
On 18th December 2008, while the largest opposition DP lawmakers and their 
aides used hammers and electric saws to break the door of the foreign affairs 
committee's conference room in an attempt to stop the unilateral move, in a closed- 
door meeting, Chairman Park Jin of COFAT and the GNP lawmakers made a quick 
decision to submit the motion to a subcommittee for deliberation. Once deliberation 
was completed, COFAT voted on the motion before a vote in the plenary session. The 
governing party passed the motion as the committee is consisted of 27 lawmakers and 
17 of them are GNP lawmakers,
On 11th February 2009, The COFAT failed to review the ratification bill for the 
Korea-US FTA due to strong opposition from the progressive DLP. The COFAT 
planned to put the bill as the main item on its agenda in its plenary session but acting 
DLP Chairman Chun Young-se and seven other lawmakers prevented the meeting 
from taking place. They physically locked the conference room so the committee's 
chairman could not enter even though the two largest parties, the GNP and DP, had 
agreed to review the bill a week prior.
On 22nd April 2009, Korea's parliamentary committee (COFAT) finally passed 
a bill to ratify the government's FTA with the US, sending it to a plenary session for
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final approval in NA. The endorsement by the COFAT came amid protests from 
opposition lawmakers who claimed that the move was premature. Opposition parties 
called the passage “procedurally flawed” as Chairman Jin refused to allow them to have 
a full discussion during the committee session. Actually, the bill was nearly derailed as 
a group of 44 lawmakers from three opposition parties tried to block its passage. The 
lawmakers, including Kang Ki-kab of the DLP, called on GNP leaders to come up with 
an effective structural adjustment program for farmers and other potential losers’ if the 
bilateral trade pact goes into effect, before ratification.
Currently, the bill has been waiting for voting in NA. The GNP has 170 seats in 
the 299-member legislature, while the DP has 83.
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Evaluation of the Impact the Domestic Stakeholders’ Influences on 
the FTA
Although the Korea-US FTA was not unusual in the method of its birth, it was 
the manner of its inception and its gestation period that were to raise eyebrows. As per 
usual, the agreement’s supporters were the dominant force during the agenda-setting 
phase. However, it was how it was transformed from an FKI concept -  meant to repair 
bridges with a jilted MOFAT -  into an obsession for the government with such rapidity 
that was to cause consternation, at least in hindsight. The negotiation phase was begun 
rather hastily, but once it had begun, the opposition groups coalesced equally quickly 
and immediately threw up some stem resistance to what the government was hoping 
would be a fait accompli1 !7. The Final Agreement Paper of June 30th, 2007 signalled the 
beginning of a ratification phase that was -  in the long term -  to prove almost as ornery 
as the negotiation phase.
The role that domestic stakeholders played in shaping the Korea-US FTA is 
unmistakeable, their footprints are to be found all over it. The agenda-setting phase is 
not unusual in this circumstance and, therefore, the section dealing with this phase shall 
be appropriately brief. The negotiation phase, on the other hand, is a section that shall 
deal with several specific issues which reflect the pressure applied by the KoA on the 
Korean government and its negotiation team. This thesis will then continue with a look 
at how the FTA -  during the ratification phase -  has again come under pressure.
Agenda-setting phase
To say that the Korea-US FTA agenda-setting phase was short would be an 
understatement of considerable proportions. The FKI led coalition approached the then 
trade minister through PPPM on March 2005118, with the idea of an FTA with the US, 
in part to atone for their subterfuge during the Korea-Japan FTA that left that particular 
FTA in the intensive care unit. The trade minister was smitten and did not lose any time
Interview conducted with Lee Hae-young, a co-leader o f the KoA, Seoul, February 2nd, 2007. 
Interviews conducted with Huh Chan-guk, Director o f Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, October 16th, 2006 and March 5th, 2007; Interviews conducted with Lee Mi-hyun, the head o f  
multilateral trade cooperation decision in MOFAT, Seoul, August 14th, 2009.
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in converting the president, who in turn was to give his trade minister the green light. 
What surprised many was the suddenness of the announcement of negotiations.
Similar to the Korea-Chile FTA, the agenda setting phase saw the FKI and 
MOFAT depending on IPI and PPPM (primary and secondary respectively). The simple 
reason no PI was used was because there was no need as both the FKI and MOFAT 
were in support of the agreement any potential opponents were unaware of what was 
happening regarding any Korea-US FTA due to their reliance on the PPFR protocols. In 
other words, the PPFR stated that public hearings would be necessary before any further 
FT As were launched and due to the lack of any hearings, potential opponents were, for 
all intents and purposes, kept in the dark. Again, given the FKI's high OP, their access 
to IPI meant that they would have a close working relationship with government 
institutions, which was strongly in evidence with their close cooperation with MOFAT 
during this phase, while their access to PPPM meant that they had good working 
relations with several key bureaucrats and politicians.
While the agenda-setting phase during both the Korea-Chile/Japan FTAs were 
similarly dominated by supporters, opponents had advance warning and were able to 
prepare themselves for the negotiation phase. The stealth by which this phase was 
completed sent shivers down the spines of many who would stand opposed to this FTA.
Negotiation phase
Negotiations began with something akin to a cosmological big bang, before it 
there was nothing, or so it seemed. However, as King Lear stated, “Nothing comes from 
nothing.” This magic trick was all illusion; the government had -  as has been described 
earlier -  begun setting the agenda behind closed doors. The unveiling of negotiations 
along with a simultaneous surrendering on the ‘four preconditions’ was enough to stoke 
the ire of oppositionists and fan the flames of anti-FTA sentiment throughout Korea. 
The eight rounds of negotiations -  particularly those held in Korea -  were demonstrated 
against staunchly. The ebb and flow of the struggle in the public sphere tended -  on the 
whole -  to support the oppositionists119 and finally, following the end of the eighth
Three Public Opinion Polls (KoA on March 22nd, 2007, Korean Gallup on April 4th, 2007 and Korean 
Research on April 4th, 2007) showed that opposition (46.8, 51.2 and 48.7 percent respectively), Support (44.5, 42.2
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round of negotiations and the two high level meetings that occurred shortly afterwards, 
a Final Agreement Paper (FAP)was published June 30th, 2007. Up to and including the 
eighth round, probably 80 percent120 or more of the issues had been dealt with but it is 
the remaining fraction of deal breakers that invariably chart the course of an FT A either 
through the reefs failure or directly onto them. It is to this FAP that we shall turn to 
evaluate the impact of the domestic stakeholders.
The FAP dealt with twenty-one specific issues related to the Korea-US FTA121. 
Although the FAP itself represents the points of view of both countries and their 
respective compromises, the issue at stake for this thesis is the relationship that exists 
not between Korea and the US but the relationship between Korea and its respective 
domestic stakeholders. While it may seem initially vague, these relationships can be 
teased out of the document with surprising ease and is probably best exemplified by the 
juxtaposition of the issues where government and domestic stakeholders clashed and the 
results of which are contained in the positions the Korean government took.
Out of the twenty-one issues that were dealt with in the FAP, roughly half were 
partially resolved before high-level meetings took place in March 19th -  21st, 2007, the 
remaining ten issues are of particular importance to this thesis due to the intransigence 
involved in their resolution. Of these ten issues (see Table 5.5), we shall focus on the 
negotiation process in relation to six specific issues. The first three (agricultural goods, 
automobiles and medicine) were issues which the US demanded that Korea alter its 
initial position. The last three items (trade remedy, the Investors-State Dispute (ISD) 
and textiles) were issues on which Korea demanded a US compromise.
and 35.0 percent respectively).
120 JoongAng Daily Newspaper (01/07/2007).
MOFAT website, http://www.fta.go.kr/user/index.asp.
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Table 5.5: Korea-US FT A Settlement Summary
Korea Issues (until 8th meeting) US Final Settlement
Excluding  opening  
sensitive item s such 
as rice and beef.
A g ricu ltu ra l
good
Early ta riff  rem oval w ithout exception.
E xcluding rice; 50 percent seasonal ta r iff  on oranges during 
the harvest, betw een Septem ber and February, and 30 percent 
tariff  during  the rest p e rio d 12-; b e e f  ta riff  rem oving period 
agreed to 15 years; 3 -y e a r  safeguard availab le12’.
Early rem oval o f  US 
autom obile ta r if f
A utom obile
A utom obile taxation  reform ; m ore 
control on  place o f  origin; change o f  
environm ent standard policy.
T a riff  (2.5 percent) rem oval for autom obiles o f  3000cc 
d isplacem ent or m ore w ith in  3 years; im m ediate rem oval for 
autom obiles o f  3000cc d isplacem ent or less; rem oval w ithin 10 
years for pickup trucks (25 percen t)124.
O pening  US coastal 
fishery; easing  foreign 
share limit for air 
travel businesses.
Service
Increasing foreign share lim it o f  
dom estic telecom m unication businesses; 
allow ing dubbing form at in broadcasting  
including CNN; increasing foreign  m ovie 
quotas.
Broadcasting/telecom m unication  fusion service, online 
contents (internet VOD) and Screen quota rem ain undecided 
(allow ed low ering the level o f  opening in the future); no 
K orean dubbing for retransm itted  foreign broadcasting 
including CNN.
In troducing  tem porary  
safeguard w hen 
financial crisis.
Finance
O pposing in troducing tem porary  
safeguard.
US accepted, for the first tim e in FTA with other country, 
in troduction o f  foreign exchange safeguard.
Excluding  taxation  
and real estate 
policies from  ISD 
system .
In v es tm en t
R eform ing dom estic regulations on 
foreign investors.
K orea accepted 'Ind irec tly  (not an acceptance but a 
governm ent policy w ith  the sam e effect as that o f  an 
accep tance)’ ISD system  and excluded real estate price 
stabilisation policy from  application o f  the system ; general 
taxation was excluded from  ‘acceptance’ 125.
Easing an ti-d u m p in g  
duty system . T ra d e  R em edy
No reform  is unacceptable.
A n ti-d u m p in g  d u ty -re la ted  m ajor req u ests126 w ere not 
accepted; only m inor requests that w ould  need no change o f  
US law including estab lish ing  trade rem edy com m ittee and 
notice p rio r to  starting  dum ping investigation were accepted.
A ccepting  Special 
exception  on O utw ard 
processing  o f  
G aeseong Industrial 
Com plex.
Place o f  Origin
A pplying FT A  only w ith in  the territory 
o f  K orea and US.
Failed to introduce 'O u tw ard  P rocessing A rrangem ent (O P A )’; 
instead, K orean Peninsula O utw ard Processing Regional 
C om m ittee’ w as established, w hich w as helpful for n u c lea r-  
free in K orean Peninsula; i f  several conditions including 
hum an rights in N orth  K orea are im proved, it w ill set a basis 
for O P A .’
T a riff  rem oval and 
easing  the standard 
for place o f  origin.
Textile Prevention for roundabout export.
Tariff(13 percent) rem oval for US textiles w ithin 5—10 years;
85 item s that K orea initially requested for Y am  
F orw ard!standard for place o f  origin based on original thread) 
application were reduced to 5 items including linen, lyocell, 
rayon, w om en’s jack e ts  and m en’s sh irts1-7.
Respecting K orea’s 
healthcare and 
m edical system .
M edicine
M inim um  price guarantee for new drugs;
establishing independent objector 
organisation w hen decid ing  drug  price.
US w ithdrew  the requests for A -7  Pricing (average drug price 
in 7 countries including US, UK  and Japan) based m inim um  
price guarantee for innovative new drugs.
M aintaining current 
regulation  o f  50—year 
copyright; no non­
violation complaints for 
intellectual property 
right.
Intellectual 
Property Right
Copyright ex tension  to 70 years; no non­
violation complaints for intellectual property 
right.
US request for ex tension  to 70 years w as accepted. It w ill have 
3 -y ea r grace period after the agreem ent is in effect; N on­
violation C om plaint for intellectual property right was 
undecided  until W T O ’s decision128.
This tariff will be removed over the course of seven years. Oranges are protected by TRQ.
According to the decision of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) on the safety level of the US 
beef in May 2007, both countries agreed to ease current import sanitation condition.
In addition, tires were classified for five years and auto parts for immediate removal. Korea decided to 
immediately remove automobile tariff (8 percent). The US requests for unification of special excise tax according to 
displacement to 5 percent within 3 years after the agreement is in effect and introducing of fast dispute settling 
procedure and environment certification according to the standard of California State, were accepted; however tax on 
automobiles based on displacement and public debt remain unchanged.
Korea's suggestion on resolving acceptance dispute with domestic remedy procedure instead of 
international dispute procedure was never realised; Korea’s current regulations remain but foreign share limit (15 
percent) of indirect investment shall be removed within 2 years after the agreement is in effect.
Korea expects to secure No Zeroing, Applying Lesser Duty Rule and Non-accumulation.
Korea, instead, had to suggest systematic measure to prevent Chinese textile products disguised as 
Korean from exporting to US.
Current WTO regulations do not support Non-violation Complaint for intellectual property right.
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i. Agricultural Goods -  Opponents ’ Influence
Strong opposition from groups supporting Korean agriculture was well reflected 
in the government’s negotiating position. The US, from the beginning, pressured the 
Korean negotiation team to accept tariff elimination with no exceptions129; however the 
Korean government withstood the pressure. Bae Jong-ha, the director of the 
International Agriculture Bureau in MOAF, declared that “the rice market would not be 
opened under any circumstances and that should the US continue then the Korean 
government would have no choice but to cancel further FTA negotiations130” 
immediately after the fifth round of negotiations. Rice and beef were highly contentious 
items for the Korean government and its negotiation team due to the amount of PI and 
PPPM applied by the KoA131. In the case of beef, besides the issue of a 40 percent tariff 
that was in place, the more pressing issue from the perspective of the US was the ban 
that Korea had placed on US beef since 2003. A resumption of the importation of 
selected cuts of beef lasted barely weeks when illegal cuts were found and the ban was 
reinforced. Recent demonstrations (as of April, 2008) have only bolstered the fact that 
the beef issue, for many Koreans, is an extremely sensitive topic.
Demonstrations against the importation of US beef in Seoul saw 30,000 people 
on the streets on April 25th, 2008, point to this fact. Further demonstrations threw a 
spanner in the works of supporters (in the shape of PI and indirect influence over 
political institutions) and the 17th extraordinary session of the NA failed to ratify the 
FTA. The Korean government was even more intransigent on the issue of rice. While 
beef has been a major issue, no Korean government has been willing consider publicly 
the possibility of opening the rice market as such a move would be tantamount to 
political suicide.
According to the final agreement paper, 585 items (38 percent) out of 1,531 
were lined up for immediate tariff removal. Rice, beef, orange and corns, in which the 
US was interested, were excluded. A surer sign that domestic stakeholders had 
influence over the outcome of the Korea-US FTA would be harder to find.
US-Chamber Calls for Comprehensive (2006), ‘ Viable US-Korea Free Trade Agreement,’ 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2006/february/06-13.htm; USTR (2006) 'FTA: US and Republic o f Korea 
Opportunities for Agriculture,' Trade Facts, February.
130 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (09/10/2006).
Interview conducted with Lee Hae-young, one o f the co-leaders o f the KoA, Seoul, February 2nd, 2007.
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ii. Automobiles: passive support
Korean and US automobile import tariffs were eight percent and two and half 
percent respectively. While Korea urged the removal of the 2.5percent tariff, the US 
focused on Korea’s NTBs, notably the automobile taxation system. The final agreement 
was that the US would concede on tariff removal for automobiles of 3000cc 
displacement or more within 3 years; immediate removal for automobiles of 3000cc 
displacement or less; removal within 10 years for pickup trucks (25 percent), while the 
Korean government conceded to the immediate removal of the 8 percent tariff and to 
reform the automobile taxation system132. Interestingly, the Korean automobile 
industries had also requested a reform of the Korean automobile taxation system (Choi 
2006: 274-299; Hong and Cheong 2006: 120).
There were two interpretations of how the FT A would impact on the Korean 
automobile industry. The first of these is present in Figure 5.3, where many specialists 
who were surveyed and asked which industry they thought would benefit most from a 
Korea-US FTA. 44 percent said that the automobile industry would benefit most. 
According to MOCIE, Korean car industries would have more price competitiveness 
and the overall prices of Korean medium-size cars would drop by around $667 (average 
car price $27,335)133. In a similar vein, KOTRA stated that 83 percent of the major US 
buyers of auto parts showed a very positive attitude towards purchasing Korean auto 
parts134. The Korean automobile industry, while agreeing with the overall thrust of these 
arguments, was not as sanguine about the specific benefits. In fact, the industry believed 
the FTA to be of little real worth. This interpretation was derived primarily from 
currency exchange rates and the future price of oil135. The KAMA which included 
Hyundai, Kia, Samsung and Daewoo and the Korea Auto Industries Cooperation and 
Association (KAICA) were supportive of the Korea-US FTA in general but their level 
of active support was -  as a result of these poor indicators of potential benefit -  barely 
evident. Because of the distributional consequences, the KAMA lacked sufficient 
motivation to aggressively push for or against the government's initiative. Notably,
Once the FTA was to come into effect, the capacity o f 1,000cc cars would be exempt from tax, over 
2000cc cars taxed 8 percent, after three years later, 5 percent down. The automobile taxation system based on engine 
capacity would be changed from five to three stages.
133 MOCIE (2006) 1Korea-US FTA, the benefits o f Korea’s automobile industries, ’ Issue Paper, No. 123, July
18th.
KOTRA (2007) 'Korea-US FTA and benefits o f Korea SMEs in Korea,’ Issue Report, November 11th.
Interview conducted with You Jong-sun, one o f the managing directors o f KAMA, Seoul, March 20th,
2007.
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Hyundai136 and Kia, with production facilities in the US, faced a further reduction in 
potential benefits.
Given these circumstances, acceptance of the US proposals was almost 
inevitable. Considering the position that the Korean government was going to have to 
adopt on other, more sensitive issues, some thought the acceptance of the US proposals 
might also help in developing capital for barter at another date (Na et al., 2006: 142).
In addition, speaking generally one considers that lowering the US 
tariff from 25 percent to zero (for 10 years) would bring obvious and concrete benefits 
to Korean Car makers. However, in May 2008 Dr. Kim Dong-jin, Vice-Chairman and 
CEO of Hyundai said137:
“due to oil prices and a declining market we don't think right now is the right time to introduce 
one [ie pick-up truck] to the market. We investigated this when we built the Kia Georgia 
plant...but in this environment we were forced to give up thoughts of the truck...neither Hyundai 
nor Kia will produce one...for the U.S. We had interests in the pickup truck market and light 
truck market, originally, the truck was to be built at Kia's soon-to-be-completed $1.2 billion 
assembly plant in West Point, Georgia, on the same line as the Sorento and a to-be-determined 
third vehicle. The new factory could have the capacity to produce 300,000 cars and trucks 
annually. In the US, Kia would avoid the 25 percent federal import tax (also known as 'Chicken 
Tax') levied on pick-up trucks built overseas, though that tariff is being phased out between now 
and 2017 through an FTA between US and Korea.”
In other words, high fuel prices were rocking big truck sales, forcing some 
buyers to look for more fuel efficient pick-ups. Will American buyers want an unproven 
Korean truck, especially a uni-body ? Honda only sold 42,795 Ridgelines last year, 
down 15 percent from 2006. And tertiary truck brands like Isuzu (which is leaving the 
American market) and Mitsubishi have only sold in the low thousands138.
In 1990, Hyundai established the Hyundai Design Centre in Fountain Valley, California. The centre 
moved to a new $30 million facility in Irvine, California in 2003, and was renamed the Hyundai Kia Design and 
Technical Centre. The facility also housed Hyundai America Technical Centre, Inc., (HATCI, established in 1986). 
The centre also has employees in California and Alabama. Hyundai completed an assembly plant just outside 
Montgomery, Alabama in 2004. It is Hyundai's second attempt at producing cars in North America. 
http://en.wikipedia.0rg/wiki/Hyundai_M0t0r_C0mpany#Hyundai_in_the_United_States.
137 The Birmingham News (09/05/2008): Automotive News (17/03/2008).
138 http://www.pickuptrucks.com/html/news/kia/kia-preps-for-us-pickup.html.
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Figure 5.3: Possible Korean industries that stand to benefit from a Korea-US FTA
Hi. Medicine (Medical Organisations and Opening Medicine Market) -  Opponent s 
Influence
The field of pharmaceuticals and health care was a bone of contention for both 
groups of negotiators. The US urged that the Korean government not reform the Drug 
Price Reasonably—Priced Plan (DPRP). The DPRP was an extremely sensitive piece of 
legislation to the Korea Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (KPMA)139. The 
DPRP guaranteed that pharmaceutical drugs would be reasonably priced and, therefore, 
was understandably very much a sensitive issue for the KoA as well (Song 2006: 224). 
The US asked for the removal of insurance price limits for new drugs and to strengthen 
patent right protection. The Korean government initially promised to hold off on 
reforming the DPRP, one of four preconditions.
Contrary to this promise and despite US opposition, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare (MOHAW)140 decided immediately after the fifth round of negotiations to 
reform the DPRP starting on December 29th, 2006 after the KPMA strongly complained, 
via PPPM and IP I, about the US position141. Korean government however enforced the 
policy as planned since pharmaceutical related negotiations had not made any progress 
during the fifth round of negotiations. The US government expressed disappointment at 
the decision.
Chun Man-bok, director of the Korea-US FTA at the MOHAW explained that
139 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (04/11/2006).
The MOHAW, 'Enforcement of Health Insurance Drug Price Rationalisation,' www.mohw.go.kr (27/12/2006).
The KPMA and KoA successfully persuaded the general public who was concerned about overall all drug 
prices due to the Korea-US FTA. The KPMA issued a public statement on December 28th, 2006 which was critical in 
drawing the public’s awareness.
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the US initially requested cancellation of the DPRP142. According to him, cancellation 
would include the guarantee of a set lowest price for new drugs; interlocking of drug 
price with price increase; opposing price reduction of medicine with expired patents; a 
delay of drug economical efficiency evaluations; and separation of wage estimate and 
drug pricing. Director Chun said, since the first round of negotiations, the US has 
requested removal of the DPRP; the US even discontinued the second round negotiation 
after learning that Korean government announced the DPRP on July 25th, 2006.
The KPMA was concerned about the extended influence of the Korea-US FTA 
for the following two reasons. First, they opposed the manner of drug pricing laid out in 
the Korea-US FTA (KoA 2006c: 292-295). The US government, at the urging of the 
drug manufacturing industry in the US, requested that the Korean government remove 
insurance price limit for new drugs and to strengthen patent right protection. Second, 
medical groups opposed the opening of a private medical insurance market. This was 
being negotiated in the services division, rather than in medicine division; the KoA was 
deeply concerned about the negative impact of opening a private medical insurance 
market143. They were of the opinion that the extension of private medical insurance 
would weaken the public medical system and accelerate the privatisation of the medical 
service and that the extension of private medical insurance would polarise the medical 
service between those who could afford to pay and those who could not.
In short, the KPMA influenced the MOHAW directly144 while at the same time 
the KoA continued its public demonstrations with the result that the Korean government 
did not concede on these issues.
iv. Trade Remedy Laws — Korean government ’s efforts
In the fifth round of negotiations, held in Montana, US from December 4th -  8th, 
2006, Korea requested improvements on five items related to the AD duty system145. 
Korea stopped the negotiation on automobile and medicine, both of which were the
Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (20/11/2006).
Interview conducted with Lee Hae-young, one of the co-leaders of the KoA, Seoul, February 2nd, 2007. 
Interview conducted with Jan Hyun-seuk, one of managing director of KPMA, Seoul, March 29th, 2007. 
Key individuals that were involved with the KPMA were also involved with the MOHAW in a 'revolving door 
scenario that is common place in many modem democratic societies.
The Trade Negotiation Centre (TNC) in MOFAT, 'Results of the fifth Meeting o f Korea-US FTA,’ report 
material of the Korea-US FTA Special Committee (14/12/2006).
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matters of interest for the US, while they waited for the US response146. This was a firm 
indication to the US of how important this issue was to the Korean government. Korea 
asserted that the US took import control on Korean exported goods worth $37.3 billion, 
which was 6.8 percent of gross export to the US between 1981 and 2005l47. Therefore 
the Korean government was of the opinion that trade liberalisation via an FTA would 
not be effective unless the US was willing to reform its trade remedy system (Kim 
2006c: 115).
The US however did not deliver an answer to this request in the fifth round of 
negotiations. The US representatives explained that the issue was beyond their authority 
since the US Congress had to amend regulations regarding the anti-dumping duty 
system. The US Congress refused the request. A safe assumption would seem to be that 
Korean exporters were vocal in their support of the Korean government. But this was 
not the case. An alteration along the lines of what the Korean government was 
negotiating would have suited Korean exporters immensely but their support was, oddly, 
silent. What helps explain this odd situation is the fact that Korean exporters understood 
the situation to be completely outside their realm of influence148. The US has never 
altered its trade remedy system for any trade agreement (Jackson 2006:4) and Korean 
exporters were well aware of the futility of attempting to influence their government to 
force the issue. However since the government publicly promoted that this issue would 
be a major accomplishment in the negotiation, actually realising it became necessary for 
justification of an FTA and ratification by the NA149.
The final outcome was that the US made minor (see table 5.5), superficial 
changes to their AD regulations and trade remedy system in order to keep their Korean 
counterparts happy, however the structure of the system remained intact (Cheong 2006: 
288-299).
Dong-A Daily Newspaper (06/12/2006).
The US started investigations into 85 trade remedy-related cases in the last 25 years, which hold eight 
percent o f  total number o f cases that the US has investigated. Considering the weight o f  Korea’s exports to the US 
import market is approx, three percent, the US trade remedy on Korean products seems rather strong (Yonhap Daily 
Newspaper 22/10/2006).
Interview conducted with Huk Chan-guk, Director o f  Economic Research Division, KERI in FKI 
affiliates, Seoul, March 4th, 2007.
149 Pressian On-line Daily Newspaper (06/04/2007).
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v. Investment 
Liberal Lawyers and ISD
Alongside agriculture, one of the most sensitive issues at stake was that of 
ISD150. This provision gives foreign investors the right to sue a country in the 
International Court of Arbitration (ICA). For example, if an American investor who 
invested in Korea thinks that a specific policy or a measure of the Korean government 
violates his/her profit, he/she can sue the Korean government in the ICA for the 
Settlement of ISD, not a domestic court in Korea, and Korean government shall accept 
the decision made by the ICA (Lee 2006f: 509-539). This was to become a lightning 
rod for the KoA, primarily because the KoA believed that foreign investors might 
receive more protection than domestic investors, and laws and policies of sovereignty 
might become subjects of international arbitration, which might violate the sovereignty 
principle (ibid).
Song Gi-ho151, a lawyer representing the MINBYUN (Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society), an organisation that vehemently opposed the Korea-US FTA, 
asserted that a Korea-US FTA containing the ISD provisions would be a violation of 
the Korean Constitution152. Even some ministries within the government were opposed 
to the ISD provisions. The Ministry of Trade, within the MOFAT, organised an 
inspection team to exam the issue of ISD at the orders of President Roh in July 2006, 
after starting FTA negotiation. Most government offices, except the MOFAT, opposed 
the inclusion of the ISD in Korea-US FTA for various reasons; the Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ) pointed out that the ISD was highly likely to reduce the government’s authority
This is an investor protection system introduced after the 1980s as negotiation power between foreign 
investors and investment holding countries became more favourable to investors. It is included in most BITs and 
FTAs with the US.
Song Gi-ho, 'Giving the ISD benefit to American Businesses is a Violation o f the Korean Constitution,’ 
(Pressian On-line Daily Newspaper 24/07 2006). And his book (2006), "Maginot Line o f the Korea-US FTA, ” Grinbi, 
Seoul. He also mentioned the liberal lawyer group (Lawyers for a Democratic Society-in Korean abbreviation, 
Minbyun), opposes the Korea-US FTA based on this logic.
First, regulations on expropriation and regulation (taking in investor protection provision), expected to be 
included in Korea-US FTA, is beyond the range of property right protection that the Constitutional Court of Korea 
follows. While only concrete rights concerning property value are protected in Korea, the investor protection 
provision in the Korea-US FTA provides the government's responsibility of compensation even when an investor 
cannot expect reasonable profit due to government activity and, so it is argued, is a violation of the Korean 
Constitution. Second, it violates the civil right of equality provided in Article XI of the Korean Constitution. US 
investors will be given the right to choose international arbitration procedure in addition to domestic legal procedure 
in Korea to resolve an investment dispute. Third, it may violate the civil right of access to courts according to Article 
XXVII of the Korean Constitution. Once Korea-US FTA is settled, Korean public policy becomes a subject of judges 
in the I CA, not of judges authorised by the Korean Constitution and laws. Since this arbitration procedure is different 
from the procedure of a court in Korea, it violates a citizen's constitutional right regarding a trial.
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on policies as well as violate legislative authority of the NA. The Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation (MOCAT) was concerned that most of the 
government's real estate policies would be affected by the ISD and suggested the 
exclusion of the ISD from the agreement153. The MOFE also raised financial issues that 
might be caused by the ISD. The MOFE criticised the MOFAT’s position, saying, “they 
(the MOFAT) are saying the ISD can introduce a global standard but we still do not 
know what that is exactly154.” A more stereotypical example of the bureaucratic politics 
model exemplifying differences of opinion would be hard to find. The MOFAT 
however, stood by its ‘pro-ISD' position. The MOFAT stated “our first draft sent to the 
US already included the ISD and settled the matter that a Korea-US FTA would include 
the ISD.” The MOFAT maintained its position that ‘Korea-US FTA would include the 
ISD regardless.
The government initially planned to include the system in the agreement without 
hesitation155. Instead, however, a plan for a thorough investigation of the system for 
potential negative effects was initiated while the government hesitated due to pressure 
applied by the KoA and resistance within government circles156. The Korean 
government proceeded to reduce the range of the ISD’s applications157. The negotiation 
attitude of the Korean representatives changed significantly; this clearly indicates that 
opponents’ pressure had a great influence on the negotiators' position. The Korean 
efforts at negotiation eventually led to the exclusion of national regulations related to 
taxation and real estate price stabilisation in the ISD provisions. Obviously, the statist 
approach is not sufficient in explaining this outcome, hence the need for a societal 
approach that analyses both the influence domestic stakeholders had and the channels of 
influence they used to affect such policy outcomes.
Korean Anti-trust regulators
Another thorny issue facing the two sides was Korea's competition laws 
concerning the chaebols. On September 6th, 2006, chief US negotiator Wendy Cutler 
stated in a press conference in Seoul that the US wanted Korean anti-trust regulators to
Interview conducted with Park Myung-jae, Minister of MOPAS, Seoul, March 3rd, 2007.
154 Ibid.
155 Hankyorech Daily Newspaper (20/11/2006).
For Major Issue of the Korea-US FTA Investment Items; ISD, the government is criticised for its hasty 
negotiation, (Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper 22/11/2006).
157 Interview conducted with Park Myung-jae, Minister of MOPAS, Seoul, March 3rd, 2007.
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apply stiffer competition laws to conglomerates and that Korea’s anti-trust regulations 
could pose as a stumbling block to the operations of multinational companies. Ms.
Cutler added that their dominance overshadowed multinational companies operating in 
Korea158.
The FKI, Korea's big business association, raised its voice immediately in 
protest against the US demand for stricter rules on family-run Korean conglomerates 
(Chaebols) through PPPM and IPI. In a statement159, the FKI said that although the 
Korean business community greatly supported an FTA with the US, it could not accept 
the US request, as the proposal overlooks Korea's market, business environment and 
international standards. “Korean conglomerates are under the watchful eyes of anti-trust 
regulators,” said an official at the FKI headquarters in Yoido, Seoul. “Laws like equity 
investment cap, cross-shareholding rules and other chaebol restrictions have always 
been applied to big business groups, not to SMEs or even foreign invested companies in 
the country. Therefore, the US demand is unacceptable. ” An FKI official stressed,
“This US claim is a burden only to the Korean companies. The US must withdraw this 
demand, which could set up a roadblock for the successful conclusion of the FTA 
negotiations. ”
The FKI is instead conversely discriminated against, the FKI added. Big 
industrial groups have constantly argued against these rules as they cast a shadow over 
their investment plans and capital spending. The chaebol rules were part of the Fair 
Trade Commission's efforts to enhance corporate transparency as well as to prohibit 
chaebols’ anti-competitive practices and to curb them from becoming too dominant in 
the market.
US calls for stiffer competition laws on indigenous conglomerates to be 
included in an FTA are unique and can not to be found in any other bilateral or 
multilateral trade accords established, including Korea's FTAs with other countries. The 
FKI’s reaction to the US demands were immediate; a meeting with the deputy prime 
minister, Han Duk-soo on September 10th, 2006, and a petition letter was delivered to 
the Minister of trade on September 12th, 2006. Korea's chief negotiator Kim Jong-hoon 
Kim responded by saying that the US demands were unacceptable160 and the result was
Dong-A Daily Newspaper (10/09/2006).
FKI public statement (11/09/2006).
Korea Times (2006/09/13); Interview conducted with Kim Jong-hoon, current Trade minister (former the
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that the US demands were taken off the table. 
vi. Textiles—lack o f  influence
Next to the automobile industry, the textile industry was expected to benefit 
most from a Korea-US FTA (see table 5.5). Korea requested an immediate opening of 
the US textile market. They devised a 3-step tariff removal scheme; immediate removal 
and removal within 3 and 5 years161. The US suggested a 5-step scheme including 
immediate removal and removal within 3, 5, 10 and 15 years.
The ‘Yarn Forward162’ was particularly anathema to the Korean Federation of 
Textile Industries (KFOTI). This regulation provides that original thread shall be 
produced in the exporting country as well for approval of a place of origin. The Korean 
government requested a removal or easing of this regulation. The final outcome 
reflected US interests more than Korean.
Unlike the KAMA and the KAICA, the KFOTI was in a considerably weaker 
position in relation to the Korean government. The reasons behind the relative weakness 
of the KFOTI are that the textile industry had been in decline for since the 1970's (Lee 
and Shon 2001:1133-1135), compared to the KPMA their political war chest was tiny 
while the importance of textiles to the Korean economy or Korean society as a whole -  
when compared to agriculture -  was negligible. Despite the KFOTFs pleas, the Korean 
government decided to concede on most points relating to the textile industry163. But 
this was not a decision that was made in a vacuum, such decisions rarely are. It was 
agreed that US request to introduce textile safeguards would be exchanged for Korea’s 
request to introduce agriculture safeguards (Kim and Ahn 2007: 95). This interpretation 
indicates the congruency of the statist approach in dealing with specific aspects of 
Korean FTAs. In surrendering on the issue of textiles, the Korean government had 
swapped it for more bargaining power on issues it considered of more value. Also, from 
the US perspective, their textile industry is almost as politically sensitive as the
chief negotiator). I was accompanied by Kim Gi-ju, former director o f  administration Bureau in Blue House, August 
24th, 2009.
161 JoongAng Daily Newspaper (26/02/2006).
This is one o f  the US NTBs; Yam Forward is a rule concerning the origin o f textiles and apparel, which 
determines the origin according to where the material used to make the final product are produced. Under this rule, 
only apparel made from yarn and fabric originating in Korea would qualify for the FTA. This rule creates the 
anomalous situation where the effective amount o f value added processing necessary for qualifying apparel is 
substantially higher than for all other products-in the range o f  80 to 90 percent. The net result is that the yam forward 
rule in this FTA will retard, rather than promote textile and apparel trade.
163 Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (17/03/2007).
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agriculture industry is to the Korean government. The KFOTI’s access164 to the three 
key structures was limited, particularly through their lack of organisational power (itself 
a result of the weakening of the industry after China’s entrance into textiles production). 
This lack of access to channels of influence reduced the KFOTTs effect on policy 
outcome drastically.
The role of the US government
One question that must be answered before we move any further is that which 
concerns the role of the US government in achieving its goals. As looked at above, the 
US government did have a role to play concerning several key issues, notable 
agriculture, automobiles, medicine, investment (ISD and anti-trust legislation) and 
textiles. Although the US did get its way in textiles and automobiles, it did not achieve 
its goals concerning the other four sectors. But what explains this result, or in other 
words, why did the US succeed in achieving some goals and failed in others? At risk of 
slight oversimplification, there are two answers that can explain why the US succeeded 
in achieving its stated goals concerning textiles and automobiles. The first explanation 
is that the US pressure on the Korean government was relentless on these products and 
that the Korean government blinked first. On the other hand, one could state that the 
Korean domestic stakeholders in these sectors either did not apply enough pressure to 
maintain their position or that they did not have the wherewithal to mount an effective 
opposition. So, while these two episodes of variance could be explained as outside 
interference from the US government, the fact is that the remaining four issues, 
agriculture, medicine, ISD and anti-trust legislation cannot be.
Summary
To summarise, the impact domestic stakeholders had on these important of 
issues varied from success to failure. The results of agricultural goods, medicine and 
ISD (investment and anti-trust laws) were firmly in favour of the Korean domestic 
actors, whereas automobiles, trade remedy and textiles favoured their counterparts. 
Evidence that suggests that domestic stakeholders influenced the final agreement is 
plentiful and each issue is replete with facts that confirm this dissertation’s main thesis;
Interview conducted with Kim Sung-jong, one of directors of KFOTI, Seoul, March 17th, 2007.
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i.e. that domestic stakeholders can and do shape FTAs.
Supporters access to PI was weak (tertiary) and there are several reasons why 
this was so. Firstly, many businesses feared supporting the agreement could lead to a 
boycott. Second, businesses also feared social compensation costs, despite government 
assurance that no company would have to pay anything of the sort. Third, Korean 
business leaders (through the FKI's focused OP) had access to IP I and PPPM (primary 
and secondary respectively) and use of these channels was seen to be strategically more 
viable given the potential aforementioned costs of utilising PI to any great degree.
Similar to previous FTAs, the agreement's opponents relied heavily on PI 
(primary) given their diffused OP, although they did have access to PPPM and IPI 
(secondary and tertiary respectively). Their reliance on PI was the result of several 
factors. First, most notably, was their failure to access PPPM and IPI to any great 
degree initially due to their diffused OP. Second, the fact that they had diffused OP, 
ensured access to PI, a channel that had served their interests well in the past. Their 
success in utilising PI was actually what gave them effective access to the other 
channels.
Fundamentally, a group’s success depends on its access to the three key 
structures of channels of influence; PI, PPPM and IPI, an important factor that shall be 
examined in greater detail during the conclusion.
Ratification phase
During the ratification phase the opponents have had the upper hand to date. 
This was largely due to two important events. The first of these was the Presidential and 
general elections. Public hysteria was much in evidence by the time the election cycle 
had begun to kick in, public demonstrations organised by the KoA were receiving 
massive media coverage and several of these demonstrations had turned somewhat 
violent. With the elections coming up, many politicians were aware of how sensitive 
this issue was and it is for this specific reason that many of these same politicians 
decided to avoid discussing the FT A or having it as part of any agenda. In June 2007, 
the agreement was signed, in December of that year the presidential election was held 
and four months later the general election was held (on April 2008). The KoA, again
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given their diffused OP, accessed PI as primary channel, to ensure that politicians were 
aware of how many people felt regarding the Korea-US FTA. The result was that the 
agreement did not even manage to reach the COFAT before the general elections. After 
the elections, the governing party had gained a majority in the NA and, one would have 
suspected, a firmer resolve to pass the agreement.
As for the second event, immediately after the general elections, the US beef- 
importation scare resulted in candlelight vigils being held from April 27th, 2008 and 
continued through till October of that same year. These vigils grew in strength and 
peaked on June 10th when one million people turned out across the nation to 
demonstrate, coinciding with the actions of the pro—democracy movement in 1987. The 
symbolism of this act was difficult to ignore. The effect these vigils had on the 
government's intent regarding the Korea-US FTA cannot be overstated, the vigils 
basically froze the agreement in the NA. Despite the government's majority in the NA, 
it was unable to push the agreement through the COFAT. The OKAC (a large umbrella 
group that contained most of the same members of the KoA) had close ties with the 
opposition parties (using PPPM as secondary) in the NA (the DP and LP) and worked in 
tandem with them to ensure that their members were up to date on the OKAC's public 
position. Finally, in April 2009, the GNP had the bill passed through the COFAT, where 
the bill is currently awaiting ratification in the NA. The influence that the KoA has had 
on the ratification phase is as unmistakeable as that it had on the negotiation phase.
This does not mean to say that the agreement's supporters had been idle. 
President Lee has been a diligent supporter of the agreement and has spoken strongly in 
its favour at several public gatherings. Senior members of government have also 
publicly come forward in supporter, including Kang Man-su, the Minister of Finance, 
who has said that delaying the agreement for a year would result in massive economic 
losses. These supporters have not been alone, many elements of the conservative media 
have additionally spoken in favour of the FTA. Furthermore, minority groups, such as 
‘FCAK’ and 'Committee against Kim Jong-il', have also thrown their weight behind it. 
Finally, the FKI has worked with the conservative media, the government and minority 
groups and have had publications printed all in support of the Korea-US FTA.
However, despite the use that supporters have made of IP I, PPPM and PI 
(primary, secondary and tertiary) through their focused OP, the fact of the matter is that
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it has not been enough to counter the massive use of PI that the agreement's opponents 
have accessed to date.
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Conclusion
The purpose of Chapter Five was to investigate the Korea-US FT A process and 
see if there was any evidence that suggested that domestic stakeholders had any 
influence on the process itself. We began by looking at why the US was chosen as an 
FTA partner and the evidence examined suggested very strongly that the FKI coalition 
played a role in convincing the government to adopt a pro-US FTA outlook. The 
courtship that the FKI paid the Minister for Trade was short but intense and had a 
domino effect -  as they hoped it would -  with the MOFAT and the president also 
lending their unqualified support. Thus, in the agenda-setting phase, supporters 
completely dominated through IPI and PPPM. Furthermore, the agreement was strongly 
supported by the president, a key veto player. However, the negotiation phase was not 
as smooth for the FTA's supporters.
The announcement of negotiations with the US on an FTA caught many flat- 
footed, although the opposition was quick to regain its composure. The thrust of the 
Korea-US FTA was wide-ranging and comprehensive; one fact among many that was 
to stoke the ire of many domestic groups and the general result was the most 
controversial of FTAs. Supporting the FTA were the MOFAT, the president and the 
FKI led coalition of large corporations. They supported the FTA on the grounds that a 
trade agreement with the world's largest economy could only be a good thing for the 
Korean economy by bringing a new, larger market for Korean produced goods, tying in 
structural reforms and, by competing with US companies, creating a drive for greater 
efficiency. Opposing the FTA were many groups and individuals; from the farming 
sector to movie, pharmaceutical and textile industries to civic groups and labour unions 
and key politicians. A loosely organised über coalition was formed from these and other 
groups, known as the KoA.
Once the battle lines were drawn, the fight ensued with vigour. The government 
had been keen to push its agenda, with the President staunchly supporting the Korea- 
US FTA and his administration adopting the FKI's position as its own. Although the 
FKI did not publicly engage in supporting the FTA, their influence was hard for the 
government to ignore once the decision to move ahead with the Korea-US FTA was 
taken. Some groups supportive of the FTA did remonstrate publicly, but their voices
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were all but drowned out by the KoA. The KoA's dominance of public influence meant 
that other domestic stakeholders would have required a similar or equivalent dominance 
in other structures to balance this. The KoA bared its teeth during the negotiation phase 
and forced the government to adopt some -  though not all -  of their demands during 
negotiations. While the KoA may not have critically injured the FTA, they did change 
the final agreement to something more palatable (especially on agricultural sectors, 
medicine, and ISD). While supporters have utilised three channels of influence in full 
mobilisation (IPI-primary, PPPM-secondary, Pi-tertiary), opponents mainly depended 
on IP as primary channel with IPI as a distant secondary channel and PPPM as tertiary 
channel (to a much lesser degree).
The ratification phase was the scene of further battles. During ratification, the 
agreement’s opponents utilised PI as their primary channel of influence and IPI as their 
secondary, while supporters focused on IPI (primary) and PPPM (secondary). The 
FTA's opponents took advantage of the presidential and general election cycles to keep 
the focus on the FTA so that the government could not push through ratification. 
Furthermore, following the elections, the issue of the importation of US beef and the 
concomitant candlelight vigils ensured that the government found it impossible to push 
through ratification, despite strong support from the President and the majority 
governing party. Massive and ongoing protests helped to stall the ratification of the 
Korea-US FTA in the 17th session of the Assembly and the 18th session of the NA again 
(at time of writing). The data presented in this chapter would suggest that there is ample 
room for applying the societal approach, given the role that domestic stakeholders had 
in all aspects of the Korea-US FTA which neither the systemic or statist approaches can 
safely define.
Of the issues that mattered most to the domestic stakeholders who opposed the 
trade deal, agricultural goods, medicine and investment were top of their agenda. The 
influence applied to the government forced the Korean negotiating team to adopt a 
position that would be supported by the FTA’s opponents. Hence the Korean 
government pushed hard at the negotiating table on these three issues and forced to US 
to accept compromises they found distasteful.
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Conclusion
The central focus of this thesis has been on the variance in outcomes in Korea’s 
Free Trade Agreement negotiations that have occurred in response to domestic societal 
pressures. The general body of literature on international trade policy has focused thus 
far, in large part, on the United States. There has been relatively little work published 
concerning developing countries, such as Korea, and what studies that are available tend 
to focus on systemic interpretations, with few exceptions. I have attempted to address 
this imbalance by examining both statist and societal approaches with a view to 
understanding the variance in FTA policy outcomes. The question being whether 
variance can be explained using systemic approaches alone; indeed the empirical 
chapters suggest that domestic social actors play an important role. Although systemic 
and statist interpretations can help us in understanding large parts of how and why 
Korean FTAs evolve, on their own these approaches fall short in providing a 
comprehensive explanation for the variance in outcomes. In order to examine this 
question in detail, I have applied an analytical framework based on three channels of 
influence; PI, IPI and PPPM. These channels of influence are, in turn, accessed 
according to the type of OP organisation's have (either focused or diffused).
Furthermore these channels of influence are ranked according to usage during each 
phase of the FTAs studied in the empirical chapters. Using this analytical framework 
and using qualitative methods, consisting of interviews with important individuals, 
across three case studies; the Korea-Chile, Korea-Japan and Korea-US FTAs, I test 
whether domestic stakeholders act as independent factors.
The recent popularity of FTAs has been partly the result of failed attempts at 
multilateral trade liberalisation through the WTO and the need for some sort of 
international trade mechanism to bridge the gap that this has created. Shifting conditions 
in international trade often have severe distributional consequences on societal actors. 
They can create tensions in extant political arrangements and alliances which result in a 
state of political flux and uncertainty. Currently, the literature on international trade 
describes three main theories which analyse the formulation of international trade 
policy; systemic, statist and societal approaches. The systemic approach helps us to see 
the situation from the outside in, whereas the statist approach offers a view from the
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inside out. The problem is that utilising these two approaches results in unanswered 
questions such as; why does the negotiation of some FTAs exceed their unofficial 
timeframe? Why do some FTAs exclude important items that were originally planned 
for inclusion? Why do all FTAs not succeed in reaching ratification? Once the societal 
approach is considered, however, we include specific factors that play a demonstrably 
important role in answering these vital questions.
On the Argument o f Foreign Economic Policy theories
One of the intentions of this thesis was to evaluate the implications of the 
theoretical arguments on foreign economic policy relative to the three case studies 
contained herein. A systemic approach provides an understanding of the situational 
imperatives of international conditions that played a role in Korea adopting an FTA 
platform. Besides general systemic approaches interpretation (e.g., domino effect, 
bandwagoning, etc.) in explaining Korean FTAs, there are also specific systemic 
approaches interpretations that can be applied to our case studies. The Korea-Chile FTA 
was interpreted as a response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and would encourage 
further FTAs. The Korea-Japan FTA, while sharing a similar systemic profile to the 
Korea-Chile FTA, was also characterised by security concerns vis-ä-vis North Korea. 
The Korea-US FTA shared similarities in its profile with both the Korea-Chile and 
Korea-Japan FTAs (i.e. encouraging FDI and security concerns). Although unlike the 
other two, the Korea-US FTA was also motivated by strategic concerns vis-a-vis 
China’s regional dominance (McDonald 2004: 548).
These clearly delineated features do help give context and understanding to 
each of Korea's FTAs. However, we are still left with unexplained variance within each 
of our case studies; the final Korea-Chile FTA agreement differed from what was 
originally set out by the partner governments (i.e. the exclusion of grapes, pears, rice 
and apples). Meanwhile the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations have been deadlocked since 
2004. The Korea-US FTA will similarly differ from what was originally laid out, if it 
should pass. Furthermore, despite a conclusion of the Korea-US FTA negotiations, the 
ratification phase would seem to have come to an impasse at time of writing. Which all 
would seem to beg several questions, what processes could result in these kinds of 
variance? Are these processes similar or dissimilar across the case studies? What other
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foreign economic policy theory could explain this variance? Are there key players other 
than the individual governments involved? Is the process of initiation the same across 
all three? It would appear that the systemic approach alone is not entirely capable of 
accounting for such variance (Ikenberry et al., 1998: 5). This thesis therefore looked at 
approaches that deal with domestic factors to see if any further light could be shed on 
the subject (i.e. statist and societal approaches).
Of these we shall deal with the statist approach first. According to the literature 
on the subject, the core tenet of the statist approach is that the state plays the lead role in 
foreign economic policy (Oatley 2004: 109; Skocpol 1985; Nordlinger 1981; Krasner 
1976: 317). For proponents of the state as actor approach, the state is not necessarily the 
only significant actor. Also, they do not assume that the state always acts as a rational, 
unified entity. Nevertheless, state officials and institutions do emerge as central actors, 
and play a critical role in shaping foreign economic policy (Ikenberry et al., 1988: 12).
To be more specific, the three leading statist arguments are; state’s dominance 
of formulation and implementation of foreign economic policy, state not as unitary actor 
but separate from parochial interests (i.e. national interest) and, finally, political 
institutions as decisive factors in explaining policy outcomes. The case studies show 
that these arguments do have congruency and help explain many factors. However, they 
do not succeed in explaining the root causes of this variance.
For the statist, the state is situated at the intersection of the domestic and 
international political economies and is the principal national actor charged with the 
overall conduct of foreign economic policy. This unique position of the state gives 
executive officials a special legitimacy (related key ministries) in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign economic policy.
As the empirical chapters have shown, the statist approach successfully deals 
with many aspects of our case studies (e.g. agenda setting phase). Accordingly, during 
the agenda setting phase, each FT A was dominated by a single political actor, the 
MOFAT, and was supported by each president respectively, a key political veto player. 
It was the MOFAT that had the legislative tools necessary to deal with this phase and it 
was MOFAT that played a pivotal role in initiating the Korea-Chile FT A (the 
government viewed FT As as a possible mechanism to help alleviate the Korean 
economy from the stresses caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997). Also, MOAF
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played an important role also as a dissenter among Korean political institutions, creating 
intergovernmental conflict. MOFAT stood in favour of the Korea-Chile FTA in large 
part due to its predilection for open markets and the belief that seasonal differences 
would reduce any detrimental impact on the Korean agricultural market. MOAF, on the 
other hand, opposed the agreement precisely because Chile was a strong agricultural 
producer and believed that the losses would outweigh any benefits that would accrue to 
Korean farmers. MOFAT, however, effectively overrode MOAF’s concerns during the 
agenda setting phase.
The Korea-Japan FTA case study likewise displayed similar features during the 
agenda setting phase. Again the MOFAT was a main instigator of the agreement and 
this it did for several reasons. Due to the financial crisis, the government was eager for 
a new economic paradigm and an FTA with Japan was seen as a way to encourage FDI. 
Also, there was widespread belief that Korea’s main industries were in need of reform 
and an FTA was seen as the agreement that would help kick-start the required reforms. 
Typically, however, industrial restructuring was strongly resisted in Korea, although 
given the severity of the financial crisis in 1997, Korean industry was understandably 
more malleable to government reform initiatives (e.g. Big Deals programme- see above 
Chapter four). Lastly, Korean agriculture was seen as more productive than its Japanese 
counterpart and, therefore, an FTA with Japan would finally help open the Korean 
domestic agricultural sector, an act that had seemed insurmountable in previous 
incarnations of this debate.
Finally, the agenda setting phase of the Korea-US FTA case study displays 
some slightly unusual characteristics, though still within the remit of a statist approach. 
Again MOFAT played a most critical role in initiating the Korea-US FTA. However, 
the manner in which it did so differs from the previous two case studies. According to 
the government’s own ‘FTA Roadmap’, an FTA with the US was a medium to long­
term goal but was set in motion with virtually no debate on the issue, public or private 
(i.e. intergovernmental). The Minister of MOFAT persuaded the President to set the 
FTA in motion without informing other ministries. The agenda setting stage was 
established with a simultaneous acquiescence on four key preconditions that the US had 
unilaterally laid out and, subsequently, the negotiation phase was started.
An examination of the three agenda setting phases demonstrates that a statist
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approach is a valid and useful analytical tool. The question remains as to whether a 
statist approach can be used to analyse the remaining phases and answer our main 
research questions. However, the case for domestic societal interference begins even 
before these two later phases, in fact the agenda setting phase the Korea-US FTA has 
produced evidence to suggest the involvement of domestic stakeholders. While the 
statist approach offers a valid interpretation of how and why the agreement was 
established, it does not account for the role that the FKI played in the early agenda 
setting phase. As the case studies have shown, the FKI wished to maintain good 
working relations with the government (MOFAT particularly) after its role in 
undermining the Korea-Japan FTA. The FKI's role, utilising IP I (primary) and PPPM 
(secondary), in cooperating with the MOFAT in formulating an approach to securing 
access to the world’s richest market through an FTA with the US and preventing any 
‘drift’ between the two countries that seemed possible due to the election of President 
Roh Moo-hyun are details that the statist approach could not uncover. Suffice to say that 
the main difference between these agreements at this point, from the perspective of this 
thesis, is that neither the Korea-Chile nor the Korea-Japan FT As reveal much else when 
examined from using a societal approach. In comparison, when looking at the Korea-US 
FTA from this approach, we see that a major societal actor, the FKI, played an 
important role.
However, to continue from our first case study; the evidence collated from the 
Korea-Chile FTA case study clearly shows that the agreement’s domestic societal 
opponents were involved quite effectively during the negotiation phase. We saw that the 
motivating factors for supporters consisted of a strong view that an FTA with Chile 
would begin a phase of FTA expansion, would help deal with the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis and increase trade. Opponents were motivated by the sensitivity of one 
of the sectors (i.e. farming) and a disillusionment with the process of globalisation. The 
alliance between the widely based agricultural sector and civic groups overcame their 
collective action problem and resulted in a diffused OP. This diffused OP was not 
focused enough to gain immediate and effective access to either IPI or PPPM. In other 
words, the organisation had a very large base of individuals who rallied together in an 
ad hoc fashion in response to a specific set of stimuli (i.e. the FTA). This kind of 
diffused OP effectively meant that their access to political institutions and key
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politicians and policy makers would be less than their ability to influence the public (e.g. 
public demonstrations, media coverage, etc.)- Their focus on infonnal channels of 
influence (PI, primary), due to their diffused OP, resulted in effective street 
demonstrations, combined with a formal channel of access (IPI, secondary), the MOAF, 
produced a tangible result during the negotiation phase (i.e. changing the contents of the 
agreement). Both the agricultural sector and the MOAF shared a common 
understanding regarding the Korea-Chile FTA, thus it was rather straightforward for the 
agricultural sector to utilise IPI through the MOAF.
The FKI, on the other hand, had focused OP. What this meant was that they had 
a smaller numbers of individuals (i.e. companies) who were organised on a permanent 
basis. Given the fact that the FKI is organised on a permanent basis (and has been since 
1961) and represented some of the most powerful individuals (i.e. chaebol CEOs) in 
Korean society, the relationship that the group built up with governments, leading 
politicians and political institutions (e.g, MOFAT) over the years should come as no 
surprise. Hence the FKI's focused OP left them with more effective access to IPI as 
primary and PPPM as secondary rather than PI. This is not to say that they had no 
access to PI, they did through the pages of various conservative media publications. But 
the fact of the matter was that they felt they could not directly access PI -  as the 
agriculture-civic group alliance had done -  because they feared a potential anti-Chaebol 
backlash.
As a result of this imbalance, the negotiation phase dragged on for almost 40 
months (Dec. 1999- Feb. 2003). After the 4th round of meetings, the negotiations ground 
to a halt. Although some might argue that the Chilean government was the cause of this, 
the evidence produced in the case study would suggest that the primary cause of this 
delay was the agriculture sector's concerns regarding the importation of specific 
products (apples, pears and grapes), which were eventually excluded from the final deal 
at the farming lobby’s behest.
The ratification phase was also hard fought, but the agreement’s supporters 
had learned from their opponents that to be more effective in influencing policy 
trajectory, they had to have access to several key channels of influence. In order to 
achieve this, the FKI led coalition utilised conservative newspapers (who shared a 
similar outlook) to project their interpretation of the FTA (PI) while maintaining their
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use of IPI (i.e. political parties and the President). At this stage, the domestic 
stakeholders who opposed the FT A had suffered attrition in the channels of influence 
that were open to them. Their access to IPI was drastically reduced when the FTA 
progressed to the ratification phase (i.e. the MOAF had no role to play once the 
agreement was signed and awaiting ratification in the NA). Furthermore, the 
agricultural sector's access to PI was similarly reduced when it was split into two 
opposing camps (thus reducing their OP in the process). However, they did retain some 
access to IPI; given the gerrymandering of political voting districts over the years, the 
rural vote was, arguably, over-represented in the NA and, hence, circa 70 members of 
the NA created a de facto ‘Rural Party’ that managed to fend off ratification for over a 
year. Given that the agreement's opponents had reduced their OP and, hence access to 
PI and IPI, they were merely fighting off the inevitable.
The case study shows that although the final outcome was ratified, the 
government had to do two things to have it ratified. First, they had to alter the 
agreement in favour of opponents in order to mollify opponents enough to ratify the 
agreement. Second, they had to offer sections of the agricultural sector large side- 
payments to see them cease their opposition. Indeed, one argument is that the 
agricultural sector was deliberately provoking opposition in order to gain increased 
side-payments.
The statist approach does indeed explain the major thrust of what happened (i.e. 
the government wanted to pass an FTA bill and did so) but it does not explain the 
nuances behind the exclusion of important items and the considerable amount of time it 
took for the FTA to pass ratification. However, as opponents were wont to point out, the 
first FTA was to be the first of many and regardless of how sacrosanct portions of the 
farming market were, the first inroads to opening them had been made in the face of 
enormous opposition.
The Korea-Japan FTA case study is another case of both the applicability of the 
statist approach to specific questions and, simultaneously, how it falls short in providing 
a comprehensive explanation for the deadlock in negotiations. The opening of the 
negotiation phase saw a coalition between labour unions and civic groups in opposition 
and the FKI in support, although they were to eventually oppose it. The motivating 
factors for supporters are quite similar to the Korea-Chile FTA although with a heavier
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emphasis on encouraging FDI. However, opponents (including the FKI) saw the FTA 
with Japan as a source for grave concern due to Japan’s great industrial strength. Given 
the distributional consequences, the agricultural sector might have been perceived as a 
possible supporter of the FTA by the government. In fact, the agricultural sector 
opposed the agreement due to perceived notions of the role of FTA-type agreements in 
the process of globalisation (but were not as noticeably involved as they were in the 
Korea-Chile FTA). The opposition alliance attempted to emulate the achievements that 
the opponents of the Korea-Chile were having but met with little success.
For a start, labour's OP was sufficient to overcome its collective action problem 
but was comparatively more diffused than the Korea-Chile FTA's opponents. Labour's 
main problem lay with their access to PI as a primary channel. This was seriously 
hampered by two key factors; the dominance of the presidential impeachment and the 
Korea-Chile FTA in the media and political spheres. This drastically reduced any 
potential access to PI. Furthermore, given labour's diffused OP, and the fact that 
gerrymandering was not in their favour, they could not utilise their limited PI to gain 
access to IPI.
As the negotiation phase progressed, the FKI-led coalition withdrew their 
conditional support for the agreement. Unlike the labour-civic group coalition, the FKI 
led coalition was not as hampered by the prevailing conditions. There have been various 
interpretations suggested of these developments. As an outsider, one cannot be entirely 
certain of the exact course of events. But several sources (a key member of the FKI, a 
high-ranking official from MOFAT and several sources from the MOCIE and MOFE) 
suggested to me that the following happened: the FKI utilised their focused OP on 
convincing ministries other than MOFAT that an FTA with Japan was a mistake, 
accessing IPI as their primary channel (i.e. MOCIE and MOFE) and PI as secondary (i.e. 
conservative media). Most notably they shared their concerns regarding the potential 
impact of an FTA with Japan on Korean industries with the MOFE and the MOCIE, 
who in turn were keen to attempt to dissuade the MOFAT from signing the agreement. 
The result of which meant, in effect, that the Korea-Japan FTA had no supporters 
outside the government and resulted in a deadlock that has yet to be resolved.
Although some might argue that the Japanese government might be a major 
factor in explaining this deadlock, the facts are that the Japanese government tried to
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restart FTA negotiations with Korea in 2007 and 2008, to which the Korean government 
did not display any enthusiasm. The evidence produced in our case study makes it clear 
that the Korea-Japan FTA reached a deadlock due to the lack of support outside of 
government circles. In other words, it is domestic actors (non-state) that helped 
determine the current deadlock.
The negotiation and ratification phases of the Korea-US FTA are best 
exemplified by the inauspicious welcome it received shortly after its brief agenda­
setting phase. The KoA, the largest civil movement in Korean history, was established 
less than two months after the agreement’s negotiation phase began. Again, the 
motivating factors that compelled the FTA’s supporters are echoed by the previous two 
case studies. Similarly, the agreement’s opponents were motivated along similar lines as 
the Korea-Chile and Korea-Japan FTAs. The size of the KoA, the fact that it was 
formed from many smaller groups (labour unions, agriculture, civic groups, etc.) and 
was focused on one specific issue (i.e. anti-FTA) meant that access to PI was virtually 
guaranteed and, concomitantly, every round of negotiation that was held in Korea 
witnessed massive demonstrations. The KoA mobilised PI as primary channel through 
street demonstrations, protests, vigils and online petitions similar to Korea-Chile FTA. 
Access to IPI as a secondary channel saw the involvement of the Rural Party in the NA.
Domestic stakeholders that supported the agreement learned their lessons well 
from the Korea-Chile FTA and supported the FTA in the manner that suited them best. 
This meant utilising the conservative media, who were more than willing to be involved, 
thus accessing PI. Again, the FKI's closeness to government resulted in firm access to 
IPI (e.g. their close working relationship with the MOFAT and other ministries), and 
PPPM. On the whole, though, the FKI led coalition tended to utilise formal channels 
(IPI as primary) more so than informal channels (PI as tertiary). This trend is seen 
stretching back through each of our case studies and can be explained by the form of OP 
the FKI had access to. In other words the FKI's focused OP allowed them to access 
formal channels (e.g. IPI) more effectively rather than informal (i.e. PI), at least in 
comparison to their opponents.
In Chapter Five we looked at six specific areas covered in the negotiations -  
agricultural goods, automobiles, medicine, trade remedy, the ISD and textiles -  in order 
to examine the processes of the negotiation and ratification phases from the perspective
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of explaining the variance that occurs in the final agreement. The evidence collected 
would suggest that domestic stakeholders played an important role in defining the FTA.
Two of these items are easily analysed using a statist approach (trade remedy 
and automobiles). Three items deal specifically with issues that require further analysis 
(i.e. societal approach) to successfully resolve (agriculture, medicine and investment). 
The remaining item, textiles, can also be explained using a statist approach but the 
specific details help us to shed light on why some domestic stakeholders have influence 
and others do not.
There is no variance in the final agreement regarding trade remedy and 
automobiles. In the case of trade remedy, the Korean government failed to achieve its 
stated goal due to the intransigence of the US government. In the case of automobiles, 
the US succeeded in achieving its aims due to a lack of resistance from the Korean 
government while the relevant domestic stakeholders (KAMA and KAICA) were rather 
indifferent to the FTA.
On the other hand, there are three items which deal with specific variance 
regarding the final agreement. Four specific items were excluded from the final 
agreement despite plans by both the Korean and US governments to include the entire 
agricultural market. What explains this variance? One might argue that specific 
elements within the KoA opposed these items with the intention of secunng larger side- 
payments should the agreement be ratified. Be that as it may, whether the KoA opposed 
the FTA on principal or whether they where solely interested in side-payments, the 
actual result stays the same. Our case study showed that the KoA umbrella group 
campaigned vigorously during the negotiation phase to either have the FTA cancelled or, 
at least, to exclude certain items. The evidence suggests that the KoA successfully 
lobbied the government to exclude these four specific items.
Similarly the issue of DPRP also involved the KoA (in collusion with the 
KPMA). The Korean government originally planned to have the DPRP removed at the 
request of the US. Notably, this was one of the four original preconditions laid down by 
the US to signing an FTA with Korea. However, this move attracted an intense amount 
of criticism from the KoA and the KPMA. Again the evidence suggests that the KoA 
(utilising PI as primary, PPPM as tertiary and IPI (MOHAW as secondary) - though 
with a heavy emphasis on PI) successfully persuaded the Korean government to
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abandon its plans to remove the DPRP.
Similarly, the issue of investment and what was originally laid out by both 
governments was to rile the KoA, who had also allied with MINBYUN. The issues of 
taxation and real estate stabilisation were agreed upon by MOFAT at the suggestion of 
the US government. The evidence here is again strongly indicative of the role that 
domestic stakeholders had in FTA policy formulation. The KoA (with MINBYUN) -  
although they lacked access to IPI and PPPM -  utilised their access to PI to influence 
the government to change its stance on these issues. Along similar lines, the US 
requested anti-trust regulations as part of the FTA but it fell upon the FKI to persuade 
MOFAT that such regulations would be unnecessarily punitive. They did so using their 
preferred channels, notably IPI.
We have seen how the statist approach can help us understand in part how 
Korean FTAs evolve. However, as our case studies have shown, the statist approach 
alone does not provide a proper and full explanation for variance in outcomes, which 
are the result of a combination of domestic stakeholders’ motivations and modes of 
expressing policy preferences. A combination of approaches, incorporating a societal 
approach is what is required to provide a comprehensive analysis of Korean FTAs. 
Indeed it is evidently necessary that a societal approach is required to help decipher the 
nuances in vanance that occur across our case studies.
Finally, and of no less importance, textiles can be safely understood using a 
statist approach; i.e. the Korean government conceded to US demands. However, unlike 
the previous two cases (trade remedy and automobiles), there was a specific domestic 
interest group which argued against these demands. The KOFTI was the lead textile 
industry representative group and they were staunchly opposed to the US demands. But 
what explains their lack of result? Firstly, the KOFTI had weak organisational power. 
This is due to several factors, most notably the fact that textiles was an industry in 
decline (and had been over many years) and, therefore resulted in a reduction of 
sensitivity (i.e. amount of workers affected and the industry’s level of importance to 
Korean society). Importantly, this weak OP reduced the KOFTI’s access to other key 
structures of influence (PI, PPPM and IPI). In other words, weak OP and reduced 
industry sensitivity combined to deny KOFTI any effective use of channels of influence. 
KOFTI lacked access to the channels of influence that worked for both the KoA and the
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FKI and as a result their ability to influence the FTA was severely truncated.
The ratification phase of the Korea-US FTA was dominated by the KoA and 
affiliated organisations’ street demonstrations of the summer of 2008. The process itself 
has been suspended (at time of writing) and it is not clear exactly when, or if, the 
agreement will be ratified. This is notable because President Lee’s government actually 
maintains a majority in the NA. What is it that has caused the ratification phase of the 
Korea-US FTA -  that has the support of both the majority government and the political 
institution legislated to design and conduct international trade agreements -  to stall? As 
the evidence clearly suggests, this is primarily because of public demonstrations and the 
role of the Rural Party in the NA, or to put it another way, because of the KoA’s access 
to PI (demonstrations) and IPI (the filibustering RP within the NA).
With the Presidential and General Elections being held during the ratification 
phase, one might assume that, given the support the FTA received from the major 
political parties, the FT A would have been a visible part of the electioneering. This, 
however, was not the case. Similar to the Korea-Chile FTA, the KoA publicly 
announced that any politician that supported the FTA would be targeted at the election 
booth. The KoA kept the FTA in the media spotlight, ensuring that neither major 
political party felt comfortable publicly supporting the agreement, and furthermore, the 
government could not begin the process of ratification. Following on from the elections, 
candlelight vigils began to occur across Korea, in response to a television programme 
called “PD Notebook” which highlighted the supposed health implications of importing 
US beef. These vigils were enough to maintain pressure on the incumbent government 
and prevented it from passing legislation ratifying the FTA. Thus the KoA utilised PI as 
their primary channel in influencing the government. Currently the bill awaits 
ratification in the NA and one would expect the KoA to respond in a similar fashion to 
how the responded during the Korea-Chile FTA.
These activities were also to find receptive members of the NA, or at least those 
members who saw supporting the KoA's position as the only viable, survivable option 
(in a political sense). These members coalesced into what became colloquially known as 
the Rural Party and were a constant thorn in the side of the government's attempts at 
passing legislation to ratify the agreement. Thus gaining the KoA access to IPI is as a 
secondary channel.
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Secondly, the statist approach does not assume that the state always acts as a 
rational, unified entity. However, their preferences are (partially, if not wholly), distinct 
from the parochial concerns of societal groups and are tied to conceptions of the 
national interest (Ikenberry et al., 1988: 10; Skocpol 1985; Nordlinger 1981; Krasner 
1978). But, as the evidence in our case studies show, this is not always the case. While 
ministries do act with national interest in mind in some cases, they are sometimes prone 
to acting on the sectional interests of the industries they represent. For example, during 
the Korea-Chile FTA the MOAF could arguably said to have been promoting their own 
sectional interests (i.e. that of farmers) over national interests.
Finally, the statist approach argues that many societal approaches (Shafer 1994; 
Frieden 1993, 1991a, 1991b, 1988; Rogowski 1989; Gourevitch 1986, 1984, 1977; 
Milner 1987; 1988) describe the state in extremely reactionary terms regarding policy­
making and defines it as little more than passively responsive to the preferences of 
interest groups (sectors or factors). The societal approach argues that overcoming 
collective action problems is a key determinant of political influence (Gowa 1988). 
Those interest groups (be they factors or sectors) that are most likely to mobilise behind 
their preferences will have the greatest effect on policy decisions. From a statist 
approach point of view, however, the ability to overcome collective action problems 
and mobilise for political purposes need not guarantee influence over policy matter 
(Keohane and Milner 1996a, 1996b; Alt and Gilligan 1994; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; 
Odell 1990; Goldstein and Lenway 1989; Krasner 1984). And so the question that the 
statist approach attempts to answer is; w hy are some coalitions o f societal interests able 
to achieve their policy goals while others such coalitions are unable to do sol Some of 
statists claim that political institutions; presidentialism, (Shugart and Haggard 2001; 
Destler 1995; Verdier 1994) and electoral rules (Rosenbluth and Schaap 2003: 307; 
Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Garrett and Lange 1995; Rodrik 1995; Carey and Shugart 
1995) are the determining factor in producing trade policy outcome. However, as our 
case studies have amply demonstrated, domestic societal stakeholders can also play a 
determining role in affecting trade policy outcome. They play that role by utilising the 
three key structures of channels of influence based on their focused/diffused OP.
When the evidence produced above is taken together, it is clear that the statist 
approach can offer valuable insights into what goes on (and why) behind Korean FTAs.
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However, the statist approach alone falls short in offering comprehensive answers for 
the variance that the FTAs in our case studies have produced. Fundamentally, what the 
evidence we have collated would suggest is the societal approach has much to offer in 
terms not only of uncovering a level of nuance that neither of the other approaches can 
offer but that it proves the important, integral and, in some cases, dominant role that 
domestic stakeholders play in defining FT A policy outcomes (and therefore foreign 
economic policy) and the mobilising factors that propel these same domestic 
stakeholders.
Contribution
A primary objective of this thesis was to undertake a theoretically motivated 
empirical analysis of Korean FTAs in light of the inability of statist and systemic 
approaches to fully explain different patterns in and outcomes of Korean FTAs. As was 
noted in the introduction to this thesis, the matter of how domestic interest groups affect 
foreign economic policy has both theoretical and practical significance. Given this 
importance, it is essential to build upon or from this work and to acquire a more 
sophisticated appreciation of a very important area of inquiry. Thus, the contribution of 
this thesis is, therefore, two fold; theoretical and empirical.
The theoretical aspect consists of three main contributions. First, due to Korea’s 
recent developmental history -  and the concomitant hangover of statist control over 
foreign economic policy typically found in states shortly after independence -  and the 
popularity of systems theory in explaining FTAs, theorists have viewed Korean FTA 
policy through the lenses of either statist or international approaches. This thesis 
demonstrates that although both theories are valid in certain circumstances, to rely on 
either/both to the exclusion of the societal approach obfuscates much of what actually 
occurs in the process of foreign economic policy-making. Secondly, most studies that 
focus on interest groups (in relation to trade policy) have focused on the US, the world’s 
most powerful economy. Relatively few studies have focused on similar areas in 
developing countries. This thesis helps to widen the literature that focuses on 
developing states, thus giving theorists more data to work with in an underdeveloped 
field. Finally, the statist approach typically criticises the societal approach for its 
weakness in not expounding upon how interest groups -  once they have overcome the
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collective action problem -  actually go about exercising their influence. This thesis has 
analysed this aspect in great detail and has provided a theoretical approach to evaluating 
precisely this weakness, the three key structures of channels of influence (PI, PPPM and 
IPI) and in so doing has helped to further the theory of societal centred approach.
The empirical aspect consists of four main contributions. First, this thesis adds 
to the relatively little attention that the role of Korean domestic interest groups in the 
field of foreign economic policy-making has received. Secondly, few studies of FT As in 
developing countries have covered all phases of an FTA in their analysis. This thesis 
has taken three FT As and applied analysis across all three phases of FTA policy 
formulation, examining the effectiveness of domestic stakeholders across the different 
phases of Korean FTAs. Thirdly, this thesis helps to shed light on domestic stakeholders 
as a dominant factor in FTA policy formulation using qualitative case studies. Finally 
this thesis has provided a strong analytical framework for studying the causal link 
between interest groups and policy outcomes.
For further study; a comparative analysis between the case studies examined 
here and other Korean FTAs would be useful for the extension of this study. Also, a 
comparative study using this thesis’ case studies and those of a similarly developing 
country would be a further useful extension of this study. Finally, an examination of the 
actual three key structures detailed in this thesis by using comparative studies could 
help test the soundness of these structures.
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Appendix 1: List of Interviews
O rg a n is a t io n N a m e T it le /P o s it io n D a te
A W N M
K im  S u n g - jo n g  and  
P a rk  S u n g - jik
L e a d e rs  o f N a t io n a l C o n fe d e ra t io n  o f  P e o p le S e o u l, O c to b e r  12“ ', 2 0 0 5 .
C C E J
L e e  H a e -k y o u n g  a nd  
Y e u n  S u n g -m in
S e n io r  m e m b e rs  o f  C C E J . S e o u l, O c to b e r  11,h, 2 0 0 5 .
N a  H y u n g -k u n D ire c to r  o f  In te rn a t io n a l E c o n o m ic  R e s e a rc h  D e p a r tm e n t S e o u l, N o v e m b e r  2 6 lh, 2 0 0 5 . S e o u l,
C h o i S u n g -h y u n S e n io r  R e s e a rc h  F e llo w , In te rn a t io n a l A f fa ir  D iv is io n , F K I. O c to b e r  2 0 th, 2 0 0 6 .
R y u  H y u n -jin D ire c to r  o f FK I C e n tre  o f L a rg e  a n d  S m a ll B u s in e s s e s S e o u l, M a rc h  4 ,h, 2 0 0 7 .
F K I L e e  B y e o n g -w o o k C o rp o ra tio n s . S e o u l, O c to b e r  2 1 th, 2 0 0 6 .
H y u n g  C h a n g  ku k D ire c to r  o f E c o n o m ic  R e s e a rc h  D iv is io n  o f  th e  F K I. S e o u l, M a rc h  5 th, 2 0 0 7 .
fo rm e r  p re s id e n t o f  th e  W a s h in g to n  O ff ic e  o f  th e  F K I ( re t ire d  
in  M a rc h  2 0 0 9 )
S e o u l, A u g u s t 8 " \  2 0 0 9 .
F K T U B a e k  H y u n -g i D ire c to r  o f  F K T U .
S e o u l, O c to b e r  2 2 th, 2 0 0 5 . 
S e o u l, M a rc h  18“1, 2 0 0 7 .
K A M A Y o o  J o n g -s u n M a n a g in g  d ire c to rs  o f K A M A . S e o u l, D e c e m b e r  2 nd, 2 0 0 5 .
K C C I
L e e  S a n g -h o
D ire c to r  o f B ila te ra l E c o n o m ic  C o o p e ra t io n  C o m m it te e s , 
K C C I.
D ire c to r  o f  K C C I.
S e o u l, N o v e m b e r  2 4 th, 2 0 0 5 .
P a rk  D o n g -s u n g S e o u l, F e b ru a ry  2 9 th, 2 0 0 7 .
K C F A P a rk  S u n g - ju n O n e  o f  c o - le a d e r  o f  th e  K C F A . S e o u l,  M a rc h  5 th, 2 0 0 7 .
K C T U C h u n g  B y u n g -d u k D e p u ty  m a n a g e r  o f  K C T U .
S e o u l, O c to b e r  4 lh, 2 0 0 6 . 
S e o u l, M a rc h  12* ', 2 0 0 7 .
K E R I H u h  C h a n -g u k
D ire c to r  o f  E c o n o m ic  R e s e a rc h  D iv is io n , K E R I in  
F K I a f f ilia te s .
S e o u l, O c to b e r  19 th, 2 0 0 5 . 
S e o u l, M a rc h  4 th, 2 0 0 7 .
K F O T I K im  S u n g - jo n g O n e  o f  d ire c to rs  o f  K F O T I. S e o u l, M a rc h  17th, 2 0 0 7 .
K IE P S o n  C h a n -h y u n A  s e n io r  re s e a rc h e r  o f  K IE P .
S e o u l, O c to b e r  3 1 st, O c to b e r  
2 0 0 5 .
K IT A
K im  S u n g -h y u n g  
C h e o n g  J a e -h w a
S e n io r  re s e a rc h e r  o f  K IT A .
D ire c to r  o f  In s t itu te  fo r  In te rn a t io n a l T ra d e  o f  th e  
K IT A
S e o u l, F e b ru a ry  2 5 th, 2 0 0 7 . 
S e o u l, M a rc h  10“ ’ , 2 0 0 7 .
K o A L e e  H a e -y o u n g O n e  o f  th e  c o - le a d e rs  o f  th e  K o A . S e o u l, F e b ru a ry  2 nd, 2 0 0 7 .
K P M A J a n g  H y u n -s e u k O n e  o f m a n a g in g  d ire c to r  o f  K P M A . S e o u l, M a rc h  2 9 th, 2 0 0 7 .
K P A F W S e o  J u -w o n S e c re ta ry  o f  T h e  K P A F W . S e o u l, O c to b e r  6 th, 2 0 0 6 .
H y u n d a i G w a k  J e o n g -y o n g D ire c to r  o f  H y u n d a i M O B IS . S e o u l, 4 th S e p te m b e r ,  2 0 0 9 .
M O A F
Y o u n  J a n g -b a e  
L e e  S u n g -c h u n  
L e e  S a n g -u k  a nd  
H o n g  J u n g -w o o
D e p u ty  M in is te r  o f  M O A F .
D ire c to r  o f  F T A  te a m .
D ire c to r  o f  In te rn a t io n a l n e g o t ia t io n  te a m  in  
In te rn a t io n a l C o o p e ra t io n  B u re a u .
S e o u l, O c to b e r  17“ ', 2 0 0 5 . 
S e o u l, S e p te m b e r  27 th, 2 0 0 5 . 
S e o u l, S e p te m b e r  2 6 th, 2 0 0 6 .
M O C IE
L e e  K y o u n g -h y u n D ire c to r  o f  T ra d e  P o lic y  D iv is io n . S e o u l, S e p te m b e r  13 th, 2 0 0 5 .
P a rk  J e o n g -s e o n g L e a d e r  o f  F T A  T e a m , in  M O C IE  (c u r re n t ly  M K E ) . S e o u l, O c to b e r  3 rd, 2 0 0 9 .
C h o  J e -h o n g  
A h n  H o -y o u n g  
L im  C h o i-k y o u n g  
L e e  M i-h y u n  
K im  J o n g -h o o n
H e a d  o f  th e  D e p a r tm e n t o f  F T A  T ra d e  P o lic y - S e o u l, O c to b e r  2 9 “ ', 2 0 0 5 .
M a k in g . S e o u l,  O c to b e r  10 th, 2 0 0 5 .
M O F A T
D e p u ty  M in is te r  o f  T ra d e . 
D ire c to r  o f  F T A  p o lic y  B u re a u .
S e o u l, S e p te m b e r, 2 8 “ ’ , 2 9 th, 
2 0 0 6 .
H e a d  o f n Y iM s te r a i t r a d e  c o o p e ra t io n  d e c is io n . S e o u l,  A u g u s t  t 4 ’\  2 0 0 S .
T ra d e  m in is te r  ( fo rm e r  th e  c h ie f  n e g o t ia to r ) A u g u s t  2 4 th, 2 0 0 9 .
M O F E
K im  Y o u n g -ta e  
K im  S u n -m in
D e p u ty  d ire c to r  o f  E c o n o m ic  C o o p e ra t io n  B u re a u . 
A  m e m b e r  o f  F T A  P ro m o tio n  &  P o lic y  a d ju s tm e n t 
A u th o r ity  d iv is io n , in  M O F E  (c u r re n t ly  M O S F )
S e o u l, S e p te m b e r  12 “ \  2 0 0 5 . 
S e o u l.  O c to b e r  2 nd, 2 0 0 9 .
M O L K im  J u n g -s u n
D e p u ty  d ire c to r  o f  in te rn a t io n a l c o o p e ra t io n  b u re a u  
in  P la n n in g  a n d  c o o rd in a t io n .
S e o u l,  O c to b e r  IS “1, 2 0 0 6 .
M O P A S P a rk  M y u n g - ja e M in is te r  o f  M O P A S .
S e o u l, M a rc h  3rd, 2 0 0 7 . 
S e o u l, A u g u s t7,h, 2 0 0 9 .
N C P K im  S u n g - jo n g O n e  o f  c o - le a d e rs  o f  N C P . S e o u l, O c to b e r  6 th, 2 0 0 6 .
N F F L e e J u n g -b a k O n e  o f  c o - le a d e rs  o f  N F F S e o u l, O c to b e r  7“ \  2 0 0 6 .
N M L U K im  H y u n g -s u n g D ire c to r  o f  re g io n a l d ire c to r  o f  N M L U . S e o u l,  O c to b e r  17“ \  2 0 0 6 .
N P L P a rk  J u n -y o u n g L e a d e r  o f  th e  N P L S e o u l, F e b ru a ry  3 rd, 2 0 0 7
P S G K K im  D o n g -s u n g O n e  o f  c o - le a d e rs  o f  P S G K . S e o u l, O c to b e r  11th, 2 0 0 6 .
P S P D P a rk  W o n -s u k D ire c to r  o f  P S P D . S e o u l, M a rc h  1 5 “ \  2 0 0 7 .
A  s e n io r  re s e a rc h  o f  E c o n o m ic  R e s e a rc h
S E R I
H e u n  Y o u n g - ja e D e p a r tm e n t,  S E R I. S e o u l, S e p te m b e r  2 3 rd, 2 0 0 5 .
K im  T a e -w a n M a n a g e r  o f  E c o n o m ic  R e s e a rc h  D e p a r tm e n t  in S e o u l,  M a rc h  3 rd, 2 0 0 7 .
S E R I.
U C C I L e e  D o o -c h u l P re s id e n t o f  U C C I S e o u l, o n  O c to b e r  14 th, 2 0 0 5 .
256
Bibliography
Bibliography
Adams, R., P. Dee, et al., (2003). "The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential
Trading Arrangements: Old and New Evidence." Productivity Commission Staff 
Working Paper: Canberra, May.
Ahn, B. J. (2006b). The Outline of National Report on the Korea-US FTA. The National 
Report on the Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi.
Ahn, B. M. (2003). Elites and Political Power in South Korea. Cheltenham, UK,
Ddward Elgar.
Ahn, S. M. (2006a). Misfortune of Workers Foretold, Korea-US FTA. Korea-US FTA, 
Already Failed Future? S. T. Kim. Seoul, PSSP.
Ahn, S. Y. (2003a). "Analysis on Reaction of Domestic Constituents in FTA
Negotiation: The Case of Korea-Chile FTA." Korea trade Review 28(2): 55-79.
Allison, G. T. (1971). The essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile Crisis. 
Boston, Little Brown.
Allison, G. T. and M. Halperin (1972). "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Policy Implications." World Politics 24(1) (Spring Supplement): 40-79.
Almond, G. A. and G. B. Powell (1966). Comparative Politics: A Developmental 
Approach. Boston, Mass, Little Brown and Company.
Alt, J. and M. Gilligan (1994). "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor
Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions." 
Journal of Political Philosophy 2(2): 165-192.
Andrews, B. (1975). "Social Rules and the States as a Social Actor." World Politics 
27(4): 521-540.
Avery, W. P. (1998). "Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining." Political Science 
Quarterly 113(2): 281-305.
AWNM and KCTU (2002). Denunciations on the decision to promote the Korea-Japan 
investment agreement and the Korea-Japan FTA. Seoul, March 23rd.
Bae, S. I. (2006). Korea-US FTA and Strategic Flexibility. The National Report on The 
Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi: 53-70.
Bae, U. W. (2001). "The Relationship between Government and Economic Interest
Groups in the Authoritarian Political Regimes: Park Jung Hi Regime and Jun Du 
Hwan Regime." Korean Public Administration Review 35(2): 19-39.
Bae, U. W. (2002). "Policy Interests, Political Behaviour, and Interests Representative 
Model of Government and Expert Interests Groups." Korean Political Science 
Association 36(1): 113-139.
Baldwin, R. (1993). A domino Theory of Regionalism. Cambridge MA, National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Baldwin, R. (1997). "The Causes of Regionalism." World Economy 20(7): 865-888.
Baldwin, R. E. and F. Robert-Nicoud (2007). "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why 
Governments Pick Losers." Journal of the European Economic Association 5(5): 
1064-1093.
Bark, T. and C. S. Kim (2005). Political Economy of Korea-Japan Free Trade
Arrangement: A Korean Perspective. Korea-Japan FTA: Toward a Model Case 
for East Asian Economic Integration. Seoul, KIEP: 17-41.
Bearce, David H. (2003). “Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy
Outcomes.” International Organisation 57(2): 373-410.
Berry, J. M. (1984). The interest group society. Boston: Little, Brown.
257
Bibliography
Bhagwati, J. (1993). Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview. In New
Dimensions in Regional Integration. J. De Melo and A. Panagariya. Washington, 
D.C., AEI Press.
Bhagwati, J. and A. Panagariya (1996). "The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements: 
Historical Evolution and Current Trends." The American Economic Review 
86(2): 82-87.
Bhagwati, J. and A. Panagariya (1999). Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism- 
Strangers, Friends, or foes? Trading Blocs, Alternative Approaches to Analysing 
Preferential Trade Agreements. J. Bhagwati, P. Krishna and A. Panagariya. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, MIT Press: 33-100.
Biglaiser, Glen and David S. Brown (2001). “The Determinants of Economic
Liberalisation in Latin American.” Paper presented for Presentation at the 
Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 
CA, September 2001.
Blondel, J. (1996b). Parties and Party systems in East and Southeast Asia. Party and 
government: an inquiry into the relationship between governments and 
supporting parties in liberal democracies. J. Blondel and M. Cotta. New York, St. 
Martin's Press.
Blondel, J. and M. Cotta, Eds. (1996a). Party and government: an inquiry into the
relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies. 
New York, St. Martin's Press.
BOK (2000). Korea-Japan FTA, Competitiveness of Korean industries. Seoul, BOK.
Bowles, P. (2002). "Asia's post-crisis regionalism: Bringing the state back in, keeping
the United States out." Review of International Political Economy 9(2): 244-270.
Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt (2000). “Geography, International Trade and Political 
Mobilisation in U.S. Industries.” American Journal of Political Science 44(4): 
703-719.
Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt (1999). “Industrial Location and Protection: The 
Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers.” American 
Journal of Political Science 43(4): 1028-1050.
Byun, C. G. (2001). "Emerging East Asian Regional Cooperation after the Asian 
Financial Crisis." Korean Journal of Political Science 9(1): 39-56.
Cameron, David R. (1988). “Distributional Coalitions and Others sources of Economic 
Stagnation: On Olson’s Rise and Decline of Nations.” International Organisation 
42(2): 561-603.
Carey, J. M. and M. S. Shugart (1995). “Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank 
ordering of electoral formulas.” Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-439.
Castro, R. C. D. (2005). "Politics in Command: The Case of the US Proposal for an 
FTA with the Philippines." Contemporary Southeast Asia 27(3): 453-471.
Caves, R. E. (1976). "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure." 
Canadian Journal of Economics 9(2): 278-300.
Cha, N. H. and S. H. Lee (2006). The Korea-US FTA and Labour: Influence of the
Korea-US FTA on Workers. The National Report on the Korea-US FTA. KoA. 
Seoul, Grinbi: 583-630.
Chang, K. R. (2005). "Korea as a Balancer in Northeast Asia." Journal of Korean 
Political Science 8(2): 62-85.
Chang, K. S, and Park and S. K. (2001) “The Relationship between Dual Legal Order 
and Media Power in South Korea”. The Korean journal of sociology 35(2):
258
Bibliography
1225-0120.
Chang, W. S. (1994). "Contents on UR Agricultural Products Negotiations and Several 
Suggestions for the Betterment." The journal of the Korean Society of 
International Agriculture 6(1): 30-40.
Cheong, I. K. (1999b). "How to cope with the expansion of FTAs." KIEP: 1-78, Seoul.
Cheong, I. K. (1999a). "Korea-Chile FTA, its process and development." Journal of 
International Economics Studies 3(4): 115-136.
Cheong, I. K. (2001a). "Korea's FTA Policy and its Implication." Korean Association of 
Negotiation Studies 16(2): 21-42.
Cheong, I. K. (2001b). How to cope with FTAs. Seoul, KIEP.
Cheong, I. K. (2001c). Economic Effect and Current Issue of Korea-Japan FTA. Seoul, 
KIEP, Policy Research 01-04.
Cheong, I. K. (2003a). A strategic Approach towards a US-Korea FTA. Committee for 
Korea-U.S. 21st Century. Washington D.C.
Cheong, I. K. (2003). "Economic Effects of a CJK FTA and Assessment of the
Environment for the Trilateral FTA." Journal of northeast Asian economic 
studies 17(3): 1-26.
Cheong, I. K. (2004a). "East Asian Economic Integration: Implications for a US-Korea 
FTA." (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research): 1-22.
Cheong, I. K. (2005a). "Exploring the possibility for US Korea FTA." Journal of 
International Logistics and Trade 3(1): 27-48.
Cheong, I. K. (2005b). "Estimating Economic Effects of a Korea - Mexico FTA." The 
Journal of the Korean Economy 14: 29-55.
Cheong, I. K., Ed. (2006). Debate on Korea-US FTA: What is the Truth? Seoul, 
Haenam.
Cheong, I. K. and Y. Wang (1999). Korea-U.S. FTA: Prospects and Analysis. Seoul, 
KIEP.
Cheong, I. K. and K. H. Lee (2000). Background in Korea-Chile FTA Development, 
Economic Effect, and Current Issues of the Policy, Economic Policy, No. 3. 
Seoul, KIEP: 1-129.
Cheong, J. H. (2005a). The Korea-Chile FTA from the viewpoints of Enterprises. Seoul, 
KITA.
Cheong, J. Y. (2006a). Actual Current Issue of the Korea-US FTA: Is It a Globalisation 
of Finance and Military led by US, National Peace or a Universal Right? Seoul, 
June.
Cheong, J. Y. (2004b). "Market Opening, Structural Adjustment, and the Political
Economy of Social Compensation: The Case of Korean Trade Politics." Korean 
Journal of international relations 44(4): 169-195.
Cheong, S. H. (2001). "Comparative Study on interest politics in Korea and Japan; 
Focusing on business associations." Journal of Asian studies 44(1): 67-101.
Cho, H. J. (2008). “Divergent perspectives in Korean broadcasting history:
Characteristics and challenges”. Journal of Press and Society 16(1): 2-48.
Cho S. D and Kang, N. J. (2009). “A Study on the Change of Audience's Media
Consumption and Composition in a Multimedia Environment.” Korean Society 
for Journalism & Communication Studies 53(1) 233-256.
Cho, S. H. and M. K. Kim (2002). "A Study on Korea-Japan FTA." Journal of Korean 
Political Economy 3(1): 133-147.
Cho, Y. J. (2003). A Textbook of International Trade. Seoul, Beub-Moon-Sa.
259
Bibliography
Choi, Byung-il and Lee, Kong-Jin (2005), A Long and Winding Road: Ratification of 
Korea’s First FTA, Ewha Case Studies in International Conflict, Ewha Womans 
University.
Choi, B. I. (2006). Korean Economy, Reform and Opening are the Only Ways. The 
Debate on Korea-US FTA: What is the Truth? I. K. Cheong. Seoul, Haenam.
Choi, H. S. (2007a). "Empirical Analysing the Trade Barrier Effects of preferential rules 
of origin in Free Trade Agreement Between The Republic of Korea and The 
Republic of Chile." Korea Research Society for Customs 8(4): 1-31.
Choi, I. B. and J. J. Schott (2001). Free Trade between Korea and the United States. 
Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics.
Choi, I. B. and J. J. Schott (2004). Korea-US Free Trade Revisited. Free Trade 
Agreements, US Strategies and Priorities. J. J. Schott. Washington, D.C.,
Institute for International Economics: 173-196.
Choi, J. W. (2006b). "Deliberative Democracy, Rational Participation and e-Voting in 
South Korea." Asian Journal of Political Science 14(1): 64-81.
Choi, S. G. (2004b). Korea-Japan FTA, Agricultural Effects and Negotiation Strategy. 
Seoul, KERI, 87-94.
Choi, S. J. (2004a). Market Access of Agricultural Products of ChungBuk Province on 
the Lines of the Korea-Chile FTA. 20-25, Seoul, the East and West Economic 
Study of Korea.
Choi, S. Y. (2006a). Korea-US FTA: Challenges and Policy Recommendations from 
Korea's Perspectives, Brookings Institution and Sejong Institute, May 1-2.
Choi, T. C. (2006c). "Art vs. Bureaucracy As a prerequisite to beginning FTA talks with 
the US, the Korean government has agreed to halve its quota allocated towards 
domestic films." Business Korea 23(236): 1-15.
Choi, T. U. (2001). "International and Domestic Politics of Foreign Trade Policy, Korea 
- Japan FTA." Korean Political Science Association 35(3): 475-497.
Choi, T. U. (2007). Korean Style of Market-Opening Strategy based on Korea-US FTA. 
Seoul, Changbi.
Choi, T. W. (2004c). "South Korea's Regional Economic Integration Policy and 
Domestic Negotiation." IRI Review 9(1): 111-139.
Choi, Y. J. (2004d). "East Asian Regionalism and South Korea's FTA Strategy." Korean 
Journal of International Relations 44(5): 85-108.
Chong, Y. A., S. K. Kim, et al., (2005). Korea-Japan FTA: Toward a Model Case for 
East Asian Economic Integration. Seoul, KIEP.
Chung, J. Y. (2006b). East Asian Economic Cooperation and Korea's FTA Strategy. 
Seoul, East Asian Institute.
Chung, J. Y. (2006a). "The Political Economy of Regional Monetary Cooperation:
Rereading Theories and Implications for East Asia." New Asia 13(2): 101-127.
Chung, S. J. (2003). "Workers’ Responses to Neoliberal Globalisation." Economy and 
Society 58: 193-221.
Cohen, B. J. (1990). "The Political Economy of International Trade." International 
Organisation 44(2): 261-281.
Cohn, T. H. (2002). Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice. Longman.
Conybeare, J. A. C. (1983). "Tariff Protection in Developed and Developing Countries: 
A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis." International Organisation 37(3): 
441-467.
Cowhey, P. (1990). States and Politics in American Foreign Economic Policy.
260
Bibliography
International Trade Policies: Gains from exchange between economic and 
political science. J. S. Odell and T. d. Willett, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan press.
Crane, G. T. and A. Amawi, Eds. (1997). The Theoretical Evolution of International 
Political Economy. New York, Oxford University Press.
Croissant, A. (2003). "Legislative Powers, Veto Players, and the Emergence of
Delegative Democracy: A Comparison of Presidentialism in the Philippines and 
South Korea." Democratisation 10(3): 68-98.
Culter, W. (2006). US-Korea FTA: A Win-Win Proposition. Speech by Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative to the American Chamber of Commerce, Seoul, March 7th.
Damania, R., P. G. Fredriksson, et al., (2005). "Collusion, Collective Action and 
Protection: Theory and Evidence." Public Choice 3(4): 279-308.
Desker, B. (2004). "In defense of FTAs: from purity to pragmatism in East Asia." The 
Pacific Review 17(1): 3-26.
Destier, I. D. (1995). American Trade Politics. Washington, DC., Institute for 
International Economics.
Dicken, P. (2003). Global Shift, Reshaping The Global Economic Map in the 21st 
century. London, SAGE Publications.
Dorussen, H. (2006). "Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict What You Trade 
Matters." Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(1): 87-107.
Duverger, M. (1972). Party Politics and Pressure Groups. New York, Thomas Y.
Crowell Company.
Ebbinghaus, B. (2003). How the Cases You Choose Limit the Questions You ask:
Selection Problems in Comparative Research Designs. European Consortium for 
Political Research. Marburg.
Ehrlich, S. D. (2008). "The Tariff and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group 
Politics." International Studies Quarterly 52(2): 427-445.
Eum, S. P. (2004). “Democratic development and Electoral systems in Korea”. 
Soonchunhyang Social Science Review: 475-504.
Evans, P. B. (1985). Conclusion. Bringing the State Back In. P. B. Peter, D.
Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded autonomy: states and industrial transformation. 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
Fernandez, R. and J. Portes (1998). "Returns to Regionalism: An Evaluation of Non- 
traditional Gains from RTAs." World Bank Economic Review 12(2): 197-220.
FKI (2004c). Effects of Korea-Japan FTA on industry and measures. Seoul, Issue Paper, 
September, FKI.
FKI (2004a). Recent trends in FTA promotion and complementary tasks for FTA 
Roadmap. Seoul, FKI, September, FKI.
FKI (2005). Survey Results on Opinions of Businesses on the Korea-US FTA. Seoul, 
FKI.
FKI (2006). Korea-US FTA. Seoul, FKI, Issue Report, October 25th, FKI.
FKI (2004b). The View of FKI on the Korea Japan FTA Core Issues. Seoul, FKI.
FKTU (2006). Source Book for Educating Korea-US FTA. Seoul, The Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions: 68-69.
Frankel, J. A., E. Stein, et al., (1997). Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic 
System: In the World Economic System, Institute for International Economics.
Frieden, J. (1991a). Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modem Political Economy
261
Bibliography
and Latin America, 1965-1985. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Frieden, J. (1991b). "Invested Interested: The Politics of National Economic Policies in 
a World of Global Finance." International Organisation 45(425-451).
Frieden, J. (1988). Sectoral conflict and U.S. foreign economic policy, 1914-1940. The 
State and American Foreign Economic Policy, Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press. G. J. Ikenberry, D. A. Lake and M. Mastanduno. New York, 
Cornell University Press.
Frieden, J. and L. Martin (2001). International Political Economy: The state of the sub­
discipline. Cambridge, MA, Department of Government, Harvard University.
Frieden, J. and R. Rogowski (1996). The Impact of the International Economy on 
National Policies: An Analytic Overview. Internationalisation and Domestic 
Politics. R. O. Keohane and H. Milner. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Fukagawa, Y. (2000). Japan-Korea FTA as a New Initiative in East Asia: Beyond 
Bitterness. Tokyo, Global Communication Platform (GLOCOM) homepage, 
http://www.glocom.org/opinions/essays/200005_fukagawajp_kr_fta/index.html.
Fukao, K., G. Kataoka, et al., (2005). How to Measure Non-Tariff Barriers? A Critical 
Examination of the Price-Differential Approach. Korea-Japan FTA: Toward a 
Model Case for East Asian Economic Integration. C. Y. Ahn, I. K. Cheong, Y. 
Fukagawa and T. Ito. Seoul, KIEP: 296-340.
Gais, T. L., & Walker, J. L., Jr. (1991). Pathways to influence in American politics. In J. 
L. Walker, Jr. (Ed.), Mobilising interest groups in America. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.
Garrett, G. and P. Lange (1995). "Internationalisation, Institutions and Political 
Change." International Organisation 45(4): 627-655.
GBA-JSG (2003). Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement. Seoul, GBA-JSG, October 2nd.
Gilpin, R. (1975). "Three Models of the Future." International Organisation 29(1): 37- 
60.
Gilpin, R. (2001). Global political economy : understanding the international economic 
order. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
Go, B. K. (2006). Korea-US FTA and Social bipolarisation. The National Report on the 
Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi: 83-106.
Godek, P. (1985). "Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions." 
Journal of Law and Economics 28(3): 687-703.
Goldstein, Judith, and Stefanie Lenway (1989). “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry 
into Congressional-ITC Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 33(2): 303- 
327.
Goldstein, J., D. Rivers, et al., (2007). "Institutions in International Relations: 
Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." 
International Organisation 61( 1): 37-67.
Gourevitch, P. (1978). "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics." International Organisation 32(4): 881-912.
Gourevitch, P. (1984). "Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy 
Responses to the Depression of the 1930's." International Organisation 38(4): 
95-129.
Gourevitch, P. (1986). Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International 
Economic Crises. N. J., Cornell University Press.
Gourevitch, P. A. (1977). "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty:
Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896." Journal of Interdisciplinary
262
Bibliography
History 8(2): 281-313.
Gowa, J. (1988). "Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy 
Processes in the United States." International Organisation 42(1): 15-32.
Gowa, J. (1994). Allies, Adversaries and International Trade. Princeton New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press. 11-21.
Grindle, M. S. (1996). Challenging the State, Crisis and Innovation in Latin America 
and Africa. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994). "Protection for Sale." American Economic 
Review 84(4): 833-850.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1995). "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements."
The American Economic Review 85(4): 667-690.
Gruber, L. (2001). "Power politics and the free trade bandwagon," Comparative 
Political Studies, 34(3): 703-741.
Haggard, S. (1990). Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrialising Countries. New York, Cornell University Press.
Hall, P. (1992). The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism. Structuring Politics: 
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and 
F. Longstreth. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Harvey, K. (2004). "Patents, pills and politics: the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme." Australian Health Review 28(2): 218- 
226.
Hathaway, O. A. (1998). "Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on 
Industry Demands for Protection." International Organisation 52(3): 575-612.
He, B. G. (2004). "East Asian ideas of regionalism: a normative critique." Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 58(1): 105-125.
Hocking, B. and S. McGuire (2004). Introduction: trade politics: environments, agendas 
and processes. Trade Politics. B. Hocking and S. McGuire. London, Routledge: 
Taylor and Francis Groups.
Holwill, R. and S. V. Andel (2006). Public Hearing Before the Trade Policy Staff
Committee, FTA Between the US and Korea. Washington, D. C., March 14, US- 
Korea Business Council.
Hong, C. (2006). "Korea's Strategy for the Formation of Multilateral Cooperation
System in Northeast Asia: With a Focus on the Simultaneous Perform Strategy 
of the Idea of Balancer in Northeast Asia." Korean Journal of Political Science 
14(1): 47-69.
Hong, E. J. (2002). "Perspectives and Challenges of the Korean Economy." New Asia 
9(3): 110-125.
Hong, G. U. (2002a). "The Change of SME's Standing after IMF Crisis " Korea 
Industrial Economics Association 15(4): 101-115.
Hong, J. W. and T. I. Cheong (2006). "Opening Pandora's Box in Korea-US FTA." 
Journal of Korea's Labour and Society 112: 114-135.
Huber, E. (1995). Assessments of State Strength. Latin America in Comparative
Perspective, New Approaches to Methods and Analysis. P. H. Smith. Oxford, 
Westview Press.
Huh, D. J. (2004). The Expected effects of a Mexico-Japan FTA on Korean exporters, 
1-29. Seoul, KITA.
Hwang, B. Y. (2006). A Bumpy Road for the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement. 
Washington, DC, the Heritage Foundation: 1-2.
263
Bibliography
Hwang, D. Y. (2001). "Korea's International Trade Policy in the Global Age." East 
Asian Review 13(3): 3-20.
Hwang, Y. S. (2001). “A Exploratory Study of the Relationship between Internet Use 
and Political Participation.” Korean journal of journalism & communication 
studies, 45(3): 421-459.
IDE and KIEP (2000a). Economic Effects and Policy Direction for a Korea-Japan FT A. 
Seoul, Joint Symposium.
IDE and KIEP (2000b). Toward Closer Japan-Korea Economic Relations in the 21st 
Century, Mimeogrpah.
Ikenberry, J. G., D. A. Lake, et al., (1988). "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining 
American Foreign Economic Policy." International Organisation 42(1): 1-14.
Im, C. S. (2002). "Korea-Japan FTA and Foreign Direct Investment." Center For
Russian Studies The Institute of East and West Studies Yonsei University: 67-84.
Im, C. S. (2005). "A Study on the Trade between Korea and China and Future Direction 
of Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement." Korea Research Society for Customs 
6(2): 443-462.
Im, J. B. (2007). Korea-US FTA and its effect on Korea's agricultural sector. Korean 
Style of Market-Opening Strategy based on Korea-US FTA. T. U. Choi. Seoul, 
Changbi: 131-172.
Immergut, Ellen M. (1990). “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A
Comparative Analysis of Health Care”. Journal of Public Policy 10 (4):391—416.
Jackson, A. (2006). Prospects for the U.S.-Korea FTA, Is Korea Really
Changing? ..Enough? Seoul-Washington Forum, the Brookings Institution and 
The Sejong Institute, May 1-2.
Jeon, D. K. (2005). "The U.S.-Korea Economic Relations: Issues and Implications."
New Asia 12(2): 61-94.
Jiang, Y. (2008). "Australia-China FTA: China's domestic politics and the roots of 
different national approaches to FTAs." Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 62(2): 179-195.
Ju, C. (2003). "The competitive liberalisation of world trade and Korea's foreign trade 
policy." Global Economic Review 32(2): 1-19.
Kang, S. I., J. J. Kim, et al., (2005). Environmental Impact of Korea-Japan Free Trade. 
Seoul, Korea Environment Institute, 1-103.
Kastner, Scott L., and Chad Rector (2003). “International Regimes, Domestic Veto- 
Players, and Capital Controls Policy stability”. International Studies Quarterly 
47(1): 1-22.
Katzenstein, P. J., Ed. (1978b). Between power and plenty: foreign economic policies of 
advanced industrial states. Madison, University Of Wisconsin Press.
Katzenstein, P. J. (1978a). Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and
Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign 
Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. P. J. Katzenstein, the 
University of Wisconsin Press.
Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). Small States in World Markets, Industrial Policy in Europe. 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Kawai, M. (2004). "East Asian economic regionalism: progress and challenges." Journal 
of Asian Economics 16(1): 29-55.
KCTU (2004). Suspend the Korea-Japan FTA, a neo-liberal gamble risking national 
economy. Seoul, June, KCTU.
264
Bibliography
Keohane, R. and Helen Milner (1996a). "Internationalisation and Domestic Politics: An 
Introduction. " In Internationalisation and Domestic Politics: Robert A. Keohane 
and Helen Milner, editors. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Keohane, R. and Helen Milner (1996b). "Conclusion." In Internationalisation and
Domestic Politics: Robert A. Keohane and Helen Milner, editors. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Keohane, R. and J. Nye (1989). Power and Interdependence. New York, Harper-Colins.
Keohane, R. O. and J. S. Nye (1977). Power and interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Boston, Little Brown.
Khor, M., Ed. (2004). The WTO and The Developing World: Do As We Say, Not As
We Did. Whose Trade Organisation: A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO. New 
York and London, New Press.
KIE (2000). Korea-Japan FTA and Future of Korean Business. Seoul, Policy Paper 00- 
81, KIE.
KIEP (1999). "Korea-Chile FTA and its Economic Estimation." Seoul, KIEP, Working 
Paper, (November): 1-35.
KIEP (2000). Economic Effects of and Policy Directions for Korea-Japan FTA. Seoul, 
Mimeograph.
KIEP (2001). Toward a Korea-Japan FTA: Assessment and Prospects. Seoul, KIEP, 79- 
81.
KIEP (2004). Background, Economic Effects, and Suggestions of the Korea-Chile FTA, 
Seoul, KIEP, Policy data 04-01.
KIEP (2005). Analysis on the economic expectations and influences of Korea-Japan 
FTA. Seoul, KIEP.
KIET (2002). Study on Korea's engineering industries competitiveness. Seoul, KIET, 
discussion paper, June, 1-35.
Kollman, K. (1998). Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kim, A. E. (2006d). "Civic activism and Korean Democracy: the impact of blacklisting 
campaigns in the 2000 and 2004 general elections." The Pacific Review 19(4): 
519-542.
Kim, B. H. (2005a). "A Spectrum of Modem Liberalism, and Conservatism and 
Progressivism in Korean Context." 71(1): 27-59.
Kim, B. K. (2002a). Reservations on Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreements. The Korea 
Times. Seoul.
Kim, B. K. (2003). "The US-South Korea Alliance: Anti-American Challenges."
Journal of East Asian Studies 3(2): 225-258.
Kim, C. K. (2006b). "The Crisis of Korean Agriculture and Globalisation: A Macro- 
Historical Approach." Korean Agricultural Society 16(2): 183-211.
Kim, C. S. (2001). "The Effect of Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreement using CGE
Model." Korean Journal of Agricultural Management and Policy 28(3): 438-456.
Kim, C. S. (2002c). Perceptions on Free Trade: The Korean Debate over the Japan- 
Korea Free Trade Agreement. CNAPS, Brookings Institute.
Kim, C. S. and S. H. Lee (2000). "Korea-Chile FTA and its Potential Effect on Korea's 
Agricultural Sectors." Agricultural Management and Policy 27(3): 56-73.
Kim, D. H. (2004d). "Japanese Non-Tariff Barriers against Korea in terms of its Price 
Differential between Domestic and Foreign Market." Journal of International 
Trade and Industry Studies 9(3): 47-89.
265
Bibliography
Kim, D. H. (1994). "Opening Rice Market in Korea and its side-effect." Monthly Korea 
Forum 53(1): 67-76.
Kim, D. I. (2007b). "Post-Crisis Changes in Korea's Labour Market and Their 
Implications." Korean Economic Review 55(4): 473-502.
Kim, D. K. (2005b). "A Role of China for the North Korea's Nuclear Issue." Korean 
Journal of Political Science 13(2): 265-289.
Kim, D. M. (2002d). "A Study on the FTA in Korea." Chung-Ang Public administration 
Review 16(2): 291-318.
Kim, E. D. (2004b). "A Study on the Financialisation of Korean Economy after 1987." 
Review of Korean Trade Policy 22(3): 29-69.
Kim, E. S. (2000a). "Trade liberalisation and productivity growth in Korean
manufacturing industries: price protection, market power, and scale efficiency." 
Journal of Development Economics 62(1): 55-83.
Kim, G. S. (2007c). "The Korea-US FTA and Labor Standards." Journal of Korea 
Industrial Associations Association 17(2): 149-167.
Kim, G. T. (1995). "A Study on the Effects of Cheju Agriculture by the Agricultural
Market Liberalisation through the Agreement of UR." The Research Institute for 
Subtropical, Agriculture CheJu National University 12: 157-178.
Kim, H. (2007a). "Security Dilemma in the Korea-US Alliance." 31: 37-72.
Kim, H. and Y. Lee (2003). "Agricultural Policy Reform and Structural Adjustment:
Historical Evidence from Korean Experience." (Policy Reform and Adjustment 
Workshop, Wye College).
Kim, H. H. and B. I. Ahn (2007). "Implications of Korea-US FTA and Directions of 
Agricultural Policies." Institute of Agriculture & Life Sciences, Gveongsang 
National University 41(4): 91-100.
Kim, H. N. (1989) “The 1988 Parliamentary Election in South Korea*’. Asian Survey 
29(5): 480-495.
Kim, H. R. (2000a). "The state and civil society in transition: the role of non­
governmental organisations in South Korea." The Pacific Review 13(4): 595- 
613.
Kim, J. C. (2004c). "Korea-US Bilateral Investment Treaty and Screen Quota: A Two- 
level Game Approach." Journal of International Trade and Industry Studies 9(1): 
95-121.
Kim, J. H. (2004d). Searching for a possible solution for Korea's Agriculture in a 
globalised world. Seoul, the Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI): 1-27.
Kim, K. H. (1998). "Bilateral Investment Treaties of the US: Implications and Prospects 
of the BIT between Korea and US." KIEP(Working Paper).
Kim, S. (2007). "The Korea's Free Trade Agreement, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, 
and U.S. Korea Relations." Japanese Focus 752: 1-9.
Kim, S. D. (2003b). The Complexity of Korea's an FTA with Chile, large corporations’ 
perspective. Seoul, Dolbage.
Kim, S. G. (2006a). Outline of National Report on Korea-US FTA. The National Report 
on the Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi, 15-34.
Kim, S. J. (2006e). "Searching a New Coordination Mechanism at the End of Rapid 
Economic Growth." Economy and society 69: 40-70.
Kim, S. K. (2002b). "The Issues and Countermeasures of the Northeast Asia FTA." 
Journal of International Trade 8(2): 1-26.
Kim, S. K., I. K. Cheong, et al., (2006). "The Impact of a FTA on Labour M arket"
266
Bibliography
Journal of KyoungSang 20(1): 21-40.
Kim, S. M. (1996). "The Political Economy of Opening Korea's Rice Market." Korea 
and World Politics 12(2): 185-225.
Kim, S. T. (2004a). "Korea' FTA Policy and Is Future Prospect." Sogang Economic 
Papers 33(2): 63-86.
Kim, T. W. (2006c). "The U. S. Trade Remedy System and Korea's disadvantage." 
Journal of Economics and Business 25: 111-129.
Kim, Y. H. (2003d). The Non-Tariff Barriers in Japan in June 2003: A Survey Result. 
Seoul, KITA.
Kim, Y. H. and J. K. Kim (2002). "The Effects of the Korea-Japan FTA on inward FDI 
and the Implications." Research of Social Science 9(2): 1-36.
Kim, Y. J. (2005c). "Effect of the Industry which it follows in Korea-Japan FTA 
Contract and the Countermeasures of Korea." Research Works 7: 15-31.
Kim, Y. K. (2003a). "A Previous Study on Prospective Countries for FTA Association 
with Korea and FTA Background of Korea-Chile." Research of Social Science 
10: 153-168.
KITA (2003). the Non-Tariff Barriers in Japan, KITA.
Kiyota, K. and R. M. Stem (2007). Economic Effects of a Korea-US Free Trade
Agreement, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, the University of Michigan.
Klinger, B. (2006). "South Korea's Economic Forecast." (Brookings Institute and 
Sejong Institute): May 1-2.
Klingner, B. and A. B. Kim (2007). The U.S.-South Korea FTA: A Defining Moment. 
The Heritage Foundation.
KoA, Ed. (2006a). the FTA policy planning research team of Korean Alliance against 
the Korea- US FTA? Seoul, Greenbee.
KoA, Ed. (2006b). National Report on Korea-US FTA. Seoul, KoA.
KoA (2006c). A study on Korea's Pharmaceutical Market in Korea-US FTA. The 
National Report on the Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi: 291-358.
Koo, M. G. (2006). From multilateralism to bilateralism? Bilateral Trade Agreements in 
the Asia-Pacific. V. K. Aggarwal and S. Urata. New York and London, 
Routledge.
KOTRA (2004). "Study on trade discrimination on Korea's Product in NAFTA." Policy 
Paper 24-2, October.
KOTRA (2005). FTAs current status in the world and the case of Korean products 
discrimination in major markets, 1-45. Seoul, KOTRA.
KOTRA (2007). Korea-US FTA and benefits of Korea SMEs in Korea. Seoul, Issue 
Report, November 11th.
Krasner, S. D. (1978). US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox 
of External Strength and Internal Weakness. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign 
Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. P. Katzenstein, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press.
Krasner, S. D. (1984). "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical 
Dynamics." Comparative Politics 16(2): 223-246.
KREI (1999). "Study on Korea's Agricultural sectors in forming Korea-Chile FTA." 
Seoul, KERI, Policy Paper, November.
KREI (1999). "The effect of Korea-Chile FTA to Korea's Agricultural Sectors." (Policy 
Paper, May): 1-35.
KREI (2006). A study on Korea's Agricultural Market in Korea-US FTA. Economic
267
Bibliography
Estimation on Korea-US FTA. S. K. Choi, H. J. Kang and H. J. Y. Seoul, KERI.
Krueger, O. A. (1999). "Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalising or 
Protectionist?." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 13(4): 105-124.
Kwon, H. J. (2001). "Globalisation, Unemployment, and policy Responses in Korea: 
Repositioning the State?." Global Social Policy 1(2): 213-234.
Kwon, O. B. (2006a). We need a wise plan to minimise damage to our agriculture. 
Seoul, Monthly FKI, 05-06.
Kwon O.B. (2006b), “Current Situation of the KORUS-FTA and Its Impact on Korean 
Agriculture.” Journal of flood management. Vol.13, No. 2.
Kwon, O. Y. (1997). "Korean Economic Developments and Prospects." Asian-Pacific 
Economic Literature 11(2): 15-39.
Kwon, O. Y. (2003). An Analysis of the FTA Policies of the Republic of Korea:
Prospects of a Republic of Korea-Australia FTA. The Graduate Institute of 
Peace Studies. Seoul, Kyung Hee University.
Kwon, Y. D., H. J. Lee, et al., (2006). "A Study on Development of Negotiation
Strategy for FTA Agreement on Forest Products with Japan, China, USA and 
Canada." Korea Industrial Economics Association 19(6): 2251-2278.
Kwon, Y. J. (2002). "How to Tackle the Negative Sentiments against the Corporation in 
Korea: the Conglomerate Reform." Journal of Social Science 22(-): 21-64.
Ladewig, J. W. (2006). "Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor
Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992." International Organisation 60(1): 
69-103.
Lahiri, S. (1998). "Controversy: Regionalism Versus Multilateralism." The Economic 
Journal 108(449): 1126-1127.
Lake, D. (1988). Power, protection, and free trade : international sources of U.S. 
commercial strategy, 1887-1939. New York, Cornell University Press.
Lawrence, R. Z. (1994). "Regionalism: An Overview." Journal of Japanese and 
International Economics 8(4): 356-387.
Lawrence, R. Z. (1996). Regionalism and Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration. 
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution.
Lee, B. C. (2006a). A Study on Korea's Service Sectors: an FTA with US The National 
Report on the Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi: 187-207.
Lee, B. H. and Y. S. Kim (2003). "Polarised Quality of Working Life between Regular 
and Non-regular Workers in Korea." Economy and society 60: 129-149.
Lee, C. G. (1996). "Characteristics of OECD and Cost/Benefit Elements of OECD 
Participation." Korean Economic Journal 35(2): 217-232.
Lee, C. H. (2006b). The Korea-US FTA and Breaking of Korean Education. Seoul, 
KoA: 280-301.
Lee, C. S. (2007c). "Main Legal Issues on Labor Clauses in FTA between the Republic 
of Korea and the U.S." Seoul Law journal 48(1): 280-301.
Lee, C. S., J. H. Park, et al., (2005). The Economic Effects of Korea-US FTA on the 
Korean Agricultural Sector. Seoul, Korea Economic Institute, 1-22.
Lee, E. Y. and M. Y. Shon (2001). "Is the Korean Clothing and Textile Industry
Processing to Globalisation " Journal of the Korean Society of Clothing and 
Textiles 25(6): 1131-1142.
Lee, G. (2002b). "Economic Interdependence, Identity Change, and Issue-oriented 
Balancing in Northeast Asia." New Asia 9(2): 104-128.
Lee, G. (2006e). "Peace on Korean Peninsula and Security Community Model in
268
Bibliography
Northeast Asia." Journal of northeast Asian Studies 40: 27-53.
Lee, G. R. (2004a). "The Analysis of the Developmental Process of Anti-Americanism 
in South Korea." Korean Journal of International Relations 44(4): 239-261.
Lee, H. B. (2005b). "Analysis of Structural Factors in the Trade Unbalance between 
Japan and Korea " Journal of Korean Economic Studies 14: 5-27.
Lee, H. Y., Ed. (2006). The Economic Effect of Screen Quota and Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT). Seoul, Hanwul Academy.
Lee, H. Y. (2006f). The Korea-US FTA and ISD implications to Korea. The National 
Report on the Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi: 497-536.
Lee, H. Y. (2006c). Unfamiliar Colony, the Korea-US FTA? Seoul, Mayday.
Lee I. Y. (2008). “Thinking Economic Institutions of'Korean Peninsula Econom
Project': Roh Moo-hyun's Era and After/' Journal of Tendency and outlook, 
11-43.
Lee, J. and H. Lee (2005a). Feasibility and Economic Effects of a Korea-US FTA.
Seoul, Korean Institute for International Economic Policy.
Lee, J. B. (2007a). "Balancer in Northeast Asia and Neutralisation of Korea." Journal of 
northeast Asian studies 43: 81-99.
Lee, J. H. (1990). "Special Politics and Political Thought in Industrial Societies:
Political Ideology of Interest Groups in Korea." Korean Political Science 
Association 24(1): 73-94.
Lee, J. H. (2005). Analysis: S. Korea’s FTA push, (30/03). UP1 Business Correspondent.
Lee, J. S. (2002a). "The Neoliberal Economic Restructuring and the Change of Labor 
Market in South Korea ." Korean Journal of sociology 36(3): 25-45.
Lee, J. W. (2001). "Socio-Political Requirements for the Korea-Japan FTA." Center For 
Russian Studies The Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University. 103- 
137.
Lee, J. W. and I. W. Park (2005). "Free Trade Areas in East Asia: Discriminatory or 
Non-discriminatory?." The World Economy 28(1): 21-48.
Lee, K. H., B. K. Kim, et al., (2005). Visible Success and Invisible Failure in Post-
Crisis Reform in the Republic of Korea: Interplay of Global Standards, Agents, 
and Local Specificity, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3651.
Lee, M. B. (2006d). Korea-US Alliance: Time to Take It to the Next Level. Washington 
D.C., the Brookings Institution.
Lee, N. G. (2003a). "A Study on Korea's FTA Policy." Korea Trade Review 28(4): 313- 
350.
Lee, S., S. Lee, et al., (2004). FTA Between Japan and Korea: Panacea or Pangloss? 
Seoul, Working Paper, Korean Association of Trade and Industry Studies.
Lee, S. H. and S. B. Chun (2004). "FTA between Japan and Korea: Non-Trade Barriers 
(NTB) and Injured Industries." Japanese Studies 9(2): 157-180.
Lee, S. J. (2007b). "The Evolution of South Korea's Trade Policy and FTA." Journal of 
Korean Political Science and International Relations 27(1): 103-134.
Lee, S. M. (2004b). "Korea and Asia's New Order in the 21st Century." New Asia 
11(3): 7-28.
Lee, S. O. and J. J. Ahn (2002). "A Study on the Problems and Improvement of the 
Korea's FTA Policy." Social Sciences Review 15: 193-221
Lee, S. S. (1998). "Killing Chaebols and Reviving Chaebols." Journal of Democratic 
Legal Studies Association 14( 1): 72-86.
Lee, S. Y. (2003c). "The perspectives of Korea-Chile FTA," Nara Economic Bulletin 26,
269
Bibliography
December (KDI): 10-14.
Lee, S. Y. and S. H. Chun (2005). "Korea-Japan FTA non-tariff barrier and damaged 
industries." Comprehensive Research on Japan 19(2): 245-267.
Lee, S. Y. and S. H. Jeon (2004). "FTA between Korea-Japan A Political Economy
Approach." Journal of International Trade and Industry Studies 9(1): 143-167.
Lee, Y. G. (2005a). "First Year Evaluation and its Lessons after Korea-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement." Journal of Public Policy 18(-): 41-61.
Lee, Y. H. (2000). "The Change of International Politico - Economy and East Asia 
Regional Cooperation." Journal of Asiatic Studies 43(2): 1-39.
Lee, Y. H. (2005d). "Participatory Democracy and Chaebol Regulation in Korea." Asian 
Survey 45(2): 279-301.
Lim, H. C. and J. H. Jang (2006). "Neo-Liberalism in Post-Crisis South Korea: Social 
Conditions and Outcomes." Journal of Contemporary Asia 36(4): 442-463.
Lim, J. B. (2004). "Internal and External Changing Factors of the Korean Agriculture 
Sector and Policy Implications." Journal of Agriculture & Life Sciences 38(1): 
47-55.
Lim, J. K. (2002). "Globalisation and Asian NGOs' Strategies for Social Development 
Implications for the Development of Korean NGOs." Journal of Korean NGO 
1(2): 185-215.
Lim, W. (2006b). KORUS FTA: A Pragmatic and Strategic View. Seoul-Washington 
Forum, Brookings Institution and Sejong Institute.
Lim, W. H. (2006a). KORUS FTA: A Mysterious Beginning and An Uncertain Future. 
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute.
Lincoln, E. (2004). East Asian Economic Regionalism. Washington D.C., Brookings 
Institution.
Lloyd, P. (2002). New Regionalism and New Bilateralism in the Asia-Pacific,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore.
Lopez, Rigoberto A., and Emilio P. (1996) “Trade Protection and the Role of Campaign 
Contributions in U.S. Food and Tobacco Industries.’'' Economic Inquiry 34(3): 
237-248.
Lyu, H. J. (2004). "Studies on Korea-Japan FTA and the Role of Large Corporations." 
Journal of Trade Politics 19(3): 125-149.
MacIntyre, A. (2001). “Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in 
Southeast Asia”. International Organisation 55(1): 81-122.
Mah, J. S. (2002). "The impact of globalisation on income distribution: the Korean 
experience." Applied Economics Letters 9: 1007-1009.
Manger, M. (2005). "Competition and bilateralism in trade policy: the case of Japan's 
free trade agreements." Review of International Political Economy 12(5): 804- 
828.
Mansfield, E. (1998). "The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Arrangements." Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 42(5): 523-543.
Mansfield, E. and E. Reinhardt (2003). "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The 
Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading 
Arrangements." International Organisation 57(4): 829-862.
Mansfield, E. D. and M. L. Busch (1995). "The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: 
A Cross-National Analysis." International Organisation 49(4): 724-731.
Mansfield , E. D., H. Milner, et al., (2002). "Why Democracies Cooperate More: 
Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." International
270
Bibliography
Organisation 56(2): 477-13.
Mansfield, E. D. and V. Milner, Eds. (1997). The Political Economy of Regionalism.
New York, Columbia University Press.
Manyin, M. E. (2006). South Korea-U. S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, 
and Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Foreign Affairs, Defense, and 
Trade Division: 1-29.
Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball (1999). “The Who and How of Organizations 
Lobbying Strategies in Committee,” The Journal of Politics 61(4) 999-1024.
Marks, Stephen, and John McArthur (1990). “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants 
of Protection: A Survey and Some New Result”. In International Trade Policies: 
Gains from the Exchange Between Economics and Political Science: John Odell 
and T. D. Willett, Editors. Ann Arbar: University of Michigan Press.
Mastel, G. (2004). "The Rise of the Free Trade Agreement." Challenge 47(4): 41-61.
Mayer, F. W. (1992). "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations:
The Strategic use of internal Side-Payments." International Organisation 46(4): 
793-818.
McDaniel, C. and A. Fox (2001). The Economic Impact of Establishing a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, The 
U.S. International Trade Commission.
Mckibbin, W. J., J. W. Lee, et al., (2004). "A Dynamic Analysis of the Korea-Japan 
Free Trade Area: Simulations with the G-Cubed Asia-Pacific Model." 
International Economic Journal 18(1): 3-32.
Midford, P. (1993). "International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on
Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments." International Organisation 47(4): 
535-564.
Migdal, J. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States, State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Milbrath, L. W. (1963). The Washington lobbyists. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Milner, H. (1993). Maintaining International Commitments in Trade Policy. Do
Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. R. 
K. Weaver and B. A. Rockman. Washington, D.C., the Brookings Institution.
Milner, H. (1997a). Interests, Institutions, and Information. Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press.
Milner, H. (1997b). Industries, Governments, and the Creation of Regional Trade Blocs. 
The Political Economy of Regionalism. E. D. Mansfield and H. Milner. New 
York, Columbia University Press.
Milner, Helen V. (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of 
International Trade: Princeton University Press.
Milner, Helen V. (1987). “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the 
Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States During the 1970’s.” 
International Organisation 41(4): 639-665.
Min, I. C. (2007). “An exploratory comparative study on the perception of journalists 
from mainstream and alternative internet news media toward their audiences: A 
case study on Donga, com and Ohmynews”. Korean journal of broadcasting 
21(3): 204-240.
Mo, J. R. (2001). "Political Culture and Legislative Gridlock: Politics of Economic 
Reform in Pre-crisis Korea." Comparative Political Studies 34(5): 467-492.
Mo, J. R., and Moon, Chung-in. (1999). “Korea after the crash”. Journal of Democracy
271
Bibliography
10: 150-164.
MOCIE (2006). Korea-US FTA, the benefits of Korea’s automobile industries. Seoul, 
Issue Paper, No. 123, July 18th.
MOFAT (2003a). Korea-Chile FTA. Seoul, KIEP.
MOFAT (2003b). Korea's FTA Roadmap. Seoul, MOFAT.
MOFAT (2003c). Trade Environment Abroad. Seoul, MOFAT.
MOFE (2003). "FTA as the Survival Strategy for Korea's Economy." Policy Paper 
(November): 1-55.
Moon, B. J. (2006). "Tasks and Directions of Korea-Japan FTA: Korea's Perspective." 
Journal of Social Science 21: 47-62.
Moon, B. S. (2005). "Rethinking regionalism: Europe and East Asia in comparative 
historical perspective." Journal of European Public Policy 12(6): 969-985.
Moon, C. I. and R. Prasad (1994). "Beyond the Developmental State: Networks, Politics, 
and Institutions." Governance 7(4): 360-386.
Moon, D. (2004). "The Political Economy of the Korea: Japan Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) - the Importance of the Open FTA." Journal of social science 22: 195-210.
Munakata, N. (2001). Evolution of Japan's Policy toward Economic Integration, 1-30, 
CNAPS, Brookings Institution.
Mundo, P. A. (1999). National Politics in a Global Economy, The Domestic Sources of 
U.S. Trade Policy. Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press.
Na, S. L., D. S. Kim, et al., Eds. (2006). Korea-US FTA Report by the Republic of 
Korea. Seoul, Dongheng.
Nakajima, T. and O. Kwon (2001). "An Analysis of the Economic Effects of A Korea- 
Japan FTA: Sectoral Aspects." Discussion Paper No.OlOle (Economic Research 
Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA)).
Nam, S. W. (2007). "A Study on the method of South Korean small-medium sized
enterprise in China for entry into Gaesong Industrial Complex: focusing on field 
survey the companies." North Korean Studies Review 11(2): 101-136.
Nelson, Douglas (1995). ‘internationalisation, Institutions and Political Change.” 
International Organisation 49(2): 627-755.
Nelson, Douglas (1988). “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey.” American 
Journal of Political Science 33(3): 303-327.
Netherlands, S. (1991) “Urbanisation and voter turnout in Korea: An update”.
Political Behaviour 13(1): 21-32.
Netherlands, S. (1988). “The 1988 national assembly election in South Korea: The 
Ruling party's loss of legislative majority”. East Asia 7(3): 59-76.
Nordlinger, E. (1981). On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press.
NSO (2000). Unemployment rate after the financial crisis. May, Seoul, NSO.
NSO (2003). Survey of Korea's current employee drift. Seoul, September, NSO.
Nye, J. S. and R. O. Keohane (1977). Power and interdependence : world politics in 
transition. Boston, Little Brown.
Nye, J. S. and R. O. Keohane (1989). Power and interdependence. Glenview, 111: Scott, 
Foresman.
Oatley, T. (2004). International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the 
Global Economy. New York et al., Pearson and Longman.
Odell, J. S. (1990). "Understanding International Trade Policies, An Emerging 
Synthesis." World Politics 43:139-167.
272
Bibliography
Odell, J. S. (2001). "Case Study Methods in International Political Economy."
International Studies Perspectives 2: 161-176.
Oe, M. G., J. O. Lee, et al., (1999). "Korea-Chile FTA and the potential effect on 
Korea's Agricultural Markets based on Economic Analysis." Korea Rural 
Economic Institute April: 1-34.
Oh, S. H. (2004a). "Korea-Mexico Economic Relationship and FTA." Journal of 
International Logistics and Trade 1(2): 151-169.
Okamoto, Jiro eds., (2003) Whither proliferation agreements? Proliferation, evaluation 
and multilateralisation, Chiba: IDE-JETRO, 2003.
Okuda, S. (2000). How can Korea take advantage of changing Japanese market?: An 
application of Gravity Model and RCA Analysis. APEC Study Centre Japan 
Consortium Conference. Makuhar, on December, 16th-17th.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collection Action: Public Goods and Theory of Groups. 
New York, Schocken Books.
Ong, E. C. (2003). "Anchor East Asian." The Washington Quarterly 26(2): 57-72. 
O’Reilly, R. (2005) "Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy."
Comparative Political Studies 38(6): 652-675.
Park, C. M. (1991). "Authoritarian Rule in South Korea: Political Support and 
Governmental Performance." Asian Survey 31(8): 743-761.
Park, C. M., et al., (2003). Korea's FTA strategy and perspectives in future. 7-25, Seoul, 
Samsung Economic Research Institute.
Park, H. R. and Y. K. Park (2006). "Korea's Alternative: A Proposal and Problem of the 
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement." 7(1): 321-339.
Park, J. H. (2004b). "The Northeast Asian Economic Community, Issues and
Perspective of Major Countries of the Region." Journal of Korea's Comparative 
Economics 11(2): 205-248.
Park, J. K. (2001). "The Neoliberal Economic Policy and the Change of the Workers' 
Quality of Life in Korea." Korean Journal of Sociology 35(6): 79-104.
Park, J. S. (2004a). "A Study of the real aspects and the Virtual Facts of Korea-Japan 
FTA." Soonchunhyang Social Science Review 10(2): 357-381.
Park, K. S. (2006). "The Conception and Realisability of a Multilateral Security 
Cooperation Regime in Northeast Asia Proposed by Roh Moo-hyun 
Administration." Korean Journal of Sociology 41: 35-63.
Park, M. H. (2005). "The electing system reform plan for a political reform." 
Administrative Review 32: 83-106.
Park, S. H. and M. G. Koo (2007). "Forming a Cross-Regional Partnership: The South 
Korea-Chile FTA and its Implications." Pacific Affairs 80(2): 259-278.
Park S. K. and Chang, K. S. (2000). “Political Transition and Changes in the State - 
Media Relationship in Korea.” Korean Journal of Broadcasting, 14(3): 81-113.
Pempel, T. J. (2006). "The Race to Connect East Asia: An Unending Steeplechase."
Asian Economic Policy Review 1(2): 239-254.
Park Y. B. et al., (2006). “Study on Korea's Dynamic FTA Policy Process: Domestic 
Dimension.” International Area Studies Review 57(2): 373-410.
Peng, D. (2002). "Invisible Linkages: A Regional Perspective of East Asian Political 
Economy." International Studies Quarterly 46(3): 423-447.
Persson, Torsten et al., (2000) “Comparative Politics and Public Finance.” Journal of 
Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161
Pincus, J. J. (1975). "Pressure Groups and the Patterns of Tariffs." Journal of Political
273
Bibliography
Economy 83(4): 757-778.
Pomfret, R. (1997). Unequal Trade: The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements. 
New York, Oxford University Press.
PSPD (2007) Evaluation Scores on Korea-US FTA Issues by Category, PSPD, Policy 
Paper, December.
Putnam, R. D. (1988). “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games.” International Organisation 42(3): 427-460.
Ravenhill, J. (2004). Trade Politics in East Asia. Trade Politics. B. Hocking and S. 
McGuire. London and New York, Routledge: 51-64.
Ravenhill, J., Ed. (2005). Global Political Economy. Oxford and New York, Oxford 
University Press.
Ravenhill, J. (2008). "The move to preferential trade on the Western Pacific Rim: some 
initial conclusions." Australian Journal of International Affairs 62(2): 129-150.
Ray, E. J. (1981a). "The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Restrictions in the United 
States." Journal of Political Economy 89(1): 105-121.
Ray, E. J. (1981b). "Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the United States and 
Abroad." Review of Economics and Statistics 63(2): 161-168.
Roh, M. H. (2004). ‘Instead of resist the Korea-Japan FTA and Protect Korean
industries, let us assemble to the front line of Crush the tamers of labour markets 
and ‘resisting the detrimental revision of the labour law,’ (on November 16th), 
http://go.jmbo. net/commune/view. php?board=cool&id=20262.
Rodrik, D. (1995). Political Economy of Trade Policy. Handbook of International 
Economics. G. Grossman and K. Rogoff. New York, Elsevier.
Rogowski, R. (1987). "Trade and the Variety of Domestic Institutions." International 
Organisation 41(2): 203-223.
Rogowski, R. (1989). Commerce and Coalitions: how trade affects domestic political 
alignments. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Rogowski, R. (2004). US-Korea FTA: The Economic Impact of Free Trade between the 
United States and Korea. AEI-KITA, Washington, D.C., USITC.
Roh, B. M. (2007). "The Ideological Configuration of Korean Politics in the Early 21 
Century." Korean Journal of Political Science 14(3): 143-163.
Rohrlich, P. E. (1987). "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis 
of Economic Policy Making." International Organisation 41(1): 61-64.
Rosenbluth, Frances, and Ross Schaap. (2003). “The Domestic Politics of Banking
Regulation,” International Organisation. 57(2): 307-336.
Sakakibara, E. (2003). "Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia." Journal of World 
Economic Studies (1): 1-36.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1935). Politics. Pressure, and the Tariff. New York, Prentice 
Hall.
Schott, J. J., S. C. Bradford, et al., (2006). Negotiating the Korea-United States Free 
Trade Agreement. Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics.
Schott, J. J. and I. B. Choi (2001). Free Trade Between Korea and the United States?, 
Institute for International Economics (IIE).
Seabrooke, L. (2002). Bringing legitimacy back in to neo-Weberian state theory and 
international relations, Canberra, Department of International Relations, The 
Australian National University..
Shafer, D. M. (1994). Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental 
Prospects of States. N. J., Cornell University Press.
274
Bibliography
Shim, G. H. (2007). Negative Influence of Korea-US FTA on Korean Films and
Cultural Art. The National Report on Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi: 400- 
435.
Shin, D. G. (2007). "Bi-Polarisation of the Income Distribution after the Recent
Financial Crisis: Trends, Causes, and Policy Implications." Korean Economic 
Review 55(4): 503-548.
Shin, M. S. (2003a). "Localisation Strategy and Its Performance of Korean Subsidiaries 
in NAFTA Region." Journal of International Trade and Industry Studies 8(2): 
245-274.
Shotaro, O. (2006). "Japan’s Foreign Policy for Economy and Japan-Korea FTA." 
Institute For Global Economics 1: 1-31.
Shugart M. S. and S. Haggard (2001). Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential
systems in Presidents, Parliament, and Policy: S. Haggard and M. D. McCubbins,
editors. Cambridge University Press.
Sim, M. S. (1993). "Nobody cares for opening rice Market in Korea." Monthly Korea 
Forum 43(1): 117-118.
Simmons, B. (1994). Who Adjust? Domestic Source of Foreign Economic Policy 
During the Interwar Years. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Sin, K. W. and B. C. Yoo (2003). "A Study on the effect of FTA Between the Korea- 
China-Japan." Journal of Economics and Business 22(1): 135-155.
Sin, K. Y. (2006). "Social Changes in Contemporary Korea." Economy and society 69: 
10-39.
Sin, M. S. (1987). "Kim Young - Rae , Interest Groups in Korea." Korean Political 
Science Association 21(1): 121-124
Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the State Back In New York, Cambridge University Press
Smith, M. S. (1980). Tariff Reform in France, 1860-1900: The Politics of Economic 
Interest. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Sohn, C. H. (2001b). Korea’s FTA Developments: Expenences and Perspectives with
Chile, Japan, and the U.S. Regional Trading Arrangements: Stock take and Next 
Steps, Bangkok, 1-23.
Sohn, C. H. (2001a). Regional Trading Arrangements: Stock take and Next Steps. 
Korea's FTA Developments, Bangkok, PECC.
Sohn, Y. (2002). Political Condition of FTA: Case of Korea-Japan FTA. Seoul, Korea 
Institute of Future Strategies, 1-25.
Solis, M. (2003). "Japan's New Regionalism: The Politics of Free Trade Talks with 
Mexico." Journal of East Asian Studies 3(3): 377-404.
Solon, P., R. Bissio, et al., (2004). WTO and FTAA: TWO Paths to the same disaster. 
Whose Trade Organisation? A Comprehensive Guide to The WTO. L. Wallach 
and P. Woodall. New York and London, the New Press.
Song, G. H. (2006). Maginot Line of the Korea-US FTA. Seoul, Kaemagowon.
Song, J. G. (2004). "An Analysis of the Determinants of the Firm's Performance in 
Korea." Journal of Small and Medium Enterprise 26(4): 79-98.
Song, Y. N. (2005). "The future of FDI in Korea." Korea Industrial Economics 
Association 18(4): 1471-1488.
Sorensen, G. (2001). Changes in Statehood, The Transformation of International 
Relations. London and New York, Palgrave.
Sung, H. J. and B. K. Jeon (2006). "A Study on the Residents' Sense of Community in 
Rural Areas." Journal of Korea Social Welfare Policy 27 : 149-170.
275
Bibliography
Terada, T. (2003). "Constructing an 'East Asian' concept and growing regional identity: 
from EAEC to ASEAN+3." The Pacific Review 16(2): 251-277.
Thelen, Kathleen, and Sven Steinmo (1992). “Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Politics,” In Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis: Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, 
Editors, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tongzon, J. L. (2005). "ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: A Bane or Boon for ASEAN 
Countries?." World Economy 28(2): 191-210.
Trefler, D. (1993). "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An 
Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy." Journal of Political Economy 101(1): 
138-160.
Tsebelis, G. (1995). "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism." British 
Journal of Political Science 25(3): 289-325.
Tsebelis, G. (1999). "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: 
An Empirical Analysis." American Political Science Review 93(3): 591-608.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). "Veto Players and Institutional Analysis." Governance 13(4): 441- 
474.
USTR (2006). FTA: United States and Republic of Korea. Washington, D.C.
Verdier, D. (1994). Democracy and International Trade. Britain, France, and the United 
States, 1860-1990. New Jersey, Democracy and International Trade, Britain, 
France, and the United States, 1860-1990.
Verdier, D. (1998). "Democratic Convergence and Free Trade." International Studies 
Quarterly 42( 1): 1-24.
Verdier, D. (2001). "Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets." International 
Organisation 55(2): 327-356.
Victor, J. N. (2007). "Strategic Lobbying: Demonstrating How Legislative Context
Affects Interest Groups' Lobbying Tactics." Amencan Politics Research 35(6): 
826-845.
Viner, J. (1950). The Customs Union Issue. Washington, DC., Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.
Wallach, L. and P. Woodall (2004). Whose Trade Organisation? A Comprehensive 
Guide to the WTO. New York and London, the New Press.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society : an outline of interpretive sociology. Berkeley, 
University O f California Press.
Weintraub, S. (2003). Some Implications of US Trade Agreements with Chile and 
Singapore. LAEBA/US Chamber of Commerce Conference.
Weiss, L. (1998). The myth of the powerless state : governing the economy in a global 
era. Cambridge, England, Polity Press in association with Blackwell.
Weiss, L., Ed. (2003). States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions 
Back In. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
White, B. (1986). Decision-Making analysis. Approaches and Theory in International 
Relations. T. Taylor. London, Longman: 64-141.
Williams, S. M. (1996). "Integration in South America: The MERCOSUR Experience." 
International relations 13(2): 51-62.
Winder, J. A. (2006). U.S.-ROK Economic Cooperation: U.S. Perspective, Brookings 
Institution and Sejong Institute, May 1-2.
Wright, John R. (1996). Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. 
New York: Allyn and Bacon.
276
Bibliography
Yamazawa, I. (2001). "Assessing a Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement." the 
Developing Economies 39(1): 3-48.
Yang, D. H. (2004). "Globalisation in Historical Perspective." Journal of Economic 
Development 10(1): 1-32.
Yang, H. B. (2003). "The Restructuring of small business and Policy Suggestions: A
Before and After Comparative Study of the Financial Crisis." Journal of Korea's 
SMEs 25(2): 353-371.
Yang, J. (2008). "Australia-China FTA: China's domestic politics and the roots of 
different national approaches to FTAs." Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 62(2): 179-195.
Yang, J. S. (2008). "Korea's FTA with US, its implications." Journal of Anthropological 
Studies 14: 126-195.
Yarbrough, B. V. and R. M. Yarbrough (1992). Cooperation and Governance in
International Trade: The Strategic Organisational Approach. Princeton, N.J., 
Princeton University Press.
Yeats, A. j. (1998). "Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?." The World Bank economic review 
12(1): 1-27.
Yeonguhoe, J. R. (2007). “Material: Stop All the Procedures relating to the KORUS 
FTA.” Democracy and Law, Vol.33, 437-439.
Yoo, G. J. (2007). "The Concept and Actual Conditions of Inequality." The Korean 
journal of sociology 30(3): 103-138.
Yoo, H. S. (2002). "Internal Politics of Korea-Chile FTA negotiation: internal
negotiation's comprehensive groups and focusing on the domestic structure." 
Korea’s Political Science Bulletin 36(3): 186-191.
Yoo, I. S., S. M. Lee, et al., (2004). "Problems and Perspectives of the Korean Film 
Industry in the Age of the WTO." The Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies 19(-): 117-145.
Yoshimatsu, H. (2005). "Japan's Keidanren and Free Trade Agreements: Societal 
Interests and Trade Policy." Asian Survey 45(2): 258-278.
Yu, H. S. (2002). "The Domestic Politics of Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreement
Negotiation: Interest groups and domestic institutions in domestic negotiations." 
Journal of Korean Political Science 36(3): 175-198.
Yu, H. S. (2006b). "Political Institution and Protectionism in Korea: The Case of Korea- 
Chile FTA Ratification Process." Korea Observer 37(4): 643-673.
Yu, H. S. (2006). "The Possibility of Northeast Asian Multilateral Security Cooperation, 
Focusing on Six-Party Talks and the U.S. Policies." New Asia 13(2): 79-100.
Yu, J. H. (2006a). "Analysis on Appropriateness of Population and Family of Rural 
Community Problem in Social Studies Textbook." Social Studies Education 
45(2): 75-110.
Yue, C. S. (2004). "Economic Cooperation and Integration in East Asia." Asia Pacific 
Review 11(1): 1-19.
Yun, B. S. (2006). A Secret truth behind the Korea-US FTA. The National Report on 
the Korea-US FTA. KoA. Seoul, Grinbi: 163-186.
277
Bibliography
Newspapers
Chosun Daily Newspaper (http://www.chosun.com/).
Dong-A Daily Newspaper (http://www.donga.com/).
E-daily Newspaper (http://www.edaily.co.kr/).
Global Economy Newspaper (http://www.segye.com/Articles/Main.asp). 
Hankook Daily Newspaper http://www.hankooki.com/).
Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (http://www.hani.co.kr/).
Hankyung Economic Daily Newspaper (http://www.hankyung.com/).
IB Times (http://www.ibtimes.com/).
JoongAng Daily Newspaper (http://www.joins.com/).
Korean Economic Daily Newspaper (http://www.hankyung.com/).
Korea Herald (http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/).
Korean SMEs Newspaper (http://www.smedaily.co.kr/).
Korea Times (http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/).
Kyodo Daily Newspaper (http://www.kyoto-np.co.jp/).
Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper (http://www.khan.co.kr/).
Labour Daily Newspaper (http://www.vop.co.kr/).
Maeil Business Daily Newspaper (http://www.mk.co.kr/).
Maeil Daily Newspaper (http://www.maeil.co.kr/).
Money Today Daily Newspaper (http://news.moneytoday.co.kr/). 
Munhwa Daily Newspaper (http://www.munhwa.com/).
Nihon Geizai Shimbun (Newspaper) (http://www.nikkei.co.jp/).
No-cut Daily Newspaper (http://www.cbs.co.kr/nocut/).
Nonmin Daily Newspaper (http://www.nongmin.com/).
Ohmy On-Line Daily Newspaper (http://www.ohmynews.com/). 
Pressian (On-line) Daily Newspaper (http://www.pressian.com/).
Segye Daily Newspaper (http://www.segye.com/Articles/Main.asp). 
Seoul Economy Daily Newspaper (http://economy.hankooki.com/). 
Newstoon On-Line Daily Newspaper (http://www.newstoon.net/). 
Venture Daily Newspaper (http://www.venture.or.kr/web/index.jp). 
Voice of People Newspaper (http://www.peoplevoice.co.kr/).
Yonhap Daily Newspaper (http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/).
E-daily (http://www.edaily.co.kr/).
278
